QUESTIONS GENERATED BY SNIE " THE OUTLOOK FOR CAMBODIA"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-7-5-8-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 10, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-7-5-8-0
M EMO1.ANDUTtr FOR
The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Questions Generated by SNIE
"The Outlook for Cambodia"
I would like a memorandum addressing the following questions
which arose from a reading of the latest SNIE on Cambodia. The
responses need not represent an interagency position. An ONE
memorandum will suffice. It should be completed, if possible
by opening of business 13 August 1970.
-- On page 6, Combat Effectiveness . . . how large
a Cambodian army will be needed to handle the hit-
and-run tactics of the present communist force it
faces. 1. e. an advantage of 2-1, 10-1, etc.
-- On page 12 the statement is made that "if the
military situation does not soon improve, Lon Nol's
support might begin to dissipate and his policies
come under open attack. What are the chances of
this happening - 50-SO? , 80-20?
-- There is a seeming discrepancy between the
statement on pages 15-16 that there is no way of
knowing the depth of peasant commitment to the
regime and the statement on page 4 that youths are
"flocking to enlist from all parts of the country
and all walks of life. " Are peasant youths among
them and if to, does that not tell us something of
their commitment to the regime?
-- On pages 32 and 33 the statement is made that Hanoi
may see an opportunity in Cambodia "to tie down South
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-7-5-8-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-7-5-8-0
Vietnamese) (forces . . . without
excessive cost or risk; 'to the Commtudats. I would
appreciate a fuller argumentation on the judgment
that Hanoi believes its Cambodian operations can be
run at "relatively , low coat and risk (page 38).
Henry A. Kissinger
HAK:TL:jlj 8/10/70
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/16: LOC-HAK-7-5-8-0