A NEW ESTIMATE OF COMMUNIST SUPPLIES DELIVERED THROUGH SIHANOUKVILLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-8-3-17-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 21, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-8-3-17-1
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge
>010
INFO TION
September 21,70
SUBJECT: A New Estimate of Communist Supplies Delivered
Through Sihanoukville
CIA has issued a memorandum revealing new evidence on the delivery of
Communist military supplies to Sihanoukville from December 1966 through
April 1969 (Tab A). In short, this evidence indicates that at least 22, 000
tons of military equipment reached the port during this period, an amount
far higher than previously estimated. (In March of this year, CIA estimated
a total of about 11, 800 tons. )
CIA notes that this must be considered a preliminary figure, since all the
new evidence has not yet been analyzed. At present, there are two
important loose ends. The 22, 000 tons is based on deliveries made by
nine Chinese ships; it is possible that there were additional ships, in
which case the total will be even higher. On the other hand, the Cambodians
retained some of this material for themselves (probably about ten per cent),
and this must be deducted before the total amount actually reaching the
VC/NVA can be calculated. Because of the mass of documents involved,
it will probably be at least a month before a firm total is produced.
- Comment. The new evidence was obtained recently in Phnom Penh, and
is solid. It is a virtually complete Cambodian record of the delivery and
distribution of Communist supplies. It contains not only bills of lading
and packing lists from the Chinese shiEs, but detailed inventories and
destinations of the truck convoys which delivered the supplies to the
VC/NVA near the South Vietnamese border. A quick look at the material
indicates that there were some 10-20 of these delivery points along the
border, and it may be that some additional caches near the border could
be uncovered by searching the immediate areas. We understand that
CIA is planning to send this information to the field as soon as it can be
assembled.
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
MORI/CDF
C05137812
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-8-3-17-1
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-8-3-17-1
SECRET/SENSITIVE 2
Aside from revealing the inadequacy of previous estimates of Communist
supplies arriving at Sihanoukville, the new evidence also poses a thorny
intelligence problem. In effect, the Communists received far more
military equipment through Sihanoukville than previously believed. This
raises the question of where the extra material is now. There are; really
only two possibilities. It may be cached in Cambodia and South Vietnam.
If so, the Communists` immediate logistical problems caused by the cross
border operations would be diminished. The other possibility is that the
Communists have been consuming a greater amount of military supplies
than previously estimated. If this is the case, then the loss of Sihanouk-
ville would be an even greater blow to the Communists.
We understand that CIA plans to re-evaluate its approach to the entire
question of Communist logistics, including rates of consumption. This
will probably be a long process, but the results should give us a better
understanding of what may have happened to the unaccounted supplies.
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-8-3-17-1