NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: JULY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI #6246-82
30 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: July
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1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situations.
a. Lebanon: 25X1
(1) Although the Begin government remains skeptical
about the prospect of an acceptable agreement on the with-
drawal of Palestinian forces from West Beirut, it apparently
continues to defer a decision to launch a major ground
assault because of concern over the domestic and inter-
national consequences.
(2) Intensified Israeli military pressure on West
Beirut and renewed attacks on Syrian positions in the
Bekaa Valley may be intended in part to induce "provocations"
that would provide a pretext for a drive to expel the PLO
from the city and the Syrians from Lebanon.
(3) The Israelis' expression of concern about an
increase in the readiness of Syria's Scud missiles raises
the orssibility that major Israeli offensive actions will
include preemptive strikes against these missiles.
b. Iran-Iraq:
break through Iraqi defenses northeast of Al Basrah, the
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(1) If the third phase of Iran's offensive fails to 25X1
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SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: July 30 July 1982
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Khomeini regime may create a diversion by sharply increasing
pressure on Kuwait and other Gulf states to end their
assistance to Iraq.
c. South Africa-Angola:
(1) The South African military. buildup in northern Namibia
and southern Angola probably signals another major incursion
into Angola similar to the offensive last August-September.
Although the South Africans may be trying to enhance their
leverage in negotiations on Namibia prior to their deadline
for an agreement by mid-August, major cross-border operations
could trigger a military escalation if the Cubans are pre-
pared to risk greater involvement in supporting Angolan
resistance to South African forces.
d. Nicaragua-Honduras:
(1) The Nicaraguans are laying the'political groundwork
for retaliatory strikes against anti-Sandinista rebel bases
in Honduras. The Hondurans have warned that they will launch
preemptive airstrikes if they believe a Nicaraguan attack is
imminent.
(2) There is a serious chance that direct clashes
between Nicaraguan and Honduran forces will fuel a rapid
military escalation. This contingency would create new
opportunities for a sharp increase in the Cuban presence in
Nicaragua and possibly for an upsurge in Soviet military
assistance.
NI0/NESA
NIO/AF
NI0/USSR-EE
NI0/WE
NI0/EA
NIO/LA
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
26 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - July 1982
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1. Iran-Iraq. All agencies agreed Iran had not utilized, during the
current offensive, techniques such as flanking movements which had enabled
its previous victories. While Iranian losses are apparently higher thus
far in the southern offensive, resupply currently underway presages further
fighting. The following consensus observations were made:
-- Were the Iranians to succeed in the south, the sheer
logistics of an offensive towards Kerbala and Najaf are
formidable. It probably would not occur soon.
-- Should the Iranians spread south to the Kuwait border,
pressures for accommodation would probably prevail in the UAE,
Qatar, and Kuwait. Such pressures would exist but be less
dominant in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.
-- Due to the commitment of Khomeini personally to the
its failure would not result in internal upheavals. X1
2. Lebanon. The basis of the discussion was not to give warning on
the timing, likelihood, or impact of an Israeli attack on West Beirut.
Sufficient attention was focused on this situation by decisionmakers, and
sufficient warning of possible resurgent terrorism had been given. The
group did note, however: '
-- Israeli policies in south Lebanon were clearly designed to
create a compliant Lebanese force structure, regardless of
events in Beirut or with the central government. Their
intention appears to be to be prepared to ensure Israeli
security in any eventuality.
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-- These policies do not, at present, have the effect of
strengthening the central government.
-- The future of the northern .Biqa and north Lebanon are
unclear. Whether or not the Israelis intend to insist on
clearing them of their Syrian/Palestinian presence is not
certain. I
4. Morocco/Polisario. The following essential trends were noted:
-- INR suggests that a basic enhanced readiness exists in Morocco
and Algeria to settle the problem, but that no mechanism to do
so is in place.
-- As a result, continuing skirmishing at a medium level of
intensity should be anticipated.
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