THE ROLE OF COMMUNIST SECURITY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-6-1-25-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 5, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

MIF
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-6-1-25-6
?
DIA review completed
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge
X9021100K
10474
OR VON
970
SUBJEcT: The Role of Communist Security Foreces in South
Vietnam
Thomas Karamss.ines, Deputy Director for Plans at CIA, has
sent you memorandum which discusses the role of Communist
security forces in South Vietnam as an indicator of general enemy
intentions (Tab A). Attached to the memo is a large package of
pertinent documents, studies, and references.
The memo and enclosures include some indication, that the
Communists are preparing their public security elements - which
thus far have been used mostly in direct support of the war effort -
for various contingencies, including a cease-fire and a coalition
government with or without Communist participation. Available
evidence io fragmentary, however, and the memo obits* that further
Intelligence on the subject is needed, especially if impending changes
in the role of the security forces are to be used as an indicator of
general Communist intentious.
MORI/CDF
C05099177
Comment. The security forces are on* of the most difficult intelligence
targets in the entire Communist apparatus. Consequently, the chances
are that we will not be able to gain the insight necessary to detect and
interpret clearly definable changes in the functions of secakity forces in
advance of other kinds of evidence of Communist intentions. Nevertheless,
the information on security forces uncovered thus far does tend to confirm
the fact that the Communists are preparing their overall apparatus In the
South for various contingencies. Moreover, Mr. Karamessines package
contains some useful background information and serve, as a statue
report on intelligence efforts in this area.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
2 1 MAY 1970
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The Role of the Communist Vietnamese
State Security Apparatus as a Possible
Indicator of Enemy Planning and Intentions
1. Since early 1969, a pattern of activity has
developed in Indochina which appears to point up the role
that the communist State Security apparatus may assume
following either a cease-fire, a collapse of the Paris
Peace Talks, or a complete withdrawal of American troops
from Southeast Asia. From this pattern of activity we
infer that the North Vietnamese communists have for some
time been preparing their Public Security forces in South
Viet-Nam for a major role in the subjugation of that country.
Information from captured enemy personnel, captured documents,
and other sources, gives support to this inference and
indicates that such preparations began in the period just
after the Tonkin Gulf incident.
2. The southern arm of the communist State Security
apparatus is an organic part of the North Vietnamese
Ministry of Public Security or Bo Cong-An. Its mission
is to protect the Communist Party and its agencies in the
South from penetration by Allied intelligence organizations,
to control the populace within communist-held territory, and
to prepare to exercise all public safety and secret police
functions in territory not yet won by the communist regime.
In support of its mission, the security apparatus directs
an aggressive counterintelligence program primarily against
the entire Allied intelligence and security structure in
South Viet-Nam.
3. The present as well as projected role of the
communist State Security Service differs hardly at all from
1
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SECR
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141.01011111=4
the role one would expect a security service to assume in
any communist dominated country, and will create a strong
feeling of sltia vu in the minds of persons familiar with the
history of East Europe from 1945 to 1949. In each case,
the Soviet Union had an established security apparatus already
in operation in each country ready to step into the void
left by the collapse of the established government. The
communist takeover in South Viet-Nam is programmed to follow
a similar pattern.
4. A dissemination containing the results of our
research has been made available to the Intelligence Community.
In light of the timeliness of the information concerning the
role of the communist security a onaratus we have attached
a copy for your information.
January 1970) Included with it is a package containiay
copies of the pertinent documents upon which it is based.
Attachments
Thomas Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-6-1-25-6
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