MEMO FROM MR. HELMS ON IRAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
October 1, 2009
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 2, 1970
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 81.03 KB |
Body:
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
MEMORANDUM IP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MSSINGER
FROM: Harold H. Saunders
SUBJECT: Memo from Mr. Helms on
Dick Helms has sent you the attached memo
INFORMATION
Essentially Ambassador MacArthur has
concern that certain bureaucratic turnings in Washington
might undercut what the Shah believes is a commitment by the
President to provide a substantial number of F4 and C130 aircraft.
The bureaucratic state of play is
that the Defense Department has asked the intelligence community
to do a SNIE on the military threat to Iran. This is somewhat like the
.Arab-Israeli situation in that the visible threat is probably not great
enough to justify as much hardware as the Shah wants. However, the
Shah is building not just a military establishment suited to the threat,
but a deterrent as well.
An effort is already being made to broaden the framework of the SNIE
so that it will not turn out to be so limited as to make it more difficult
for us to operate from a broader view of the situation. However, the
SNIE by itself obviously will not make policies. The decision on the
number of planes to be sold will be made over the next couple of months,
and we will have a crack at it in the normal bureaucratic machinery.
Essentially, this decision will be made with the President's general
commitment in mind, although not perhaps without some argument.
In passing on the attached memo, therefore, I simply want to reassure
you that I am on top of this problem and will continue to work -- along
with Joe Sisco -- to make sure that the President's general promise is
not undercut.
SECRET SENSITIVE
OSD review completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
SECRET SENSITIVE -2-
The broader problem with Iran, of course, is that as long as the
military credit program is held up we will not have the assistance
of Iran that will permit it to proceed with financial confidence.
" SECRET SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
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No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5
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