CABLE FROM CIA TO DEPT OF STATE (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000400020008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 1, 1978
• Content Type: CABLE

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CONF? NFAC/CSw2 INFO: RF, FILE, (4/P)
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF AP MEAB 78.09/4 FOR JUNE 19, 1978.
1. OPEC; OIL PRICE DEADLOCK.
25X1 II OPEC OIL MINISTERS NOW MEETING: IN GENEVA HAVE FAILED
$0 FA REACH AGREEMENT ON OIL PRICING. SAUDI ARABIA HAS
PUSHED FOR NO CHANGE IN PRICES, WHILE OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE
URGED HIGHER PRICES TO OFFSET THE LOST PURCHASING POWER OF OIL
REVENUES CAUSED BY THE FALL IN THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR SINCE
THE: PREVIOUS PRICE INCREASE IN JANUARY 1977.
025X1 SAUDI CROWN PRINCE.FAHD ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN
GENEVA DAY, APPARENTLY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN AN EXTRA
SESSION MONDAY. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER FAHD'S ROLE WILL BE TO
0 LEND STRENGTH TO THE SAUDI POSITION OR TO ENGINEER A COMPROMISE
WITH THE ADVOCATES OF HIGHER PRICES.
125X1 II MINISTERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE CALLED FOR EITHER
A DIRECT PRICE.INCREASE OR FOR DENOMINATING OIL IN TERMS OF
A GROUP OF CURRENCIES IN ORDER TO PROTECT AGAINST FURTHER DE-
CLINES IN THE DOLLAR. SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI HAS ARGUED
THAT THE CURRENT WORLD OIL SURPLUS PRECLUDES'A PRICE INCREASE.
HE FORESEES A STRENGTHENING DOLLAR AND CONSEQUENT RECOVERY IN
.4
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THE PURCHASING POWER OF OIL REVENUES.
2. BENIN: CUBAN AND SOVIET INTEREST.
25X1
25X1
25X1 BENIN HAS RECEIVED INCREASED AMOUNTS OF MILITARY
EQUI ND ADDITIONAL ADVISERS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND
CUBA OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE COUNTRY'S RADICAL ANTI-WESTERN
PRESIDENT KEREKOU JUSTIFIES THIS SUPPORT AS NECESSARY TO PRO-
TECT HIS COUNTRY.
25X1 I //AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW KEREKOU EARLY LAST
YEAR.GAVE THE USSR AND CUBA A PRETEXT TO INCREASE THE MILITARY
AID THEY HAD BEEN PROVIDING BENIN. SINCE THEN, THE SOVIETS ARE
REPORTED TO HAVE PROVIDED BENIN WITH ARMORED VEHICLES, ANTIAIR-
CRAFT WEAPONS, SMALL ARMS AND AN ESTIMATED 30 MILITARY ADVISERS.
CUBAN INTEREST IN BENIN HAS ALSO INCREASED SINCE THE ATTEMPTED
COUP--WHICH THE CUBANS MAY HAVE HELPED SUPPRESS. THERE ARE NOW
ABOUT 55 CUBAN MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISERS IN THE COUNTRY.//
25X1 0 KEREKOU WANTS TO ACQUIRE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, AND
SOME BENINESE PERSONNEL ARE SAID TO BE TRAINING ON MIG FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT IN THE USSR.
25X1 //SOVIET AND CUBAN MOTIVATION FOR AIDING BENIN
IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. SOVIET NAVAL'UNITS HAVE MADE REGULAR
VISITS TO COTONOU, AND ACCESS TO BENIN'S PORT AND AIR FACILI-
TIES MAY BE A FACTOR. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS MAY ALSO SEE BENIN
AS A STEPPING STONE TO EXPAND,THEIR INFLUENCE IN WEST AFRICA.
IN ANY EVENT, THEIR PRESENCE HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY KEREKOU WHO,
IN ADDITION TO HIS DESIRE FOR MILITARY PROTECTION, PROBABLY
SEES SOVIET AND CUBAN INTEREST AS A RESPONSE TO HIS ATTEMPTS TO
IMPOSE A MARXIST IDEOLOGY ON THE COUNTRY,//
25X1 //BENIN'S ARMY LACKS THE.TRAINING TO ABSORB
QUICKLY: ALL THE MATERIEL IT HAS BEEN RECEIVING. IN ANY EVENT,
AN ATTACK FROM ITS AFRICAN NEIGHBORS--DESPITE KEREKOU'S OB-
SESSION THAT A MILITARY THREAT EXISTS--IS UNLIKELY.//
125X1 0 KEREKOU'S.PERCEIVEO NEED FOR COMMUNIST PROTECTION
AND, HIS DEVOTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM ARE PROBABLY SUF-
FICIENT TO SUSTAIN MOSCOW'S INTEREST. KEREKOU'S RADICAL BEHAVIOR
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MAY BE TEMPERED SOMEWHAT BY HIS COUNTRY'S CONTINUING HEAVY DE-
1 PENDENCE ON WESTERN ECONOMIC AID.
3.//PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: SUMMIT PLANNED.
125X1 I ANGOLAN PRESIDENT NETO AND PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT EANES
PLAN ET THIS MONTH IN GUINEA-BISSAU TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE
A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES. IMMEDIATE OBJEC-
TIVES APPEAR LIMITED TO DISCUSSING TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOP-.
ERATION, BOTH LEADERS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN EX-
1 PANDING ANGOLA'S TIES WITH THE WEST, A POLICY THAT MIGHT LESSEN
ANGOLAN DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR AND CUBA. THE PORTUGUESE BELIEVE
PROGRESS TOWARD THESE GOALS DEPENDS ON NETO'S ABILITY TO OVER-
COME OPPOSITION AT HOME AND ON PORTUGAL'S SUCCESS IN ELICITING
EARLY WESTERN SUPPORT//.
25X1 0 //DISCUSSION AND PLANNING FOR A PORTUGUESE-ANGOLAN SUM-
MIT BEGAN LAST DECEMBER, BUT SEVERAL FACTORS INTERVENED. EACH
SIDE HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE.OTHER'S MOTIVES IN PURSUING
CLOSER. RELATIONS. SCHEDULING A SUMMIT WAS COMPLICATED BY.NETO'S
UNCERTAIN HEALTH AND BY THE TIMING OF PRESIDENT EANES':RECENT
VISITS TO BRAZIL? VENEZUELA, AND THE US. IN ADDITION, THE PORTU-
GUESE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT HOLDING A MEETING BEFORE THE. SITUATION
IN SOUTHERN ZAIRE HAD QUIETED//.
25X1 0//SOMEIOF THESE OBSTACLES WERE OVERCOME LAST MONTH WHEN
MELO ANTUNES, A NOTED LEFTIST AND EANES' PERSONAL EMMISSARY,
TRAVELED TO ANGOLA TO EXPLORE THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT WITH
NETO AND OTHER ANGOLAN LEADERS. HIS VISIT WAS FOLLOWED SOON BY
M A FLURRY OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS--SOME MEDIATED BY LEADERS OF.
OTHER FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES--THAT CULMINATED LAST WEEK IN
THE DISPATCH OF NGOLA'S FIRST AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL//.
25X1 0//EAVES' ABILITY.TO DISASSOCIATE HIS CURRENT INITIATIVE
FROM ANGOLAN INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES WAS ALSO IMPORTANT IN
PRODUCING.A FAVORABLE CLIMATE. HE WAS PRAISED BY THE ANGOLAN
FOREIGN MINISTER FOR ABSTAINING FROM GENERAL WESTERN CONDEMNA-
TION OF CUBA'S MILITARY ROLE IN ANGOLA. THE PORTUGUESE HAVE
ALSO.ABANDONED THEIR EARLIER INSISTENCE ON PRECONDITIONS FOR
ANY FORMAL AGREEMENT--RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NETO AND JONAS
SAVIMBI'S REBELS AND A REDUCTION IN CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE
25X1
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IN ANGOLA.//
25X1 IL//PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE SUMMIT SUGGESTS THAT THE'
TALKS WILL FOCUS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC
` COOPERATION,.PERHAPS WITH SOME DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AID TO.
ANGOLA. EAVES, HOWEVER, SEES FORMAL AGREEMENTS. IN THESE;AREASww
WHICH. COULD LEAD TO LUCRATIVE TRADE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGMENTS
AS WELL AS TO. THE RETURN OF BADLY NEEDED PORTUGUESE TECHNICIANS
TO ANGOLA--AS MINIMAL OBJECTIVES. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR A PORTUGUESE LEAD IN OPENING ANGOLA TO THE WEST//.
25X1 IF/THE LATTER OBJECTIVE HAS INTRIGUED EANES FOR SOME.
TIME AND REMAINS THE MAJOR LONG-TERM GOAL OF HIS ANGOLAN POL-
ICY. HE RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH AN OPENING WILL REQUIRE
BOTH THE STABILIZATION OF THE ANGOLAN MILITARY SITUATION AND
WESTERN ECONOMIC AID THAT FAR EXCEEDS PORTUGAL'S LIMITED CA-
PACITY//. 0 25X1
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5. LIBYA.
25X1 //THE.LIBYAN CENTRAL BANK IS APPARENTLY PREPAR-
ING TO RECALL ALL OUTSTANDING DINAR NOTES AND ISSUE A NEW CUR-
RENCY. ONLY FORMALLY DECLARED ASSETS UP TO A CERTAIN MAXIMUM
LIMIT WILL LIKELY BE.ELIGIBLE FOR EXCHANGE. INDIVIDUALS WHO
HAVE BEEN HOARDING DINARS PROBABLY WILL NOT DECLARE ALL~THEIR
HOLDINGS FOR FEAR OF BEING BRANDED ANTISOCIAL.//
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25X1 I _J //THESE ACTIONS BY THE CENTRAL BANK WOULD BE
` CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT QADHAFI'S CALL FOR LIMITATIONS ON
WEALTH. IN RECENT MONTHS, MANY WEALTHY INDIVIDUALS HAVE CONVERTED
THEIR DINARS TO OTHER ASSETS OR SOLD THEM ON THE FLOURISHING
BLACK MARKET, THUS AVOIDING THE IMPACT OF THE NEW REGULATIONS.
6. USSR-AFGHANISTAN.
25X1 D
.7. OMAN.
25X1
25X1 II //THE ATTACK.ON AN OMANI ARMY CONVOY BY THE.
MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE.LIBERATION OF OMAN ON 7 JUNE
-?
TWO SOLDIERS WERE. KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED--WAS THE SECOND REBEL
OPERATION IN DHOFAR PROVINCE IN A WEEK. FIVE.BRITISH CIVILIAN
TECHNICIANS WERE KILLED IN THE OTHER INCIDENT. THE ATTACKS
WERE PROBABLY MEANT TO MARK THE 13TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OR-
GANIZATION LAST FRIDAY.//
25X1 0 25X1X
DO NOT JtLitVt 1Mt AIIALKS 516NAL A LARGE-SCALE RESUR-
25X1X
GENCE OF THE REBELLION--WHICH WAS LARGELY QUELLED IN DECEMBER
1975 WITH THE AID OF IRANIAN TROOPS--BUT THEY ANTICIPATE'MORE
ATTACKS ON "SOFT" TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY..THIS.UNALARMED VIEW
IS BASED ON THE POOR STRATEGIC AND LOGISTIC POSITION OF`THE:
REBELS. A HANDFUL OF,HARDCORE REBELS ARE STILL AT LARGE IN
THE DHOFAR.MOUNTAINS, BUT RESUPPLY FROM NEIGHBORING SOUTH YE-
MEN IS DIFFICULT. THE COMING THREE-MONTH MONSOON PERIOD-COULD,
HOWEVER, TIE DOWN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND MAKE RESUPPLY OF THE
REBELS EASIER.//
25X1 0 SOUTH YEMENI LEADER SALIM RUBAYI ALI STRONGLY RE.
ITERATED HIS GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT OF THE REBELS LAST WEEK.
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ORIG NFAC/CS
ENO OF ' MESSAGE
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