THE PROBLEMS WITH RETALIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410018-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 8, 1985
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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ON PAGE~-
TIME
8 July 1985
The Problems with Retaliabun,
F64r ex-CIA chiefs weigh the options for countering terrorism
he TWA hijacking have fed
he desire to find some way to
oing to American citizens.
threaten and perhaps take the lives of hi-
jackers? Might swift retribution deter ter-
rorists, or at least punish them? What
about covert counterterror, the capacity to
identify and eliminate terrorists, pre-emp-
Navy strike team trains In California
" [f there are casualties, so be it. "
tively or in retaliation? TIME Washington
Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott put these
questions to four former directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency. All agreed
that the U.S. should move vigorously and
effectively to oppose terrorism but not
adopt assassination as an instrument of
policy.
Each of the former CIA chiefs has had
other experiences that bear on the current
challenge. Richard Helms (Director of
Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973)
spent many years in the CIA's clandestine
services and was Ambassador to Iran from
1973 to 1976, so he knows about Shiite
fundamentalism firsthand. James Schle-
singer (DCt from January through June
1973) was Secretary of Defense from 1973
to 1975. William Colby (DCI, 1973 to 1976)
ran the highly controversial Phoenix
counterinsurgency program in Viet Nam
from 1968 to 1971. And at the request
of Annapolis Classmate Jimmy Carter,
Stanfield Turner (DCI, 1977 to 1981) came
to the CIA from a career in the Navy. Their
interviews with Talbott follow.
RICHARD HELMS
It is very important to keep these inci-
dents in perspective and not get so incred-
ibly worked up over them. Terrorism, of
course, is a serious challenge, and we must
do our best to deal with it. But to declare a
"war on terrorism" is just to hype the
problem, not solve it. The quiet, steady
approach is better than bombast.
As for assassination, it's just not on.
The people of the U.S. won't stand for it.
In fact, there are problems with all levels
of violent action. Let's say the Delta Force
puts on masks and goes in and blows up
an installation around Beirut. We've vio-
lated the sovereignty of Lebanon and
killed a lot of people in cold blood. Are
they terrorists? You'll have a lot of argu-
ment about that, just on our side alone.
What if you send in a coup-de-main
group of civilians [a hit team]? If it comes
out that they were Americans-and it
takes no time at all for that kind of thing
to unravel in public-you're facing all
sorts of allegations.
If, instead, the blow-and-burn stuff is
done by surrogates whom you've trained
in the black arts and given a suitable cov-
er, there is a whole other set of problems.
If you've recruited them from dissidents
who have an ideological motivation, they
may be very hard to control. You may
think you've called the operation off and
wake up one morning and find out they've
gone and done it anyway.
Let's say we have reason to believe that
Khomeini or Gaddafi is behind some ter-
rorist act, so you decide to strike by attack-
ing the Iranian oil fields or a Libyan air force
base. In the latter case, you've now got all
the Arabs against you. Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and the moderates will feel immense pres-
sure to line up with their Arab brethren.
We've got to get used to the disagreeable fact
that there really is no quick fix for terrorism.
What we do need is improved intelligence
work against terrorist groups. Penetration
can help derail the nasty stuff. When I was
in the agency, the CIA penetrated the P.L.O.,
and we helped head off several terrorist acts,
including an assassination attempt against
Golda Meir.
We also need improved cooperation
among free-world intelligence services. As
long as we have a leaky Congress and a
leaky oversight process, friendly services
caumled
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U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPOR
8 July 1985
Spying on
Terrorists-It's
A Tall Order
To punish hijackers, U.S. must
know who and where they
are. The CIA is hard pressed
to provide the information.
In the war on Middle East terrorism,
America's intelligence services are up
against one of their toughest chal-
lenges ever.
Their task: Cracking the shadowy
bands of Moslem zealots to obtain the
information needed to pre-empt anti-
U.S, acts of violence or to punish those
terrorists who succeed.
In attempting to match overseas the
success of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation in penetrating and neutraliz-
ing terrorist organizations at home, the
Central Intelligence Agency faces
enormous obstacles.
Particularly difficult to infiltrate are
the Shiite terror cells in Lebanon re-
sponsible. for the current hijacking epi-
sode as well as most of the major at-
tacks on American installations in the
Middle East in recent years.
These cells of killers are small, clan-
nish and fanatic. Some-
times they consist solely
of brothers and cousins
who are distrustful of all
outsiders. "Almost every-
one is suspicious of every-
Attack on Shiite gunmen by
carrier-based planes Is one
Reagan option. But it re-
quires Information on their
identity and whereabouts.
on activities of Palestinian
and other Arab under-
ground groups.
Despite the difficulties,
officials assert, the CIA has
managed, directly or indi-
rectly, to penetrate some
clandestine groups in the
Mideast and elsewhere
overseas. On June 24, Sec-
retary of State George
STAT
f/
Shultz said in a press interview that the
U.S., in cooperation with intelligence
organizations of other nations, had
been able to obtain advance warning
of some 60 planned terrorist operations
over the past nine months.
One example, say officials, was when
a CIA informant disclosed that a Shiite
gang was preparing for an attack on
the American ambassador's residence
in Beirut last fall. Since they knew the
identity of the group and the general
location of its hideout, the authorities
were able to forestall the assault.
Saudi Arabia's royal family has been
able to take precautions against terror
attacks on the basis of information that
U.S. intelligence officials passed on
from Israeli agents who had infiltrated
Middle Eastern guerrilla groups.
There are other instances of success-
ful international cooperation in the
campaign against terrorism. One came
last November when Italian police
rounded up seven Shiite Lebanese who
reportedly were plotting to blow up
the American Embassy in Rome. The
Italians, acting on a tip from Swiss au-
thorities, alerted Washington in time
for protective measures to be taken.
An eighth man was arrested, in Zurich.
Collaboration with friendly intelli-
gence agencies also paid off for the U.S.
recently when Egyptian agents uncov-
ered a Libyan plot to attack the Ameri-
can Embassy in Cairo with a truck
loaded with explosives.
Beyond the grave. Dogged police
work resulted in the arrest of Shiite
terrorists from Iraq who carried out a
suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S.
Embassy in Kuwait in 1983. Kuwaiti
authorities recovered two fingers of
the driver. Identification of his finger-
prints led to capture of the others in-
volved in the attack.
Experts on American intelligence
matters say that the CIA and other
Western services have managed to
thwart terrorist attacks by recruiting
people in support organizations-for
example, those who produce false pass-
ports, supply weapons, make bombs or
provide vehicles. With the cooperation
of these operatives, terrorists' guns and
bombs, according to one authority,
have been "spiked"-secretly doctored
so that they failed in an attack.
Given the magnitude of the chal-
lenge they face, American intelligence
officials concede that their successes
have been modest and partial. They
warn that President Reagan has scant
hope of implementing a policy of swift
retaliation unless spying on terrorists is
far more effective. 0
body" else, maintains former State De-
partment terrorism analyst Terrell
Arnold. "Their paranoia is a big prob-
lem for us."
Compounding that problem is the
fact] that today's hard-core terrorists
are true professionals, trained and
equipped by experts from Eastern Eu-
rope or radical Mideast states.
Some operations, according to Amer-
ican intelligence sources, are planned
and staged by teams whose members
may come together only for a single
spectacular attack. The group then dis-
solves and disappears, making attempts
at pre-emption or retaliation virtually
impossible.
Entrance test. Prospective Western
informers or agents often are deterred
from trying to penetrate the terrorist
gangs by demands that they demon-
strate their bona fides in advance-by
committing murder or other violent
crimes.
"Some of the groups are so fanatic,"
warns former CIA Director Stansfield
Turner, "they they will put your agent
to a test that he can't possibly accept."
Ironically, the expulsion of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization from
Lebanon in 1982 by the Israeli Army
dealt a serious blow to the operations
of the CIA and those of Mossad, its
Israeli counterpart, in combatting Mid-
east terrorism. The two intelligence
agencies relied heavily on operatives
within the PLO to provide information
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WASHINGTON TIMES
rnT"1F..'' - 1 July 1985
ebirth
ReagaI signals r
counterspying
By Bill Gertz
THEN ISHINOTON TIMES
President Reagan has called for a
renewed effort to counter the activities of
foreign spy services after what he called
"mistakes of past restrictions" on U.S.
intelligence officials during the 1970s.
Of the more than 2,500 Soviet-bloc offi-
cials stationed in the United States, the
president said 30 percent to 40 percent
were known or suspected intelligence
officers.
. Besides espionage directed against
U.S. secrets and. high technology, the
Soviets recently have stepped up "active
measures" - disinformation, propa-
ganda, subversion, forgeries and covert
action - directed against the West, Pres-
ident Reagan said in his weekly radio
broadcast Saturday.
The president said the United States
needs to "deal severely with those who
betray our country."
Congress recently passed a measure
calling for the death penalty in cases of
espionage. The move follows revelations
of a major espionage operation involving
the loss of U.S. Navy nuclear submarine
secrets to the Soviet Union.
"We're in a long twilight struggle with
an implacable foe of freedom. ... We
need to reduce the size of the hostile
intelligence threat we're up against in
this country," the president said.
He called for reducing the number of
Soviet bloc spies working in the United
States to "more manageable" levels and
singled out the United Nations as a "spy
nest."
The administration he said, is intent
on strengthening the U.S. intelligence
community's capability to curb spying by
foreign powers, own as counterintel-
ligence.
"During the 70s we began cutting
back our manpower and resources, and
imposed unnecessary restrictions on our
security and counterintelligence offi-
cials;' Mr. Reagan said.
The president was referring to the
period in the mid-1970s when congres-
sional committees uncovered evidence of
abuses by U.S. intelligence agencies. As
a result of the committee findings, activi-
ties of the FBI, CIA and other agencies
- primarily the counterintelligence and
surveillance programs - were
restricted.
W Ray Wannall. former head of FBI
counterintelli ence believes both the
CIA and not u recovered
from these counterintelligence cutbacs.
He said some 400 counterintelligence
personae were cut from the CIA. and a
similar number were dropped from the
FBI.
"When you take a man who spent 25 to
30 years in counterintelligence work and
he drops out the picture, you don't find
his knowledge in files," Mr. Wannall said
in a recent interview, "he's carrying it
around in his head:'
f'-
Morale among U.S. intelligence of
cers suf ere as a result of cut acks. tvar-
ticu ar y within the CIA which handles
forei n counterinte ge a outside the
ntte States. Under former CIA chief
Stnsfie rner in office under Pres-
ident Carter, more than 2.2 00 CIA veter-
ans resign , according to a report by the
Agociation o Former me igence Offi-
cers.
The association estimates the loss of
experienced personnel cost the agency
30,000 man-years of experience. In what
critics describe as a "purge" of exper-
fencea CIA Q is s Adm. rner fired
o&50 oicia~~ October 1~977. The mass
ismis was called the "H oween
massacre" and led to the voluntary
retirement of some o t e. most exper-
ienced intelligence officials.
" lbtally competent people trained for
years in certain jobs were just dismissed
with pink slips or tranferred to the side-
lines;' one former intelligence official
said.
Adm. Turner defended the dismissals
by claiming he was only carrying out a
program of cutbacks agreed to under the
previous administration. He could not be
reached for comment on the president's
radio address.
President Reagan said "we've begun to
rebuild" counterintelligence efforts, but
called for more coordination among U.S.
agencies and improved analysis of
threats posed by hostile spies.
He said the United States should
"learn from the mistakes of past j
restrictions which unduly hampered us:'
Without elaborating, the president
said U.S. officials have developed a "list"
of proposed security reforms.
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?L.V, IURl\ I 11'1LJ
ART1WL4 A; i ,..
I
ON PAGE
1 July 1985
Soviet Defector Accused
Of Fabrications in Book
By EDWIN MCDOWELL
A magazine article charging that a
former Soviet diplomat made up im-
portant parts of his best-selling book,
with the apparent complicity of the
Central Intelligence Agency, has
evoked heated denials from the
American intelligence community.
Moreover, defenders say that even if
some dates in the book are incorrect
and some passages embellished, the
overall thrust - that the author spied
for the United States while serving as
the senior Soviet official at the United
Nations, until his defection in 1978 -
is essentially correct.
The story by Edward Jay Epstein,
titled "The Spy Who Came in to Be
Sold," appears in the Issue of The
New Republic on sale today. It sets
out a lengthy bill of particulars
against the book "Breaking With
Moscow" by Arkady N. Shevchenko,
the highest-ranking Soviet official
Mr. Epstein's article seeks to cast
doubt on Mr. Shevchenko's claim that
he spied for the United States begin-
ning in 1975, while he was the senior
Soviet diplomat at the United Na-
tions, until his defection.
It attempts to debunk Mr. Shev-
chenko's claim that he furnished the
C.I.A. with details of Soviet strategy
on arms-control negotiations, includ-
ing the strategic arms limitaton
talks.
And it asserts that the "car chases,
meetings, conversations, reports,
dates, motives and espionage activi-
ties" in the book, which has been on
the best-seller list for 18 weeks, were
concoted to create "a spy that never
was."
C.I.A. Issues Response
Mr. Shevchenko, who did not return
a message left on his answering ma-
chine, is said by his publisher and
friends to be out of the country on
vacation and unreachable. But last
week, while galleys of the Epstein ar-
ticle were circulating in Washington
and New York, the C.I.A. took the un-
usual step of responding publicly to
Mr. Epstein's article, saying that Mr.
Shevchenko "provided invaluable in-
telligence information" to Washing-
ton and that the C.I.A. "had nothing
to do with writing his book."
Nevertheless, the Epstein charge
that the book is a fraud caused both
the book's publisher and Time maga-
zine, which ran two lengthy excerpts
from the book earlier this year, to re-
examine its accuracy. Both pro-
nouns qd themselves satisfied that it
is accurate.
But Mr. Epstein, who has written
books challenging the Warren Com-
mission conclusion that Lee Harvey
Oswald acted alone in killing Presi-
dent Kennedy, said he sticks by his
account. In the magazine article and
in telephone interviews, he said the
spy fraud was perpetrated in order to
produce a "success story" at a time
when "the C.I.A. was in disarray"
following Congressional revelations
of past abuses, and the agency was'
concerned about K.G.B. espionage
successes. the
Mr. Epstein's article makes
numerous allegations, and cites a
number of seeming inconsistences in
Mr. Shevchenko's account. Mr. Shev-
chenko's ?inaccessability and the re-
fusal of some present and former offi-
cials to discuss the various matters
have greatly complicated the task of
independent observers in rechecking
the accuracy of many points raised in
the article. Nevertheless some of Mr.
Shevchenko's assertions that have
been questioned by Mr. Epstein can.
be supported and certain inconsisten-
cies of Mr. Epstein's account have
come to light.
Kissinger Cited in Article
For example, a major Epstein
claim is that "one former national se-
curity adviser to the President" -
whom he, subsequently identified as
former Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger - told him "there could
have been no such spy as Shevchenko
purported to be" without his knowing
about it. But Mr. Kissinger did not re-
turn a number of telephone calls to
his New York office, seeking to verify
that claim.
However, Stanfield Turner, who
headed the C.I.A. from 1977 to 1981,
said in a brief telephone conversation
that, "Shevchenko gave good intelli-
gence." And Ray Cline, former
deputy C.I.A. director, said that the
C.I.A. denial is correct "and the
Shevchenko story substantially truth-
ful."
Mr. Epstein, reconstructing a
timetable based on incidents reported
in the book, says Mr. Shevchenko's
spy career could not have begun be-
fore 1976. "Yet the book details a
wealth of espionage coups Shev-
chenko accomplished on behalf of the
C.I.A. before 'the end of 1975,'" Mr.
Epstein writes.
The Shevchenko book is vague on
dates - as indeed it should be, in the
opinion of current and past intelli-
gence officials. And Mr. Epstein is
correct that Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynahan, when he was later vice
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Dec. 5, 1975, that Mi
told an American I
that he wished to d
But Senator Moyn
scribed the Shevcht
as "invaluable," sa
tant to discuss detai
article, except to re
Shevchenko "was wortung torus for a
period until that rather dramatic mo-
ment" of his defection.
Information on Arms Talks
Mr. Epstein writes that one of those
espionage coups claimed by Mr.
Shevchenko in 1975 was that of
providing information about the
strategic arms limitation talks. Yet
Mr. Epstein said in conversation that
Mr. Kissinger told him he had never
heard of Mr. Shevchenko passing
along information on those talks.
"And if that claim is wrong than the
book's a lie even if none of the other
details are wrong," he added.
But Strobe Talbott, the Time maga-
zine correspondent who recom-
mended that Time publish the Shev-
chenko excerpts, and the author of
several books on arms negotiations,
said be, is convinced that the Shev-
chenko story stands up. "A former in-
telligence community official with dl,.;
rect knowledge told me one reason he'
remembered the Shevchenko epi-
sode, although he did not know Shev-
chenko by name, was because this
Soviet source at the U.N. was provid-
ing information that was useful on
arms control," he said.
Mr. Epstein's article describes Mr.
Shevchenko's three-page account of a
1976 dinner party at the two-room
apartment of Boris Solomatin, the
head of the K.G.B. in New York, at
which they and Georgi A. Arbatov,
the Soviet authority on the United
States, discussed President Ford's
chances of winning re-election - dis-
cussions that he said he relayed to the
American case officers.
But "there could not have been
such a meeting," Mr. Epstein writes,
because Mr. Solomatin returned to
the Soviet Union in July 1975, six
months before Mr. Shevchenko began
his alleged spying for the United
States and more than a year before
Mr. Arbatov would have come to the
United States to appraise the presi-
dential elections.
Discrepencies Not Explained
William Geimer, a former State
Department official and close friend
of Mr. Shevchenko, concedes that he
has no ready explanation for the ap-
parent discrepency. He said he has
not been in contact with Mr. Shev-
chenko since he left the country early
last week. "But my suspicion is that
Solomatin came back into the country
and Epstein missed it," he said.
Even if that were true, Mr. Epstein
said, the apartment that is described
in such detail as having been Mr.
Solomatin's would then have be-
longed to his replacement.
cntinu6,j
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ATI?'l F AFFLARLD NEW REPUBLIC
QN Pj 7' 1 July 1985
IN PRAISE OF SPYING
Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition
by Stansfield Turner
(Houghton Mifflin, 304 pp., 616.95)
"Arrogant, insensitive, absurd ideas
... [he] has ruined the place...."
That was the common run of rightward
Washington comment on Stansfield
Turner as director of Central Intelli-
gence by the end of 1977, his first year
in office. By then Jimmy Carter no long-
er maintained his deceptive pretension
to bi-Pauline balance. Of his two sup-
posedly coequal chief advisers, Paul
Nitze was moving toward conspicuous
opposition, while Paul Warnke was
running arms control policy, the only
strategy that aroused the president's
enthusiasm. For the rightward think-
ing, the stories coming out of the
CIA-about the 2,000 covert-branch of-
ficers abruptly fired on Halloween day
to "emasculate" the country's espio-
nage abilities, about the placement of
narrow-minded Navy officers in key
positions, about the new director's dis-
ruptive managerial changes-seemed
quite consistent with the revealed char-
acter of the Carter administration. The
Annapolis graduate who seemed set on
ruining the nation's defenses had found
a classmate to ruin the CIA for him.
But this reviewer, as rightward-
thinking as any, was nevertheless de-
nied the clarity of that analysis, for he
had heard it all several years before. At
that time it came in regard to Stansfield
Turner's term as president of the Naval
War College in Newport, Rhode Island,
the place where the Navy's future ad-
mirals are supposed to be educated. It
was on a working visit, some months
after Turner's appointment in 1972, that
I heard the complaints from officer-
students, and from some of the faculty
too. In fact, the place was then being
greatly transformed by Turner, in ways
most uncomfortable.
With its Mahanian vitality long since
spent, the college had been in the
business of offering an extended vaca-
tion in Newport's pleasant surround-
ings to Navy mid-level officers between
command tours and career-enhancing
headquarters assignments. Its staff was
just as comfortable, teaching an anti-
quated curriculum replete with self-
congratulatory Navy banalities, punctu-
ated by more of the same from visiting
lecturers, who were often retired admi-
rals. By tacit arrangement, Turner's
predecessors had indulgently over-
looked the somnolence of the teaching
staff, while the staff in turn was just as
indulgent with the officer-students.
To break this pattern, Turner brought
in a cadre of civilians and selected Navy
officers of unusual intellectual quality to
formulate a drastically revised curricu-
lum; the new studies were to be strong
on both the truly modern and the an-
cient classics, in lieu of the merely out-
dated. He created a center for advanced
studies under James E. King to set
scholarly standards for the entire col-
lege, showed a remarkable instinct for
picking out the talented in his inherited
teaching staff while he forced out the
rest, and made it clear to the students
that they were in Newport to read
broadly, think freely, and study hard-
and not to indulge in suburban repose
with some fishing thrown in.
The "arrogance" that his critics com-
plained of referred to Turner's dismal
opinion of the college as it had been. He
was "insensitive" because he refused to
tolerate private indulgence at public ex-
pense. His "absurd ideas" were such
things as the compulsory reading of
Thucydides, instead of the memoirs of
retired admirals or of nothing at all. The
ruination Turner was inflicting was the
hard work imposed on both officer-stu-
dents and the staff, as well as his insis-
tence that bright academics and serious
men of affairs be invited to give the fre-
quent outside lectures. Thus he dis-
placed the previous cycle of visitors, the
retired admirals who so greatly relished
the Navy's VIP privileges in the lux-
urious college "cabin" before and af-
ter their "When I was in command
of..." lectures of complacency. Trivial
in itself, this last outrage was important
in its consequences: the retired cohorts
spread the word that Turner was trying
to educate a new kind of naval officer,
who might question the sacred pi-
eties-including the sanctum sancto-
rum of the aircraft carrier, and the
huger-is-better school of thought in
ship design in general.
IN I HE Central Intelligence Agency,
too, Turner imposed, or tried to im-
pose, painful transformations, and to
eliminate staff. In that case, again, it
was the retired cohorts above all-
surprisingly well-connected in the me-
dia-who blackened his reputation out-
side the institution's walls. Among the
other managerial efforts recorded in his
book, Turner wanted to place the CIA's
traditionally independent three major
branches under a joint administration.
At the same time, he sought to elevate
two of them, the analytic and technical,
toward equality with the traditionally
dominant "operations" branch, which
gathers information by espionage and
carries out covert action. Moreover,
Turner reduced that latter branch by
820 posts. Most of those operations offi-
cers were eliminated by transfers and
scheduled retirement. (According to
Turner, only 17 people were dismissed
and 147 others forced into early retire-
ment-far from the 820, let alone the
2,000, of media gossip.) It seems, in
fact, that a 1,350-post reduction had
been called for by the branch itself dur-
ing the previous administration, al-
though over a five-year period instead
of Turner's two.
In his other role-as director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, as opposed to head
of the CIA as such-Turner had less
success in coordinating the Pentagon's
Defense Intelligence Agency (the mili-
tary's own analysis shop), the am-
ply funded National Security Agency
(which gathers electronic intelligence in
order to do its own analysis), and the
State Department's intelligence and re-
search bureau. He was even less suc-
cessful in obtaining cooperation from
the intelligence organizations of each
military service; his own Navy's organi-
zation was the most defiant of all. The
president, it turns out, wanted his own
"raw data" to play with, and without
his backing Turner's attempts could
only fail. By sheer obstructionism, the
NSA and the rest even defeated
Turner's utterly modest ambition of im-
posing a unified system on the chaos of
50-odd overlapping and obscure "code-
word" classifications, which are sup-
posed to regulate secrecy above the
common run of "top secret."
I have no notion of the wisdom or
weaknesses of Turner's managerial
changes, nor can I judge whether re-
forms, however wise in theory, were
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UnAUNLULI: Ur nlutirK L'UUUA'11UN
10 July 1985
-Point of View.
Secrecy and Democracy:
the CIA and Academe
Should colleges and their professors remain aloof from government's intelligence activities? Can they?
NOT LONG AFTER MY APPOINTMENT as Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence in 1977, the chief
of a foreign intelligence service gave me a bit
of friendly advice: "You know, of course,
you want to collect all the intelligence you canon home
territory."
What he was alluding to was that journalists, profes-
sors, and businessmen, among others, are often in con-
tact with their counterparts in other countries. Some
professors have taught foreign students who now are in
important positions in their native countries. Interna-
tional journalists keep in touch with key thinkers and
politicians in countries where they've served. Many
businessmen have frequent dealings with foreign busi-
nessmen. Although contacts of this kind aren't likely to
have access to the inner secrets of the local Politburo or
Cabinet, they will have an excellent feel for the state of
the economy, the degree of societal unrest, or the pros-
pects for incipient political movements.
My foreign colleague's logic#:while irrefutable, ran
exactly contrary to prevailing attitudes in the United
States, particularly following the report in 1976 of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by
Sen. Frank Church and known popularly as the Church
Committee.
Without a doubt, the Church Committee investiga-
tions damaged the longstanding relationship the C.I.A.
had with the academic community. The committee re-
vealed that some professors had worked for the C.I.A.
without informing their universities. We received let-
ters from university presidents who wanted to know
which professors had worked or were working for the
C.I.A. But the C.I.A. had agreed with these professors
that their relationship would be kept secret. If the pro-
fessors chose to reveal their ties to the C.I.A., they were
free to do so, but we could not and would not breach
those agreements.
Next, a number of universities began drafting their
own regulations to control future faculty relationships
with the C.I.A. On March 25, 1977, I received word that
Harvard was about to issue a set of guidelines that
would greatly inhibit its faculty in associating with the
C.I.A. I had already taken a number of steps to encour-
age better relations with the academic community and
didn't want this prestigious university to set an exam-
ple that would hamper my efforts. I called the president
of Harvard, Derek Bok, and told him I would like to
send someone to Cambridge to discuss this new regula-
tion and explain how it would affect us. President Bok
was very cordial and accepted my offer. An hour later
he phoned back; the people who were writing the Har-
yard regulation had told him they had already contact-
ed the C.I.A. and asked for the Agency's views. Much
to my embarrassment, they had been told we would not
comment. My enthusiasm for repairing relations with
the academic world had obviously not permeated the
C.I.A.'s bureaucracy. We did, however, finally have
thorough discussions with Harvard. The regulation
was modified, but Harvard still required its faculty to
report all relationships with the C.I.A. Fortunately,
very few other universities followed Harvard's exam-
ple, and this did not become a continuing problem.
Harvard also requested a complementing C.I.A. regula-
tion forbidding any relationships with Harvard that
were not disclosed; I refused to issue such a rule.
The reason I did not comply with Harvard's request
was that I felt it was not reasonable to ask an academic
to disclose only his relationships with the C.I.A. and
ignore the relationships, formal and informal, he might
have with corporations, foundations, or other govern-
ment agencies. Any relationship can compromise a
professor's objectivity and affect his teaching responsi-
bilities, one with the C.I.A. no more or less than one
with a business that pays him as a consultant. In the
business world some of those relationships involve se-
cret, proprietary matters; some require a division of
loyalty, as with screening students to recommend
whom a company should hire.
I could fully understand a university's insisting that
its faculty members report all external, paid relation-
ships. After all, a university has a right to know how
much time its faculty members are spending on outside
employment. I issued an instruction that before we
engaged a professor whose university required disclo-
sure of relationships with the C.I.A., we would remind
him of his responsibilities to his university. If he insist-
ed on not disclosing our relationship, that was between
him and his university, not between the C.I.A. and the
university. We could not and would not be the universi-
ty's policeman. However, I did require that my ap-
proval be sought before we engaged an academic who
refused to act in accordance with his university's rules.
It was my practice to make a distinction between uni-
versities whose regulations required their people to
report all outside relations and those which required
the reporting only of a C.I.A. association. If the C.I.A.
was singled out and an academic did not want to report
his relationship, I would approve it. If all relationships
had to be reported, I would not.
We did find professors who were insistent that they
would work with us only if they did not have to disclose
that they were doing so. Sometimes this was a matter of
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A.
obstinate independence; other times it was a concern
over the possibility of recrimination by colleagues. A
professor at Brooklyn College contacted the C.I.A. in
1977 to ask for some unclassified information about an
Iron Curtain country he was going to visit. On his
return he called us again to share his thoughts. It was as
simple and aboveboard as that. He had been given no
assignment or remuneration by the C.I.A. and expected
none. But when word of his contact with us leaked, his
colleagues almost blocked his obtaining tenure. In an-
other case, I twice contacted a professor at an Ivy
League university whom I regarded highly and asked
him to accept a year's assignment in the C.I.A.'s analyt-
ic branch. My friend thought about it seriously on both
occasions, but concluded that associating with the
C.I.A. could jeopardize his academic position.
What did we want these academics to do? The pri-
mary need for contact between the C.I.A. and academe
is to share ideas on all manner of world affairs, ranging
from the psychology of foreign leaders to the state of
world oil production to the strength of Islamic funda-
mentalism. The C.I.A., like every research and analytic
institution, must be able to test its views and conclu-
sions against the thinking of other experts. Through
one-year fellowships, through committees of academ-
ics who periodically reviewed the C.I.A.'s work, and
through individual consulting arrangements, we sought
to tap the wisdom of academe. But the benefits did not
flow in one direction. Professors who consulted with
the C.I.A. benefited from seeing how governments ac-
tually work, rather than how they theoretically work,
and from gaining valuable insights into world events
based on classified sources that they otherwise did not
have access to. Although they could not discuss the
classified data with their students when they returned
to the campus, they were more richly informed and
more discerning in their interpretation of security is-
sues.
THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL AREA OF CONTACT
between the C.I.A. and the academic commu-
nity concerns a much smaller group of uni-
versity people, who help the C.I.A. scout for-
eign students. Finding people from abroad who are
favorably disposed to support American interests in
their countries is a necessary part of maintaining a
strong human intelligence capability. It is difficult to do
this in countries with tight internal security and a disre-
gard for human rights, which is exactly where we often
most need good intelligence. It would be foolish not to
attempt to identify sympathetic people when they are
in our country. University personnel can sometimes
help the C.I.A. in this identification, though there clear-
ly can be a conflict between a university official's doing
that and fulfilling his responsibility to look after the
student's best interests in and out of the classroom. It is
largely a matter of how the situation is handled and is
not different from singling out students for scholarships
or jobs with business. Many of us are evaluated as
having or not having the potential for all sorts of things.
In the end, it is up to us, as it is with the student in this
situation, to accept or reject whatever offers are made.
The argument is also raised that we are unfairly tak-
ing advantage of impressionable youngsters whom our
country has a duty to protect when they are here. I
respect that sense of duty, but the young, impression-
able undergraduate is not usually the person the C.I.A.
seeks to win over to supporting us in his home country .
He is not likely to have the maturity, the depth, or the
clear career direction we are seeking. The more suit-
able candidates are graduate students, who are often
foreign government employees studying on govern-
ment grants and whose eyes are wide open.
MY SPYMASTER FRIEND was certainly right
in theory. There is a wealth of information
no farther away than the media, academe,
and commercial enterprises right at home.
But in our free society any association of such institu-
tions with secret intelligence activities may impinge on
the freedoms of speech, academic inquiry, and capital-
istic endeavor. The more I grappled with the question
of whether associating these particular communities
with intelligence was worth the risk, the more I be-
lieved that attempts to isolate them from intelligence
would endanger, not protect, those freedoms.
Accommodating secrecy in a democracy requires
compromises with the theory of full freedom of speech,
inquiry, and endeavor. The media, academe, and busi-
ness need to think through the problems and participate
in drawing the lines of compromise themselves, not
wait to have them imposed by government, if we are to
avoid tilting too far toward either secrecy or freedom.
Stansfield Turner was Director of Central Intelligence
from 1977 to 1981. This article is adapted from his new
book, "Secrecy and Democracy: The C.I.A. in Transi-
tion, " published by Houghton Mifflin Company. Copy-
right ? 1985 by Stansfield Turner.
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AiU ICL kPPLAM
ON P1lGE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
29 June 1985
Former director gives
an inside look at CIA
By Leonard W. Boasberg
inquirer Staff Writer
body who was an outsider and who'
Philadelphia is the 11th stop on a could look at it more objectively,,
book-promotion tour that will take than those insiders who have previ-
Stansfield Turner and his wife to 12 ously written books on the CIA. It's'
cities in 24 days. unique in that regard."
"Is this Cleveland?" Turner says A major theme of the book is the
with a smile. conflict that inevitably arises w)en
"No, this is Monday," someone. an open, democratic society conducts
says. secret intelligence operations. When.
"Have we done that much?" Carter was in the White House and
Turner's wife, Karen, asks in disbe- Turner was at the CIA, a reasonable
lief.
"Yes."
"Wow."
They're at the Marriott on City
Avenue for a quick lunch between
two TV interviews in the morning
and two radio interviews in the af-,
ternoon. The book Turner is promot-
ing is called Secrecy and, Democracy:
The CIA in Transition. Turner was
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency under his Annapolis class-
mate Jimmy Carter. (Turner ranked
2Sth among 820 in the class of 1946;
Carter was 59th.)
In February 1977 Carter summoned
Adm. Turner, on an hour's notice, to
return from Naples, where he was
serving as commander in chief of the
southern flank of NATO. A career
Navy man and former Rhodes schol-
ar who had served in a variety of
commands, Turner hoped he was
about to be named chief of naval
operations.
Instead, Carter made him director
of central intelligence, putting him
in charge of an agency reeling under
recent revelations that during its 30-
year history it had committed a'mul-
titude of abuses, including plots to
assassinate foreign leaders, drug ex-
periments on unwitting subjects and
illegal spying on U.S. citizens.
What he found at the CIA, and
what he did about it, are discussed at
.length in his book, and Turner
adopts no air of false modesty in
appraising the result. "I think it's the
best view of the CIA ever written,.
because it was written by somebody
on the inside who really understood
it because he was there making the,
decisions at the top, but yet some
balance was struck between open-
ness and secrecy, in Turner's view;
lie feels that is not the case under
president Reagan and William Casey.
In the introduction to his book,
Turner complains that Casey's CIA
made more than,10Q. fleletions, rang-
ing "from borderline issues to the
ridiculous," when he submitted his
book for security clearance.
"One of the things that I could not
put in my book - and which I took all
the way to the ultimate level in the
CIA and they took to the White House
- was a quotation from a speech I
gave in the CIA auditorium to the
alumni of Vassar College of Washing-
ton, D.C. What I said was, in my opin-
ion, totally unclassified. And if I told
you what it was, you would laugh. You
old
I
h
en
t
}would rip your. sides apart w
you the subject that they wouldn't let
the talk about that I'd already talked
about in public."
No quotes.
-" He says the CIA also would not let
him quote from Carter's memoirs of
his presidency, Keeping Faith, and
refused to tell him why. When he
protested, he says he was told "you
have to do what you feel you have to
do" but was threatened with a law-
suit if he did. "If they really were
worried about the secret," he won-
ders, why did they leave it up to him
whether "this secret of great impor-
tance to our country was suddenly
[going to bet spewed out into the
public domain in an irretrievable
way. So they clearly weren't inter-
ested in the secret."
What, then, is their interest?
"Their interest is in preserving
their right to. protect themselves."
_. Ironfea ly, it was CIA chief Turner
who, as he acknowledges in Secrecy
rand Democracy, urged then-Attorney
General Griffin Bell to prosecute an
ex-CIA employee, Frank Snepp, for
publishing the book Decent Interval.
In it, Snepp discussed the fall of
Saigon and what he contended were
the United States' shoddy role and
inept behavior during that event.
Snepp had signed the usual CIA
contract agreeing to submit any-
thing he wrote about the agency to
security review. The prosecution was
successful: In a case that went to the
Supreme Court, Snepp was compelldd
to forfeit all his profits from the
book and forbidden to write or say
anything about the CIA without the
agency's permission.
A different case
The Snepp case, Turner insists, is
entirely different from his own: "We
didn't prosecute Snepp for secrecy,
we prosecuted him for violating ,a
contract, and if we had not prose-
cuted him, how could we prosecute,'
the next person?"
When he ran the CIA, he says, the
agency carried out its clearances
''much less arbitrarily and with no
arrogance. The process is a good
process. It's a necessary one I-still
support. I do not resent having- to
submit my book for clearance. Ire-
sent . the arbitrariness and the arro-
gance of the Reagan administration's
handling of that. They have changed
the policy since I left."
Turning to current events that
have great resonance for him - he
headed the CIA during the Iranian
hostage situation - Turner takes is-
sue with those who hold that the
-United States should make no deal to
free the hostages currently held by
Shiite terrorists. He dismisses the
argument that yielding to blackmail
would set a dangerous precedent:
"The President keeps saying we'll
make no concessions to terrorists.
Why aren't we at the Beirut airport? STAT
We're not there because the terror.
ists drove us out.
"I want to support,the President,
because I remember what pain it
Contint .
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gave President Carter when he was
being criticized from his political
opposition for his handling of the
hostage crisis, and I think President
Reagan is doing a fine job. What
worries me is the criticism he's get-
ting from his own political spectrum,
the demands that we make abso-
lutely no concessions, that we be
totally ready to retaliate, maybe even
retaliate now."
His own advice
Suppose he were still director of
central intelligence? How would he
advise the President?
"I'd do just what he's doing."
But what he's doing is insisting
that there will be no concessions, no
linkage.
"That's right. I'd do that - and
then make a linkage, and make a
deal, and get our people out. You
don't think Ronald Reagan does what
he says, do you? He said he was not
going to pull out of Beirut on Friday
before the Monday that he pulled the
Marines out of Beirut. You of the
media don't bother to remember
that."
Recalling that in April 1980 Reagan
had said the Tehran hostage situa:
tion never should have been toler-
ated for even six days, he says: "Well,
we're on Day 11 right now." But he
adds that at least now Reagan is
saying the "absolutely right" thing
-- "that for us to take out innocent
people in order to try to get at some
terrorists would be an act of terror-
ism in itself, and that's not what the
United States stands for, ... I'm glad
that he finally, after about five years,
has come to where his rhetoric has
confronted reality."
Turner believes that the Reagan
administration has little to boast
about in its handling of foreign af-
fairs. To one reviewer of his book -
Charles Lichenstein, former U.N. del-
egate under Reagan, who ticked off a
series of alleged foreign policy fail-
ures "an Stansfield Turner's watch"
-= Turner responds:
"Would he look on the 241 Marines
[killed in Beirut in 1983) as a major
success in the Middle East? Would he
look on, the fact that they weren't
smart enough to ward off three
bombings, continued killing of
Americans there, as a tremendous.
success?. Would he look on the situa-
tion in Central America as a great
success today? Are the American
people really pleased that [in Nicara-
gual we mined the harbors and that
we wrote a manual of assassination?
Is he pleased that the CIA is impli-
cated in the truck bombing of 80
innocent women and children in
Beirut in the last few weeks?
"I guess he's very proud that the
Reagan administration has one, and,
I think, only one, success in foreign
policy in 4'/2 years, that I know of,
and that's that we managed to beat
up on 600 Cubans in Grenada, and we
only sent in fourteen thousand troops
to do it."
In Secrecy and Democracy, Turner
devotes a great deal of space to coun-
terespionage and the problem of
tracking down-"moles" and traitors
while protecting the rights and liber-
ties of citizens. The book was printed
before the Walker spy-ring case
broke,. implicating John A. Walker, a
former Navy radioman with top-se-
cret clearance at Atlantic Fleet Head-
quarters in Norfolk, Va.; his older
brother, Arthur; his son, Michael, a
Navy communications specialist, and
a friend, Jerry.A. Whitworth.
During his _.CIA tenure, Turner
says, he froze clearances for special
intelligence - things rated above
"top secret" - and cut by 30 percent
the security clearances of civilian
firms doing business with the CIA.
But he had no control over the Pen-
tagon. "I tried to do it with the De-
fense Departtnant," he says, "and ran
into a stone wall."
The Pentagon, he holds, is at long
last on. the right track in planning to
cut the number of security clear-
ances by half - "we just have too
many people with security clear-
ances, so it's difficult to screen them
as thoroughly as you should" - but
that, he adds, is only part of the
answer.
The Carter administration, he says,
sought to take as much information
as possible out of the "classified"
category; its successor has gone in
exactly the opposite direction in its
"blind belief that more classification
keeps more secrets." The result, he
says, has been to "let loose the natu-
ral instincts of the CIA, which are to
classify everything. And that's what
they're doing."
Turner defends his controversial
action, a few months after he took
charge of the agency, of firing 17 old
CIA hands and forcing 147 others
into retirement - the "Halloween
Massacre" - although he concedes
that the abrupt way the agents were
notified was "unconscionable."
To critics who have accused him of
decimating the CIA's clandestine ca-
pabilities, he responds that the rec-
ommendation to cut staffing had
been made : under his predecessor,
George Bush, who "just couldn't face
up to doing anything about it." More-
over, he says, the ousted individuals
had all been rated in the bottom 5 to
10 percent, and not one of the 820
positions eliminated was overseas.
"This was bureaucratic overhead,"
he says, "and anyone who has ever
served in a big bureaucracy would
not question my assertion that big-
ger bureaucracy is, not necessarily
better bureaucracy."
Continued
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The Philadelphia Inquirer / KENDALL WILKINSON
Stansfield Turner and wife, Karen, during Philadelphia visit
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CHICAGO SUN TIMES (IL)
26 June 1985
Books in the news
How ex-chief
views the C/A
Secrecy and
Democracy
TheQA, in Transition. By Stans-
fleki- umer. Houghton Mifflin.
$16.95.
By Robert S. Smith
I n 1977 President Carter
tapped Adm. Stansfield
Turner, one of the Navy's
best and brightest, to head the
Central Intelligence Agency in
the troubled period after a Sen-
ate committee exposed CIA mis-
deeds. Four years later, after
reorganizing its massive bu.
reaucracy and integrating high
technology into an espionage
world dominated by human
spies, Turner was replaced by
the Reagan administration's
William Casey. This book is a
record of his watch at the CIA.
Turner's tenure was no easy
task, but in a turbulent time his
was a fairly steady (sand on the
helm. He lost as many battles as
he won, but he brought a level
of courage and honesty to the
post few other CIA chiefs have.
His main problems were rein.
ing in his covert operators and
melding the efforts of the CIA
with other intelligence agen-
cies-National Security Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency and
the State Department's Bureau
of Research.
But Turner was never able to
control the covert side and errs
in writing that the 1947 CIA
charter says nothing about co-
vert action. The smogball phrase
authorizing such actions as the
overthrow of Salvador Allende
in Chile and the restoration of
the shah of Iran to his throne
reads that the CIA shall perform
"such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting
the national security as the Na-
tional Security Council may
from time to time direct."
Boiled into plain English, this
means that the CIA can do
whatever the president wants,
whatever it thinks he wants, or
whatever it believes he would
want if he thought about it.
Covert activities were what
caused Harry Truman to say
that creating the CIA was his
biggest mistake.
Although Turner admits los-
ing some skirmishes, he avoids
blame the way Dracula did gar-
lic. To reduce a swollen espio-
nage staff, he fired 820 people in
the so-called "Halloween Massa-
cre" in 1977. The act was long
overdue but he handled it poor.
ly, sending a brusque note to
those afflicted. He now claims
that his chiefs advised him
against a more gracious note.
On his two biggest flaps-the
downfall of the shah of Iran and
the "discovery" of a so-called
"combat brigade" of Russians in
Cuba in 1979-he gives flaccid
rationalizations. No one could
have foreseen the fragility of the
shah, Turner says in effect, and
it was NSA that goofed on the
Cuban affair. The brigade was a
training unit that had been in
Cuba for years. The CIA knew
about It, but Turner was unable
or unwilling to keep conserva-
tives from using it to stymie
ratification of the SALT II arms
control treaty.
Self-criticism is alien to a man
who sprinkles his prose with
statements like, "I weathered
the NSC meeting because I had
done more extensive homework
than anyone else in the room."
As a military man, however,
Turner easily sees through the
tendency of the military to pre-
sent worst-case assessments of
Soviet power, writing, "The
budgetary process virtually
forces the military to use intelli-
gence to overstate the threats
they must be ready to counter."
T urner has harsh words for
the way President Reagan
has "unleashed" the CIA
under William Casey. An
apolitical CIA has disappeared,
as has effective congressional
oversight. Casey is now im-
mersed in policy formation and
is running the illegal contras
and mining harbors in Nicara-
gua in violation of both interna-
tional law and the 1982 Boland
Amendment forbidding funds
for the purpose of destabilizing
Nicaragua.
"The Reagan transition team;
that descended on CIA in 1980
was as unbalanced and unin-
formed a group on this subject
as I can imagine," Turner com-
ments, a conclusion possibly
triggered by the fact that CIA
censors took 18 months to read
his manuscript, but made only
three concessions on more than
100 deletions.
Turner ends his book urging
more congressional oversight of
the CIA. expansion of intelli.
gence analysis beyond current
events and Soviet military
strength; increased attention to
terrorism, narcotics and nuclear
proliferation; new and nonpoliti.
cal chiefs for the intelligence
agencies, and less covert action.
The way things are going a
major CIA overhaul will be nec-
essary. It does not appear likely
that it can happen until the
president and Congress forgo
their macho views and restore
the CIA to its proper place in
national and world affairs.
Robert S. Smith was a mem-
ber of the U.S. inteIt+'ence com-
munity for nearly 25 years.
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FT. LAUDERDALE NEWS (FL)
20 June 1985
Editorials
0600410018-1
CIA must not be allowed
to abuse censorship rules
AMERICA'S Central Intelligence
Agency has the legal right, and the need, to
prevent former employees from publish-
ing books disclosing secrets that compro-
mise national security.
But the CIA has no need, and should not
have the legal right, to engage in unjusti-
fied censorship of harmless material.
Unfortunately, according to Admiral
Stansfield Turner, a former CIA director,
the CIA is abusing its rules and engaging in
Big Brother-style censorship not needed to
protect government secrets.
Turner charges that high-level Reagan
Administration CIA officials forced him to
remove more than 100 passages, including
a lot of non-secret material, from his new
book, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in
Transition, before they would let him pub-
lish it.
Among the censored items, he says,
were quotes from his own public speeches
and passages taken from former President
Jimmy Carter's memoirs.
If true, that kind of abuse of power is
stupid, senseless and far in excess of the
CIA's proper authority to review publica-
tion of books by former employees.
The case is loaded with irony. Turner
was caught in a trap that he helped make.
In 1978, when Turner was serving as Car-
ter's CIA director, he was instrumental in
-pressing then Attorney General Griffin
Bell to prosecute former CIA employee
Frank Snepp Jr. for publishing a book
about the CIA, Decent Interval, without
getting the required CIA clearance.
The U.S. Supreme Court allowed the
government to seize $60,000 in Snepp's
profits.
CIA officials have not commented on
Turner's charges, but if they did harass
Turner, the motivation to do so is there.
Many people on the Reagan team have
never forgiven Turner for what they con-
sider gutting the CIA in his "Halloween
Massacre" of Oct. 31, 1977, at which he
reduced staff in the espionage section by
822 positions, some by early retirement
and some by firing.
Also, his book is candidly critical of the
CIA under Reagan-appointed director Wil-
liam Casey, especially its resistance to
congressional scrutiny. He also documents
a series of foulups that he says could lead
to a severe loss of public credibility and
resultant harm to the U.S. intelligence-
gathering ability.
The Turner case should not be swept
under the rug. Congressional hearings
should be held to determine the validity of
Turner's charges. If warranted, changes in
the law should be made to ensure that CIA
censorship power is severely restricted to
halting disclosure of real secrets, not to
harassing critics to. prevent the public
from knowing the truth.
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ARTVIF APPEARED
P .,e
BALTIMORE SUN
20 June 1985
Sta~sfield Turner's Advice
'ftie dilemma of how an open, democratic soci-
ety should carry out and control secret intelligence
operations has been a recurring issue in American
public life. At one time many Americans probably
agreed with the senator who declared he "would
rather not" know about Central Intelligence Agen-
,asecrets. That mood, however, made possible the
abuses that began to be revealed in the 1970s,
inciing illegal spying on U.S. citizens, drug ex-
.Krl;nents on unwitting subjects and assassina-
tigp,plots. Following those disclosures, Congress
nand-the public agreed on the need for stronger
congressional oversight of intelligence matters.
To President Reagan. his intelligence chiefs and
oth conservatives, that represented the "leash-
ing' -pf the t;1 by timid or overscrupulous liberals.
Mr: Reagan and Central Intelligence Director Wil-
y may not heed the views of Stansfield
Tuner, who headed the CIA in the Carter admin-
iion. But they should, because Mr. Turner's
new. book, "Secrecy and Democracy," has some
sensible and worthwhile things to say about covert
action and the oversight principle.
Mr. Turner Isn't against covert operations. But
he is afraid the CIA will lose Its capability for such
operat'ons if it squanders its shills (arid congres-
sional and public support) on "Insignificant proj-
ects." Covert means should be used only when
their objectives are truly significant - something
congressional oversight can help assure. That is
an argument worth considering. So is Mr. Turn-
er's point that the country is not well served if its
intelligence chief is more committed to covert
operations than to objective intelligence-gathering.
The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Turner
writes, "is the only one of the president's advisers
who has even a chance of presenting unbiased
Intelligence to him. All the other advisers are di-
rect participants in the policy-making process who
are bound to favor intelligence that supports their
policies. For that reason alone the president
should keep his DCI from advocating one policy or
another, as is bound to happen if he becomes
deeply enmeshed In covert action."
Under Mr. Casey, that seems to be what has
happened. Covert action has its place, but Mr.
Turner Is correct that gathering accurate and ob-
jective information should be the intelligence com-
munity's primary goal. The administration and
the country might profit by.-putting aside partisan
prejudice and giving an open-minded reading to
Mr. Turner's thoughtful advice.
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DETROIT FREE PRESS (MI)
19 June 1985
Ex-CIA chief seeks airport
insnection system
By REMER TYSON
Free Press Politics Writer
Former CIA director Stansfield
Turner said Tuesday that the creation
of an international airport inspection
system would accomplish more than"
U.S. military retaliation against Middle
East hijackers.
Turner proposed that the United
Nations establish and supervise the
worldwide airport inspection system.
If a country's airport failed periodic
surprise tests, Turner said, airlines
should refuse to land in that country
until the inspection system was
;broluibt up to standards.
''l drner, IA ctor during the
Jimmy Carter administration from
1977 to 1981, was in Detroit to promote
his recently published book, "Secrecy
and Democracy, The CIA in Transi-
tion."
TURNER SAID the first priority for
the United States is to get back the
Americans who are being held by Arab
hijackers in Lebanon. Then the United
States should decide what follow-up
actions to take, he said.
Expressing support for actions tak.
en by the Reagan administration,
Turner said a military operation would
"cause the loss of most or all of the
hostages ... There is no chance of a
surgical strike."
Turner said he is optimistic that the
administration can free the hostages
because the hijackers' demands are
"not only obtainable, but ought to be
done." The hijackers, who say they are
Shiite Muslims, are demanding the
release of more than 700 Shiites being
held in Israel.
"IT IS ALL a question of saving
face," Turner said.
If the hostages are released, Turner
said, "What we have to decide is
whether retaliation - killing people is
what we are talking about - will deter
terrorism. I think not ... I think killing
some of their people - except for the
hijackers themselves - will simply
keep the cycle of violence going."
At least, Turner said, the United
States should have a national debate on
the retaliation issue before taking ac-
tion. "We shouldn't let our frustrations
get the best of us and do something
indiscriminate."
IN AN INTERVIEW, Turner also
said:
? Recent spy cases demonstrate the
need to tighten U.S. security, to reduce
access to classified materials, and to
submit government employes with se-
crecy clearances to more frequent lie
detector tests.
? The increasing criticism of the CIA
is endangering its ability to carry out
covert intelligence operations because
the criticism reduces congressional
support for the agency.
? He has learned that "old boys" from
the CIA network who opposed his
reforms have been asking newspapers
for the opportunity to review, his book
so they can criticize it.
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STAR-TRIBUNE (MN)
18 June 1985
Ex-CIA -chief recalls Reagan's
critiismbf Carter's actions
By Jim Dawson tors to monitor security systems at
Staff Writer major airports throughout the world
to prevent would-be hijackers from
Former CIA director Stansfield Tur- boarding aircraft.
ner said he is sure President Reagan
is doing everything possible to free The United States nearly managed
the hostages from TWA Flight 847 in to eliminate domestic hijackings
Beirut, but he was quick to remem- through heavy use of sky marshals
ber Reagan's harsh criticism of the and security equipment, he said, and
Carter administration's handling of the same thing must be done interim,
the Iranian hostage situation. tionally. The inspectors, he said,
would try to get weapons through
"He stood up and boasted, 'Terrorists airport security and could go as far
beware, here I am,' " Turner said of as to try to bribe airport workers to
Reagan. "Well, here he is and we're help them. .
no better off today than we were
then." If airlines of the major western na-
tions refused to land at airports de-
Turner, in Minneapolis Monday to termined to be "dangerous," it would
promote his book, "Secrecy and De-' provide tremendous incentive to im-
mocracy, the CIA in Transition," prove security and eventually re-
served as the director of the Central duce hijackings, Turner added.
Intelligence Agency from 1977
through 1980 under President Jima He said the CIA remains ttie best
my Carter. intelligence-gaMMW force in the
world, but he said he is worried that
He said the "military option" to res.; Reagan is damaging it.
cue the hostages in Beirut would be
something to try only when "you
come to your wits' end. "
"If you undertake a military opera-
tion, you're putting the hostages'
lives at risk," he said. "I don't think
in the environment such as we've
got, we can put a rescue force in
because the people who control the
airport are sympathetic to the hi-
jackers."
The U.S. government is probably ne-
gotiating with the terrorists despite
its proclaimed policy not to do so,
Turner said. In order to try to limit
kidnappings and other terrorist acts,
he said, the United States, like Israel,
has to take the position that it won't
negotiate. However, when push
comes to shove and lives are at
stake, he said, "we will negotiate.
And we ought to."
Turner called for the e3tablishment
of an international force of inspec-
"Reagan looks at congressional over-
sight (of the CIA) with disdain and as
an adversarial relationship," he said.
,,He (Reagan) has emphasized co-
vett activities that have blown into
the public."
On that point, Turner described the
CIA efforts in Nicaragua as the
,most overt covert action" he'd seen,
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