PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN ATTITUDES ON THE RHODESIAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-91-6-31-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 31, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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C rRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
31 August 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
FROM George Bush
Director
SUBJECT Present South AfxZican Attitudes on the Rhodesian
ituation
The attached memorandum may be of assistance to you in your dis-
cussions of African problems during the next few weeks. The memorandum
was prepared within the Central Intelligence Agency and has not been
coordinated with the other intelligence agencies. We are sending
copies of this memorandum to Ambassador Schaufele and to the Director
of INR, and plan no'further dissemination.
Attachment
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31 August 1976
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: Present South African Attitudes on the
Rhodesian Situation
-- Despite the ambivalent attitudes toward Rhodesia that exist
among South African whites, South African policy toward
Salisbury has by and large followed two key tenets: busi-
ness-as-usual, and non-interference in Rhodesian affairs.
Although Vorster has discreetly pushed Ian Smith toward a
negotiated solution, the South African Government's commit-
ment to these tenets has limited Pretoria's actions.
-- South Africa has continued to provide Rhodesia access to
vital military and economic support.
- As long as the Smith government can pay for such support,
it will be extremely difficult to persuade the South
Africans to regard the continuing shipment of supplies,
to Rhodesia as anything other than normal business.
- A change of South African policy in this regard would
be seen domestically as a repudiation of Pretoria's long-
held position against politically motivated economic
sanctions.
-- The strongest arguments in favor of a South African disengage-
ment from support of Rhodesia may derive from Pretoria's con-
cern about its own continuing racial strife, and worries about
the South African economy.
Racial Strife
- South African whites are deeply concerned about the extent
of the rioting in their country and indications that militant
This memorandum has been prepared by the Central Intelligence
Agency. It was drafted by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence and the
Directorate of Operations.
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students are having some success in involving blacks in
work stoppages that could, if continued, cause serious
industrial disruption.
There is a fair chance that they sense of emergency which
has developed would favor public acceptance of any curtail-
ment of support to Rhodesia that Vorster presented as
essential to promote internal security.
The South African Economy
When -- but only when,-- the Rhodesians become unable to pay
for purchases in South Africa, Pretoria's need to conserve
dwindling foreign exchange reserves may become the most
persuasive reason (within South Africa) for curtailing mili-
tary support to Salisbury.
We cannot estimate when this time will come, but even now,
concern in South Africa over falling gold prices, recent
currency devaluations, import controls, major increases in
military expenditures, and increases in the general cost of
living may be strengthening sentiment against support for
Rhodesia.
In sum, to the extent that the South Africans see their own
domestic political and economic problems as likely to mount
in coming months, the chances of a change in their present
policies toward Rhodesia will increase.
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THE DETAILS
Background
1. Ever since the Rhodesian Unilateral DecLaration of
Independence (UDI) in 1965, Pretoria's dealings with the
Smith regime have reflected ambivalent attitudes among South
African whites. The Afrikaners as well as the English-speak-
ing South Africans have a strong sense of solidarity with the
white Rhodesians, due to kinship ties and a long-held belief
that a white-ruled Rhodesia is an important defense perimeter
for white supremacy in South Africa. Although most South
Africans applauded UDI, government leaders recognized that
it involved serious risks for South Africa.
2. The economic sanctions against Rhodesia that ensued
from UDI posed hard choices for government leaders.in Pretoria.
South Africans have substantial economic interests in Rhodesia,
but more important, they regard the UN sanctions against
Rhodesia as a dangerous precedent, because international
critics of apartheid have long advocated mandatory sanctions
against South Africa. Responsible South African leaders
feared that blatant participation in Rhodesian "sanctions
busting" would spur new demands for mandatory sanctions
against South Africa. South African leaders also saw early
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on that UDI would goad Rhodesian black nationalists toward
insurgency, that Rhodesian appeals for military aid would
strike responsive chord!; among South Africans, and that
South African assistance to Rhodesia would further inflame
hostile attitudes throughout black Africa.
3. Such considerations led then prime minster Verwoerd
to say privately within a year of UDI that a Rhodesian
settlement would be good for South Africa, provided the
transition to majority rule was stretched out for many years.
By mid-1974, when it became clear that the new government-in
Portugal would soon abandon its African colonies, Prime
Minister Vorster perceived that Pretoria had to choose be-
tween openly propping up Smith or working toward coexistence
with a black government in Mozambique. By the end of the
year Vorster was discreetly pushing Smith toward a com-
promise settlement that, he hoped, would bring about. an
orderly transition to a moderate, black government within
five to ten years. As the four "front-line" presidents be-
came involved in the Rhodesian negotiations, Vorster en-
visaged a Rhodesian settlement opening an era of collabora-
tion between Pretoria and black governments throughout
southern Africa. Vorster's dealings with Smith, however,
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have been hampered by the gap between the strong pro-Rhodesia
attitudes among South African whites and Vorster's own stated
goal.
4. In the initial response to UDI, former prime minister
Verwoerd declared "non--interference" and "business-as-usual"
to be the principles governing South Africa's relations with
Rhodesia; these watchwords have in fact marked the limits of
subsequent South African actions. Pretoria has withheld
diplomatic.recognition of the Smith regime.and refrained
from open economic or military aid. Nevertheless, South Africa
has provided Rhodesia with substantial economic and military
support, which has become increasingly vital for the Smith
regime under the cumulative impact of sanctions and insur-
gency.
5. The most important single aspect of South African
support for Rhodesia since UDI has been providing transit
for an increasing portion of Rhodesia's overseas trade.
1973 some 70 percent of Rhodesia's overseas trade passed
through seaports in Mozambique.; since Mozambique closed
its borders with Rhodesia last March, South African ports
and railroads have handled almost all of Rhodesia's over-
seas trade. Much of the.foreign capital invested in Rhodesia
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since UDI has come from South Africa, and South Africans
have bought significant amounts of the Rhodesian exports
that have been embargoed elsewhere. Meanwhile, the South
African government has stood ostensibly aloof, neither en-
forcing international sanctions nor openly facilitating the
manifold rearrangements. In reality the government-operated
railroads and harbors have made substantial preparations t
handle additional traffic from Rhodesia, government officials
have accepted patently false documentation that masks the
origin of Rhodesian produce, and Pretoria may have provided
some secret loans to Salisbury.
South African Military Aid
6. Although South African military aid to Rhodesia has
not been extensive, it has become critical with the recent
expansion of foreign-backed insurgency. Salisbury depends
heavily on Pretoria for military materiel because UN arms
sanctions have been more widely observed than the ban on
non-military trade. Sparse reporting indicates that at
least 12 Alouette III helicopters from the South African
Air Force are stationed in Rhodesia, and that Pretoria is
supplying some Eland armored cars, spare parts for ground
equipment and aircraft, small arms, and munitions. It seems
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unlikely that the mounting tempo of Rhodesian counterinsurgency
operations since last January could have been sustained with-
out some increase in the flow of supplies from or through
South Africa.
7. The South African and Rhodesian military establish-
ments have long maintained close, albeit informal, contacts.
A secret training agreement enables Rhodesians to receive
training in South Africa and provides for small numbers of
South African instructors and observers in Rhodesia. Pretoria,
however, has kept its military presence to the minimum that
is essential to implement its ancillary support for the
Rhodesian counterinsurgency program. The only major excep-
tion was the gradual buildup of the South African paramilitary
police contingent in Rhodesia from several hundred in 1972
to at least 1,500 by late 1973. Although casualties in-
curred by this contingent made apparent its combat role,
official publicity glossed over the extent of the buildup
and implied the force was in Rhodesia primarily to gain
realistic Craning.
Efforts at Negotiation
8. The gradual withdrawal of the South African police
from Rhodesia, completed in August 1975, was an integral
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part of Vorster's joint mediation efforts, along with Kaunda,
Khama, Machel and Nyerere, that aimed to bring about a com-
promise settlement between Smith and the black nationalists.
The joint efforts began with discreet exchanges of views
between Vorster and Kaunda. It was Vorster's urging that
induced Smith in October 1974 to release imprisoned na-
tionalist leaders for talks in Lusaka with Kaunda and the
exiled insurgents, to conclude a truce with the newly formed
ANC in December, to proceed with the settlement talks with
the combined ANC leadership that collapsed a year ago, and
to renew negotiations last December with Joshua Nkomo.
Vorster's prime lever throughout was the police withdrawal.
He warned Smith repeatedly that the withdrawal would proceed,.
even if he failed to conclude a settlement- Meanwhile, the
withdrawal induced the four African presidents to restrain
guerrilla incursions from their countries.
9. The agreement on modalities that preceded the
Victoria Falls conference included a pledge that Pretoria,
along with the governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
and Zambia, would guarantee any settlement that resulted
from the conference. Vorster's leading role in the pre-
liminary negotiations was further dramatized by his public
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meeting with.Kaunda at Victoria Falls. Since the collapse
of the talks and the resurgence of Guerrilla warfare, how-
ever, Vorster has avoided any open move that might suggest
he is pressuring Smith to compromise. He reportedly has
warned Smith privately that South African troops will not
come-to his rescue if the insurgency grows worse, but a
government minister's statement to this effect was denied
when it appeared in print.
10. The sensitivity of South African leaders to pro-white
Rhodesia sentiments among their own constituents is also
reflected in Foreign Minister Muller's speech at a provincial
congress of the National Party on August 13. Muller intimated
disapproval of a recent Rhodesian strike against guerrillas
inside Mozambique, implied that Pretoria might welcome a
peaceful settlement that resulted in majority rule, but
stressed approval of efforts to guarantee the rights and
interests of the white minority.
11. Vorster's extreme caution since the abortive Victoria
Falls conference indicates that sobering experience has in-
clined him to adhere more closely to the established guide-
lines of "non-interference" and business-as-usual." Smith
has implied in press and television interviews that Vorster
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pushed him against his better judgment into negotiating with
the insurgents instead of crushing them. Vorste.r's sensi-
tivity to such criticism will make him very reluctant to show
his hand again in settlement negotiations unless he feels
sure the settlement will demonstrate that he is salvaging
more than Smith could from the wreckage of white rule in
Rhodesia. Only such an outcome could vindicate, in the South
African political context, any significant departure from
the "non-interference" doctrine.
12. Vorster will also find it difficult to impose any
substantial restrictions on Rhodesia's trade with or through
South Africa in order to coerce Smith. Any South African
prime minister would be hard pressed to repudiate Pretoria's
stand against politically motivated interference with nor-
mal international trade. Although Vorster reportedly warned
Smith before Mozambique closed its borders with Rhodesia
last March that the South African transportation system
could not handle the volume of Rhodesian traffic then going
through Mozambique, this in fact was accomplished. At the
time, as Vorster knew, Smith's talks with Nkomo were stalled;
the break-off was announced several weeks later. During the
interval, Vorster could have coerced Smith by quietly im-
peding the rerouting of Rhodesian traffic from Mozambique
to South Africa.
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13. In the military field as well Vorster will find it
hard to impose a substantial curtailment of supplies to Rho-
desia. Vorster orchestrated the police withdrawal in order
to push Smith toward settlement talks, but the two types of
support for the Rhodesian counterinsurgency program are not
analogous from Vorster's standpoint. The police buildup was
a departure from the non-interference doctrine; when the
withdrawal was completed, a South African spokesman said it
was intended to avoid any suggestion of interference in Rho-
desian affairs. By contrast, Rhodesia probably pays cash
for South African military supplies; the'Rhodesians would
complain--and most South Africans would agree--that a cutoff
of military sales would be a violation of the non-interfer-
ence doctrine.
14. Furthermore, the police withdrawal was completed
during a truce between Smith and the ANC leaders, and as the
four African presidents who had joined Vorster in backing the
truce were maintaining some restraints on the guerrillas.
Since late 1975, however, the four presidents have been pub-
licly backing the "liberation war," and as long as they main-
taro their belligerent stance, it will be politically very
difficult for Vorster to curtail South Africa's current sup-
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port for the Rhodesian counterinsurgency program. Rather,
if the insurgency continues to expand with obvious foreign
backing, Vorster will be under increasing political pressures
to provide additional military supplies, and eventually to
send combat troops.
Vorster's Present Position
15. Vorster's current attitudes suggest that while he
will be reluctant to curtail military shipments, he will try
to resist pressures to increase them. His hope is that a
worsening military situation will make Smith, or a successor,
come to terms with some grouping of black nationalists that
might maintain a stable government. We believe that Vorster
would do his utmost to avoid sending troops to Rhodesia, ex-
cept to protect an evacuation of whites. Sending troops to
defend Smith would incur a high risk of hostilities with Mo-
zambique, which would forfeit the important economic ties
that Pretoria has carefully maintained since Machel came to
power. Furthermore, the outcome of South Africa's military
intervention in Angola apparently has hardened Vorster's
belief that South African troops in Rhodesia would provoke
additional Communist aid to the insurgents. He appears es-
pecially anxious to avert the increased Soviet presence in
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Mozambique that would accompany a buildup of Soviet or Cuban
aid to the insurgents.
16. Nevertheless, even though Vorster is the unrivaled
leader of the ruling National Party,. he usually avoids im-
posing a decision regarding any controversial issue. Rather,
he straddles and temporizes until there is broad acceptance
of whatever he believes should be done. Because he appears
especially anxious to avoid a divisive showdown on the Rho-
desia problem, the limits he sets on additional supplies to
Smith are likely to be somewhat flexible. if the Rhodesian
security forces appear to be hard pressed but staving off de-
feat, we cannot discount the possibility that Vorster would
allow some increases in the flow of supplies as long as a
truce was unattainable.
17. Vorster presumably will be more anxious to disen-
gage from Rhodesia if the Rhodesian forces repeatedly conduct
major strikes inside Mozambique, Zambia, or Botswana.
would regard such highly provocative actions as undercutting
the ultimate purpose of his quest for a regional detente--to
prevent neighboring countries from serving as staging areas
for black insurgency in South Africa or Namibia. Many South
Africans, however, are likely to take an opposite.view; they
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discount the feasibility of detente with the black states,
r,.nd would applaud aggressive actions by the Rhodesians as
showing that Rhodesia is still an effective bulwark for South
Africa.
18. Any escalation of the Rhodesian conflict is likely
to intensify current controversy on the subject among South
Africans. A dramatic expansion of foreign-based insurgency
in Namibia would similarly heat up the inconclusive ideo-
logical debate that has simmered within the National Party.
Whenever such untoward happenings abroad touch off rhetori-
cal fireworks at home, Vorster is likely to sidestep doctrinal
debate and focus on the practicalities, assessing proposed
actions in terms of costs and resources.
Restraints on South African Su lies
19. Confronted with calls for increasing the flow of
weapons to Rhodesia or for sending combat troops, Vorster
is likely to ask whether South Africa can afford such out
lays. The costs of increasing military shipments to Rhode-
sia would sooner or later exceed Rhodesia's limited foreign
exchange holdings and pose the issue of whether South Af-
rica should assume the financial burden. Furthermore, South
Africa cannot export large amounts of indigenously produced
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arms, equi-?ment, and supplies without depleting reserve
stocks for its own armed forces.
20. Deciding the affordable limits of South African mil-
itary aid to Rhodesia would involve Pretoria in assessing a
broad range of variables, from needed troop strengths in
South Africa and Namibia to prospects for the South African
economy, which is highly vulnerable to adverse international
trends. If Vorster does feel it necessary to take a public
stand against aid for Rhodesia, he might well rest his case
on the persistence of serious rioting among South Africa's
urban blacks since last June, and on the economic exigencies.
21. The rioting that has spread from Soweto to many ti
black townships across the country is by far the most exten-
sive urban violence in South African history. So far the
regular and paramilitary police have coped fairly effectively,
and the military forces, with minor exceptions, have not been
directly involved. Hence there is no immediate conflict be-
tween internal security needs and sending some combat troops
to Rhodesia. On the other hand, South African whites are
deeply worried over the extent of the rioting and the indi-
cations that militant students are trying--with some success-
to involve blacks in work stoppages and ether actions that
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could, if continued, cause serious industrial disruption.
Although the rioting has spurred some public criticism of
the government's performance, on balance we believe the
sense of emergency would favor public acceptance of any cur-
tailment of aid to Rhodesia that Vorster presents as.essen-
tial for internal security.
22. Pretoria's need to conserve dwindling foreign ex-
change reserves may become the most persuasive reason--to
South Africa--for curtailing military support whenever the
Rhodesians are unable to pay for procurement or openly ap-
peal for South African troops. South Africa's foreign ex-
change bind, due to falling gold prices and other interna-
tional trends since early 1975, has been brought home t
the public by appreciable currency devaluations, import con-
trols, and increases in living costs. Even before.the
Soweto riots, commentators were warning that unemployment
among urban blacks was increasing at a rate that could fuel
smoldering unrest. Government leaders have acknowledged
that major increases in military expenditures since 1974
.are a significant factor in the foreign exchange bind.
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