EVIDENCE OF RECENT SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENT TO AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000300030006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 14, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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Strategic Waraling Staff
SUBJECT Evidence of Recent Soviet Troop Movement
to Afghanistan
recent deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. It
was prepared by
the SWS. Questions and comments should be addressed to
DOUGLAS F. MacEACHIN
Director
Strategic Warning Staff
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3,600
t t s
--~r1
has reported that the Soviet government moved
troops into Kabul early this month.
RRC N
these troops are located in the Soviet communica-
tions rea across from the American Embassy and at locations
near and in the USSR Embassy compound. Their mission in
Kabul is alleged to be the protection of Soviet citizens and
facilities.
We have not yet been able to confirm this report
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LOA"I
3. On balance, taking into account the evidence that is
available to us and particularly the pattern of Soviet ac-
tivity in recent weeks, we believe that there is a better
than even chance that the report of Soviet troop movement
to Afghanistan is accurate.
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9. As regards flights to Kabul International Airfield, the
major civil airfield in Afghanistan,
the activity there since mid-Auau~t reminds them
o Tan Son Nhut airbase in the late sixties, with a steady
stream of aircraft landing, unloading. and taking off, and
cargo being moved about in trucks.
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 Although we have only sketchy information on what Soviet
equipment and weapons are in Afghanistan or what has been
brought in by the airlift over the past month, there is no
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11. Moreover, the airlift to Afghanistan of 3,600 troops,
roughly the number of men in two fully manned Soviet air-
borne regiments, would not necessarily have been accompanied
by the airlift of all of the weapons and equ.ipment on the
TO/E of two airborne regiments. For example, there would
be no need for the antiaircraft weapons. Much of the other TO/E
equipment could be drawn from assets already in the country.
The.Soviets also would have access to a large
c equipment already in the
country.
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18. If the airlift merely represents implementation of the
"more of the same" option, the Pavlovskiy mission may not
be directly related to it. He may have been sent to determine
if anything further should be done beyond what is already
underway. The coincidence in timing, however, indicates
that there is at least the strong possibility that Pavlovskiy
was sent to oversee implementation of the decision that
brought about the large airlift. If so, it seems likely that
that decision involves more than simply increasing the number
of advisors and the supply of weapons.
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The Pavlovskiy Mission
16. The Pavlovskiy mission has been viewed by most Com-
munity analysts as a fact finding venture persuant to a
decision on possible further military steps the Soviets
might take in support of the Taraki regime. The possibility
remains, however, that Pavlovskiy was sent to Kabul to over-
see the implementation of a course already decided upon.
If this were true, the stature and military position of
Pavlovskiy--CinC of Soviet Ground Forces--would suggest
that-the decision..invo.lved more than simply "more of the
same"--i.e. advisors-and material.
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