(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 48
• Content Type: REPORT

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A. Introduction
1. Following the establishment of the National Reconnaissance
Office and implementation of the National Reconnaissance Program,
certain problems and incidents have occurred which have demonstrated
a complete breakdown in the understanding of CIA's relationship to
the NRP. A brief summary of the NRO history as well as a capsule
narration of the various problems and incidents which have occurred
during the NRO's young life are included herewith to acquaint you with
the framework in which CIA is now called upon to cooperate. We feel
that the requirement for an overall coordinating body of the National
Reconnaissance Program is a sound one, but one in which CIA should
play a managerial, as well as a coordinating role, as oppose to its
present secondary membership.
2. In spite of the past differences with the Air Force which have
taxed our relations seriously we feel that the situation is salvagable
provided certain modifications and suggestions to the present NRO
agreements and understandings are adopted which will grant the
Agency .a senior partnership in the NR.P. These modifications and
suggestions are amplified as recommendations within this paper.
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1. The National Reconnaissance Office and the National
Reconnaissance Program were initially identified in writing on
6 September 1961 in a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, to Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director
of Central Intelligence. That memorandum, which was concurred
in by General C. P. Cabe11, the then Acting Director, CIA, defined
the management of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
and officially established on a covert basis a National Reconnai -sance
Office to manage the NRP. The Office was placed under the co-
direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy
Director (Plans), CIA. It was charged to include a small special
staff of personnel drawn from DOD and CIA. The Office was granted the
charter of direct control over all elements of the total reconnaissance
program, whether overt or covert. According to the 6 September
memorandum, decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office "will
be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance
Program made effective: within DOD by the exercise of the authority
delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; .within CIA, by the
Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned
duties The management and conduct of individual projects or
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elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be
assigned to the CIA as the operational agency."
2. On 15 November 1961, a working level meeting was held between
Colonel Martin, USAF and members of the OSA Staff. In that meet-
ing, Colonel Martin said that Dr. Charyk's stated view was that the
NRO would not become a single geographic entity confined to one office.
3. By 22 November, a working draft of the NRO functions and
responsibilities was forwarded to the Agency for comment by Colonel
Martin which designated CIA with the responsibility for security of
the National Reconnaissance Program and the handling of black contracts;
technical and operational management would be the sole responsibility
of the Air Force with CIA participating on a target selection group.
The CORONA Program was to continue under CIA operational manage-
ment since the project at that time was nearing a close.
4. On 7 December 1961, Mr. R. M. Bissell, the DD/P, gave
25X1 Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign
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Intelligence Advisory Board, a document titled "The Division of
Responsibility within the NRO." Mr. Bissell had received Dr. Charyk's
agreement to the document by telephone prior to submitting it to
In that document, the NRO was acknowledged as being
headed by co-directors, each of whom would act using the authority
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of his overt position within his own organization. With respect to
major programs, it allocated responsibilities of the CORONA/
MURAL/ARGON to CIA as primarily responsible for targeting,
operational planning, and control of payload operation; development
and procurement of photographic payloads and nose cones; and finally
security.. The Air Force was charged with launch scheduling and
launching; orbit and recovery operations; and the development and
procurement of boosters, orbit vehicles, and ELINT payloads. In
the SAMOS Program, the Air Force was held primarily responsible
for SAMOS with CIA in the supporting role particularly in target
and security planning. The OXCART Program was the primary
responsibility rof the CIA with the Air Force in a supporting role.
With respect especially to the later configurations of SAMOS and to
other advance systems, the document stated that "consideration will be
given to gradual modification of this distribution of responsibilities.
In general, it is clear that Air Force elements will retain primary
responsibility for operations and for fuel development and procure-
ment. For the most part, these activities not only .can but must be
'white,' that is conducted in a reasonably public fashion. CIA's main
contribution will be in target planning serving as the communications
channel for operational control and security and that development and
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procurement which must be 'black'." The paper went on to state
"consideration will also be given in due time to the desirability of
gradually converting the NRO into a more unified single office with
a single directing head. This development presumably will require
a delegation of authority from both the Secretary of Defense and Director
of Central Intelligence to the Director of the NRO so as to permit him
to exercise an appropriate degree of control over elements of both
agencies. It might also render appropriate some re-distribution of
responsibilities as between the two components of the NRO and a
change in budgetary procedures."
5. On 20 March 1962, Dr. Scoville as the DD/R forwarded in a
memorandum to the DCI an agreement for the management of the
National Reconnaissance Program. In that agreement, which had
been concurred in by Dr. Charyk, the Central Intelligence Agency was
tentatively assigned the primary responsibility for OXCART and CORONA
and future truly covert satellite projects. DOD, on the other hand, was
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and future semi-overt projects. (
? 6. On 20 March, James Cunningham recorded the following
comments relayed by Dr. Scoville concerning his meeting with the
DCI on 19 March. In that memorandum, three major reactions of the
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DCI to the proposed NRO management agreement were as follows:
IIa. The DCI does not favor a dual chairmanship for NRO. He
believes that a single source must be the chairman with the other
Agency's senior individual being the deputy chairman. The language
of the agreement will not mention individuals as such, but the DCI
is reportedly ready to concede to having Dr. Charyk as chairman,
with Dr. Scoville as deputy or vice chairman. Within this general
statement, however, the Director insists upon specific assignments
of projects to each Agency; i. e., OXCART to CIA, SAMOS to USAF.
Amplifying this, it is reasonable to infer that the senior responsible
official will be determined in each case by the assignment of the
project to a given group; i. e., Charyk to head SAMOS, Scoville to
head OXCART.
"b. The DCI wishes to have language written into the draft agree-
ment specifying that programing and even planning on all new collection
systems will be done jointly by the NRO chairman and the deputy
chairman.
."c. Lastly, it is the Director's wish that CIA control, through
all security clearances for all programs
within the purview of the NRO."
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7. On 2 April 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Under Secretary of the Air
Force, forwarded a memorandum to the DD/R stating the delegation
of responsibilities for the LANYARD Project. Within that Project,
contract administration of the payload and those portions of the recovery
system which must be procured under covert contract were assigned
the responsibility of CIA. Technical management of all aspects of
LANYARD including the payload were assigned to the Director of
Special Projects, OSAF (General Greer). Operationally the CIA was
charged with the responsibility.for pre-mission planning and on-orbit
operational decisions in the same manner as currently followed in the
CORONA Project.
8. On 5 April, Dr. Scoville replied to Dr. Charyk stating CIA's
agreement to accept responsibility for the operational aspects of the
LANYARD Program as well as contractual administration for payload
and certain recovery systems.
9. On 2 May 1962, the Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense
co-signed the agreement between the Secretary of Defense and Director
of Central Intelligence on the responsibilities of the. National
Reconnaissance Office. In that document, CIA was designated as an
executive agent for the Director, NRO for those covert projects already
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under its management and such additional covert projects as are
assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence. The Director, NRO was held responsible for
funding the National Reconnaissance Program. The agreement stated
that DOD funds will be allocated on an individual project basis! 25X1
NRO
NRO
CIA will be responsible for funding covert projects for which
it has management responsibility. Secondly, the D/NRO was charged
with the responsibility for all NRP contracts with CIA, as executive
agent of the D/NRO, responsible for administering procurements and
contracting for covert projects for which it is assigned responsibility.
The D/NRO was held responsible for advance plans (post calendar
year 1962) in support of the NRP. In view of the DCI's major responsi-
bility to the NSC for all intelligence programs, all NRO advance
planning will be coordinated with CIA.
10. On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense his agreement that Dr. Joseph Charyk be named Director of
the NRO.
11. On 22 to 23 May, Dr. Charyk, General Greer, General Curtin,
Colonel Martin, and Colonel Geary met with Dr. Scoville, Colonel Beerli,
25X1A Mr. Gene Keifer, Mr. George Miller, and
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establish the mechanics to functionally carry out the May 2 agreement
regarding the NRO.
12. On 15 June, Dr. Charyk forwarded a memorandum to the
DD/R which stated, "In regard to our agreement that the NRO Staff
should be put into a single office located as closely as possible to the
D/NRO, I believe that the satellite operations functions requires an
early resolution"; Dr. Charyk proposed that all satellite projects of the
National Reconnaissance Program be handled in the same manner by
a single operations unit of the NRO Staff, which staff would also make
all on-orbit selection between target coverage options based on target,
weather situation, or intelligence factors. He further proposed that
the nucleus of the CIA satellite operations unit be integrated within the
NRO Staff.
13. On 26 June, regarding the procedure for initigion of overflight
reconnaissance, Dr. Scoville proposed to the D/NRO that the Committee
on Overhead Reconnaissance would submit its recommendations on
reconnaissance for U.S. intelligence needs to USIB, who in turn would
forward its own recommendations to the NRO for submission to the
Special Group. However, in the case of on-going programs which
have already been suggested to the aforesaid procedure, COMOR will
forward its recommendation for additional reconnaissance directly
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14. On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to
the President on Intelligence Matters, directed a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence wherein
he remarked that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its report
to the President noted the agreements that had been reached between
the DCI and the Secretary of Defense with respect to the organization,
management, and functioning of the NRO with the following comment:
"We believe that the actual structure of the documents is inadequate
to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and
distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We,therefore recommend
a continuing study of a more satisfactory, permanent documentary basis
for the NRO with particular references to existing NSC directives
with which the present NRO plan may be in conflict." Mr. Bundy
indicated that the President had approved the Board's recommendation
and was therefore requesting the DCI and Secretary of Defense that
appropriate implementing action be taken and that a joint report of
the progress made be furnished to the President and the Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.by 15 September.
15. On 12 July in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from
the DCI, as Chairman of the USIB, Mr. McCone stated, "The US1B
also wished to note that they felt that the FIREFLY proposal had
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reached higher authority without adequate consideration by the NRO
or the USIB: The Board therefore believes that in the future for this or any
similar reconnaissance system, the NRO should first, as a result of
coordinative development and testing, advise the USIB if the NRO
believes that it is a suitable reconnaissance system including all
necessary information on capabilities and characteristics of the system
involved. The USIB would then consider the use of the system to meet
appropriate intelligence requirements and make recommendations
relative to targeting and priorities for consideration by higher authority.
16. On 19 July, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO, replied to the
DD/R's memorandum concerning the procedure for initiation of over-
flight reconnaissance. In that memorandum, Dr. Charyk stated that
it was his opinion that as a normal procedure, the COMOR, which is
ticomm410,47-fc
solely concerned with requirements, should submit its iwoonnet-s-eaprvze
for U.S. intelligence needs to USIB. The USIB in turn would forward
its recommendation to the NRO. The NRO would forward its specific
recommendations to the Special Group for a decision. In cases where
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significant new factors entered or where new systems were
the NRO as a normal rule would forward its assessment to USIB for
comments and would include these in its portion tb the Special Group.
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In the case of on-orbit programs, the NRO treatment would be
perfunctory, but Dr. Charyk felt it desirable that all such matters
go to the Special Group through the NRO since under the charter the
NRO had the operational responsibility for the total effort.
17. On 23 July 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO forwarded
a memorandum to NRO Program Directors and the Director of the
NRO Staff outlining the organization and functions of the NRO. In
outlining the overall concept of the organization and operation of the
NRO, Dr. Charyk established the NRO as an operating agency separately
organized, concealed entirely within other agencies using personnel
and other resources of these agencies on a full- or part-time basis as
required. The NRO was designed to consist of the D/NRO, the NRO
Staff, the NRO Program Directors, and their Project Directors, and
any Staff Officers at that present time. At that time, there were two
NRO Program Directors: the Director, Program A being responsible
Ti-tat DIR