PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-30-18-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 17, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
17 April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY AID
TO NORTH VIETNAM
1. The Politics of Aid: Moscow Hanoi's Offensive the Summit
1. Two basic factors must underly any analysis of Soviet involvement
in Vietnam. First, the USSR would like to see an eventual Communist
victory in Vietnam. Conversely, some decisive Southern victory in the
conflict would be felt as an important setback to Soviet interests, given
the high degree of Soviet commitment and support to Hanoi's cause.
2. Yet this proposition must be qualified. The USSR certainly does
not attach the same priority to the struggle that the DRV does. In 1954
the Soviets worked out a deal with the French that fell well short of North
Vietnam's objectives; by 1964 Khrushchev was all but ignoring the area.
His successors have proven truer and more consistent allies to Hanoi, but --
even given the interests shared on the two sides - Moscow can hardly be
expected to subordinate all its international concerns to this single problem.
3. The second proposition is that Soviet room for maneuver is
limited. It is dealing, not with a puppet, but with a distant, independent
client to which, in the Communist context, it has obligations of some
weight. Furthermore, this client has, in the People's Republic of
China (PRC), another patron that is eager to pillory the Soviet Union for
any faltering in its support to Hanoi's cause and that gives North Vietnam
military and economic aid of its own. The Soviets should derive some
leverage from their position as supplier of complex, advanced weapons, but
even here the Chinese could confound their attempts to apply this leverage
by replacing them in this function as well, albeit incompletely and with
difficulty.*
* In terms of total value, Chinese military aid in 1965-71 was about 40% that of
the USSR. In the last two years, however, the Chinese have supplied almost 95% as
much military aid, by value, as the USSR. This is mainly because the DRV's air defense
needs, met primarily by the USSR, declined for several years after the bombing halt
of 1968.
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4. Last, in this concrete situation theoretical leverage does not have
much practical effect. The North Vietnamese themselves are immensely
jealous of their independence, and they assiduously work their relations
with their two big supporters not only to maximize the aid but also to
minimize the influence of the donors.
5. We lack direct evidence of the real tone of the Soviet-North
Vietnamese relationship, although we do occasionally receive indications,
mostly indirect, on this matter. Relying on these and on deductions from
the above propositions, we surmise that. these relations are somewhat as
follows. The Soviets feel a special obligation to help in the air defense
of North Vietnam, as a socialist state under bombing' by the imperialists.
As for military supplies intended for use in the South, the bulk are by
now routinely supplied; and, beyond this, Moscow is anxious to help the
DRV overcome the advantage in modern weapons that the other side has
enjoyed. Hanoi for its part probably submits its aid requests with a minimum
of explanations. Hanoi's leaders have consistently said that they need no
advice from outside strategists, and they 'have excoriated any North
Vietnamese who seem to be coming too heavily under outside influence.
Moreover, they are always wary of getting caught in a bargaining relationship
with their patrons, and they thus almost certainly avoid being drawn into
the kinds of consultations that might grow into joint planning. The Soviets
can draw many conclusions from the kinds and volume of aid requested,
as well as intelligence from their people in North Vietnam, but they have
no apparent mechanism for advising on strategy and tactics -- that is, on
matters beyond those affecting training in and use of their equipment. They
also recognize * that, given Hanoi's sensitivities and its Peking option, they
would be treading on delicate ground if they sought to intrude into this
sphere.
6. If these views are correct, then it is likely that over the last year
or so, and particularly after the DRV's heavy losses of equipment in Lam
Son 719, the Soviet Union has been delivering to North Vietnam large
shipments of weapons and supplies, some of which are undoubtedly being
used in the present offensive. The signing of a number of military aid
agreements has been announced during this period, including one in August
1971, another in October, and the most recent in December (the Chinese
have kept pace throughout with similar announcements of aid deals). We
cannot associate Soviet decisions on particular weapons or volumes with
individual agreements, but Moscow would clearly have been aware that
Hanoi was building up large inventories of tanks, for example, and long-range
artillery. This process almost certainly began before the Soviets were aware
of President Nixon's planned visit to Peking and before their own summit
was scheduled. The Soviets could easily infer that the North Vietnamese
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were preparing for large-scale conventional action, which would occur during
a dry season. They may have been told as much, but they were probably
not kept abreast of the details of Hanoi's evolving plans for a multi-front
offensive.
7. When, with this buildup in process, summit diplomacy began to
develop from July onward, first in Peking and then in Moscow, the Soviets
must have had to consider the relationship between their diplomacy and
the Vietnam war. By November, with the breakdown of secret US-North
Vietnamese negotiations, their task had become how to relate what they
knew of Hanoi's military plans to the May summit.
8. At least by the first of the year, Moscow almost certainly knew
..;,that an offensive. was in the offing and could foresee several outcomes.
First, a North- Vietnamese offensive might score victories of a scope to
have major repercussions on South Vietnam's stability. This would be
welcome for its own sake and (the Soviets would reason) would put them
at an advantage vis-a-vis President Nixon in Moscow. At the summit, in
any discussion of a Vietnam settlement, it would require the United States
to. be the supplicant. This would be a desirable result unless the United
States reacted so negatively as to postpone or cancel the summit. The Soviets
would see some benefits even in this reaction, in that they would anticipate
a weakening of the President's domestic political position.
9. It is possible to argue that these advantages are so great that the
USSR hoped that a North Vietnamese offensive would provoke the United
States to put off the summit and even contrived to arrange matters to
this end. Putting aside for the moment the question of its ability to control
events in this fashion, it is doubtful that Moscow sees this as the preferred
outcome. Its interest in a successful summit is substantial. It has a stake
of some importance in certain bilateral matters, especially arms control and
trade. It has an interest in improved US-Soviet relations as the centerpiece
of a detente campaign, which is meant to forward its interests in Western
Europe. Most important, it is a matter of deep concern not to encourage
the rapprochement between its major antagonists (China and the United
States) to proceed to a stage of active anti-Soviet cooperation, a contingency
to which the Soviets have shown themselves acutely sensitive.
10. Second, the North Vietnamese might suffer a major defeat. This
would clearly be a bad outcome from the Soviet standpoint. Its only virtue
would be to deflate the importance of the Vietnam issue as a problem
in Soviet-US relations, thus leaving more time for the bilateral matters that
are Moscow's primary incentive for a summit. But if this defeat had been
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accompanied by heavy US bombing deep into North Vietnam, the Soviets
would have a hard time justifying any summit at all.* Thus this outcome
could be a double defeat for the USSR.
11. Third, major action could have eased off with no decisive result.
This would be, in terms of summit considerations alone, a manageable result,
since Vietnam would then not play a critical role in the Soviet-US encounter.
12. Fourth, the outcome might be undecided and still hotly contested
at the time of the summit itself. This would run the major risk of the
first case -- a US postponement or cancellation - and would put Moscow
under pressure to do the same. If the summit nonetheless took place, this
situation would almost guarantee that Vietnam would dominate the political
atmosphere. Vietnam, to the Soviets, is the wrong issue for this meeting.
13. This review shows how hard it would have been for the Soviets
to make confident calculations of the best way to relate the evolving conflict
in Vietnam to their summit diplomacy. In fact, however, there was little
they could do about Hanoi's plans. The Soviets have long been committed
to the military support of North Vietnam, and they began to be committed
to the aid that supports the present offensive before they arranged the
Moscow summit. For the Politburo, it would have been a momentous
decision to change course in the latter part of 1-971. Supporters of a summit
would have had the greatest difficulty in mustering a majority behind the
proposition that North Vietnam should be pressed to call off its offensive
plans. In fact, it is doubtful that they would have prevailed, especially since
it would have been argued that Hanoi would not have turned aside from
its plans in any event. No matter how the individual Soviet leaders appraised
the situation, it would be uncharacteristic of the present leadership, which
is closer to a collective than to the Khrushchevian model, to consider such
radical alternatives.
14. In sum, the Soviets, through their long commitment to North
Vietnam and the momentum of their military aid program, probably began
to underwrite the expansion of North Vietnam's offensive capabilities before
the summit was in view and without being fully consulted on Hanoi's
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specific intentions.* They see dangers to their interests in the way in which
Vietnam and the summit have become related, but the alternatives available
to them as this relationship developed were even more unpalatable. As of
now, they want both a North Vietnamese victory and a summit, but they
find that the key choices are beyond their control.
* The visit of Marshal Batitskiy (16-27 March) came far too late to fit into any
scenario of major decision-making. The composition of his delegation suggests that his
purpose was to advise on the air defense of North Vietnam, probably in connection
with renewed US bombing expected as a consequence of the North Vietnamese offensive.
Batitskiy's and other recent Soviet visits are discussed in Appendix A.
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11. The Amounts and Timing of Soviet Military Aid:
Relationship to the Present Offensive
Background
15. Until 1965 the Soviet Union provided only small amounts of
military aid to Hanoi - substantially less than $10 million annually in
the; .decade before 1965. From .,1965. through. 1971, however, the USSR
shipped nearly $1.7 billion of military aid to North Vietnam, or about
70%'0 of total Communist military aid (see Table 1). Soviet deliveries rose
sharply during the first three years of this period to a peak of $505 million
in 1967, mainly because, as already indicated, Moscow was providing Hanoi
with a large quantity of air defense equipment. Following the 1968 bombing
halt, the value of Soviet military aid declined markedly to about $70 million
in 1970. Deliveries rose again in 1971 as Moscow once more stepped up
shipments of expensive air defense equipment and provided replacements
for losses of other equipment suffered by North Vietnam during Lam
Son 719.
Estimated Communist Military Aid Deliveries
to North Vietnam
-1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Total
Total
270
455
650
390
225
155
180
2,330 1
USSR
210
360
505
290
' 120
70
100
1,655
PRC
60
95
145
100
105
85
75
665
Eastern
Europe
and
other
Negi.
Negl.
Negi.
Negi.
Negl.
Negl.
5
10 a/
a. Including an estimated cumulative value of deliveries from Eastern Europe which amounted
to $5 million during 1965-70. More detailed tables on Communist aid by value, country of origin,
and types are presented in Appendix B.
16. The PRC provided about $665 million of military aid during
1965-71, accounting for most of the remaining 30% of total military aid
deliveries. Ammunition and light infantry weapons dominated the Chinese
contribution to North Vietnam's arsenal, but the PRC has also provided
such equipment as MIG-17s, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), field artillery
pieces, amphibious and other types of tanks, and naval craft.
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17. Over the years it has always been difficult to establish, until after
the event, the link between Hanoi's planning for an offensive and specific
military aid deliveries in support- of such an offensive. For one thing,
preparations for an offensive normally precede by many months the action
itself. Second, the existence of stockpiles maintained by the 'North
Vietnamese 'enables Hanoi- in many instances to use goods imported at a
considerably earlier date, at least in the initial phases of an offensive. (The
st iitag is.-di sad im mwve4o.tail,-belo - )Third, a-portion
of our-iti arts tioh labobf No 'th' Vi ttarnese' arths i pb'tts1s only, devek ped
after the fact thatris, it is derived not ~ from direct evidence of shipments
but from a later calculation of what the enemy has actually used or lost
on the. battlefield. Our estimates of Hanoi's imports of such items as
ammunition and small arms are derived in this fashion.
i ' 1$~r " - Tr t#aan'ji' fey are a H of oda se we 'do - leave, `on a Wholly--current
basi9;-high-quality information about recent trends in military aid.
frequently provide hard evidence of the presence of various
types of equipment, such as SA-2's, AAA weapons, tanks, heavy field
artillery,-aritl'"armored - equipment. -Direct and up-to-date evidence is also
generally available on Soviet deliveries of military support items such -as
trucks and petroleum products. This information, however, does not enable
us to monitor the total flow and exact mix of military shipments on a
continuing and real time basis.
A More Detailed Look at Soviet Aid in the Past Year
19. Soviet military aid to North Vietnam during the past 12 months
or so appears to have been geared to Hanoi's changing needs, as has been
the case throughout the war. There is no indication that Moscow at any
time has withheld aid from North Vietnam in an attempt to influence
Hanoi's military policies. On the contrary, the large deliveries of air defense
equipment, tanks, small arms, ammunition, trucks, and petroleum products
in 1971 and early 1972 demonstrate Moscow's continuing support for North
Vietnam in the conduct of the war. The types and quantities of goods,
as well as the timing of deliveries, clearly indicate that some of the Soviet
aid was intended to replace losses from Lam Son 719. These amounts,
however, were also adequate to permit Hanoi to prepare for the current
offensive. The major categories of Soviet military aid delivered in 1970
and 1971 are shown in the following tabulation:
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Million US $
Missiles
3
Ammunition
49
Ground forces equipment
4
Other
10
Air defense equipment
Because of rounding, components may not -add to the totals shown.
1971
100
46
2
34
13
5
20. Reliable estimates for the first quarter of 1972 are not available,
but there is no evidence of any upsurge over previous levels. This does
not, however, imply any withholding of support by the USSR: all historical
precedent indicates that many types of supplies needed for the first phases
of the current offensive would have arrived months in advance. Similarly,
historical precedent suggests that replacements for ammunition and
equipment expended in the offensive almost certainly will cause a bulge
in military aid deliveries in the months immediately after the offensive.
Recent aid agreements signed between the two countries undoubtedly
provide assurances of continuing future aid. In an unusual display of
support, Soviet President Podgornyy traveled to Hanoi in October 1971
with a high-ranking delegation to sign the- annual military and economic
aid agreements for 1972. In late December 1971, during a period of US
protective reaction strikes against North Vietnam, additional guarantees of
Soviet support were provided by the announcement of a supplementary
agreement on military and economic aid for 1972.
21. Details of deliveries of selected military equipment and war
supporting goods are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
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In 1971 as a whole, the USSR almost certain y e were
at least ten SA-2 battalions to North Vietnam, the first such deliveries since
1968. These imports substantially improved North Vietnam's air defense
capability, increasing its SAM strength from 35-40 missile battalions to
45-50 battalions. This expansion enabled North Vietnam to maintain its
air defenses around Hanoi and other strategic areas in the north while
deploying more than 20 missile battalions to southern North Vietnam and
Laos. The latter deployment, in turn, greatly strengthened the.enemy's
ability to protect his logistic network in Laos, and it gave him means with
which he could seek to counter US air attacks during the current offensive.
Tanks
23. At least 100 Soviet tanks and probably more were delivered to
North Vietnam during 1971, in part to replace losses incurred during Lam
Son 719 and in part to build up inventories. More than 80% of these were
T-54 medium tanks - the largest in North Vietam's inventory and the type
being employed extensively by the NVA in the current offensive. All
available evidence suggests that Soviet tank deliveries to Hanoi in 1971 were
at record levels. On two separate occasions last summer, photography
revealed a total of about 50 tanks at P'ing-hsiang, the main rail
transshipment point for Soviet military equipment entering North Vietnam
via China.
Field Artillery
24. Hard evidence shows that the Soviet Union delivered at least eight
new 130-mm field artillery pieces to North Vietnam in 1971 and six more
in the first quarter of 1972, bringing North Vietnam's inventory of these
long-range guns to more than 50. The USSR has also delivered a minimum
of 15 field pieces of other calibers in the same period. The actual number
of pieces delivered was almost certainly greater, but our evidence does not
indicate how much greater.*
25. North Vietnam imported an average of more than 3,000 Soviet
trucks per year from 1967 through 1970, and imports continued at least
at that rate in 1971. An unprecedented buildup of trucks was observed
in photography of North Vietnam's truck parks in 1971, including the
country's largest at Dong Dang on the border between China and North
* We also estimate that the PRC provided North Vietnam with over 200 field artillery
pieces during 1971.
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Vietnam. The heavy floods may have contributed to the buildup (by
preventing newly imported vehicles from moving out of the truck park),
but the presence of nearly 6,000 trucks in storage clearly indicated a high
volume of truck imports. The overall truck inventory of North Vietnam
is presently estimated at more than 20,000 - an all time high and well
in excess of normal civilian -needs and military requirements, even taking
into account anticinated heavy losses from Allied air strikes. Furthermore,
Hanoi has
ordered more than 5,000 Soviet trucks for 1972 delivery. More than 1,100
of these trucks had already arrived in North Vietnam by early March, out
of planned deliveries of about 2,300 trucks during the first half year.
Petroleum
26: NorthVietnam{s `petroleum imports, more than 90% of which
come from the USSR, rose nearly 10% to a record level of 390,000 tons
in 1971. Deliveries in the first quarter of 1972 totaled about 145,000 tons,
an all-time high. The record pace of deliveries of this critical commodity
provides further evidence_.,_of_ Moscow's unstinting support for North
Vietnam. Large quantities of petroleum are essential both to North
Vietnam's logistic effort and to the large-scale use of armor that has
occurred in the current offensive.
Weapons Currently Deployed by the NVA in South Vietnam
27. Heavy supporting weapons deployed by the Communists during
the current offensive in South Vietnam include 122-mm and 130-mm field
guns, 152-mm howitzers, 160-mm mortars, surface-to-air missiles (SA-2s),
and tanks. All of these types of equipment have been in the North
Vietnamese inventory for several years, and four of the above weapons have
been used by the NVA inside South Vietnam in the past.* These four are
the 122-mm and 130-mm field guns, the 152-mm howitzer, and tanks. Only
the SA-2s and 160-mm mortars have not previously been deployed inside
South Vietnam. Since all of these weapons have been in the North
Vietnamese inventory for some time, it is impossible to say categorically
that their deployment results from an increase in recent aid deliveries rather
* The 152-mm howitzers and 130-mm field guns are believed to be manufactured
only in the USSR. The 160-mm mortar and the 122-mm field gun are manufactured
in both the USSR and the PRC. While the PRC has a limited capability to manufacture
the SA-2, we believe that those being used by the North Vietnamese are Soviet-made.
Most of the tanks in North Vietnam's inventory are also Soviet-made, though Hanoi
has some tanks of Chinese manufacture. There are preliminary indications that at least
some of the tanks recently captured in Quang Tri are Chinese.
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than from a drawdown in stocks. In the case of tanks, however, the sheer
losses of the enemy reportedly more than 100 in the present offensive --
t that Hanoi already is wusing some of those recently delivered.
sines
'lie- Stockpiling `Issue
28.. ., As the above discussion suggests, analysis of the. relationship
cvinplicated by the facti that the North Vietnamese as a matter of policy
maintain large stockpiles of war materiel and do not prepare for an offensive
in a hand-to-mouth manner. Throughout the.' war,' Communist forces appear
to have adhered to a stockpiling concept that calls for large reserves of
all basic. equipment and supplies. Stores of food, weapons, and ammunition
are established at three ;distinct echelons of command. Field Stockpiles -
also..called.Combat Stockpiles.- are, suppose to be. in all operational, areas
to meek. ,-the specific 'requirements Of units that are. to be committed to
combat for a certain minimum period of time. Other reserves, denoted
Campaign'. Stockpiles, 'are stored in' areas that are more secure but still
relatively close to potential combat areas. Finally, Strategic. Stockpiles.. to
meet various contingencies are'establishedin base areas having a high degree
of security,
29. The enemy has set up Strategic Stockpiles principally in North
Vietnam and Laos, although there are undoubtedly some in South Vietnam
and Cambodia in base areas deemed adequately secure. Campaign Stockpiles
have been established widely throughout the Laotian and Cambodian base
areas and in the more secure areas within South Vietnam. Combat Stockpiles
also exist both in South Vietnam and in other areas close to the locations
of military operations planned by the NVA.
30. Firm intelligence on the true size of the enemy's stockpiles in
Indochina is difficult to come by. Based on the enemy's logistic planning
doctrine, Strategic Stockpiles should approximate 12 months' resupply
requirements; Campaign Stockpiles, six months' requirements; and Combat
Stockpiles, three months' requirements - a total of 21 months of resupply
requirements. These figures undoubtedly represent an ideal; the odds are
that current North Vietnamese stocks are below these levels. Nevertheless,
there is good evidence that Communist stock levels are substantial. For
example, intercepted enc.,niy communications in January 1972 revealed that
more than 4,500 tons of supplies were stored in eight storage areas in the
Laotian Panhandle. These storages areas are only a fraction of the number
currently being maintained in the Panhandle alone. COMINT also indicates
a similar picture in southern North Vietnam. One late-1971 intercept
revealed that more than 5,000 tons of supplies were stored in several areas
in Quang Binh Province. More recently, intercepts have indicated that several
12
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thousand ton,, of ordnance were stored in or near Vinh. Thus, from the
standpoint of stocks, the North Vietnamese probably would have been in
a position to launch a sustained offensive this spring regardless of whether
or not there had been a significant increase in Soviet aid over the past
year.
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Soviet Military Visitors
and the North Vietnamese Offensive
Travel by an unusually large number of high-ranking Soviet military
officers to North Vietnam during the three weeks before the initiation of
the current North Vietnamese drive in South Vietnam raises the" question
of whether, despite Soviet protestations to the contrary, the USSR may
have been involved in planning the attack. Available background information
on the Soviet officers, and other factors pertinent to the visits, suggests
that Moscow did not have this specific purpose in mind. Nevertheless, the
episode further illustrates how Moscow's present Vietnam policy complicates
the pursuit of its policy goals elsewhere.
A total of 15 Soviet officers have been identified with the delegations
to Hanoi led by USSR Minister of Communications Psurtsev (9-17 March)
and by the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Air Defenses (PVO), Marshal
Batitskiy (16-27 March). With Psurtsev were a Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of PVO formerly responsible for fighter aviation (Air Marshal Savitskiy),
the First Deputy Commander in-Chief of the Baku PVO district (Lt. General
Konstantinov), and the Deputy Commander of Soviet forces in
Czechoslovakia for combat training (Maj. General Tukeyev). With Batitskiy
were 11 other Soviet officers, notably his deputies in charge of surface-to-air
missile troops (Lt. General Bondarenko). and of radio technical troops
(Lt. General Beregovoy). Among the rest were an assortment of senior
military intelligence, communications, and propaganda specialists. Almost
certainly the Batitskiy delegation constituted the largest group of Soviet
military VIPs ever to visit Hanoi.
Indeed since 1965 such visits have been relatively infrequent. In
January 1966 Politburo member Shelepin had in his entourage the present
Commander of the Far East Military District, General Tolubk
in October 1966 Batitskiy himself ma ec a -secret
visit to inspect North Vietnamese air defenses. President Podgornyy's
delegation in October 1971 included a First Deputy Minister of Defense,
General Sokolov.
By the time Batitskiy arrived, the Soviets clearly knew what was in
the works. It seems doubtful that these Soviet officers were advising the
North Vietnamese on how to conduct offensive operations in the South.
Possibly, the combat training specialist from the Soviet forces in
Czechoslovakia could have been of some help in this regard, but the PVO
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specialists were probably better qualified to advise on defense of North
Vietnamese territory than on offensive operations. In this context, the
Soviet officer best qualified in matters directly relating to the protection
of advancing ground troops from,air- atttacic, Lt.: General Levchenko, Chief
of Ground Forces PVO, seems corlspieuous by.. his absence.
Moreover, the fact that Moscow sent other delegations to Hanoi at
about the same time suggests. that Moscow had. broader, purposes in.view,
hot _time
rs?'t ~ehiv y..related to:
!Xq
important Soviet delegations are -known to have been in Hanoi at various
times from 22 February to 30 March, headed by the Minister of Culture,
the Minister of Maritime Transport, and a Deputy Chief Editor of Pravda.
Two of these five visits began during the Sino-American talks, while the
other three were dispatched . after Chou En-lai's 5 March visit to Hanoi.
Ceaapeivabiy. .Meow ; simply ,w:iahed .its::effielet. spokesman to: ploy on
Hanoi's apprehensions - which ofcourse the Soviets share to some degree --
regarding the possible effect of Sino-American detente on the course of
the war.
In any. . case, the Soviets . have clearly tried to minimize adverse US
reaction to the appearance of Soviet involvement in the -offensive.. The
Soviets gave the Psurtsev delegation no publicity and gave none to the
Batitskiy delegation until Hanoi broke the story on 27 March, the last day
of the visit. On 4 April a Soviet official abroad privately stressed the USSR's
non-complicity in the ill-timed venture and his hope that it would not
jeopardize the impending US-Soviet summit meeting. On 5 April a Soviet
TASS correspondent in West Germany refused to participate in a television
news panel discussion on Vietnam on the grounds that the criticism of
US policy he would feel obliged to express could complicate the approaching
Presidential visit to the USSR.
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