THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION - WSAG MEETING MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1975 - 10:15 A.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-86-1-5-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 11, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/04/15: LOC-HAK-86-1-5-0
MEMUh111V.UUA1 C j
NATIONAL SECT t1 I"TY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Mr. Clift
October 11, 1975
The Ital.ia:n Political.Situation - WSAG Meeting
Monday, October 13, 1975 - 10: 15 a.m.
6858
The intelligence community's current assessment of the Italian political situ-
ation is at the immediate tab.
The main elements of the situation are as follows:
-- The mid-June regional and local election results presented the ruling
Christian Democrats (DC) with their most serious challenge in nearly 30 years
as Italy's dominate party -- with less than two percentage parts now separating
the DC and the Communists.
-- The vote had little to do with Italy's foreign policy. It reflected
increasing frustration over inefficient government, inadequate services and
a host of other complaints for which the Christian Democrats were held re-
sponsible.
-- Political leaders are still digesting the results, but their initial
reactions indicate that the Christian Democrats have limited options. In4he
period before the next national elections, scheduled for 1977, they can:
1. Try to make a deal with the Socialists, whose moderate gains
put them in pivotal position. The Socialists want major programmatic con-
cessions, some of the more important ministries, and an arrangement that would
allow the Communists to participate formally in shaping the government's pro--
grain without actually holding cabinet posts. If the Socialists can be persuaded
to drop their insistence on a Communist role, such an agreement could give the
center-left a new lease on life -- although it would probably strain Christian
Democratic unity.
MORI/CDF Per
C05135021
XGDS of E.O. 11652 b authority
of Tlci~r A . Singer; Exemption
Category Section 5(135-(3).
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2. Resist Socialist demands andti y for a center-left on the
traditional model, i.e., a coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social
Democrats, and Republicans, in which the Christian Democrats have most of
the power. This would mean a protracted political crisis.
3. Form an all-Christian Democratic ?monocolore" cabinet.
4. Set up a centrist coalition, substituting the small and conserva-
tive Liberal Party for the Socialists.
5. Call early national elections,
--- The next national elections are likely to deprive the Christian
Democrats of the centrist option, because the losses suffered by the Liberals
in the local contests are almost certain to be duplicated at the national level.
The Christian Democrats' real alternatives then will be reduced for the first
time to collaboration with the Socialists or a deal with the Communists.
-- In any event, the Socialists will drive a hard bargain. They have
concluded that current political dynamics threaten their survival as a separate
party. The Socialists beleive that they are being hurt at the polls by their
association with the Christian Democrats while the Communists are helped by
their opposition status. On the other hand, the. Socialists are afraid they would
be overpowered in any alliance with the Communists at the national level.
-- Whatever the Communist Party's ultimate intentions, while it works
for a share in national power it will continue the soft line toward NATO, Europe
and the US.
-- How much this soft line would harden should the PCI come into the
national government and how responsive the PCI would be to Soviet influence
are questions on which there are no clear answers.
-- While Communist membership in the national government may have
been brought closer by the PCPs recent success, the Christian Democrats
have other options and are likely to take them especially in the period
before the 1977 elections. In terms of real political influence, however, the
PCI is vastly stronger today than before the elections. Communist leader
Berlinguer has always stressed the gradual nature of his "historic compromise"
strategy and will welcome additional time to consolidate these gains. Continu-
ing his cautious approach, 13erlinguer's major aim will be to demonstrate that
the party can deliver the efficient administration the PCI promised during the
campaign. Any success achieved in that respect will go far toward breaking
down the remaining psychological and traditional barriers to PCI membership
in the national government.
SECRET - XGDS (3)
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1P
-- The near-term outlook is forcont.inuin weak Italians overnment.
The Moro government will probably remain in place at least until the DC and
Socialist Congresses take place late this year. However, the results of the
regional elections and the subsequent local growth of communist administra-
tive power have not only demoralized the DC but have also pushed the
Socialists further in the direction of cooperation with the communists, particu-
larly at the local level -- a tendency which has accelerated in past weeks. If
the Socialists decide that opposition offers them the best campaign posture
for the national elections scheduled for 1.977, it will be very difficult to main-
tain an effective DC-led coalition government in Italy this fall.
-- In an effort to overcome their reputation for inefficiency and corrup-
tion, the Christian Democrats recently chose Benigno Zaccagnini as the new
party secretary. He is described as honest, intelligent and hardworking.
-- Many Italian politicians are expressing a pragmatic approach to the
question of the communist role in national policy-making. In a recent speech,
Prime Minister Moro continued to rule out communist membership in the govern-
ment, but said that "no one could ignore" the Communist Party's strength and
weijlit in the country. He declared himself ready to exchange views with the
communists on economic policy and acknowledged that the communists could
.play an..iniT)ortant role in the economic recovery effort, particular l,r in achieving
solutions to the porblems of unemployment and labor unrest now plaguing Italy.
-- For their part, the communists have served notice that they are not
about to accept responsibility without power. In the meantime, indications
are that the communists will play a "waiting game, " consolidate their gains, and
postpone action on the national level until their position is even stronger. But
they are keeping on the pressure. Following Ambassador Volpe's recent public
remarks to the effect that the U.S. opposes the entry of communists into the
governments of member states of NATO and the unofficial visit to the U.S. two
weeks ago of MSI (neo-fascist) party members, the PCT sharply criticized the
U.S. and Christian Democrats.
We need to ask the following key questions:
--- What steps have the Christian Democrats taken to improve their
position since the disasterous results of the June elections?
--- What is the current Christian Democratic thinking on possible coalitions?
Are they still toying with the idea of having consultations with the Communists --
even though the Communists will not be formally in the government?
-- When can we expect the next governmental "crisis"? Is this keyed to
union trouble to be expected this fall or to the outcome of leadership struggles
in the DC and Socialist party congresses later this year.?
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4P
-- When Rumor visited last month he made a point of emphasizing the
Christian Democrats desire for more attention by the United States. What
steps might we take to help bolster the standing of the Christian Democrats?
Is there anything we can do ---- or that some of our West European friends
might do -- to help the DC in its efforts to reshape its image?
--- How can we continue most effectively to convey our Opposition to an
"historic compromise" with the Communists?
--- What can we do economically at the government-to-government level
to assist the Christian Democratic Government in its efforts to stay in power?
In this connection, where do we stand on their request for multi-billion
assistance in a nuclear energy program?
SECRET -- XGDS (3)
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