DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000400010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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..
2-4-August 1951
CIA No. 49313
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been pr. epared primarily;;,.for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence.. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments. represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
DIA and-DOS review(s) completed.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. New Soviet Ambassador to North Korea: On 16 August, Izvestia
identified V. No Razuvaev as Soviet Ambassador to North Korea in a re-
port of sixth anniversary celebrations in Pyongyang. This is the first
indication that former Ambassador To V. Shtykov has been replaced,
Comment: There has been no reliable information concerning Shty-
kov4s whereabouts since September 1950. Unlike his predecessor, who
despite a generalss rank held assignments chiefly as a political commis-
sar, Lt. General Razuvaev commanded the Minsk Military District in 1945
and subsequently is believed to have had various staff assignments. In
December 1949 he signed the obituary notice of Colonel General of Signals
I. F. Korolev.
Razuvaev was chosen as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet by the Minsk
Military District in January 1946 and was elected in the following month
to the Soviet of the Union,
Soviet grain: The USSR delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe
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meeting has stated that Western European countries must be willing to ex-
port the same goods to the USSR as they did in 1949?50 in order to maim
.tain the level of East-West trade of those years.
The Soviet spokesman refused to specify Russian grain availabilities
but stated that the 1949-50 minimum of all Soviet goods could readily be
increased, provided Western Europe was prepared to lengthen the list of
exports or increase the quantities involved. The Western. European coun-
tries had previously stated their requirements for bread and coarse grains.
The US observer at the meeting comments, and various WE delegates
concur, that the proposal and the manner in which it was delivered "bear
the earmarks of a major Soviet trade and propaganda offensive."
Comment: The USSR is apparently part icipat:ing in. this, mee.t;iag:,,(to
gain information for bargaining in the hope of undermining the entire
Western export control program.
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3- EASTERN EUROPE. POEM.' Poland bare US shipping lines The Polish Gov- )i
ernment has notified the AmericanaScantic Linem., which represents the US
Moore-McCormack Line in Poland, that its license to operate in the coun-
try is revoked effective 51 December 1951. According to the notifica-
tion, this action was taken because the US Government placed impossible
restrictions on Polish shipping in theUSa
Comments Curtailment of US shipping services to Poland will serve to
to eliminate one of the very few remaining direct contacts between the
Polish people and the West. Polish shipping traffic with the Western
countries, and especially with the US9 has decreased steadily in favor
of commitments within the Soviet Orbit.
4.. Poles demand strategic commodities from Switzerlands The Swiss
Charge in Warsaw has informed the US Embassy that Swiss-Polish trade ne-
gotiations are in difficulties over the question of including ball bear-
ings and aluminum in the agreement, The Polish demands are running in
terms of "thousands of tons of 'aluminum" and "millions of dollars of ball
bearings.. The Poles are reported to be coal. sum-ported b,-food-
stuffs, as their main bargaining weapon.
Comments This is the most recent evidence of repeated Polish ef-
forts to exploit, in trade' negotiations with Western European~eountries?.
its strong bargaining position arising out of its large supply of coal.
Polish coal exhorts to Western Europe during 1950 totalled over 8,5
million tons, valued, at approximately 112 million dollars. Swiss ship-
ments to Poland of ball bearings and aluminum in anything like the
amounts quoted would have to originate outside of Switzerland.
5. 7CUGOSLALVYAo Government reduces compu.lsoru delivery quotas for farm
products A recent government decree further reduces the volume of com-
pulsory.'?agricultural deliveries to the state. Compulsory deliveries on
grain, olive oil, fats and wool, however, are extended through 1952.
Producers may lodge complaints if they have legitimate grounds for being
unable to meet their delivery quotas. On the other hand, local authori-
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ties are authorized to change the assessment of any individual farmer.
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Comments Earlier this year, the government abolished.compulsory
deliveries on meat, milk, vegetables and fodder, in order to encourage
agricultural production and to placate the peasants.. Despite this con-
cession, the peasants have deliberately slowed up the threshing of the
wheat crop and have failed to deliver their assigned quotas to the gov-
ernment. On privately owned farms, which cover almost 75 percent of
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Yugoslav agricultural land, only 60 percent of the wheat crop has been
threshed; threshing'is also lagging on cooperative farms, Although the
new-decree decreases somewhat the delivery quotas which the peasants
must make to the state, it also serves as a warning that the government
has no intention of abandoning the collective system,
6. Government rejects Cominform navigation rules for Danube.* Yugo-
ela:via has rejected the new rules of navigation for the Danube drawn up
at the Galati Conference in June, and has formally notified the Danube
Commission that it will draw up its own rules. These'regulations will
include all the proposals that were advanced by Yugoslavia at the Galati
.Conference but rejected by the Soviet-controlled majority. In its note
to the Permanent . Danube Commission, the Yugoslav Government declared that
it specifically rejected the three following Soviet-imposed rules:
(a)
(c)
Each riparian state must give international traffic
priority over internal traffic,
Ships involved in accidents are immune from boarding
and inspection by representatives of the riparian state
in whose territorial waters the accident occurred.
A special administration will be established in a sector
of the Danube River near the Hungarian-Czechoslovak bor-
(The Yugoslavs argue that this provisio designed
der
,
to choke off Yugoslav traffic with Germany.) 125X1
Comment. The Yugoslav delegation walked out of the June session of
the Danube Commission because the USSR and Satellite members proceeded to
amend the Danube Convention over Yugoslav objections and rejected all
'Yugoslav proposals. Although the Yugoslav officials previously indicated
that they would take no action to interfere with Cominform traffic on the
Danube, the new note indicates that the Yugoslavs intend to adopt a
tougher policy. Available evidence indicates increased Yugoslav reliance
on railways rather than water transport for its commerce with Western Eur-
ope -o a step apparently made to protect Yugoslav river traffic to Germany
and Austria from possible Soviet retaliation,
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1 AFGHANISTAN. Government income from imbort and export duties .An Austrian
expert?a comparison of Afghan trade statistics and customs duty receipts
shows that since 1.941 the Afghan Government has received only a small
percentage of the income it theoretically should obtain from customs duties
on imports and exports. This is attributed either to lack of training on
the part of Afghan customa-DIfIr4als and statisticians or to their corruption.
Comment: Afghanistan?s internal economic situation presumably could be
considerably improved by better administration and the establishment of an
appropriate training program.
2. PAKISTAN. Communist propaganda compares Communism and Islam: Communist
propaganda in Pakistan describes the religious freedom of Moslems in the
USSR, and compares various features of Communism and Islam_
go-AM-8-nt.' If this propaganda is successful, it will destroy the major
argument advanced in Moslem countries to belittle the future of Communism --
i.e., that Communism and Islam are incompatible.
3. INDIA. raganda discounts reports o~ Near Eastern ort for Pakistan:
On 20 August., the Indian radio broadcast a ptatement that, except for a
few fanatics who have been inflamed by religious propaganda, the people
of Egypt, Syria,, Jordan, and Lebanon have taken a completely neutral
attitude toward India and Pakistan despite the latter?;s frantic efforts
to drum up anti-Indian feeling in the Near East. According to the Indian
radio, the people of the Near East,.have merely expressed a kdesire:to!?aee
a -eacefa solution of Indo=Pakistani disputes.
rerrk a Despite its brave tone, this radio broadcast probably
indicates that Pakistani s success in stimulating formal expressions of
concern from Near Eastern countries over the Kashmir dispute has so embar-
rassed the Indians that they feel some counter-propaganda is necessary.
4. ComiList Party e1ectionmanifestos The Communist Party of India
has published a fifteen point election manifesto calling for the forma-
tion of a Peoples Democratic Government, and including the following
proposals
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(a) Abolition of landlordism without compensation;
(b) Transfer of all land to the workers;
(c) Establishment of full civil liberties with freedom-of speech,
press, assembly, and strike-
(d) Withdrawal of India from the British Commonwealth;
(e Expulsion of British officers from the armed forces; and
(f) Confiscation and nationalization of all British capital in
India.
C amen o Lip service is paid by most Indian parties to the principles
of abolition of landlordism, land for the workers, and civil liberties.
The Communists, the Socialists, and the Hindu Mahasabha, representing all
shades of popular opinion from the extreme left to the extreme right, are
i agreement and apparently sincere on the point of Indian withdrawal from
the Commonwealth. There has been no recent indication that large segments
of the Indian population were in favor of such withdrawal, however.
5. CEYLON. India desires us_ of base at Trincomalee: .High Indian
military officers have repeatedly and frankly told Ceylon?s Inspector
General of Police that India needs and must have the use of the Ceylonese
naval base at Trincomalee. The Inspector General, a thoroughly competent
individual with long-standing contacts among high Indian. officials,
illustrated his belief that India has expansionist designs on Ceylon by
mentioning this fact in a conversation with the US Ambassador to Ceylon.
Ca :: Trincomalee is potentially one of the best naval bases in
the Indian Ocean area, but it is now in a relatively undeveloped state.
Neither India nor Ceylon is ina position to improve it materially at
present.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
to GERMANY, Reports-of expected Communist sabotage-in-Vest Germany discounted:
Commenting on the appeals for "nation resistance to Wes German remi i
tarizats,on made by leading Communist officials at the Berlin "World Youth 25X1
Festival"
US
ffi
i
,
o
c
als in Germany estimate that the first phase of the
drive will be propaganda calculated to intimidate West Germans followed by
Comment., Although it is always
ossible th
t
p
a
a spontaneous attempt
to sabotage vital installations will be undertaken independently by over-
enthusiastic west German Communists, a planned coordinated campaign of
physical sabotage is not considered probable in the near future. Such a
campaign would provoke swift and severe punitive action by both Allied and
West German authorities, would almost certainly result in the banning of
the West German Communist party, and would neutralize any future Communist
potential for successful sabotage in West Germany. -The current appeal
for "national resistance" is stronger and more inflamatory than the origi-
nal appeal, in July 1950,-but it is not believed that international tension
has reached the pitch that either the East German Communists or the USSR
would wish to engage in direct local violence to block West German re-
militarizatione
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3. NETHERLANDS, Dutch reluctant to participate in Europe-an Defense Forces:.
e u--c i fATO a ega a states that his government is doubtfully anU
reluctantly "veering" toward participation in the European Defense Forces
(EDF), primarily for economic reasons* Close economic ties among the
participating countries would inevitably develop under the EDF, and it
would be "extremely difficult" for the Netherlaz ds to remain outside if
Germany, Belgium, and France joins
However, at a recent conference of Netherlands ambassadors, opinion
was unanimous against the Dutch joining the EDF. It was felt that France's
motive was domination of the other EDF participating countries, a situation
Germany was sure to resist. There was serious concern over participation
in the "hastily improvised far-reaching military agreements" which would
put the.Dutch forces and one-third of the country's budget under French or
German military and political controls
According to the Dutch NATO delegate, effective NATO control over EDF
would inspire greater confidence, and the Dutch Government would consider
German membershi in NATO an essential element in the control of EDF.
Comment: The shift in the position of the Dutch, who distrust French
leaders p on the continent, is probably also, due to US support of the EDF
and the qualified UK approval. The NATO delegate undoubtedly-fears-that-
the civilian authority of NATO will be overshadowed under the new EDF organi-
zation,
For some time now, the Dutch have. endorsed the creation of German-
military power to establish a defense line farther east than the Rhine,
although this is the first concrete indication of Dutch support of German
membership in NATO.
ate Dutch doubt effectiveness of a.sus ension of Czech overflight
rights in German Y.- The Netherlands Government is agreeable to the us pro-
posal or cessation of Czech overflight rights in Germany, only if the
interests of the Dutch and, inferentially, Belgian Airlines are not sacri-
ficed to those of the UK-owned BOAC, The Dutch Foreign Office, however,
judging from its own experience, doubts that the contez.plated action would
be effective. Furthermore, the Dutch airlines probably would lose about
$fiSOO,OOO yearly, and there are ways for the Czechs rip-
privation of overflight rights,
Comment: The UK has conditionally agreed to the US proposal, and
Belgium has indicated it will not oppose suspension, France, however.,
remains opposed, feeling additional sanctions would hurt France more than
the desired political gains warrant.
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p
commission has in-formed US Emban the a newl -crea e o Sr~vzet orbit:
panish wolfram control
certificates of ultimate destinationaccomtant the law requiring that
lead exports has now been extended to strategic metals and minli and rains for Spanish
in-
cluding wolframo The same Spanish official, who stated that the regu
in question is designed to prevent the transshipment of essentialmae atzon
to Soviet satellite countries, had recently told the emboss th t rials
is ripe f
SPAIN. Madrid enlarges ban on sale of strategic materials t
TTNe-governmen re
res t
wolframs anzsh a r' ement for the y a the time
purchase of Spanish
Comment: The tightening of export co failure of Spain's and the bid for chases __3f >;ani.sh Wolfram seem to indicate the p ions
t
policy of holding out for the hi her p~_
or of t g prices paid on t o r e
ring to force the US to satisfy ' forer marker,
minerals needed for its special steelndust s dema'n'd for certain rare
tons of Spanish
wolfram were shipped to the US in the past eig teen p
n t s0 The
Spanish
Government and wolfram producers'now appear to be turning to a US contras
as the best means to insure further development and the t
profitableof the wolfram mines.
~p~~ra,tion
6, NORWAY. British holdings to be sold: According to a delayed report, the
mineral claims there through ordinary is negotiating to dispose of its
owners, having determined that neitherctheez or channels, The Syndicate
terest in purchasing or subsidizing operations in the British claims, have obtained British consent to dispose of the governinents have in-
on corripanyrs
claims, ha The obtained
S
Norwegian government has stated that it might have an
interest, at a reasonable price. The SSS manager has su
should the Russians outbid the Norwe ions ggested that
the higher offer. he would be obliged to accept
Comment: The SSS holdings, containing principally coal gypsum~,
nave ? not b exploited since World War II, and Prewar e plo, and n pro
unprofitableo Before SSS renewed its claim in I 8
considerable interest in acquiringthearrea in quest ~'' ztatio proved
.C
adjacent ons de to Soviet holdings. Ta 9e tion the aboubout showed
, about 100 sq, mi*
management will both endeavor to avoid Soviet pu ch Government and SSS
claims in Spitsbergen, but the prospects for economic e eQ l itiion may be deemed sufficient to warrant the outlay by Norway. nation mnot
7? UNITED KINGDOMO Government concerned over ublic
o You Ies$yv t
rove erso -action to
repo
r US
e racy ens o the government" Uhave Privately oex
wo responsz-
over the alle
r
d rr
e
d
p
ge
e
maltreatment ss
considerable
..b
co
y US troops in Austri
u
t
a of?British
Youth
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in transit to
the Communist Youth Festival in Berlin
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T
he two members of the government stated gat, even allowing 25X1
or ommun st
question wheth
ports that it
poses that a f
counteracting
bias in reports of the incidents, there is still "reasonable
er excesses did not in fact occur". The Foreign Office re-
has received protests from some 60 MP's. The Embassy pro-
ormal US investigation be instigated with the purpose of
the unfavorable propaganda which has resulted from the affair.
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Comment: The Foreign Office had previously released a statement to
the Bri sh press emphasizing that the incidents had been highly exaggerated,
and that the US troops were compelled to resist when physically challenged
in carrying out their legal orders. Despite this statement, however, the
traditional British sensitivity to restrictions on travel, and the use. of
arms against unarmed civilians have produced criticism of the US in quarters
not at all pro-Communist.
8. ARGENTINA. President and Senora de Peron accept Peronista nominations for
Press anc 'T ice-Presi en : At a giant labor r y, President Per 6h an
is wffe-'9 a, were alpersuaded" to become the Peronista candidates for
president and vice-president in the ii November elections. Perrin "bowed
to the people's will" quickly, but Evita tested the crow39s reaction-for
thirty minutes before she "agreed" to accept. To promote-the rally., the
government-controlled General Confederation of Labor called a nation-wide
support strike. Opposition leaders charged that the demonstration was a.
fake, claiming the workers were forced to attend or face possible reprisals 25X1
if they failed to present check cards to the union bosses. In line with
Perongs anti US campaign theme, posters describing the US as the "wor'ld's,
most criminal nation" lined the streets.
Comment-. This first firm declaration of Evita's electoral intentions
will accelerate political maneuvering to dislodge the Perdns,,. The army,
which is intensely opposed to Evita 25X1
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Pill attempt to attract the support of dissident Peronista leaders who
favor Colonel Domingo Mere ante (Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires) 25X1
for vice-president.
CUBA. Guatemalan motor vessel QUETZAL steriously missing: Cuban authori
ties are serious y concern over the disappearance o six Cuban crew mem-
bers aboard the motor vessel QUETZAL which left Mariel, Cuba, on 25 July
destined for the port of Livingston, Guatemala. The ship failed to'arrivve
by 8 August and a search has been instituted, To. compound the mystery,
the Cuban Navy received a distress message on 26 July stating: "Notice
urgent to Cuban Navy. We are being boarded by warships of Dominican Navy.
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the matter, and has reouested the US Navy to assist in the search* 25X1
We are 0 -miles .south of Cape San Antonio.. Signed MV,'! The Cuban Naval
Commander-in-Chief is not entirely convinced of-Dominican culpabilit in
Comment: The 350 ton QUETZAL, now.flying the Guatemalan flag, was
sold a auc ion by the Cuban government to anti-Trujilloist General Miguel
Angel Ramirez. It was> one of the ships found stationed in Cayo Confites
in September 1947 and was to have been used in the unsuccessful attempt
to invade the Dominican Republic and overthrow Trujillo. -Although its
present crew is made up of Dominican, Cuban, and Guatemalan Cayo Confites.
veterans, there has been no evidence up to the present that the vessel has
since been engaged in illegal activities. The incident may represent a
maneuver by Cuban and Dominican revolutionaries opposed to Trujillo to
revive the mutual antagonism between the Cuban Government and the Trujillo
regime.
10. PANP A. Shipping decree now effective.. The Panama decree implementing
1 e-tl em argo on s Mpping o s ra eg c materials to North Korean or Chinese
Communist ports was signed by the President and the Mi.ister.of.Finance
on 18 August, the official text was released on 22 August, and the decree
is now in effect. The signature was kept secret until 21 August in order
to test public reaction before making an official announcement of the 25X1
effectiveness of the new regulations. The Foreign Minister informed Ambassa-
dor Wiley that there had been no adverse reaction on the part of the opposi-
tion nor was any expected.
Comment. Ricardo J. Bermudez,, who has been closely associated with
Communes activities, held a cabinet position throughout the US Panama
negotiations on this decree, and therefore the Communist party presumably
had access to the debates as to the legality of promulgating the decree
without waiting for legislative action. Nevertheless, Panamanian Communists
made no apparent effort to mobilize opposition to this decreed
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FORM
8-73 26 uE PREVIOUS EOITIONS. TOP SECRET (40)
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24 August 1951
CIA No. 49313-A
Copy No.
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA,
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2. IN17-- OON Extra-government-influences oppose Indonesian participation in
peace treaty conference: A cabinet member told US Ambassador Cochran that
altthoough opposition cabinet favors full participation in the San Francisco conference,
pposition from "outside the cabinet and outside Indonesia." The
Indonesian Socialist Party, he said, is definitely working against participa-
tion.
When Cochran
,
o
1 ? iiuuz i na ilitate a favorable Indonesian decision.
Comment: The Socialist Party is not represented in the cabinet. How-
ever, Socialist Party members who hold influential government positions are
largely responsible for Indonesian efforts to create a common front on the
Japanese peace treaty with Burma, Pakistan, and India, and they were the
original. advocates of Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy,'
3e PHILIPPINES. Government does not object to presence of Associated States
at San Franc!scot The Philippine Government does not object to the invita-
tion extended to the Associated States of Indochina to attend the San
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1 24 Aug 51
remarked that India may send a delegation
the
fficial
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Francisco conference, It desires, however, that the wording of the procedural
article to the effect that signature of the treaty does not necessarily imply
recognition 'of other signatories. be so changed that Japan cannot make use
of it to deny recognition of the Philippines in order to hinder future nego-
tiations for reparations. 25X1
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