COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
MEMORANDUM
lp
THE ' ?~ STJ i HAS 51 ,.r.-~.,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET(GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
\_~- V
7617
INFORMATION
26 November 1975
THE PRESIDENT
BRENT SCOW.CROFT(f`s' .
Communications with the Middle East
The memorandum at Tab A was given to you by a private citizen who is
concerned that our communications capabilities to the Middle East are
shaky. You asked for a report on the matter.
U. S. communications in the Mid-East have been substantially degraded
by two recent incidents: (1) the failure of the Atlantic Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) satellite, and (2) extensive damage to
the U. S. Naval Communications Station at Asmara, Ethiopia, caused
by the September 1975 attack by Eritrean insurgents.
A replacement satellite to restore DSCS service to the Mid-East is
planned for launch in May 1977. In the interim, satellite communica-
tions capabilities are being provided in most Mid-East areas by leased
commercial circuits over the INTELSAT satellite, as well as use of the
United Kingdom's SKYNET satellite, and will be augmented by the Cap-
filler Satellite early next year.
Until the time of the insurgent attack, the Asmara communications station
provided long-range high-frequency radio communications for U. S. Naval
units operating in the northwest Indian Ocean, contingency communications
for.U. S. military operations in the Middle East, or Persian Gulf areas
(disaster relief or airlift, for example), and communications to Presi-
dential or VIP aircraft (MYSTIC STAR). Partial restoration of opera-
tions at Asmara is expected in March 1976. In the interim, limited high
frequency radio communications with reduced coverage is provided by
other U. S. military installations in Europe, and from the U. S. commu-
nications sites at Bahrein and Diego Garcia.
The long-term future need for the communications station at Asmara is
being addressed by an interagency study group directed by NSSM 233. A
number of alternatives for the station and the functions it performs are
SECRET(GDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08
SECRET(GDS)
Until the time of the insurgent attack, the Asmara communications station
used a combination of high frequency (HF) ,,,radio," UHF ground-to""-airs and
DSCS II links back to the C ONUS to provide communications support for
three major functions: - (1) U. S. Naval tactical fleet communications to and
from units operating in the northwest Indian Ocean (2) contingency cow-
munications for any U. S. military operation (disaster relief,. airlift, etc)
or Task Force deployed to the Africa, Middle East, or Persian.Gulf area;
and (3) Presidential and VIP aircraft communications (MYSTIC STAR).
Partial restoration of operations at Asmara is expected in March 1976. " In,'
the interim, limited HF capability with. reduced coverage and reliability ist
provided by U. S. Navy sites in Greece, "Bahrein: (Persian Gulf coverage
only), and Diego Garcia; by U. S." Air Force facilities in England,
Turkey, and Ascension Island; and U. ` S. 'Army facilities in Germany.
The long-term future of and need for the communications station at Asmara
is being addressed by an Interagency Study, directed by NSSM 233. This;
study group is considering the value of the 'Asmara station to the =US. and
is evaluating a number of alternatives, for the base and the functions it per,
forms, including:
(1)
M
Retention of the current base;
Relocation to another site in 'Ethiopia',, Saudi Arabia, or
other locations in the Middle East orAfrica;
(3) Closure of the current base and support of `selected missions by
deployment of mobile /transportable communications.facilities
when required;
(4) Closure of the current base and support of 'selected missions by.
aship specifically configured as.a communications station.
(This alternative, which was specifically suggested by the memo-
randum to the President,at Tab A, would, be" less vulnerable to
political pressure or insurgent activitists, but has several draw-
backs including the high operating and maintenance cost of the
111
ship, and technical limitations on the capability of the I4F radio
imposed by the limited area available, for HF antennas. )
A complete answer to the questions raised by the memorandum at Tab A,
including an assessment of the se rve rity: of the problem, and an evaluation
of alternative solutions, will be included in the response to NSSM 233.
This response is currently being circulated in draft to State, Defense, and
CIA for clearance and/or comment."
SECRET /GDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08. LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
SECRET/GDS
A proposed memorandum to the President Is. at Tab I for:your signature.
This memorandum summarizes the status of U. S. communication to
the Middle East and informs the President of the actions being taken in
response to NSSM 233.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the. President at Tab I.
Concurrence:
Hal Ho ran
Attachments:
Tab I -- Memo to the President (for signature)
Tab A --Memo to President from private citizen
SECRET(GDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
7617.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
sECR Er (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOW CROFT
SUBJECT: Communications with the ,Middle East
The memorandum at Tab A was given to you by 'a private citizen who is
concerned that our corn unicationa capabilities to the Middle East are
shaky., You asked for a report on the matter.;
U. S. communications in the Mid-East have been substantially degraded
by two recent Incidents: (1) the failure of the Atlantic Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) satellite,14and,(2) extensive damage to
the U. S. Naval Communications Station at Asmara, Ethiopia, caused
by the ,September 1975 attack by Eritrean! insurgents.
A replacement satellite to restore DSCS service to the Mid-East is
planned for launch in May 1977. In the interim, satellite conmiunica-
tions,capabilities are being provided in most Mid-East areas by,leased
commercial circuits over the INTELSAT satellite, as well as use of the
United Kingdom's SKYNET satellite,"' and will be augmented by the Gap-
filler Satellite early next year.
Until the time of the insurgent attack, the Asmara communications station
provided long-range high-frequency radio communications for U. S. Naval
units operating in the northwest Indian Ocean, contingency communications
for U. S. military operations in the Middle East, or Persian Gulf, areas
(disaster relief or airlift, for example), and communications to Presi-
dential or VIP aircraft (MYSTIC STAR). Partial restoration of opera-
tions at Asmara is expected in March 1976.. In the interim, limited high
frequency radio communications with reduced coverage is provided by
other U. S. military installations in Europe,.. and from the U. S.',
sites at Bahrein and Diego Garcia.
The long-term future need for the communications station at Asmara is
being addressed by an interagency study group directed by NSSM 233.
number of alternatives for the station and the functions .it performs are
SECRET(GDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08
W
SECRET/GDS
... ...... .
LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
being evaluated by this study, including alternate locations b r a .
land-based station as well as use of a ship converted into a floating
communications station. The response to this NSSM 'will provide
a comprehensive answer to the questions raised by.'the memorandum
at Tab A.
Attachment:
Tab A --Memo from a private citizen
SECRET/GDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
m1plzi C-4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-November 14, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: DICK CHENEY,
Brent, the attached was given to the President by a private citizen
who claims to have some knowledge that our communications
capabilities in the Middle East are shakey.
The President asked that l pass it on to you with the request
that you check into it and get back to him with a ,report.
Attachment
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
 Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08
MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT FORD
In view of the volatile situation in almost every country of the
Middle East, there is concern about the communications system there
for the United States. Turkey is directly connected with the NATO
system, but the communication system for the United States to other
countries in the Middle East is not always reliable. Obviously we
cannot rely on Beirut, and, though we have communications into and
out of Israel, that system is note-connected with the rest'' of the
Middle East.
So much can happen so fast. 'in that part of the world' that we need
the most reliable and best possible communications at al:1 times. And
systems that are completely controlled by us: One solution. (suggested
by. U.S. personnel): anchoring a ship in the-Eastern Mediterranean
with all systems of communication on it,'notjust, relying on satellites;
then connect
.beyond Turkey
throughout
it with all of our. instal-lation.s in' all of the countries
as far as Iran, down through the Persian Gulf and
the Middle East..
To sum up, it may. be farsighted to find out if indeed this problem
exists, and, if so, what the solution should be.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/08: LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5
ILLEGIB