DEFINITION OF NATIONAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003400020026-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 1, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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Approved For Relejse 2006ftllbt&ctoCiPc-RIDR$Q$15,, R003400020026-9
Washington, D.C. 20505
1 December 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Cochairmen, National/Tactical Interface
Steering Group
SUBJECT: Definition of National and Tactical Intelligence
1. III hear a good bit of what I believe is inaccurate utilization
of the terms "national" and "tactical" intelligence. Inaccuracies develop
from the fact of the very complex and difficult subject with which you are
wrestling. I would like to share with you my views on how we define
national and tactical intelligence, because unless there is full agreement
on this, your study can only end in controversy.
2e Ii believe that there are five bases on which you could divide
intelligence into national and tactical categories:
a. By the quality or nature of the intelligence activity and/or
output;
b. By who produces the intelligence;
c? By who utilizes the intelligence;
d. By who collects the intelligence;
e. By the program in which the activity appears.
3. II Subdivision by nature and quality: I find it difficult to
find any examples of intelligence which are uniquely national or uniquely
tactical in all circumstances. For instance, the most detailed tactical
intelligence activity might be a lookout with binoculars sighting four
tanks coming across the East German/West German border. Clearly, this is
primarily a matter of concern to the tactical commander. Yet, there are
many circumstances in which it would be brought immediately to the
attention of the President of the United States; e.g., it was the initia-
tion of hostilities; e.g., it was the appearance of an armored division
in an area where we had never noted or expected one before and during a
war. Similarly, during the Mayaguez crisis, the President was intimately
involved in details of the movement of boats with personnel in them,
normally a very tactical matter. At the other end of the spectrum, I
can hardly think of a piece of intelligence primarily intended for use at
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SUBJECT: Definition of National and Tactical Intelligence
the national level which is not of some concern to major tactical commanders.
In short, what is national and what is tactical by its nature varies with
the circumstances and with the level of command. Most frequently, one man's
tactics is another man's strategy.
4. I ISubdivision by producer: If the previous paragraph is correct,
it's almos axiomatic that no matter who produces the intelligence it is
going to be difficult to label it either national or tactical. In addition,
the way we are organized for producing intelligence there certainly is no
clear line between who does what on this particular ground.
5. a Subdivision by consumer: Again, no matter who the intended
consumer is, there may well be other consumers who are equally involved in
the question and it would be impossible to subdivide on this ground.
6. Subdivision by collector of intelligence: Collection systems,
especially t e large vacuum cleaner space systems, do not take into account
the eventual use of the information being collected. This is becoming more
apparent as processing and dissemination systems link the collector
directly to both national and tactical level users. As in the case of the
other instances, there is no clear line of demarcation in collection either.
7. ^ Program in which the activity appears: There is a clear line
of demarcation in programmatic terms; e.g., either the activity unit is
in the NFIP or it is not. The key criteria for placing an activity in the
NFIP is that it is primarily (not exclusively) in support of the national
level as opposed to the tactical level.
8.~ It therefore seems to me that what we are talking about in your
study is twofold:
a. Program and budget matters related to collection assets which
are designed to provide the best mix of capabilities to meet combined
national and tactical needs.
b. Tasking/dissemination procedures for existing capabilities
(regardless of what they were originally programmed to do) which
ensure the collected information meets the needs of both national
and tactical users.
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SUBJECT: Definition of National and Tactical Intelligence
9. " In this connection I would like to clarify my views on the
major concerns of the report. They should be:
a. How we conduct some review in the budget process to ensure
(1) There are sufficient combined assets to meet both
national and tactical intelligence needs.
(2) That there is not undue duplication between
national and tactical assets.
b. How we ensure that the information relevant to tactical
needs from nationally funded collection systems is made available
in a timely manner to the proper tactical'commanders, and con-
versely, that non-NFIP funded systems provide relevant and timely
information to the national level.
ER
gSFILDTUN
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FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
When you redo the testimony on the DID cuts, add the following
in the appropriate place:
Incidentally, the reports in the media that these
cuts were directed. by either the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
are totally erroneous. I have never even spoken
with either one of them on this subject, other than
keeping the Vice President informed of my decisions.
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