CIA'S MEMORANDUM AND SNIE ON CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-8-2-12-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 11, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET/ SENSITIVE:
September 11, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM John Holdridge/ Tonic Latimer
SUBJECT: CIA's Nil. emarandum and SNIE on Cambodia
1. You asked about requesting CIA to comment on our comments
(Tab B), and especially to square the memo for the President with
the SNIE. We recommend against further dialogue with CLA on this
subject at this time. Both the SNIE and the memo for the "resident
agree that the Cambodian Government will survive at least through
the end of the year. The difference lies mainly in tone, with the SNIE
somewhat more cautious than the memo in assessing Hanoi's long and
short-term intentions. That is normal for ONE. Moreover, since
ONE concurred in the views expressed in the memo to the President,
thero would seem to be little profit from your viewpoint in asking them
to plow this same ground again.
If nevertheless you wish to task CIA further on this subject, we
would suggest a memo from you to Director Helms as attached at Tab A.
That you defer recommending against further dialogue with CIA on this
subject at this time.
Approve
Disapprove (Sign Menlo to
at Tab A)
MORI/CDF
C05137815
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SE CRE TJ SENSITIVE
7"L,:nm: 9/11/ 70
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SE;CRETJSENSITIVF
MEMORANDUM
THE HONORABL?. RICH
DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: The Situation in Ca nbodia
Several follow-on questions have arisen in the kF)resideat's mind
as a result of Special National Intelligence Estin ate 57-70 'The
Outlook for Cambodia' and the CIA memorandum of 27 August 1970
entitled ' `T?he Current Military Situation in Cambodia and Short-
Term Prospects.' The President has requested that a memoran-
dum be prepared which addresses the question of what priority
Hanoi now attaches to its operations in Cambodia coznparnd to the
priority it places on operations in South Vietnam. In other words,
does Hanoi believe the Cambodian Government must be overturned
before it "a accomplish its aims in South Vietnam'?
The question of Hanoi'# attitude toward possible a accosrumodation
with Lou Nol should be examined also. What would Hanoi' s terms
be for such an accommodation or would it reject such an accom-
modation all together?
Would you please have the memorandum to tat by 23 September 1970.
SECRETISENS.IT1V
TL:am:9/11/70
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MEMORANDUM ! IF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASR1t4GTdN
SECRET /CONTROLLED DIS-s
SepEembe , 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSIN
21494
FROM: John Roldridge/Tom Lr&';;?( '~ '-Z,
SUBJECT: ~ C l4' G x z.: ~~ GOOF
Our Comments on SNIE .'The Outlook for
e
5 ass that it is diffi -
apathetic peasants can add up toeatb oad base of suultoto see how the
Mr. Holdridge also points out that the SNIE should have considered
many problems the Commuj,.ists would have if they attempt to
take over all of Cambodia, One such problem would be heac of to
Cambodian officials sympathetic to the com k of
need for large numbers of Vietnamese. communists lr~unists, and the
civil affairs missions. to be tied down in consequent
would have to incur if they should attack i the force t a s ould Another would co over all
Cambodia, losses they can ill afford, Mr. H?Id~dge also notes that
an impact. ges on the communist side now appear to be making
2 Mr. Latimer's view that the SNIE is too ess
from his disagreement with the estimate's basic udgc stems in
Hanoi': s Prime intentions at Judgment that one of
present is the elimination of the Lon Nol
government and its replacement by
to its wishes.
Mr. Latimer Y a regime which would be responsive
goal but that for the near l the enemy's a Ian gaols ar
go l but that t namely for h gare m m couchmmLessuni st
reconstituting its supply system.
3. Both of us note that the
SNIE does not come to grips with the
important question of what priority Hanoi now places on its o
in Cambodia compared to the priority it places .on operations in Sou hs
Vietnam. Mr. Hoidridge states that it is conceivable that o South
ultimately decide to concentrate on seizing and holding Hanoi may
just those strategic
I- We are agreed that the estimate is undid~~L~ `^~?
chances for survival of the unduly Pessimistic over the
notes that the SNZE speaks of the broad ba8eo of su Mo . Holdridge
among the peasantry but fails to draw an pp rt for Sihanouk.,~~, fJ~~
describes as the traditional apathy of the peasants toward what it
the ca tal.
Pi Mr. Holdrid
rd events ~-.
SECRET /CONTROLLED DTSSEM
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SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
- 2 -
areas which are of value to it with respect to Vietnam and let Cambodians
fight, Cambodians elsewhere. Mr. Latimer expresses his belief that
South Vietnam remains Hanoi' s number one priority and that what they
are now doing in Cambodia is primarily aimed at securing supply routes
and base areas for further operations in South Vietnam.
4. Mr. Holdridge points out that the SNIE does not address some of
the real questions which are central to Hanoi's problem and to ours in
dealing with the situation such as: identifying the tensions and pressures
existing in the Sihanouk--Peking-Hanoi relationship and how they could
influence Hanoi's tactics in Cambodia, and possible North Vietnamese
terms for an accommodation with Lon Nol or the likelihood that Hanoi
would reject any such accommodation.
5. Mr. Latimer picks some different points which he feels the SNIE
did not adequately address . o r did not address at all. For example,
-he did not find persuasive evidence to back the SNIE's judgment that
the mood in Phnom Penh could turn to despair once the Cambodians
realize they may be in for a long, hard war. He also believes the
SNIE failed to back up its assumption that Hanoi may see'an opportunity
in Cambodia to tie down South Vietnamese 25X1
without excessive cost or risk to the communists. Mr. Latimer also
notes that the SNIE failed to address the question of how large a Cam-
bodian army is needed to handle the hit-and-run tactics of the communist
force it faces. He also believes the paper gives too little credit to the
value of U. S. air strikes and material assistance to the Cambodians.
6. As a final point, we note that both the CIA and the JCS/CINCPAC
memos done per the President's request the last week in August state
their belief that the present communist intention is to wage a protracted
war against the Cambodian government and that it is unlikely the commu-
nists will attempt a quick strike aimed at toppling Lon Nol. That would
imply that the chances are pretty good that Lon Nol will be able to
survive through the end of the year, which was the original question
ONE was asked to address.
SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
INFORMATION
August 21, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: Special National Intelligence Estimate 57-70:~
`
-'`
The Outlook for Cambodia ~
At Tab A is a summary of Special National Intelligence Estimate 57-70:
The Outlook for Cambodia. I understand that you have received your
own copy of this SNIE, but thought that the summary might be of use
to you.
Our comment concerning the SNIE is that while it is a well written
paper which touches on most of the major factors at work in
Cambodia on both sides, it is unnecessarily pessimistic.
For example, it speaks of the broad base of support forSihanouk's
leadership provided by the peasantry on the basis of great respect for
royalty and affection for Sihanouk, but fails to draw any conclusion from
what it describes in.the next sentence as "traditional apathy of the
peasants toward events in the capital. " Those of us who have seen
Cambodian peasants can assure you that they are.apathetic, illiterate, and
passive. They are simply there, and it is hard to see how.they really
add up to a broad base of support for Sihanouk.
There is another factor to consider -- the problems the NVA/VC would
have if they were to attempt to take over all of Cambodia. The adminis-
tration perforce would have to be Vietnamese, since most of the
Cambodian officials have either fled or withheld their cooperation. This,
then, would tie down large numbers of NVA/VC in civil affairs missions.
Moreover if the NVA/VC should attack in force to take all of Cambodia,
they will encounter resistance and suffer losses which they can ill afford.
SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
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SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
Another factor appears to be making itself felt -- ammunition shortages
on the NVA/VC side.. You will recall that our estimates were quite high
on the percentage of total enemy ammunition stocks which we captured.
This may be borne out in the fact that the enemy has not captured one
major city which he has attacked recently. In the battle at Prek Temeak,
just across the Mekong from Phnom Penh, the FANK noted that in the
three successive enemy assaults launched each successive wave was of
less intensity than the preceding one. FANK attributed this to lack of
ammunition.
On the North Vietnamese side, the paper represents an adequate delineation
of Hanoi's probable attitudes, as far as it goes, but it does not pose or
begin to answer some of the real questions which are central to Hanoi's
problem and to ours in dealing with the situation. For example, it does
not address the following issues:
What are the tensions and pressures existing in the Sihanouk-
Peking-Hanoi relationship, and how could they influence Hanoi's
tactics in Cambodia?
-~ What would Hanoi's terms be for an accommodation with
Lon Nol, or would it reject any such accommodation ?
-- Is Hanoi now committed to a "Cambodia First" or still a
"Vietnam First" policy, or to either ?
It is conceivable that Hanoi may ultimately decide to concentrate on
seizing and holding just those strategic areas which are of value to it
with respect to Vietnam, and "let Cambodians fight Cambodians" else-
where. This would entail building up pro-Sihanouk Cambodian forces,
but might be less expensive than trying to take over the whole country.
SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
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SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
THE OUTLOOK FOR CAMBODIA
I. The Situation of the Lon Nol Government
Hanoi has long planned its hegemony over Phnom Penh. This
could take the form of direct Vietnamese occupation, installation of
a puppet-Khmer-Rouge regime comparable to the Pathet Lao, or
acceptance of an ostensibly non-Communist or coalition group in
to Phnom Penh which would be fully responsive to Hanoi's wishes.
At present, Hanoi controls all the northeast provinces, and
some of the northern provinces of Cambodia. NVA/VC troops
move at will throughout the rural areas of the country. The economy
is at a standstill and Phnom Penh's rule is not felt outside the
principal urban centers, in a country composed 85 percent of peasants.
Hanoi has been able to accomplish this with less than 10, 000 active
combat troops.
Though Cambodian Army morale is reportedly still generally high,
it is manifestly incapable of meeting and defeating Communist forces
on a unit for unit basis. No terminal dates are suggested for the
training period which would be required to try and bring the Cambodians
up to the level of the Communist forces.
With the exception of South Vietnamese
operating in Cambodia in contiguous areas to secure their own borders,
no other countries are likely to send combat forces to Cambodia. With
the exception of the U. S. no country is likely to provide more than small
amounts of economic or material assistance. Whatever military defense
Cambodia puts up remains dependent on U. S. air support.
Whether Hanoi decides to extend its hegemony over Phnom. Penh
swiftly or more slowly will probably not be discernible until the end of
the rainy season in October or November. If Hanoi chooses to invest its
resources elsewhere this autumn, Lon Nol's government might survive
into 1971. However, the Phnom Penh leadership has made it clear that
it is not planning for a long war against the North Vietnamese such as
has taken place in South Vietnam.
SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM
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 -SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM
Both Lon Not and Sirik Matak reportedly are interested in
examining compromise settlements for the conflict rather than
subject their country to the kind of destructive military activity
which has taken place in South Vietnam and Laos. While such
compromise would probably require the sacrifice of Sihanouk by
Hanoi, this possibility should not be excluded since Sihanouk has
chosen to throw in his lot with the Chinese whom the North Vietnamese
have disappointed more than once in the past international negotiations.
II. Hanoi's View
,The paper also discusses Hanoi's attitude and probable courses
of action. With regard to attitude, it makes the following points:
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-- Hanoi recognizes that the new situation in Cambodia confronts
it with many problems, including the maintenance of supply
and infiltration trails to South Vietnam. The latter can be done,
if with effort.
-- But Hanoi also sees opportunities to take over Cambodia more
quickly than it had planned earlier, and with the support of
such assets as Sihanouk. It lacks a number of things for conducting
successful operations, such as a logistical system,an established
infrastructure, and a claim to legitimacy for its people (all of
which it had in South Vietnam). But it can fight without those.
-- Hanoi also hopes that U. S. and South Vietnamese forces will become
more extended because of Cambodia.
-- Thus Hanoi is still committed to the struggle, and will not be
rendered incapable of continuing that struggle by material or
manpower shortages. It still thinks that it can go on longer
than we can.
With respect to Hanoi's probable goals, the paper states that these
are difficult to define but it suggests the following:
? - To maintain the supply and infiltration routes into South Vietnam.
-- To eliminate the Lon Nol Government. The paper gives the
advantages and disadvantages, from Hanoi's view, of a slow
or fast campaign against Lon Nol.
SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
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SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
The paper concludes that Hanoi will continue to maintain military
pressure at a level which will sustain a long campaign, but that it
could try to knock out Lon Nol at any time.
SECRET /CONTROLLED DISSEM
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