MEMO TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM THOMAS BARNES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-86-7-12-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 20, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/13: LOC-HAK-86-7-12-6
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ASE
PLY
October 20, 1975
MEMO FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: THOMAS BARNES
I recommend that we cable this memo
and the CIA study it covers to the
Secretary in Peking October 20.
Request your clearance. The cable
should also be slugged for Phil Habib's
attention.
E
ON-FILE NSC REL
INSTRUCTIONS AP
MORI/CDF Pages 3-6
per C03213559
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/13: LOC-HAK-86-7-12-6
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRE
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INFORMATION
October 20, 1975
7002
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT: Probable Thai Reaction. to U. S. Request
to Retain Combat Presence Beyond
Next March
At the SRG meeting on October 17, you indicated that the Thai might
be willing to accept a U. S. combat presence beyond March 1976. CIA,
at your request, prepared an intelligence memorandum (Tab address-
ing this subject. 25X1
give the following reasons for holding
-- The Thai no longer regard the U. S. as a reliable guarantor of
their security, and therefore believe the withdrawal of U. S. combat
forces is within their own best interests.
- Prime Minister Khukrit's pledge that all U. S. combat forces
would be withdrawn by March 1976 remains official policy.
The Khukrit government would be reluctant to run the political
risk of going back on this time table.
-- Public pressure for a total withdrawa~ewoulsdgti quickly if buts earlier
it became apparent the government was not p p
commitment.
t a serious deterioration in security along
th
a
Thailand's border with Laos or Cambodia could perhaps prompt a shift
in the Thai position. Short of such aturn tof retain sa c mbat fo r h~. Thai
would view unfavorably any U. S, request Moreover, U. S. request at this time might wc~11
backfire on U. S. interests as the Thai might move to delete some of the
non-combat elements which we hope to retain.
Request that this information be passed on to Phil Habib.
SECRET 25X1
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/13: LOC-HAK-86-7-12-6
",. 19 (ber 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Probable Thai Reaction to a US Reuesst to Retain a Small US Combat
Presence in Thailand Beyond Next 25X1
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It is the judgment of
the Central Intelligence Agency
that a direct US request to retain any
0 us combat force in Thailand beyond March 1976 would be rejected.
The Thai government no longer regards the US as a reliable
guarantor of Thai security and believes that the withdrawal of
US combat forces is therefore in Thailand's best. interests. Many
Thai -- military. and civilian believe that even if there were
n US combat presence, the US would be unwilling to use it to
defend Thai security.
-- Prime Minister Khulcrit's public pledge last April that all. US
combat troops and-aircraft would be withdrawn from Thailand by
'March 1976 remains official Thai policy.
The government would be reluctant to run the political risk
of going back on its original timetable for the withdrawal of
US combat forces.
~.- Public pressure to-complete the withdrawal of combat forces on
schedule would quickly build if it became apparent that the
government were not prepared to fulfill its earlier corcmitment.
2. A request to retain US combat aircraft in Thailand, coming at the
very time the Thai are expecting the US to present a comprehensive withdrawal
SEEM I
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 schedule, would shock many Thai Officials-. The Thai believe that the
d the shock effect alone would probably in-
issue was settled long ago# an
Crease the odds of a negative response. The strongest opposition would come
from within the foreign ministry, which would argue that a continued Us
combat presence would not only derail Thai efforts to improve relations
with Hanoi but would provide a provocation for Hanoi.stepping up its support
to the That .nsurgents. Although the Thai, military would be more oytapat:hetic
to the U5 position irn private, they would not be prepared to take a public
stand to this effect.
As things now stand the Thai are prepared to accept a limited non-
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combat US military presence. F
I LU VCI.I I IIII.QLIUII III rQlL LU IU/UU/ IJ LVI.~-1 I,- r\-cw-1- i4-v
.... A "modest" US support and advisory presence that would be
sociated with continuing US military aid would be perms?sible.
xs
?.- The0US would be permitted to retain an option to uoe U-Tapao
air base'for combat elements. Olt an timer enc' basis, provided
prior permission ,had been obtained from the Thai government.
Such use would last only for the period the Thai believed
Thailandts national security required a US combat presence.
Although Y.hukrit is favorably dispooed toward the US, we
is olicy will deviate significantly from those poaitiono.
do not believe that h p
SECRET
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/13: LOC-HAK-86-7-12-6
25X1 ?
IV I SELRET
ct ITS request at this time might well backfire on US interest$?
i
advantage of and
military presence is an issue that could help propel him into the prime
the US presence
has already come out publicly against. any US military p
ministership, atiatina
beyond March. Such statements could reduce laiukrit's flexibility in neg
T1 ailand,
re
44 A d
he proposal were taade initially to certain Thai. officials who received
Even if t P
it sympathetically, the foreign ministry would almost certainly leak the
Opposition
request to embarrass the prime minister and limit his options. The Thal glao
could be hardened against retaining,any non-combat presence.
could up the ante on the non-combat elements which the US hopes to retain.
Pramsri
1hukrit's political rivals, such as Deputy Prime Minister
his ally Foreign 11inister Chatchai, would be'quick to take political
and
al. Prarnan, perhaps sensing that
slippage in the withdraw
any kind of agreement on a future US military presence n
Possible Chan es ~'i'ai Vie`ae n ,accent a US combat
deterioriation in the security situation along Thailand's
presence. A serious
der with Laos or CaMbadla- for example, could prompt a shift in Thai
border a US coeDat
opinion. The Thai could come to see a deterrent value in having
element.Tegularly' stationed in Thailand.
Short of such e~ turn of events, the Thai leaders would loatc askance
presence in Thailand, viewing it as
at a?US request to retain a combat anything of
unnecessarily complicating Thailand's position and not affording take
sequence in return. i There is a chance, hovaevar, that the That might
con
SECREII
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/13: LOC-HAK-86-7-12-6
SECRE
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a legs negative stance if a US demarche were not in the form of a request
but were couched in terms of a willingness to retain a combat presence in
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responae'to a Thai desire for it.
SECRET
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