ESTABLISHMENT OF POLICY ON DECLASSIFICATION REQUESTS FOR NIES AND SNIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-66-1-19-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 29, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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W-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1975
Didn't you already convey your views to
Director Colby that you were opposed to
declassification of these NIE's/SNIE's?
(Also against providing summaries? )
If so, this action is OBE.
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MEMORANDUM 1855
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT
ACTION
March 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: Richard Ober 1"/
SUBJECT: Establishment of Policy on Declassifi cation
Requests for NIEs and SNIEs
In his memorandum to you on March 25, 1975 (Tab A), Mr. George Carver,
D/DCI for National Intelligence Officers explains that DCI Colby is faced
with the question of how to handle declassification requests for certain
NIEs and SNIEs. He asks for your views on the subject and indicates that he
has made a similar request to Philip Buchen. As background information, he
forwards with his memorandum two attachments; a memorandum for USIB
members from Mr. Carver on Freedom of Information requests for the
declassification of certain NIEs in preparation for discussion at USIB on
March 27, 1975 (Tab B) and a staff study which assesses the issues for
and against the declassification of such documents (Tab C).
The issue has arisen because of two broad requests for the release of NIEs
and SNIEs on the Soviet Union, particularly on Soviet strategic forces
prior to 1965 and on Soviet intentions in Cuba from 1960 through 1963. One
of these requests has been resubmitted since the effective date of the Freedom
of Information Act by Walter Slocombe, formerly of the NSC Staff, and a res-
ponse must be made by March 31, 1975 in order to comply with the FOI dead-
line.
The staff study drafted by Mr. Robert Hewitt (Tab C) offers several options
for handling the issue of continued classification of estimates on Soviet
strategic matters:
? complete refusal to release this kind of estimate,
0 refusal to release entire estimates, but a willingness to
sanitize portions for release, and
b consideration of each request individually without trying to
set up a special category for this kind of estimate.
SEGAVX (Unclassified when separated from classified attachments) /XGDS
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SECRET
Although Messrs. Carver and Hewitt tend to discount the importance of the
documents on Cuba and feel that they can be dealt with "at a lower level",
Stephen Low feels strongly (see Tab D) that no portion of any NIE or SNIE
should be released without a case-by--case review by the NSC Staff.
Jan Lodal basically agrees with the necessity of a case-by--case approach to
the issue (see Tab E) because he feels that such an approach provides a
sound basis for judgment and upholds the spirit of the FOl Act. In general,
Denis Chit is against the release of such documents.
The issue of the declassification requests for certain NIEs and SNIEs was discussed
at the USIB meeting on Thursday, March 27, 1975, but, because of the pressure
of other business, a final position was not adopted. I understand that
Bill Hyland of the State Department strongly urged the adoption of a position
of blanket refusal for estimates on Soviet strategic matters. In fact, he indicated
that this issue would make a good test case in courts as he felt that denial
could be successfully defended. His position on denial su rted by DIA,
NSA and ERDA. Later in the discussion, Mr. Hyland ortedly xpanded his
position by saying that all NIEs and SNIEs as a category of documents could not
be released. I understand that one of the members recommended that a request
be made for an extension of the March 31 deadline and that several members
expressed their intention to check with their respective legal offices on the
feasibility of complete denial.
The DCI after consulting with USIB and obtaining the opinion of the legal
authorities of USIB agencies, has decided to respond to the request for the
NIEs and SNIEs by denying release of these documents but offering to provide
the summary and conclusion sections of the estimates. The rationale for this
position is that the summary and conclusion sections have in effect been
declassified for their use in the unclassified posture statements by the
Secretary of Defense. The legal advisors anticipate a refusal by the requestor
to accept this compromise offer and that consequently there will be an appeal
and a court case on this request. They feel that an offer to provide the
summary and conclusion sections will help the government's case by showing
a willingness to be as fortloming as possible in responding to the requestor.
Mr. Buchen has reporte y agreed with the proposed action.
RECOMMENDATIONS
a That you authorize me to advise the DCI that he should request a
ten-day delay in responding to the request for release of the NIEs
and SNIEs. During this time, there could be a review of the content
of the conclusion and summary sections to determine whether, in fact,
all information of concern has been used in the declassified Defense
statements. More deliberate consideration of the possibility of setting
up policy on non release of all NIEs and similar documents could also be
considered during this period.
Approve Disapprove
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V
SECRET
That you authorize me to advise the DCI that in the future all requests
under the Freedom of Information Act for declassification of NIEs, SNIEs,
NIAMs and similar "national level" intelligence documents be referred to
the NSC for an opinion before a decision is made.
Approve Disapprove
SECRET (Unclassified when separated from classified attachments)
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELWNCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
25 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant General Brent Scowcro?t, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Request for the Declassification of
Certain National Intelligence Estimates
1. Attached is a memorandum and accompanying
staff study circulated to the United States Intelligence
Board on the issue of how to handle requests the DCI
has already received for the release of certain National
Intelligence Estimates dealing with the Soviet Union and,
specifical.I.y, Soviet strategic capabilities. The DCI
plans to address this matter at the USIB meeting now
scheduled for Thursday, 27 March, and would appreciate
receipt of your views prior to that date.
2. I am sending a similar note, with the same
attachments, to Mr. Buchen.
George;/t1. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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SECRET W USIB -D-13. 1 /47
25 March 1975
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Office of the Director 25 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Requests for the
for portions of other NIEs for those years which deal with
Soviet capabilities and intentions for producing strategic
weapons.
2. These requests were not filed under the Amended
Freedom of Information Act (having been submitted prior to
its effective date) but one of the requestors (Mr. Slocombe)
has now submitted an FOIA letter with an initial ten-day dead-
line which expires on 31 March 1975.
3. The matter of the Cuban Estimates can be dealt with
at a lower level, but the DCI feels that the broad requests for
Estimates on Soviet strategic forces should be discussed at
the USIB before a final decision is made. The decision made
on these requests will clearly set- a precedent with which we
will have to live for years to come.
the years 1961 through 1964 (including 1965, if possible) and
forces for all years prior to 1965, plus those concerning
Soviet intentions and actions in C,Q%a from 1060 through 1 953
The other asks for all NTE!zz relating to the Soviet Union frr
Declassification of Certain National
Intelligence Estimates
1. We have in hand two very broad requests for the
release of National Intelligence Estimates and Special
National Intelligence Estimates relating to the Soviet Union.
One of these asks for all NIEs and SNIEs on Soviet strategic
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112
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USIB-D-13, 1/47
25 March 1975
In addition to soliciting the views of the United
4
.
States Intelligence Board, the DCI will also be consulting
with the NSC Staff and the President's Special Counsel,
Please note that the points specifically at issue
5
.
are how we handle a request for the release of Estimates
dealing with Soviet strategic capabilities and (slightly more
generally) other Soviet matters. We are not addressing the
question of whether to release National Intelligence
Estimates or Special National Intelligence Estimates but,
instead, trying to set a policy for Estimates on these specific,
particularly sensitive subjects.
6. The decision on release of these Estimates, or portions
thereof, will hinge on a determination as to what extent they
should still be regarded as classified and the extent to which
such release would jeopardize intelligence sources and methods.
In this regard, the DCI will want to consider to what extent,
his decision-with -respect to the release of strategic
if an
y,
Estimates ought to be affected by the fact that the Posture
Statements of the Secretary of Defense and other senior Defense
Department officials (military and civilian) draw on these
Estimates' arguments and conclusions
7. Appended to this meAmor andum is a staff study done by
a retired Agency officer brought back as a consultant for this
purpose. It assesses the issues involved and lays out several
possible alternate courses of action. It would be helpful if
recipients of this memorandum could have reviewed this study
prior to the USIB's discussion of this topic, which the DCI would
like to take up at the meeting scheduled for Thursday, 27 March.
It would also be useful if the members of the USIB could consult
their respective General Counsels prior to this meeting to have
the advantage of their opinions when this subject is raised
for discussion. A
Geo~ge A. Carver, Jr.
.Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachments
SECRET
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"CM-n-1 3 1 /47
25 March 1975
SECRET
6 February 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: George" Carver
SUBJECT
Requests for Release of National
Intelligence Estimates
1. Even before the amended Freedom of Information
Act takes effect this month, CIA is confronted with
two sweeping requests for NIEs under the provisions
of Executive order 11652 which provide for review on
request of the classification of documents tenor
more years old which had previously been exempt from
downgrading. One is a long-standing (6 May 1974)
request, recently renewed, by Walter Slocombe of the
prominent Washington law firm Caplin and Drysdale.
It asks that we make available to him for "inspection
and copying" the NIEs and SNIEs on Soviet strategic
forces for all years prior to 1965 and those con-
cerning Soviet intentions and actions in Cuba for
the year 1960-1963 inclusive. (Slocombe, incident-
ally, served as strategic forces/SALT planner on Dr.
Kissinger's NSC Staff in the early 1970s and thus had
full access to the strategic NIEs.) The other re-
quest, submitted on 17 January 1975 by Arthur Steiner
on the letterhead of a Los Angeles firm called Pan--
heuristics., asks that we provide, in sanitized form
if necessary, the agreed terms of reference for all
NIEs relating to the Soviet Union for the years 1961-
1964 (plus 1965 if possible) and for those portions of
the NIEs for those years dealing with Soviet capabil-
ities and intentions for producing strategic weapons.
Except for the request for terms of reference ----
presumably intended to provide a basis for further
requests -- the Steiner request closely parallels
Slocombe's for the years cited.,
?.!''2. For the most part, the request for the Estimates
involving Cuba poses no problem, since they concern a
historical episode whose intelligence aspects are
generally well known and no longer sensitive. 25X1 (1
25X6
Most of what the r'equestor, presumably wants
to know about estimated Soviet intentions and actions
25X1
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- SECRET V
are contained in five SECRET-level NIEs or SNIEs
on the situation and prospects in Cuba which were issued
at intervals between 8 December 1960 and 14 June 1963.
(The next in the series is dated 5 August 1964.) I
believe that all of these Estimates including the
crucial 19 September 1962 Estimate, The Military
Buildup in Cuba -- can be declassified without dele-
tions.- There are also three SNIEs which-assess Soviet
and Cuban reactions to possible U.S. courses of action:
d basis in October
two issued on a TOP SECRET codewor
1962, at the height of the crisis, when the U.S. was
considering invasion and blockade, and one issued on
21 February 1963 which considered reactions to a low-
level overflight program. I see no objection to their
declassification and release from the standpoint of
protecting intelligence sources and methods, though
it is, I suppose, faintly conceivable that there
docu-
itl
y
could be some policy objection to explic
menting this aspect of U.S. policymaking during the
crisis.
3. The requests for the Estimates on strategic
military forces, in contrast, call for a substantial
of what has a.1.ways been regarded as the most
opening up
rcns'tI'!e anr~ n?osely held of the NIE files, `virtuall
all items in them being of TOP SECRET or higher clas-
sification. By rough count., some 54 NIEs and SNIEs
up through 1964 discuss Soviet strategic forces in some
detail. Even excluding certain categories, such as
overall Soviet Estimates in which strategic weapons
are only one of several categories covered, or spec-
ialized Estimates on the technical aspects of weapon
development, some 30-odd Estimates would remain. Even
screening and processing them would be a messy prob--
lem. The honoring of these requests would also provide
precedent for the wholesale declassification on demand
of other annually updated military NIEs, such as those
on, theater forces. Under the new provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act, we would presumably
face requests, not only for the successive declassi-
fication of the military Estimates as they became ten
years old, but for a case-by-case lowering of the time
interval before declassification.
4. Admittedly, on an item-by-item basis, much of
the specific information in the older strategic military
estimates is no longer sensitive. We are no longer con-
cerned with missile systems like the 55-1 and SS-2
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SECRET
4P
It airplanes s like the Bull, which have long been retired-
It is now openly accepted that we can tell when downrange
missile testing takes pCendnb~lli~t~cimissilersub-
count of ICBM deployments
marine production, using the "national technical means
of verification" used to monitor the SALT accords.
Nor is it a secret that we have sometimes misjudgedth
the extent of the Soviet strategic buildup --
the bomber and missile "gaps" -- and were initially
divided on the role of new weapon systems such as the
SA-5. Thus the decla.ssato~~cynmatera-als based on
longer currently applicable P
the Estimates, such as all but the more recent state-
Secre-
ments of the strategic threat contained
statementstto Congress,
tary of Defense's annual posture
is easy to justify.
--
5. Declassifying the Estimates themselves, how-
ever, is another matter. On the one hand, the TOP
SECRET versions of the older NIEs could probably
purged of specific references to sensitive sources and
methods or to results thereof that are clearly still
sensitive without losing more than about one fifth
of their length (plus technical annexes) in the case
of most in the strategic attack series. Sanitization
r. i more
'aLL'~.ie U~1.ense E 1:,t. 4irtates , wh ch rely
the StX -c l ^' {7t];c,
o
heavily or, technical coIieCtion a,-,d :: ..1 z ,
would probably be more extensive but still possible.
On the other hand, it is often very difficult to judge
how far we safely can go in declassifying the older
results of classified collection and analysis techniques
we still employ. And even if fairly stringent standards
were employed, release of the older strategic military
Estimates would inevitably still tell a good deal
more about our long-drawn out effort to understand
Soviet strategic forces than we have been willing to
reveal so far. Therein lies the dilemma. a
6. My own review of the older Estimates in question
thus leads me whether the older strategic
military Estimates can be regarded, like most other
government documents, as inherently releasable as a
class except insofar as certain passages require san-
i-tization or the special nature of the individual
estimate's subject matter requires continued classi-
fication. My principal reasons are as follows:
a. The Soviet military Estimates -- and especially
the various strategic series -- are uniquely
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tied to the military planning process. Most of
those produced up through 1955, reflecting the
atmosphere of the Korean war, were specifically
concerned with Soviet capabilities -- and some-
times intentions -- for waging war against the U.S.
and generally represented the intelligence input to
a series of assessments of the results of a possible
nuclear exchange prepared by a super--secret sub-
committee of the NSC. Although later Estimates
were less concerned been handled throughrotherng
aspects (these have
derivative documents) the annual NIEs have
continued to represent the bedrock of agreed nat-
ional intelligence on which all military planning
is ultimately to be based. There has thus been
a continuing requirement that these estimates be
comprehensive and definitive, with a good deal
of detail on the characteristics and operational
capabilities of weapon systems.
b. Except for the Estimates of the early 1950s,
which were issued somewhat sporadically at a time
when the Soviet strategic buildup had scarcely -be-
gun to take place, the strategic military Estimates
are part of a continuing series and mainly concerned
z?-tens whir--h are still deployed. In
'with weapon view of the stren.,,a,.is efforts the Soviets have under-
taken to deny us information about their strategic
judg-
forces, moreover, most f are everyfindings
heavilyadePendent
ments in these estimates
on a variety of classified collection systems and
analysis techniques. Taken together, the strategic
military Estimates thus provide the basis for a
systematic year--by--year evaluation 'of U.S. stra-
tegic intelligence and, by implication, of its
sources and methods.
c. The sensitivity of the Estimates has often been
enhanced by the special analytical and presentational
form they have come to assume. Because of their
frequent dependence on incomplete or indirect
evidence, their findings have often involved
complicated chains of reasoning. Because of the
critical influence of some intelligence judgments
on force planning and resource allocation in the
Pentagon, they have often been highly controversial.
SECRET
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'Hence the drafters have tended to be quite precise
in identifying the evidential, analytical and
judgmental basis for their findings.
d. This tendency is most evident in the TOP SECRET
codeword versions of the basic Estimateseonestra-
tegic attack forces and on strategic
They are replete with references to particular
to
sources or methods, to details of evidence,
gaps in the evidence, to particular forms of
reasoning such as use Eof U.S. stimatesxwereealsoapublished
guide. Most of these specific
in a sanitized TOP SECRET version omitting sp
reference to the existence and results of certain
codeword-designated collection efforts (notably
overhead reconnaissance) which were then very
closely held. Otherwise, they were unchanged,les
often retaining specific references to other, less
exotic sources and methods. Even without specfic
references, the effort to differentiate between what
could be factually justified and what could be not
was often a revealing characteristic of the art form.
7. I think we should therefore considetrejecting s
requests that the strategic military-Estimates as a clas
r~
,~ on tyrn q v,o'. n t t :7 ; ex .r e
be E~=:~.~..c.sai,.].eand .,i Xcl~.u.~c.u, -,