LETTER TO THE HONORABLE HENRY M. JACKSON FROM RICHARD HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000300120079-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: February 24, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

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24 February 1
The Ranomble terry M. Jwkson"Mairaw
National Ott and Internatiorml Operation
united States senate
W"hington, D. C.
Deer Senator Jac cons
Thank you for being so thoughtful as to
send = a co'' of y Subao ittatr;s initial
staff report an the Ati, 1c Alliance. I read
with particular interest the section on *Tbe
Soviet Throat".
I owe you a lunch, and hope to call you
soon to arrange it.
Cordially,
T1elJ$
RHelms/ecd - 2!i/2/66
Distribution: Orig - addressee
1 - ER v/basie
ct.y
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JOHN L. MC CLELLAN,
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.
ERNEST GRUENING, ALASKA
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN.
FRED R. HARRIS, OKLA.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY. N.Y.
LEE METCALF, MONT.
KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAM
CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
MILWARD L. SIMPSON, WYO.
WALTER L. REYNOLDS
CHIEF CLERK AND STAFF DIRECTOR
' JCnifelb Ztatez Zonate
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 87, 89TH CONGRESS)
February 23, 1966
M. JaVson, U.S.S.
Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security and
International Operations
Mr. Richard Helms
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Helms:
I wanted to be sure you received a personal
copy of our Subcommittee's initial staff report on
The Atlantic Alliance.
With best wishes.
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EDMUND S. MUSKIE. MAINE KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN. JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
FRED R. HARRIS, OKLA. MILWARD L. SIIMPSON, WYO.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, N.Y.
LEE METCALF. MONT.
SUBCOMMITTEE:
SHENRY M. JACKSON, WASH., CHAIRMAN
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THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
BASIC ISSUES
A STUDY
SUBMITTED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 181, 89th Cong.)
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-855 WASHINGTON : 1966
89th Congress
2d Session
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL It. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
FRED It. HARRIS, Oklahoma
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York
LEE METCALF, Montana
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
JAMES R. CALLOWAY, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
ARTHUR A. SHARP, Staff Editor
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York
LEE METCALF, Montana
DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director
ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant
CEDRIC W. TARR, Jr., Professional Staff Member
JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk
WILLIAM 0. FARBER, Minority Consultant
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Because the struggle in Vietnam is so important and because it
demands daily so much of our national thought and effort, we run the
risk of neglecting areas of the world which are at least equally crucial.
But we cannot afford to be totally preoccupied with the conflict in
Vietnam. The North Atlantic area is still the decisive area and it
needs our national attention.
The cooperation of the North Atlantic nations in building a com-
mon defense, the steady progress toward a Western European economic
community, and joint efforts of these and other nations in reducing
trade barriers and strengthening the international financial system
have helped to create a center of stability in an unsettled world.
Recently, however, there have been signs that the solidarity of the
Atlantic community is weakening.
It is not surprising that the winds of change are freshening in the
North Atlantic region when they have reached gale force in so many
parts of the world. Nor is it surprising that the nations of this region
have not found the full answer to the problem of reconciling national
sovereignty with the need for joint action in many fields.
If it remains true, however, and it does, that the hopes of the world
for peace with freedom continue to depend chiefly on a strong and
confident Atlantic community, the problems it faces deserve high
priority on the agenda of the Executive Branch and Congress.
Authorized by resolution of the Senate, the Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security and International Operations is reviewing the conduct
of national security policy, with special reference to the Atlantic
Alliance. Its approach is nonpartisan and professional. During the
first session of the 89th Congress, the subcommittee held hearings
which laid the foundation for the present phase of the inquiry.
At my request, the staff has taken a first-hand look at North
Atlantic Treaty installations, and conferred with ranking civilian and
military authorities, in this country and in Europe. This subcom-
mittee staff report, drawing on these studies and interviews, examines
a number of key issues on which the subcommittee will hold hearings
during the current session of Congress.
HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations.
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CONTENTS
Foreword-----------------------------------------------
I. The Problem---------------------------------------
II. The Soviet Threat----------------------------------
III. The French Challenge-------------------------------
IV. The Consultative Process----------------------------
V. A Practical Footing----------------------------------
V
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THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE : BASIC ISSUES
I. The Problem
The North Atlantic Alliance had its origins in the inability of the
victor powers in World War II to make a European settlement.
With Germany's defeat-and the presence of Soviet armies in the
center of Europe-Stalin believed that Soviet power and influence
could be extended deep into Western Europe. The United States
diagnosed the danger correctly, thanks to the interplay of minds
between Marshall, Lovett, Clayton, Acheson, Senator Vandenberg,
and President Truman.
In 1947 and 1948, with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan, the United States undertook the two-fold task of halting Soviet
expansion and rebuilding the strength of Western Europe. Shortly
after the coup in Czechoslovakia establishing a communist regime,
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom, on March 17, 1948, signed a 50-year agreement for economic
cooperation and common defense against aggression-the Brussels
Treaty. On the same day, referring to this action in a special message
to a joint session of Congress on the threat to the freedom of Europe,
President Truman declared that-
the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect
themselves will be matched by an equal determination on
our part to help them to protect themselves.
Soon thereafter General Marshall and Mr. Lovett held a series of
consultations with Senator Vandenberg and other Senate leaders,
and on June 11, 1948, the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution
affirming the objective of
association of the United States, by constitutional process,
with such regional and other collective arrangements as are
based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,
and as affect its national security.
The words had been carefully used in the order of their importance:
"continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid".
During July 1948, in the midst of the Berlin blockade, Mr. Lovett
was authorized to begin exploratory talks in Washington with Canada
and the parties to the Brussels Treaty. By September the partici-
pating representatives had reached agreement on the desirability and
necessity of a treaty for the collective defense of the North Atlantic
area and on the general nature of the treaty. The governments
concerned approved the recommendations of their representatives
and the negotiation of the treaty was started in December and com-
pleted on March 15, 1949. Early in March, Norway joined the nego-
tiations and that month invitations to become original signatories of
the treaty were issued to Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal.
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2 THE ATLANTIC ALLIA : BASIC ISSUES
Throughout the talks and negotiations, first Mr. Lovett and, after
January 20, 1949, Mr. Acheson consulted regularly with Senator
Vandenberg, Senator Connally, and other Senators.
On April 4, 1949, the United States and Canada joined ten European
states in signing the North Atlantic Treaty (Greece and Turkey
became parties to the Treaty in 1952 and the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1955).
Articles 3 and 5 are the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The parties agreed (Article 3) that "in order more effectively to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack."
In addition it was agreed by the parties (Article 5) "that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all" and consequently agreed
"that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area."
Like the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty also recognizes
the interdependence of economic cooperation and a common defense.
Article 2 obliges the parties, among other things, to "seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies" and to "encourage
economic collaboration between any or all of them."
The North Atlantic Treaty has no specified duration and continues
in force for an indefinite period. Article 12 provides that after 1959
"the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the
purpose of reviewing the Treaty." Article 13 stipulates that after
twenty years-that is, in 1969-"any Party may cease to be a party
one year after its notice of denunciation."
The North Atlantic Alliance has worked-superbly. It is the most
effective peacetime alliance of modern times-perhaps since the
Hanseatic League of the 14th and 15th centuries. Unfortunately,
however, in the politics of alliance it may be that nothing fails like
success.
The historic association of North America with Western Europe
and the commitment of the United States and Canada to the defense
of their allies in Europe contributed notably to their recovery. West-
ern Europe has enjoyed a period of high prosperity and rapid growth.
It has made important progress toward building a Western European
economic community and together with the United States, Canada,
Japan, and other nations it has reduced barriers to trade and devel-
oped impressive practical measures of international monetary co-
operation. In their economic and financial relations these nations
are demonstrating that collaboration and sovereignty are not mutu-
ally exclusive but that one may reinforce the other.
At the same time American strategic power and the other defensive
forces of the Alliance have been greatly strengthened, both absolutely
and relatively. The balance of forces thus created since 1949 and the
resolute response to Soviet expansionist probes-especially in Berlin
and in the missile crisis in Cuba-have made the policy of deterrence
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THE ATLANTIC . IANCE : BASIC ISSUES 3
effective. It has closed the door to Soviet westward expansion. No
armed attack has been made on Western Europe or North America,
and provided an appropriate balance and resolve are maintained, none
is likely. What justifiable hope there is of a genuine European settle-
ment rests on Soviet recognition of, and respect for, the durability of
this balance and the constancy of this resolve.
Nevertheless, the very success of the Alliance in influencing Soviet
behavior has partly obscured the relationship between the forces and
firmness of the Alliance and the moderation of Soviet policy, and has
encouraged wishful thinking about the possibilities of a European
settlement, if not of more far-reaching agreements, with the Soviet
Union. In some quarters the advantages of alliance are now being
discounted, while the disadvantages loom larger-it limits freedom
of action, it complicates diplomacy, it costs money, the stability it
affords is mistaken for rigidity. A desire to experiment-with nation-
alism, with arms limitation, with rapprochement-is gaining support.
Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, made this comment to
the 1965 NATO Parliamentarians' Conference:
* * * all of us are agreed that the world has changed since
1949, and that the Alliance may have to change with it,
though here, of course, is where the divergencies start, in
that all of us have our own ideas on why it should change and
in what directions.
There is no one NATO problem: there are as many as there are
allies who want changes, and allies who are asked to accept changes
the-,r believe unwise.
But if there is no one problem, there are four key questions:
1. How do the allies perceive the Soviet threat? Does
a united effort still have priority as a means of deterring
Soviet domination of Western Europe and of winning even-
tual Soviet acceptance of a genuine European settlement?
2. How does France perceive the Atlantic Alliance in
relation to the achievement of French aims? As a vehicle
in need of repairs? Or as one ready for the scrap heap?
3. What lessons can be learned from experience with
the decision-making processes of the Alliance?
4. Can the inter-allied dialogue be moved onto a prac-
tical footing-away from theoretical questions and back to
brass-tacks issues of real concern to governments?
II. The Soviet Threat
Twenty years after the end of World War II, a genuine European
settlement is still far distant. As C. B. Marshall told the subcom-
mittee:
The most salutary thing for the strength and durability of
NATO is to get our perspectives straight about the probabili-
ties-rather the improbabilities-of coming to an acceptable
settlement with the Soviet Union.
5S-S55-66-2
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4 THE ATLANTIC ALLIA BASIC ISSUES
Since Stalin and the start of the cold war, a major goal of American
policy has been to bring it to a conclusion on terms that serve the
legitimate interests of all the parties concerned. The relative tem-
pering of Soviet behavior under Stalin's successors has led some
Americans and some Europeans to believe that at long last the Soviet
Union is ready to move toward a genuine settlement. Some people
even see Communist China as the one disturbing and aggressive
world power and the Sino-Soviet quarrel as a doorway through which
the Soviet Union may step to rejoin Western civilization.
The Atlantic allies must of course be ready to welcome any and all
serious moves by the Soviet Union in the direction of a European
settlement, but the watchword of allied policy should remain vigi-
lance-for it is not weakness but strength that exerts an attractive
force in world affairs.
Moscow now appears to have some understanding of the need for
preventing nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of
communication. There are cases, like the hot line and the limited
nuclear test-ban treaty, where we may find common ground with the
Soviets on specific problems. But there is as yet no hard evidence
that the Soviet Union has given up the contest for Europe, or aban-
doned its goal to break up the association of Western Europe and
North America, or is ready to turn to serious efforts to settle basic
political conflicts with the West. On the contrary, the contest for
Europe-in low key for the moment-is still with us, and Soviet
forces remain in the center of Europe. The Soviet government con-
tinues to invest an increasing share of its resources in arms, to push
hard for major advances in critical new weapons, and to reject in-
ternationally inspected and controlled arrangements for the limitation
of arms.
It is evident that the law of change is at work inside the Soviet Union
and in Eastern Europe as elsewhere. Not so easy to see is how it will
affect Soviet ambition and policy. We cannot be confident that a
Soviet Union which may enjoy some political stability with less use of
repression, and which may maintain a favorable rate of economic
growth, will exert less political influence around the world or be less
determined to prevail. Nor can we discount the danger that the
reassertion of the national interests of the Eastern European countries
will lead to new forms of crisis to which the West has given little
thought. There is always the possibility that Moscow may try to
restore the unity of the Eastern European nations by manufacturing
a crisis centered on Germany.
Nor does discord between Moscow and Peking necessarily increase
the likelihood of substantive settlements in Europe. In fact, the
incessant Chinese criticism of Soviet leadership as insufficiently
militant, and whatever gains for Red China her combativeness may
produce, are generating pressures on Moscow to demonstrate its own
militancy. Events in Asia could have a backlash in the Atlantic
area. Soviet leaders, of course, are not unconcerned with Chinese
expansionism. On some problems and in some areas of Asia, Western
nations and the Soviet Union may find it desirable-in terms of their
own interests-to follow roughly parallel courses. But we cannot
assume that Moscow and Peking are headed for a final separation.
In time, with the passing from the scene of Mao Tse-tung, some
reconciliation is conceivable.
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THE ATLANTIC LIANCE : BASIC ISSUES 5
If Soviet policy in Europe continues to be relatively moderate, it is
because "objective conditions", as the Communists say, impose such
a policy. Should the balance of forces be upset, for example, should
there be major confusion in NATO or a break-up of the Alliance so
that the Soviets do not confront a strong, united front of Western
Europe and North America but rather a Western Europe divided
again into a number of weak and competing nations, "objective
conditions" would encourage the Soviet rulers to take bolder actions
and run greater risks-and Berlin is always there, if no other target of
opportu;uty is handy. We could expect a European crisis of un-
predictable magnitude.
The key issue is the division of Germany. The reunification of
Germany has been a goal of Western policy because, so long as
Germany is split, the division will be an unsettling factor in European
and, indeed, world affairs. In the words of President Johnson in
December 1964:
* * * our friends and comrades throughout Germany deserve
assurance from their allies that there shall be no acceptance
of the lasting threat to peace which is the forced division
of Germany. No one seeks to end this grim and dangerous
injustice by force. But there can be no stable peace in
Europe while one part of Germany is denied the basic right
to choose freely its own destiny and to choose, without
threat to anyone, reunion with the Germans in the Federal
Republic.
Unfortunately, however, there is no way to make the reunification
of Germany a practical short-run goal of Western policy. It cannot
be bought with any concessions consistent with German national
interests or Western interests. It cannot be compelled by measures
short of war. It cannot be imagined except in the context of~a general
European settlement. And such a settlement requires it change in
the Soviet conception of Russian national interests-at a minimum a
reliable change in the means by which the Soviet leaders pursue their
goals.
A European settlement will be the product of Western strength,
firmness, and patience, coupled with a willingness on each side to give
and accept appropriate guarantees of the security of the other. The
failure to obtain a settlement is not to be explained by a refusal of Vie,
West to recognize the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union. It is
not explained by a lack of imagination in the West. It is not, as
some now find it fashionable to say, a lack of "bright ideas" or "bril-
liant policy proposals" but a lack of Soviet interest in any terms that
do not take as a premise the continued Soviet hold on the Warsaw
Pact countries, and, in particular, East Germany.
There are some doubts in Western Europe about the steadiness and
coherence of American policy toward East-West relations. The
United States has not yet brought its foreign o receipts about and the payments
grow
into balance, with the result that doubts
ability of the United States to support its European policies. In its
enthusiasm for a European settlement, the United States government
has pursued the will-of-the-wisp of rapprochement with the Soviet
Union, even though this raises in Western Europe, especially in West
Germany, the specter of bilateral Soviet-American deals at the
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expense of European interests. In their zeal for arms control and
disarmament American officials have b(,r"i truing to n~~gotiato it non-
proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union-as though the West
had reason to fear that the Soviet Union might be about to assist its
satellites or other states to acquire nuclear capabilities! An obvious
danger is that major concessions will be made on our side without any
compensating change of policy on the Soviet side.
For the United States to show unsureness and unsteadiness in its
perception of the continuing Soviet threat is especially disturbing.
Despite the remarkable recovery of the Western European allies, they
do not have, separately or jointly, the strength to counter Soviet
pressures. For the United States to toy with the idea of rapproche-
ment, therefore, is to tempt its allies into unilateral exploration of the
possibilities of transforming their relations with the Soviet Union-
and thus to create new opportunities for Soviet diplomacy to achieve
what Soviet arms and pressures have been unable to win.
The West must not overlook any signs of willingness on the Soviet
side to move towards a European settlement. There may be useful
initiatives to take in finding specific measures to reduce the danger of
war, and in such fields as East-West trade. But the West should act
together-or it will risk upsetting the balance on which the hopes of a
genuine settlement rest.
President de Gaulle advocates what he calls a "European Europe"
existing "by itself for itself"-a phrase which seems to mean a Europe
independent of America. But for a long time to come a Western
Europe isolated from the United States would not exist "by itself for
itself" except at the sufferance of the Soviet Union. And, of course,
the French President knows this. A Europe effectively protecting
itself "by itself" is far from De Gau]]e's thoughts. He is assuming the
constant protection of American nuclear power, no matter what he
says or does.
The United States also wants an independent Europe, meaning
that we see no necessary conflict between European independence
and Atlantic cooperation.
The original American conception, in the time of Marshall and
Lovett, was of one Europe-"the European world", "Europe as a
whole". That is still the American objective. As in the past, the
United States hopes for a genuine European settlement, one which
would make possible, among other things, the reciprocal withdrawal
of American and Soviet forces from central Europe.
There is, in short, no real inconsistency between a truly independent
Europe and the objectives of the United States and other allies. But
no member of the Alliance will advance this goal through bilateral
dealings with the Soviet Union on the security of Europe--it will
jeopardize them. Even the most expert judo artist cannot make
"united we fall, divided we stand" a formula to advance the integrity
of Europe as a whole.
Now, as in 1949, the foundation of the Alliance is a working agree-
ment among the allies on what the Soviet threat is and how to deal
with it-together.
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THE ATLANTIC LIANCE : BASIC ISSUES 7
III. The French Challenge
No one, possibly including President de Gaulle, knows exactly
what, in practical terms, the French position on allied cooperation is.
In the judgment of its partners in the EEC, France has been less
than faithful to its obligations under the Treaty of Rome-but it has
not slammed the door. Similarly, in international financial matters,
its on-again, off-again policies-now shaking confidence in the gold
exchange standard, now assisting to shore it up in a crisis-reflect both
French reluctance to cooperate and also to sacrifice the benefits of
cooperation.
With respect to NATO, France has, on the one hand: withdrawn
its Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets from NATO; assigned to NATO
only small French air and ground forces (about 60,000 men) ; refused
to permit non-French controlled nuclear weapons on French territory;
withdrawn French naval personnel from certain high NATO command
posts; not accepted the 1962 NATO Council idelines for the use of
nuclear weapons; not committed itself to consult with its allies on the
use of these weapons in contingencies of an ambiguous nature;
announced its refusal to participate in the 1966 FALLEX program;
not participated in the ten-nation special nuclear committee.
On the other hand, France took a strong stand in both Berlin crises
and gave immediate support to President Kennedy at the time of
the Cuban missile crisis. It continues to provide valuable facilities
to NATO, a French officer is Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces
Central Europe, and other French officers participate fully in the work
of several international commands. It engages, on a bilateral basis,
with its allies on various projects, such as joint French-American
space research.
President de Gaulle himself states the French position on NATO in
these terms:
Above all, it is a question of keeping ourselves free of any
vassalage. It is true that, in many areas, we have the best
reasons for associating with others. But on condition of re-
taining our self-determination. Thus, so long as the soli-
darity of the Western peoples appears to us necessary for
the eventual defense of Europe, our country will remain the
ally of her allies but, upon the expiration of the commit-
ments formerly taken-that is, in 1969 by the latest-the
subordination known as "integration" which is provided for
by NATO and which hands our fate over to foreign author-
ity shall cease, as far as we are concerned.
When war can mean anything between instant, massive destruction
and a limited probe with conventional forces, deterrence requires an
instant readiness to respond appropriately. This, in turn, has dic-
tated the deployment of large allied forces in Western Europe and of
allied naval forces in Atlantic and Mediterranean waters. A corol-
lary requirement has been the creation of some kind of allied com-
mand organization. Allied Command Europe and the Supreme Head-
quarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) were activated by General
Eisenhower on April 2, 1951. Allied Command Atlantic and Head-
quarters, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) were
activated a year later.
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8 THE ATLANTIC ALLI BASIC ISSUES
In peacetime the international commands, like SHAPE and
SACLANT, are primarily planning agencies with such duties as the
development and recommendation of force requirements. They also
have certain responsibilities for developing and maintaining bases and
supply and communication facilities, for training and exercises for an
emergency and, in the case of SHAPE, for training inspection of
assigned units to ascertain if they meet agreed standards, and for
operational control of certain forces, such as air defense forces. These
must be ready for operations on very short notice, have certain on-
going patrol responsibilities, and must be dispersed on bases in several
countries. The fundamental justification of the international com-
mands is to be ready and able to take charge, within minutes, of the
forces which would come under their control in an emergency-and
thus, by virtue of such readiness, to strengthen the deterrent power
of the Alliance.
In peacetime, however, until a certain stage of alert exists, national
forces (with a few exceptions) remain under national command. The
international commands do not infringe upon the sovereignty of the
members nor do they violate the principle of the equality of all mem-
bers. No member can be compelled to accept a plan with which it
does not agree, or to provide facilities against its will, or to designate
forces which would be assigned to the international commands in an
emergency. There is, in short, no "integration" except as members
freely agree to coordinate their policies and forces. It may be won-
dered whether the objection to "integration" is really a way of deny-
ing the need for coordination.
To date, the French have talked about NATO in such abstract,
ambiguous, and theoretical terms as "vassalage", "subordination",
and "integration", and the discussion has not been put on what Secre-
tary General Brosio calls "a practical footing".
Of course, France may bow out completely from the unified mili-
tary commands. If France insists on moving NATO military facili-
ties out of France, or on an effective veto on their use, it will become
extremely difficult to devise a sound plan for the defense of Western
Europe. One need only look at a map to learn why the facts of geog-
raphy make France an important member of the Alliance. But allied
contingency studies show that it would be possible-though costly-
to replace the bases, lines of supply and communication, and other
facilities now located in France.
France may decide to request a review of the North Atlantic Treaty
in accordance with Article 12. That has been the right of any mem-
ber since 1959.
France may even withdraw from NATO in accordance with Article
13. It would be unwise to assume, however, that French withdrawal
is a fixed and unalterable intention. It is not, after all, likely that
the "solidarity of the Western peoples" will appear unnecessary for
the defense of Western Europe in 1969.
And even French withdrawal need not mean the end of NATO.
On the contrary, the appropriate policy for France's allies would
then be the policy of "the empty chair"-to leave a place for
France at the table and to await, and work for, her return.
The French President now deliberately displays a policy of inde-
pendence from allies, while accepting the benefits of the American
nuclear umbrella. He is playing a very risky game-counting on
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THE ATLANTIC A ANCE : BASIC ISSUES 9
the American commitment regardless of what he does or what happens
to the Atlantic Alliance. The risks include a real possibility of
alienating the United States.
The American commitment to help the allies to defend themselves
was made on the assumption that each of the allies was determined
to do its part in a cooperative undertaking. But, in the words of
Dirk Stikker, former Secretary General of NATO:
This vaunted complete independence of action has created an
atmosphere of incompatibility of both aims and methods be-
tween France and nearly all of its allies. He who insists on
retaining his complete independence of action can never be
counted on as a devoted and staunch member of any alliance.
Much clarity on all sides is needed about the price of "going it
alone." If the French government does not consider the Alliance
important enough to do its part, then the importance of France as an
ally will unavoidably diminish-as the other allies do what they can
to make the Alliance work without France. It may become necessary
to revise and reduce the American commitment to the defense of
France.
Under the circumstances, the United States must work closely with
Great Britain and West Germany and the other allies who can and
do see their common interest in a common defense. If the key
Atlantic allies move ahead together on the urgent issues-as they
have the right and duty to do-sober second thoughts may in time
prevail in the great and ancient French nation.
IV. The Consultative Process
The membership of the Atlantic Alliance includes great powers and
lesser powers, each with its own economic and military potential, its
own geographical and historical associations, and its distinct per-
spective: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States.
The Alliance in operation is a group of governments-that is, of
officials-on-the-job with particular responsibilities and particular
interests who have varying hopes and expectations about how the
Alliance may be useful in advancing their concerns. Because allies
are governments, their actions are the product of internal bargaining
among the bureaus, lobbies, and personalities comprising their own
political system. As Richard Neustadt said to the subcommittee:
The impulse to collaborate is not a law of nature. It
emerges from within, arising on the job, expressive of a need
for someone else's aid or service * * * if one government
would influence the actions of another, it must find means to
convince enough men and the right men on the other side
that what it wants is what they need for their own purposes,
in their own jobs, comporting with their own internally
inspired hopes and fears, so that they will pursue it for them-
selves in their own bargaining arena. This is what we did,
with Stalin's help-and economic crisis-in Europe nearly
20 years ago.
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10
Alliance institutions, civil and military, are not sovereign author-
ities, but creatures of the member governments-and governments
alone possess the ability to act. Thus, the importance of the North
Atlantic Council and other Alliance organizations, beyond their ob-
vious symbolic value, turns on their usefulness as quiet corners
where ministers from different capitals get together, and on their
actual capacity to produce results of utility to key men inside member
governments. If the views of the Council, the international com-
mands, and other agencies are to attract the top-level attention of
national governments, they must point the way to the practical
compromises which are the very heart of joint action.
The organization of NATO is, therefore, an important but secondary
subject-the cart, not the horse-of allied concerns.
It sometimes appears to be more important than it is because the
processes of consultation within the Alliance are not producing
agreement-and because, as often happens within our own govern-
ment, disputes over high policy are cloaked as disagreements over
organizational issues. Things cannot be worked out that way.
Consultative processes produce an alliance's decisions-they are
its surrogate for executive authority. If they are not effective, the
alliance will lack direction and energy.
Within our own government, we are painfully aware of the difficulty
of deciding on new policies. Decisions are difficult enough when the
decision-making process culminates in a President. Within an
alliance, not only are the issues inherently more difficult (because a
wider variety of interests are affected) but also decisions have, in the
nature of things, the character of a common denominator. That is,
they must be acceptable to a group of governments and must be
watered down or compromised until they are acceptable.
There is, of course, no rule of unanimity in NATO, despite the
widespread belief to the contrary. The emphasis of the Treaty is on
separate and joint action to maintain and develop the individual and
collective capacity to resist aggression (Article 3), and on such action,
individually and in concert with others, as each ally deems necessary
in response to an attack (Article 5). The only requirement in the
Treaty for unanimity is for the admission of new members. In
practice, the operations of the Alliance have confirmed. that each
member does not have to participate in everything the others do-
and that no member can prevent the others from taking a joint
action they wish to take.
The absence of a rule of unanimity does not diminish, however, the
desirability of unanimity. A member may be unable to block a joint
action by the others, but if it feels strongly, it may refuse to cooperate
on other matters or even denounce the Treaty. Practical wisdom
dictates that a great effort should be made to reach full agreement on
important issues and programs, particularly those relating to the
credibility of the deterrent and relations with the Soviet Union.
In the happiest circumstances, crisp decisions by a group of gov-
ernments are hard to come by, and the accommodations made in
arriving at agreement should be treasured, not lightly discarded.
Continuity with a second-best policy may be better than to push a
better one at the cost of not agreeing on any policy at all. As General
Norstad testified :
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THE ATLANTIC AAANCE : BASIC ISSUES j j
We should not destroy the foundation under which we are
working until we know we can produce a better one. Not
that there is not a better one, because there is always a better
one, but the criterion against which we judge this is not
whether or not there is a better policy, a better plan, or a
better strategy. The criterion must be: Can we get a better
one accepted?
Unfortunately, the United States government has not always
taken this view.
A case in point: in 1962 the United States abruptly shifted to a
strategy of. "flexible response." There was little or no consultation
with our allies, and the shift was explained in terms which, to say the
least, caused doubt and confusion about what kind of counterblows
the United States might be planning in the event of a Soviet attack
on Europe. To some in Europe it looked as though the United
States would rather switch than fight. The change in American doc-
trine forced modifications in allied military doctrine as well, thus
painfully underlining for the allies how little influence they had on
American policies of life and death importance to them. The diffi-
culties thereby created have not yet been overcome, especially perhaps
in relations with France, whose President, like most chiefs of state,
does not accept short shrift easily.
This advice to the allies from the Committee of Three in 1956 is
still good advice:
* * * any variations in plans and strategic policies which may
be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its
members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the
proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its
capacity to play its full part in discharging the political com-
mitment for collective action against aggression which it
undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also-and
recent events have shown that this is equally important-that
any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the
coalition are made only after collective consideration.
At present, nuclear questions are troubling and dividing the allies.
The problem is complex, involving considerations of national prestige,
inter-allied confidence, strategy, and East-West relations. The time
is past, certainly, for trying to deal with this problem on the basis
that our European allies are equal but that one is less equal than
others. It is not difficult to define what is wanted: a strategy which
will effectively support the policy of deterrence, and arrangements
which will win the confidence of the European allies in American
support of the strategy in an emergency. Clearly, Soviet pressure
should not deter the allies from doing what needs to be done-on
that basis NATO itself would never have been created and West
Germany would never have been permitted to join-but at the same
time there is no point in taking militarily unnecessary measures unless
it is clear that the political advantages outweigh the political disad-
vantages.
Beginning with the hasty improvisation of the concept of the multi-
lateral nuclear force, organizational salve has been prescribed for a
distressing political irritation-but the salve has converted the
irritation into a five-year itch.
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12 THE ATLANTIC ALLIME: BASIC ISSUES
Clearly, since the United States has 95 percent or more of total
Western nuclear capabilities, it necessarily and unavoidably has the
decisive power, positive and negative, with respect to the use of these
nuclear weapons. And that power is and will be located in Washing-
ton; no President can delegate it to anyone else.
However it may be accomplished, therefore, Canada and the Euro-
pean allies need greater access to the policy counsels of the United
States-and vice versa-not just regarding the more remote con-
tingencies of nuclear war, but also the ambiguous challenges that a
flexible communist strategy makes probable. What the allies, in-
cluding West Germany, need is confidence that they are, in fact,
involved in major issues of strategic and political planning in such
ways as to influence the actions of the United States government in
a crisis. And again, vice versa.
Here is where organizational imaginativeness is needed, rather
than a managerial pseudo-science which formally locates power in
bodies to which no member government will in fact delegate real
authority.
For example, there is every good reason why the allied capitals in
Europe and. North America should be linked by the most effective
communications arrangements that modern technology has made
possible. There is still much to be done to update present
arrangements.
For another example, we should be able to find ways of involving
allied military officers more deeply in strategic planning that will
receive a President's attention-without altering in any essential way
the President's final powers of decision. SHAPE and SACLAN T now
participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System, based on the U.S.
Strategic Air Command at Omaha, Nebraska, and allied officers are
stationed at the headquarters of U.S. Strategic Air Command. In
addition, since 1963, the United States has committed three POLARIS
submarines to the planning control of SHAPE. The United Kingdom
has similarly committed RAF Bomber Command. Such arrange-
ments are a good start.
The steps now being taken to develop a special nuclear committee
may also be useful, especially if such a committee can be located in
Washington where it could involve key men in the central and most
worrisome problems of strategy and give them access to each other
on matters high on the agenda of national governments.
What is required is access of key men to key men-at the North
Atlantic Council and by new consultative arrangements close to, or
closely linked with, the centers of national decision-making.
Lord Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO, paid a well-deserved
tribute to the statesmen who negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty:
They did not attempt, at the outset, to draw up a blueprint
of the international organization which should be set up,
or to lay down any hard and fast rules of procedure. They
realized that these could only be evolved step by step in the
light of practical experience * * *
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V. A Practical Footing
The North Atlantic Alliance remains what it was created to be in
1949-an agreement among sovereign states for their defense, with
all that implies in terms of political, economic, and military collabora-
tion.
It does not exist in isolation, however. OECD, the Group of Ten,
EEC, EFTA, the Kennedy Round, and other bodies and arrangements
are concerned with economic and financial problems of the North
Atlantic allies and like-minded states around the world. Normal
bilateral relations-private and governmental-between all these
countries deal with political, economic, cultural, and military affairs.
In short, difficult though it may be to name or define, these nations
form a community and their community of interests finds expression
in a rich variety of relationships.
The North Atlantic Alliance is but one link, albeit an extremely
important link, in this chain of institutions, arrangements, and re-
lations, and there is no point in trying to make NATO into something
more than it is by duplicating the work of other agencies, or to find
artificial tasks for it, such as the promotion of cultural exchanges, to
keep it busy or enhance its importance.
Moreover, for the United States or any other member to expect
help from its allies on matters outside the scope of the North Atlantic
Treaty, and outside the obligations undertaken by the members in
other alliances and arrangements, may put a heavy strain on the
Alliance. Members can, of course, properly seek to win understand-
ing and support for their policies outside the North Atlantic area
through bilateral channels, and NATO organs may provide useful
opportunities for one ally to explain to others what it is doing and
why, but the Alliance itself does not entitle one ally to claim the
support of others on matters outside the Treaty.
In the words of Secretary General Brosio:
To extend the scope-geographically and otherwise-of the
obligations the allied countries undertook in 1949 would not
be easy. It would have to be very carefully considered and
the pros and cons very cautiously weighed. In any event
we must beware, lest in seeking to improve the Alliance and
strengthen our ties, we bring about precisely the opposite re-
sult and cause a split in it.
If the threat to the allies changes or if their interests would be
served by a change in the scope of NATO's concerns-if, for example,
Communist China proves in due course to be the principal threat to
their survival in freedom or if economic, social, and cultural develop-
ments make closer political links between the allies desirable-the
time will come when the allies may wish to re-form NATO to meet the
new challenges and opportunities.
But at the moment the urgent task is to put the inter-allied dialogue
on a practical footing-to cope with the hard issues of the present.
Getting to work on them is, in any case, the only way of building a
foundation for the future.
All agree, President de Gaulle included, that the Alliance has un-
finished business. Its record since 1949 is one in which all can rightly
take pride. But alliances are mortal. Like old generals, they may
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14 THE ATLANTIC ALLI BASIC ISSUES
simply fade away unless they are used by, and useful to, national gov-
ernments in dealing with their real, pressing problems.
The North Atlantic Alliance has not yet achieved its initial, and
still its fundamental, purpose-which is a genuine European settle-
ment. The phrase is too easy to utter, perhaps, to suggest what a
drastic change for the better a genuine settlement would mean in
the world environment. It would be tragic were the Soviet Union
to accomplish, by allied default, its long-standing goal of destroying
the Alliance at a time when a potentially stable balance of forces-
the essential precondition of a genuine settlement-has been achieved.
The foremost issue facing the Alliance is, therefore, a working agree-
ment on policies toward the Soviet Union.
Another real issue is an understanding with our allies on what it
may be necessary and desirable to do to simplify the over-proliferated
international command structure-preserving its essential elements
and strengthening its effectiveness while discarding the tinsel and
furbelows-and to meet the costs, political as well as economic, of
doing so.
Another down-to-earth issue is burden-sharing. In viewing national
shares in the costs of protecting the North Atlantic area, inequities
are apparent: the burden falls more heavily on some, including the
United States, than the others. The problem is bound to become
of more concern for the United States because of its relation to our
payments difficulties and of our mounting expenditures for defense
of other areas of importance to the entire free world. The time is not
far off when the allies must squarely face this problem in line with
their obligations under Article 3 of the Treaty for "continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid."
Other practical issues are allied military strategy, including the role
of nuclear weapons, the role of the non-nuclear powers in nuclear mat-
ters, the size and composition of conventional forces, and such ques-
tions as procurement and weapons standardization.
The Alliance, like any other political arrangement, requires leader-
ship, and the facts of power impose a special responsibility for
leadership on the United States.
Leadership is needed within a national government if divergent
interests are not to stymie progress. It is even more necessary in an
alliance, where decisions must be the product of the round table and
where the highest position any ally can attain is primus inter pares.
The United States will have no one but itself to blame if our
preoccupation with other important areas of the world keeps us from
showing imagination and sound judgment in the affairs of the Atlantic
community-and from showing the largeness of mind needed to
reconcile national interests with the needs for joint action.
It may be that under the pressure of events the conduct of Atlantic
affairs has gotten into a rut, that issues and approaches have become
stereotyped, and that our responses to events have become almost
ritualistic. Some new heads may be needed to get the dialogue back
onto a practical footing.
In any event, the problems of the Atlantic Alliance call for more
and better attention on the part of our government than they are
receiving.
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