MAO'S RETREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 9, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved Fo Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R009OW01200030018-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
9 October 1968
1. Recent events raise the question of whether the Cultural
Revolution is being closed down. The two-year sway of the Red
Guards has been broken; Peking has ordered their organizations
abolished. The army is acting with purpose and direction in
restoring order and controlling the factional fighting that has
disrupted China. In the provinces, installation of revolution-
ary committees throughout China completes the first hesitant
step toward rebuilding the political order. Overall, the per-
missiveness and sanctioned disorder that have characterized the
Cultural Revolution is being reversed in a sharp back-lash toward
discipline and authority.
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030018-7
 Approved Foielease 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R0096001200030018-7
2. This clear trend toward moderation has not had visible
repercussions in the balance of power in the top leadership. The
appearances for National Day (October 1) revealed no major shake-
up. The radicals in the Cultural Revolution Group (i.e., Madame
Mao, etc.,) have been fairly restrained of late. One of them,
Yao Wen-yuan, authored a definitive piece establishing the new
moderate line, just as he did when the Cultural Revolution first
began. And of course everything is being done in the name of
Mao and his latest "instructions". Nevertheless, it seems
likely that the moderate forces, especially the PLA and the
bureaucrats around Chou En-lai, are the chief beneficiaries of
the new line, since they have almost certainly urged it on Mao
for the last year.
3. In addition to the obvious consequences of rampant
indiscipline, economic conditions could have played a decisive
role in swaying Mao and the leadership. Political chaos has
led to confusion and drift in the managerial echelon of China's
economic and governmental bureaucracy. This, combined with
poor weather thus far in 1968, virtually guarantees that this
year's agricultural crop will fall short of last year's abundant
harvest. Peking has already boosted its orders for fertilizer
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030018-7
 Approved Fo elease 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79RO0967 001200030018-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
and has shown some concern over current negotiations for wheat
imports. Considering that China's exports have fallen as a
direct result of the violence and disruption of the Cultural
Revolution, the prospective strain on foreign exchange for food
and fertilizer imports might well have played a significant role
in the retreat from revolutionary excesses. Certainly the regime
has been embarrassed by transport difficulties that interrupted
the flow of military aid to North Vietnam. Indeed, some of the
strongest orders for PIA action date from that event. Thus,
while economic problems are far from the whole story, the leader-
ship's timing and apparent resolve to end the chaos probably
owes much to the growing pressures of a lagging economy.
4. As regards what is to come, there will be the standard
claims of victory for the Cultural Revolution. Peking claimed
"decisive victory" in 1967 and forecast "all-round victory" for
1968. The regime apparently hopes to wind up the Cultural
Revolution by convening the Ninth Party Congress to sanction the
new political order and leadership. Although there was some
evidence that Peking hoped to hold the congress as early as
this year, this is now clearly impossible.
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030018-7
 Approved Fo lease 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79RO09OW01200030018-7
5. The next major task is to rebuild the party structure.
The divisions within the central leadership, the factionalism
in the revolutionary committees, and the general climate of
fractiousness suggest that reconstructing the party will be a
bitter contest that can not be settled this year. Nevertheless,
Peking is clearly indicating that revival of the party will
receive high priority in the near future.
6. Peking has acknowledged that the core of the new
party will come from the existing revolutionary committees.
The army's present position of dominance in the provinces will
most likely be reconfirmed in the new party. At the same time,
we would expect many of the party old-guard, now "purified" by
the revolutionary fires, to emerge in symbiotic unity with the
PIA leaders. No more than token representation -- if that --
is likely to be accorded the young revolutionaries. More impor-
tant than the make-up of the new party will be its attitude
toward Mao's revolutionary line. There is growing evidence in
China of cynicism and resentment toward the incessant ideologi-
cal exhortation. The new party members will have experienced
the disruptive effects of Mao's ersatz revolution. Unlike Mao,
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030018-7
 Approved Fo elease 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R009OZA001200030018-7
S-E-C -R-E -T
they will have felt the popular revulsion against violence and
disorder. They will have had another object lesson in the
irrelevance of Mao's thought for the building of China.
7. Thus, even though events in China are moving in the
direction of greater stability and order (as we predicted in
NIE 13-9-68 "The Short-Term Outlook in Communist China," 23
May 1968), this trend is by no means irreversible. As long as
Mao survives, we must expect the unexpected. Even now there
is an undertone in the propaganda suggesting that Mao may be
shifting his attention to the economic scene. Rather than
sulking in his tent, as he did after the earlier collapse of
the Leap Forward, Mao may already be planning his next revolu-
tionary campaign. But trying to read the mind of Mao is to
compound futility with frustration. What counts now is whether
Mao and Lin can control the rebuilding of the party to their
own advantage or whether the intricate web of power relation-
ships now evolving will subtly enmesh and ultimately enshroud
them.
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001200030018-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030018-7
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01200030018-7