LETTER TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-81-1-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 3, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/26 : LO
ILLEGIB
GENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC
WASHINGTON, D.G. 20505
Sept
LTG Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
I have three major suggestions rega
ding the draft
Executive Orders you sent for our review on August 30. ILLEGIB
In addition, there are a number of editorial changes as
we11 as substantive changes outlined in the attached
memorandum.
Our primary concern deals with the relationship of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the
National Security Council Intelligence Committee as the
President's oversight vehicles with respect to the
Tntelligence Community. I believe that the NSCIC
should be the primary vehicle of supervision. The 1947
statute requires the CTA to report to the NSC. This would
put the Agency under the proper chain of command. The
NSCTC is also an appropriate chain of command for the
intelligence activities of the other departments. Such
supervision can be accomplished by a staff with the
authorization to investigate all aspects of the activities
of the intelligence producing agencies. The staff would
not only be technically competent but also able to handle
allegations of improprieties.
PFTAB, as it is proposed in the draft Executive Order,
would act as a civilian review board, much like the
organizations created in the late 19b0's to oversee
metropolitan police forces. As a civilian review board,
it is susceptible to many of the vices attached to such
organizations. Now, PFTAB plays an important role in the
major questions relating to foreign intelligence. It is
questionable whether the same talented people would be
interested or sufficiently free to handle the continuous
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/26 : LOC-HAK-81-1-1-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/26 : LOC-HAK-81-1-1-9
"watch dog",assignment. Thus I recommend that PFIAB continue
its present tale as independent adviser to the President on
major intelligence problems but not be brought into detailed
management review for which its part-time membership is not
well suited.
A second major suggestion is that we not talk about the
"foreign intelligence community." The community concept has
always been somewhat complicated and difficult. I believe
it more appropriate to refer to Chase agencies of the U. S.
Government participating in foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities. The DCT could continue to have the
two hats of full responsibility for CIA and a staff responsi-
bility to the President for review and recommendations with
respect to the other agencies of the Government involved in
foreign intelligence, but their departmental command struc-
ture would remain inviolate. (Arrangements would be appro-
priate, of course, in special cases of joint activity for
an $xCom approach:) The DCI's staff responsibility should,
in my view, cover all aspects of national foreign intelligence
plus making recommendations for optimum mutual support between
national and tactical foreign intelligence. This would elimi-
nate the requirement currently on the DCI to report on all
foreign intelligence "including tactical intelligence," which
we have found to be a very difficult concept to implement.
This would also leave the DCI with his two hats rather than
adopting what I believe would be a counterproductive suggestion
of separating the DCI as a foreign intelligence counsellor
working in the White House from his current bureaucratic and
substantive base in the CIA.
The third major suggestion is to insure full coordination
of the enclosed with the FBT as well as D4D and State. A
number of the activities here would bear heavily on the FBI's
situation, and I think they should be given every opportunity
to examine them.
As noted above, I have made a number of specific textual
suggestions in the attached, supplementary to the three
points above.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/26 : LOC-HAK-81-1-1-9