DAILY DIGEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 August 1951
CIA No. 49305
Copy No.
DAILY DIGEST
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.
OSD REVIEW COMPLETE TOP SECRET
State Department review completed
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1. USSR. Embassy Moscow co nuents on US-USSR exchaxa~e8 Embassy Moscow believes
that the VOA campaign publicizing the US resolution of friendship for the
Russian people was the decisive factor whi'ch'-forced the sudden and perhaps de-
fensive shift in policy resulting in the publication of the US messages and
the Soviet rebuttal. Recent Embassy monitoring indicates that a significant
segment of VOA broadcasts has reached the Russian audience. Embassy officials
note that the Kremlin had a convenient opportunity to lend official stature
to many component phases of the "peaceful co-exi.stence8? campaign but chose
instead the points on a Five Power Peace Pact and on "discrimination." The
Five Power Pact contains, in a single package, these basic essentials of cur-
rent Soviet'policys
(a) Recognition of the CFR,
(b) strain on free world unity in the Far East,
(c) weakening of the UN,
(d) reestablishment of big power diplomacy, and
(e) checking of impetus toward strengthening of the free
world defenses,
The Embassy concludes that the USSR reply was not meant to lead toward
a change in the existing relations between the two governments.
25X1
2. Airfield in Sovzone of Germany to recdiye TU L?s (B?29 type )s Two cur-
rent reports indicate that Briesen Airfield located in the Sovzone of Germany 25X1
will receive a second taxi track and 44 concrete parking stands in addition to
the planned 8,,200-foot concrete runway 260 feet in width. Each parking stand
is to be circular and 118 feet in diameter.
TU-4, aircraft are
to be stationed at this field and that parking stands are to be constructed for
this purpose.
Field Comments One of the above reports was substantiated with a master
construction plan of the new runway including parking stands The latter were
drawn on the plan on 20 July 1951. The 118-foot diameter circular parking
stand is adequate for parking and accommodating TU-4 aircraft. This is the
first time that parking stands have been included in construction of any air-
field in the Soviet Zone of Germany. It is also the first time that Soviet
officers have mentioned plans for stationing TUrr aircraft at one of the newly
constructed airfields. 25X1
1 14 Aug 51
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Comments TU=419 are not now stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany.
This spring, type 27 twin jet bombers became the first bomber aircraft with
increased offensive capabilities to arrive in the Zone,
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EASTERN EIJROPEQ CZECHOSLOVAKIA, New technique adopted to perfect Communist
political trials The Russians are reported to have developed a new *'Ohnique
to assure a perfect performance at political trials. The new technique, al-
legedly used at'the Oatis trial, consists of conducting four or five dress
rehearsals, complete with a handpicked audience, during which all mistakes
in the d.alogue are corrected. If the accused attempts to interject unauth-
orized statements the audience is instructed to burst into laughter. These
rehearsals take place until the script is effected.
25X1A
Ccm eats Many theories have been advanced for the lethargy of the de-
fendants at Cnunist trials, although few facts are definitely known. The
monotonous lack of spontaneity exhibited by the accused and prosecutor alike
in the Oatis trial could stem from such preparation, Extreme physical ex-
haustion, the application of drugs, and the promise of improved physical con-
ditions may also contribute to the lethargic manner of the defendant,
HUNGARY. Soviet troop departure reporteds The US Air Attache in Bud-
apest transmits the report that Russian 25X1
troops in Hungary are to begin or have already begun a slow withdrawal to
Russia and the Rumanian-side of the border, This move is to be effected by
mid-October in advance of a possible Hungarian strike against Yugoslavia,
The USSR would then aid the Hungarian invasion of Yugoslavia with "volunteers."
Cents No evidence is available of any unusual movement of the two
Soviet divisions in Hungary. The Hungarian Army which has been ezpanded from
659000 to 100,000 since 1950 is generally considered less prepared for any
aggressive action than are the Bulgarian or Rumanian armies. Moreover, until
the Austrian Peace Treaty is signed, the USSR has a valid reason, provided
by the Hungarian Peace Treaty, for maintaining armed forces in Hungary,
58 Hungary procuring copper through Zurich firms Metallimpex Budapest has
arranged to procure.3,OO0 tons of electrolytic 99% copper bars through Herman
Ax, a Zurich firm, The Hungarian importer has stated that he prefers to have
the shipment routed through Antwerp or Durazzo (Albania) rather than via
Rumania, The US Legation Vienna has suggested that an investigation by the
Swiss Government is in order, The Legation points out that recent information
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indicates that the Satellites regard Antwerp as the Dort throuch which
clandestine trade can be diverted most easily,
Comments There have been numerous reports of Hungarian efforts to pro-
cure critical raw materials through intermediaries, The copper would prob-
ably be obtained from Rhodesia, Chile,,, or Mexico, Shipment of goods through
Antwerp or Dcrazzo, from whence they!would be taken to Trieste for trans-
portation by rail to Hungary, is quicker and cheaper than shipment through
Rumania,
Pte. Prosecutor exceptionally violent in trial summation of ~-my
offs US Embassy Warsaw reports that the prosecutor's summation of the
evidence in the trial of nine former senior Polish Army Officers was extra-
ordinarily violent, even for such Communist denunciations, The defendants
were referred to as "foul subversionistss", "mercenary. degenerates," and
"the scum of the Polish nation." Their objective was described as plotting
"to pave the way for the Anglo-Saxon air pirates to destroy Polish towns.,
murder its women,, aged., and children as they are nowdoing in Korea," The
prosecutor declared that their rincipal aim was to break the bonds linking
Poland with the Soviet area,"
Comments The trial has consistently emphasized national deviationism
as being the root of the evils in which the defendants were engaged, De-
spite the smear tactics which the prosecutor used in his summation, it is
unlikely that he was able to erase'the respect which the Polish public holds
for these leaders of the wartime underground.
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7, YUGO Tito Government not internally endangered. US Ambassador
Allen reports that although the unpopularity of Yugoslav Communist regime
remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stabil-
ity. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the govern-
ment?s military and foreign policies., as well as an unconscious dissociation
of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Kardelj and pos-
sibly Pijade, from the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's
policies, The &bassador concurs in the opinion of the US Military Attache
that the Yugoslav army would fight loyally, and if its organization were dis-
rupted., would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. Allen concludes that
the widespread popular discontent is caused by the demand for continued op?
ular sacr fices after the country's past tribulations, 25X1
25X1
C nenta The shrewd appeal of the Tito regime to the strong nationalism
of the Yugoslav people afforded it internal stability even during the crucial
period of.the 1950 drought, All available intelligence indicates that the.
Yugoslav Government, although beset with numerous internal difficulties, can
effectively cope with them,
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
INDONESIA. Darul Islam Possibly involved in Djakarta port attack: State-
ments from prisoners arrested in connection with the attack on the
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Djakarta port of Tandjong Priok (see Daily D $ Aug) indicate that
a Moslem religious leader, Kijahi, was the key figure behind the incident.
Also seized at the time of the arrests were hammer and sickle insignia
and emblem itary arm, the Indonesian Mos-
lem Army,
Comment: The Darul Islam is a fanatical Moslem organization en-
trenched in West Java, which seeks to establish a Mohammedan state by
force, Although Darul Islam followers include certain "Communist-
tinged" groups (which could explain the presence of hammer and sickle
insignia at Tandjong Priok), the organization is not known to have co-
operated in the past with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
It is significant to note, however, that in June the Consultative
Council of Political Parties--the PKI-sponsored national front organiza-
tion--set up a branch in Bandung in West Java Appointed as general
chairman of the branch was a member of the Indonesian Islamic League,
an organization which has always been sympathetic to the Darul Islam and
which has now joined the government?s opposition. The branch secretary
of the League is a member of the PKI.
Undoubtedly the PKI hopes to exploit Darul Islam strength in West
Java, Whether the Tandjong Priok attack represents evidence of PKI-
Darul Islam cooperation, however, has yet to be proved,
4. THAILAND, Military leaders continue to vie for ower; Hostility be-
tween Police Director Phao and General Sarit commander of the Bangkok
army garrison) is continuing. The latter is obtaining increasing sup-
port from various army elements but is not yet ready to make a bid for
power,, Phao, on the other hand, apparently prefers to temporize until
the elections of March 1952, at which time he hopes to gain control of
Parliament and be in a position to dominate Sarit without resort to
force. The ositio o the air force in the struggle is unclear,
Comment: If at any time between now and the elections Phao believes
he is losing ground in his rivalry with Sarit, he might well attempt a
coup d?etat,
5. CHINA, Chinese Communists strengthen police controls: The Chinese Conn
mun.ist press reveals that the Peiping regime has strengthened its al-
ready extensive police controls over the Chinese populace by
(a) promulgating new. regulations further restricting
entry and exit of overseas Chinese and travel to and from
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Hong Kong and: .cao;
(b), giving the.Ministry of Public Security new powers
to control radio appliances and supplies (with the partial
intention and result of reducing the effectiveness of the
Voice of America); and
(c) establishing a central school charged with, the.
training of county and municipal public security and jtid-
icial cadresR
Comet: The Peiping regime aims at the total domination of its sub-
jects in all aspects of their lives* An enormous increase in security or-
ganizations, regulations and operations is to. be expectedi
6.
`The Peiping Peopl&:s Daily, organ ? of the Chinese Communist Party.,
asserted in an 11 August-editorial that the Chinese and North Korean
"people" are not "afraid of continuing our just war of, resistance to
aggression." and are "fully confident and well preparedtl to continue.
Comment: On 5 August, General ?9eng Teh-huai commanding Chinese
Communist forces in Korea, asserted that the UN?s superiority in wea-
pons "will change," and that Chinese forces had-,"begun the establishment
of a people-Is artillery and large-scale air forces" with which they
would "win greater victories.."
The 11 August assertion that Communist forces are now "well pre-
pared" to continue hostilities implies, or at least threatens, that the
artillery and air arms are ready for action0 UN field intelligence
confirms a considerable build-up in Communist artillery and air strength
in the past several months. However, the 11 August editorial is largely
devoted to asserting that Communist China genuinely desires a Korean
armistice on the basis of the 38th Parallel..
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g4 KOREAm A ointment of new ROK Best news source in Korea reports a rumor
spatch from a Chinese Nationalist is slated onalist that U e Bum Sulu, present ROK AmbassaldorRto Gaternmentp CThe item notes
for the post of Defense however, that Lee has expressed reluctance to accept a. Cabinet office
2 5X1
and desires to return to his dip:omatic posts
E Comm nt: Zee, an ex Prime Minister and. Minister
theDefensl,ic, tThere
ROK, was considered a strong man in.the early days of
is no evidence. to indicate that aridetent official and personal friend of
Minister of Defense Yi Ki Bongs comp
Rheee with Tree
t3air capabilit s reconnaissance limitations aare
s if 9
and
FECOM notes danger to UN farce
o mnunis
a
-ed in cease-fire a x^eemnp ' C US Far Corma
1anchuria have been reevaluated. by the US Far F, astern ~ ty that e hostili
Eastern Air Force., This new estimate, based on the p t lksy notes a
ties may cease in the near future as a result of the Kaesong
agreement be reached
In FECOM~~ opinions such
considerable danger to the UN forces in Korea should an limiting UN aerial reconnaissance over North Korea,,
ation of North Korean airfields by CO=21-
ation
limitations might allow the reoccup
hi.st aircraft, thereby posing a serious threat to UN aerial su eriorit an
the event of renewed hostilities
An 11 August radio
10, North Koreans rotest use of as bUN forces:
broadcast in Korean released the text of .~A~neri.canointervex~tioxl3estsa~~ Tpro he
a ainst the use of poison gas by
of two s=bombs" on the city of Yonan
i
ng
st dropp
broadcast cites the 6 Augu
t bombing of a North K crean troo
A
ugus
d the 7
an
(southwest of Kaesong)
e "deliberate atrocities a"
th
es
ideas e of
instal:i~ tion as e
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Comet: North Korea has previously accused the US of employing
chemical and biological warfare, These accusations are probably for
Soviet Orbit internal consumption in order to strengthen the "hate
America" feeling.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
F
Fifib RANCE. New ro4TS French Government is formed without Socialists: US
sJ Paris finds that the replacements o Moch an Pe sc e by Bidault
and Mayer in the Defense and Finance posts, respectively, are the. Fre
Cabinet shifts of particular interest to the US i nch
rearmament and relations with NATO
n connection with France's
Bidault will have full authority, accord
co-
ordinate rapidly French policy on North Atlantic defense including Germany
prospective contribution. While he reportedly "co
s
" with Foreigrin
Minister Schuman in this task, the latter vrIll be will operate
develop-
ment of the French Position in the Far East, I dochina.9 and the on as well as on application of the coal-steel pool plantr$ and the Mediterranean,
The embassy believes that, whatever Bidaultas official relation
Schuman may turn out to be, "it is more than probable that Bidault with his
training and interest in foreign affairs and his long and ill-concealed
desire to be more active in that field will exert an influence beyond th
strictl domestic as ects of national defense", e
Comment: Both Bidaultand M _
eminen pos Lions in the new PleveneGovernment. are ardents w ro hold 'pre-
and strong supporters of NATOQ ~ ardently pro American
of immediate Socialist aims to defense grequi e ents. het reflected S aciafict
coolness to US leadership and was oculist
generally
The departure of Petsche, however, and his replacement ?with Mayer, whoohaator,
narrower political support, close business connections, and a recordd ofas
quarrels with the Socialists,
of the government, will weaken, their present conditional support
While the past sympathies of Pleven, Bidault, and Mayer for De G
could be expected-to help soften the o
ppo aulle
the difficult months ahead, the Gaullists sistrateg the General's party in gy is
the position whenever the middle-of-the-road regime can be discredited,
AUSTRIA.
Government plans to deny residence nerm t+.r
us rian Minis for ----,---.
declared ills al _.,_ v11c&` Vile Work! Federation of V
Austria, Trade Unions hadbe been
g in The
expiration of two--month te minister stated further that after the
mporary residence permits
(other than Soviet nationals who mayrem all moIFTU nths employees
permits) would be denied permission to reside ~in Aseven raa nhs on temporary
however, remains skeptical-that the Austrian The US legation,
government will be able to
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take effective action against the wFTU, and expects that little can be
achieved other than to make it clear that the 1/VFTU continues in the
Austrian capital by grace of the Soviet occupation authorities and against
the wishes of the Austrian people,
Comment: Althou h
25X1
effec vie action against the WFTUa thby the e AustriangGovernmentahas b enossible
in its measures by the possibility of Soviet interventilce
of clear legal justificationa St on and by theabsen
rong support of the WFTU by the Soviet
Element in the Allied Commission and consequent hesitancy on the part of
the Austrians have led US observers to believe that Austrian officials will
move slowly in declaring the WFTU a "menace to public safety", if it should
register as required by Austrian law, or an illegal secret society, if it
should not, The move to deny residence permits to 1FTU personnel should
probably be regarded, therefore, as merely part of the general
campaign which the Austrian Government is apparently willing tohundertake,
3. ITALYQ De Gas eri urges USSR to return Italian war risoner
Gasper- as announce t ha one o s. Premier
in the new cabinet was to press the Soviet Union fora the returnMofimoire
than 63,000 Italian prisoners still held in the USSR
Government has evidence that Italian prisoners are stilAl held h the
somItalian
Soviet concentration camps, probably as slave labor, the Soviet Union has
replied to previous Italian inquiries with. the statement that no Ital
prisoners remain in the USSR, ian 25X1
Comment. The Italian statistics on war prisoners were presumably
elici ed by he.UN commission investigating the of
war in the Soviet Union status of.prisoners of
coincide with: Premier De Gasper- timed his announcement to
(1) his recently inaugurated campaign to diminish the
strength of Italian Communists by propaganda and restrictive means; and
(2) Italy's intensified drive for revision of the Italian peace'treaty and
admission into the UN. On several, occasions former Foreign Minister Sforza,
in attempts to debunk Communist claims that the Soviet Union is friendly
to Italians has USSR. Sforza hastalsoedwthe eltronethe Sovett veto ofrIta3yane's war by
admission to the UNa. s proposed
Government a rehe
i
ns
ve over possible loss of US market for It
cheese an o lire o : e Italian Foreign Office has Italian
en a t e De ense Act, suspend- primes ed the Anderson
oil
s, cheese, etc. from Western European countr 'Lng export of fats,
materials to Eastern Europe. The Foreign Office xport strategic
hit two typical Italian products, olio oil and chepoints out
ese, and wthat ould iappear
to conflict with US policy favoring the economic recove
d
ry of count rie
es within
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Vile zramewor}c or. II~q US Embassy. Rome believes "the Iidttii - protest is
more than justifiedai "since it.,would" be most difficult to explain to the
cheese and oil producers, "now faced with the loss `of one-third. and one--
half of their respective export :markets hour e i cts
assists US defense productionq
Comment: While Italian exports of cheese and olive oil to the US
for the sst four months of. 1951 were approx .mately" 37per cent and
61 per cent respectively of total Italian exports"of these commodities for
the same period, they were only : '.`per cent and ,5 per pent respectively
of total Italian. exports to all countries: On the other'hand,9 since these
two products had a total value:. of 4 million for thisperiod9 the loss
of the US market "for Italian cheese and; olive oil ;exporters would . have a
significant effect on Italyls foreign exchange,positionQ
5. sWITZEnLANDO Reassertion of neutralist pos tions In.East-West trade:
oau-Lons on export controls involved any agreement on the part of the
Swiss, and asserts that Switzerland is unwilling to become involved with
either the East or the West in any kind of embargo, To favor one side to
the detriment of the other would, he declares mean "giving up the neutrality
which is written into our constitution and international aggreements", He
further comments that Switzerland would be taking sides and., forsaking its
neutrality if it adopted the US suggestion that it prohibit export to the
USSR of goods manufactured .at home from raw materials obtained from the West.
Comment: The commentator is editor of
the
ll
i
"
sma
L
beral Partyas new
paper, w =c has a relatively lows c"ircuiation6 Nevertheless the views
expressed represent, th:e opinion, of that large-segment of the public.,
composed principally ofbusiness men, which insists; that, Switzerland keep
f t
d
?` 1i-. _, , _ .
open its normal channe 1 s
o
ra
e
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7. UNITED KINGDOM. Serious decline in steel production foreseen: ECA London
reports aka critical reduction in British steel output is-expected in
1951. This will be due primarily to an estimated lag of one million tons
in ingot capacity which has resulted from:
(a) drying up of German scrap exports,
(b) inability to purchase adequate iron ore supplies in
world markets,
(c)
a shipping shortage, and
(d) inadequate blast furnace capacity.
The British contend that the US has been getting most of the available
German scrap exports and is the most favored purchaser of continental
steel. Although the British'Government has started a blast furnace
expansion program, and has begun to develop iron ore resources in parts of
Africa, UK domestic roducton is unlikely to exceed 16 million ingot tons
in 1951 and 1952a
Coimient,: A steel shortage now appears as an added serious factor in
the UKs d teriorating economic situation. The latest production estimate
now anticipated is 1x5-2 million tons less than past long-range estimates
for this period. The Government is hard-pressed to fulfill defense com-
mitments for the rearmament program, which by increasing consumption, is
largely responsible for the steel shortage.
BRITISH GUIANA. Significant gains made by Communist-oriented part : The
ommunis?-oriented People's Progressive y PP has gained wide support
in British Guiana in the year-and-a-half since.its formation, and all
evidence indicates that it will meet with continuing success in its current
campaign for recruiting additional members. Formed early in 1950 by Dr. and
Mrsb Cheddi Sagan, a couple with known pro'-Soviet, anti-US sympathies, it
is the only political party which has ever commanded a significant following
in the colony. Membership in March,-as announced by Mrs. Jagan during the
party's first congress, stood at 3,060--a figure which was probably not
grossly exaggerated and which assumes significance with the realization
that the membership fee, although small, is not easily raised by the average
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Guianese, The remarkable strides which the party has made in 18 months
are explained by the fact that it is the first group ever to hold out
any hope to British Guiana's poorly paid, inadequately housed workers for
improving their miserable standard of livings
The party has cleverly used tactics which attract the widest possible
support from lower-income groups. By playing up the poor conditions under
which most of the Colony's peoples actually do work and live, PPP leaders
have created considerable unrest and have rather successfully presented the
party as the rallying point for those dissatisfied with their lot. In ad-
dition, the party has sought to align itself with some of the organized
labor unions. Its connections with the Guiana Industrial, Workers' Union
now seem to be firmly established, and it is probable that the Jagans were
at least partially responsible for the recent separation of the bauxite
workers' union from the non-Communist Man Power Citizens' Association.
-influence
continues to increase and there is ever
d
i
I
y
n
ication that it
will),
monist capabilities for hindering the flow of British Guiana bauxite to
Canada and the US through strike and sabotage activities will 'increase cor-
respondingly (9% of US requirements come from British Guiana).
One slightly hopeful sign on the B
ritish Guiana scene was the formation
in December 1950 of a second political party-the National Democratic Party--
organized by non-Communist leaders and also designed to appeal to lower-
'income groups, As yet, however, it has not had
members, and has given no great success in recruiting
PPP' gpromise of becoming an effective opponent of the
ARUBA N.WLI, `Strike reported in Aruba oil refine The US Consul reports
tan re finery workers s roc on 10 u
wage increase. The companyt emanding a 20 per cent
s counter-offer was refused by the workers, who
repudiated their bargaining-committee which had accepted the offer' The
Netherlands Government mediator is negotiating. The refinery is-now
operating at reduced capacity on an emergency basis.
F
Comment: The Lago oil and Transport Company, Ltd, of Aruba (Standard
Oil o ersey) operates the world's second largest oil refinery which
has a normal output of approximately 1490,000 barrels daily' Labor dis-
satisfaction has been present right along in both Aruba and Curacao, and
it apparently is now coming to a head as a result of the
inter-
national petroleum situation which has led the workers to believe that they
are in a2'stronger bargaining position?
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The main grievance of labor has been the wage differential and
general preferential position given-to certain foreign nationalities.
During World War II this wage policy operated against the Chinese employ-
ees of the tanker fleet and produced a long strike which seriously hampered
the importation of crude petroleum from Venezuela? The present cause of
dissatisfaction is possibly a sharp rise in the cost of living which has
not been offset by a proportionate upward adjustment of Lago's cost of
living bonus to its employees
Lago has exercised rather close supervision of organized labor in its
plant. It wisely has encouraged establishment of the Lago Employee Council
(employee advisory committee) to.confer with management on labor problems
while simultaneously using it as a device to combat the rise of labor unions,
Of the numerous. sporadic efforts at unionization, one formal union has
managed to ,rise---the Aruba Labor Union. It has been used primarily to
further the political aspirations of its president, Henry Eman, The union
apparently has attracted enough dissatisfied workers to its ranks and has
gained sufficient strength to declare this strike in an effort to force
company recognition,
10, SWEDEN. Government grants asylum to Polish mutineers: The Swedish govern-
.
1nn(ind. at, e southern Swedish port or Ystaci on Z augusti.
Comment: The Swedes were able to escape a conflict between their
humanitarian impulses and their pride in strictly observing international
law because there is no extradition treaty between Poland and Sweden, and
the Swedish law of 1913 specifically exempted mutiny as a crime requiring
extradition. In the case of such a conflict, the government would un-
doubtedly make a great effort to find some legal loophole or overriding
political reason to maintain its humanitarian record,
25X1
11, ARGENTINA. Peronista Part urges denunciation'of opposition: The Peronista
police of any "attemp s to promote sabo-
11
ar y as urge mem ers to e
tage" and has advised them that the time has come "to wipe out the swine
made daring by our tolerance", The statement followed the arrest of 80
railway engineers and a number of Radicals and Socialists, all of whom were
accused of plotting a campaign of terrori and sabotage to spread disorder
on the eve of the 11 November elections. 25X1
Comment: Peron has denounced all non-Peronistas as traitors. The
const~all for action against the opposition and foreign interests could
result in violence, as election activities are intensified. On occasion
official newspapers have published names and addesss of anti-Peron elements,
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TOP SECRET
and often Peron has advised workers to keep a supply of baling wire to
hang the opposition".
12. MEKICO0 Administration seeks to-avoid publicizing military cooperation
serves revalidate the US Mexico reciprocal agreement for the transit of
military aircraft, a Mexican Foreign Office spokesman has indicated that
it would be well not to question the validity of the agreement and to assume
that it has not expired. In a strictly confidential oral reply, the spokes-
man stated that the exchange of notes would have to be ratified by the
Senate, and-although ratification would be likely political opposition
might be encountered which would lead to undesirable public debate The
proximity of the coming presidential elections was given as a factor which
"might also complicate matters". The US Embassy comments that these remarks
"would seem to confirm the present.well known policy of the Mexican govern-
ment to avoid any action which might .in any way be interpreted as a military
commitment".
Commei f: As the 1952 elections approach, the administration ~rill
proba yec~ome increasingly hesitant to admit international obligations
which might be regarded as adverse to'national sovereignty and welfare*
The Mexican public does not appear convinced, at present.. that the East-
West struggle involves an immediate threat to Mexico. Unless a new crisis
arises, therefore, it is possible that domestic. political-considerations
will serve to inhibit expressions of agreement with, or support of, various
US international aims,,.
13. PANAMA., President's new legal advisor: President Arosemena has appointed
Ricardo J. AlT aro as his legal counse or, Alfaro accepted the office with-
out salary which may indic ate a desire to remain aloof from the present
weak administration. Clearly, thoug h, he plans to'play an important
political role,
Comment: Ricardo Jb Alfaro has been prominent in Panamanian govern-
ments roug out Panama's history* His first position was that of Under-
Secretary of Foreign Relations in 1905, two years after the establishment
of the Republic, Throughout his career he has maintained a reputation for
financial honesty.
In recent years, he has been obdurate and ultra nationalistic in
negotiations with the US Embassy in Panama on issues of bilateral interest,
but has been cooperative with members of US delegations at international
conferences, especially when problems of international law were under
discussion, The Embassy reports that he is currently exerting his influence
in favor of strong measures, which are advocated by the US, to ban Panama
flag vessels from visiting Chinese Communist or North Korean ports,
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14 August 1951
CIA No. 49305-A
Copy No,
3a
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
Not for dissemination outside O/CI and O/NE.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA
or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
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SESTION 2 (EASTERN)
DiIIPPINES. -Government accepts latest draft of Japanese peace. treaty:
--President Quirino, with the concurrence of his special 15 man advisory
committee, has agreed to accept the language of the latest draft of the
Japanese peace treaty. 25X1
II~-OC~ HINA. West weighs choice between India and Indochinese states as
signatories of gapanese treaty: The UK Foreign Office is opposed to inviting
the Associated States to the San Francisco treaty conference as "observers,"
feeling that this would stir up the question of Chinese Nationalist observer
status,,, The Foreign Office plans to delay its reply to a formal request from
Cambodia that it be invited to sign at San Francisco pending India's response
to UK attempts to persuade India to sign the treaty, Apparently.the Foreign
Office believes that India will delay its reply, thereby blocking an invita-
tion to the Associated States
Meanwhile, Minister Heath in Saigon argues against offering the
Associated States observer status,, stating that such a half-measure would
cast more doubt on the independence of the.Associated States than wo eir
non-attendance at the onference, 25X1
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U Aug 51