INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH BANGLA DESH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-30-11-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 6, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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2- 70 454r, fun
Intelligence Memorandum
India's Relations With Bangla Desh
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6 October 1971
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 October 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Ina y 9 Rela ion - With Bangla Desh
Introduction
On 17 April at "Mujibnagar"--a frequently moved,
semifictional capital--the Bangla Desh,,government in-
augurated a,'new cabinet and ratified a declaration
of independence. Indian Government public relations
officers handled the advance publicity, and the Indian
Army organized the caravan of newsmen who drove to
Mujibnagar--on this. occasion a mango grove in East
Pakistan about a mile and a half from the Indian bor-
der. The chairs and public address system bore the
markings of the Indian firm from which they had been
rented. The canvas on the Bias had Indian army mark-
ings. Refreshments arrived in an Indian army truck
on which the divisional insignia had been obscured
by mud. Indian support forBangla Desh has since
been less visible.
Since late March, New Delhi has provided military
supplies, training, political support, advice, fire
support, and combat personnel for East Pakistani in-
surgents. As a result of this extensive support, the
Indian Government has been able so far to exercise
considerable control over the Bangla Desh movement.
This may lessen if the strains.now appearing between
the Bengalis and New Delhi increase.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of
"-Current InteZZigence and coordinated within CIA.
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The Background
1 1. Fighting broke out in East Pakistan on
25 March when West Pakistani troops moved to re-
assert the central government's control. During
the first few weeks of fighting West Pakistani
troops were confined to Dacca and a few isolated
cantonments. The Bengalis believed that they
would win: indeperrdence quickly, and many Indian
policy makers apparently agreed.
2. Presumably hoping to ensure that an in-
dependent Bangla Desh would have no reason to
doubt India's good intentions, New Delhi moved
quickly to help the insurgents. By 28,March
Indian arms
were being is ri u e to enga 1 freedom fighters.
This support was approved, if not ordered, by
Prime Minister Gandhi.
the decision was made at a cabinet-leve
meeting almost immediately after Pakistani troops
began to move.
11 Mrs.
Gandhi on 30 March informed parliamentary leaders
that India was supplying arms to the Bengalis.
On 2 April India's paramilitary Border Security
Force was ordered to assure its"mutinous-East
Pakistani counterparts of "full protection and
support." When West Pakistani aircraft destroyed
Radio Bangla Desh at Chittagong, the Indians gave
the Bengalis a new; transmitter. A few Indian of-
ficers entered East Pakistan in late March and
early April, ostensibly to advise the Bengalis,
but more likely to obtain accurate information
on the situation there.
3. Initially, the Indians seem to have made
no attempt to use the aid they provided as a lever
to secure control over the Bengalis. According to
one newsman, any Bengalis who asked for arms at
the border were given them. The amount of Indian
aid was slight, and the originally optimistic Ben-
galis may not have regarded it as crucial at this
.juncture.
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The Political Side
4. By the second week in April, however, it,
was clear that the Bengali freedom fighters, hand-
As the Bengalis faded, Indian concern grew over the
possibility that in a prolonged struggle leftist
extremists would gain control of the guerrilla move--
ment. India's response was to begin focusing support
on Bengali political moderates. Some consideration
was given at this time to direct intervention, but
caution prevailed.
5. The leadership of the Awami League, the
centrist party that had led the provincial autonomy
movement and had swept elections in East Pakistan
the previous December, was disorganized. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, the only man who could speak for
VT'e f3' ?d' Xd!Sr ` Paki's'ta:x1, *'~?S t pr gonde. Other
party leaders were either making their way to India
or already in India fighting among themselves. The
Indians concluded that the moderates must be stimu-
lated to give political direction to the-struggle.
The Awami League was the logical choice, since many
of its leaders were in India and dependent on New
Delhi for political support and, in some cases, for
their daily needs. Thus it'was;that, under Indian
direction,Awami League leaders on 12 April formed
a government-in-exile, and announced it publicly on
17 April.
6. Indian diplomatic support for the Bangla
Desh government has been active but limited. The
Indians in public have taken a line very sympathetic
to the East Bengalis. They have permitted the in-
surgents to open high commissions in India. They
have even allowed Bengali officials to travel on
Indian documents. The Indians sent their foreign
minister to argue the Bangla Desh case in chanceries
froz0 Moscow to Washington but they have so far
ulars advanced. During this period, the Indians
stayed with their policy of limited involvement.
no match for West Pakistani regulars in direct fire
fights. Bengali resistance melted away as the reg-
icapped by lack of organization and equipment, were
SF. F.
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.cians to follow a fairly moderate course. They
apparently have tried to force the Bengali politi-
istan would probably see as a casus belli. They
refused to grant de jure recognition--which Pak-
also may have blocked attempts by the Bangla Desh
the reluctance of the Awami League to, ;tram power
has never been confirmed). In September, despite
to open contacts with other foreign countries
the Indians--perhaps thinking a broader base was
now needed for the independence movement--succeeded
in pushing the league into a liberation front with
the less extremeelements
7. Radio Bangla Desh is the primary means of
communication between the government-in-exile and
the people of East Pakistan. Although it is osten-
sibly run by the Bangla Desh government, it uses
the facilities of All India Radio and would find
it almost impossible to continue on the air without
Indian support. While we cannot be sure that New
De,lh,i conUols the content, of Radio Bangla Desh' s
programs, we do note the broadcasts on most occa-
sions conform to Indian policy.
powerful sponsor.
7
8. Bangla Desh has failed to gain formal
recognition from any country or to win greater in-
ternational support for the guerrillas. Moreover,
it is becoming isolated from both the insurgents
in the field and the people of East Bengal. These
factors, combined with its domination by the Indians,
have weakened the politicians' role. Some Awami
Leaguers--once concerned only with ending West Pak-
istani rule--have become increasingly worried about
Indian domination of an independent Bangla Desh.
To ensure a political future for themselves and
some independence from India, Bengali politicians
may at a future point decide to forgo Indian sup-
port and guidance and to strike out on their own.
For-the time being, however, most seem content to
live on Indian charity and be, guided by their
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 The Military Side
actions that might plunge India into war with Pak-
istan. By late May, as'.guerrilla fighting began
in earnest, members of the Mukti Fouj* were com-
plaining of Indian control..
11. When fighting broke out, deserters from
the East Pakistan Police,, the paramilitary East
Pakistan Rifles, and regular East Bengal Regiment
formed the nucleus of the freedom fighters. In
addition to the arms these 10,000 or more men
brought with them, the Bengalis captured weapons
from the West Pakistani troops and further supple-
mented their supplies from privately owned stocks.
When resistance collapsed in April, a part of this
supply may have been lost. The hard core of the
resistance are perhaps still armed with original
weapons.
12. The guerrillas must now depend on weapons
furnished by New Delhi if they are to increase in
size and effectiveness. Ten thousand or more newly
trained guerrillas may already, have entered.East
Pakistan, and the total force may reach as high as
50,000. India has already supplied or plans to
supply rifles for "tens of thousands" and is also
and some camps were in operation by the end of the
month. Personnel of the Border Security Force en
teed Ea" Pakistan to advise and fight alongside
the insurgents. The supplying of arms was put on
a more systematic basis.
10. Although willing to give extensive aid,
the Indians refused to grant them freedom to take
started to collapse in early April, New Delhi also
began to support a prolonged guerrilla war. Plans
9 When the East Pakistan freedom fighters
tion Forces).
The Mu t. Foul (Liberation Army) was the term orig-
inally applied to -the armed forces of Sangla Desh.
The name was later changed to Mukti Bahini (Libera-
SF.CRF
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providing some heavier weapons such as machineguns
and light mortars.
13. The Indians have denied .. requests by the
TH'ey pdtht out, probably, accurately, that, the Mukti
Bahini is not yet ready for such a campaign. The
Indians, however, are at least as interested in
preventing, he Bengalis from launching a major of-
'fensive so obviously based in India and supplied
by New Delhi that Pakistan might decide to go to
but-the Indians have said the time is not ripe.
Pakistani Army if they had this. kind of equipment,
Mukti Bahini for artillery, tanks, and aircraft.
The Bengalis claim they could drive out the West
war.' By controlling the amount of arms it supplies,
New Delhi is,also able to deny the Mukti Bahini the
men it needs for such an offensive. Although those
being trained in the camps might follow Mukti Bahini
orders to enter East Pakistan even were India to
object, they would be unlikely to do so without,
weapons.
14. Indian control of axmnunition and other
expendable supplies also allows New Delhi to pre-
vent an unwanted major offensive. It even gives
them control over day-to-da operations of the
cross-border raiders.
ammunition is issued only for app
missions.
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15. Indian fire support contributes to New
Delhi's oontrol of the cross-border raiders. The
raiders are frequently protected by artillery
directed at West Pakistani troops, and the presence
of Indian forces along the border helps deter Pak-
istani hot pursuit. There is no direct evidence
that Indians have threatened to deny fire support
for unauthorized raids, but the Bengalis are cer
tainly aware of the possibility.
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16. Indian control of units permanently
Mukti Bahini units apparently have received little
more than general guidance and`a minimum of sup-
plies from the Indians. These units, however, are
not in a position'to draw India into war with Pak
operating inside East Pakistan is tenuous. Some
istan. Indian advisers heln ensure Indian control
of the Mukt i Bahini.
in one border sector Benga i, ssamese,
and Nepali personnel of the Border Security Force
are used in,about half the Mukti Bahini raids.
One such raid against a Pakistani army. camp was
led by the colonel commanding the local security
force battalion. Pakistani propaganda claims
that alnhost all raids are by Indian infiltrators
are exaggerated, but the Pakistanis have produced
good evidence--including captured ersonnel--to
substantiate some of the charges.
17. -dia. probably has, no. control over the
guerrilla units--most. of them leftist--which rec-
ognize neither the authority of the Mukti-Bahini
nor the Bangla Desh government. These insurgents
depend on arms and ammunition they can acquire
from the enemy or friendly civilians supplemented
by limited supplies from Indian Communists. The
most successful such group--the Naxalites who
advocate Maoist revolution--apparently receives
no outside support. Should India continue to
limit the operations of the Mukti Bahini, these
groups might eventually become a significant
part of the insurgent movement. And, within
these leftist circles, the more radical revolu-
tionaries already appear to be outdistancing the
much more easily controlled pro-Soviet groups.
Outlook
18. Despite the failure of the Indians to
do all the Bengalis want and despite growing
strains in the relationship, the Bengalis do not
appear likely to make a major effort to assert
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their independence from,New Delhi's control at this
time. Both the Bangla Desh government-in-exile and
the Mukti Bahini are almost totally dependent on
India and probably are unwilling to risk any diminu-
tion of Indian support.
19. Leftist guerrillas have shown that Bengalis
can fight at least a small-scale guerrilla war with-
out Indian support or Indian control, and eventually
the Mukti Bahini may have to follow their example or
face the possibility that the fighting may be taken.
over by extremists. The politicians in exile in
India are already showing a greater inclination to
act without prior indian approval, and eventually
they, may break free of Indian controls or lose out
to rn re independent--and probably more leftist---
politicians.
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SECRET /EXDIS/ CODEWORD
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
October 7, 1971
Time and Place: 3:10 p. m. - 3:50 p. m. , White House Situation Room
Subject: India and Pakistan
Farticipants?
chairman Henry A. Kissinger CIA Richard Helms
John Waller
State U. Alexis Johnson
Christopher Van Hollen NSC
Defense David Packard
Armistead Selden
James H. Noyes
JCS
situation and to prepare contingency papers as required.
--No approach is to be made or suggested through the United Nations unless
the President grants his approval.
Staff: Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
R/Adm. Robert Welander
James Hackett
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Capt. Howard N. Kay
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
--The State Department is to send a telegram to our Ambassadors in
New Delhi, Islamabad, Moscow and Tehran, instructing them to initiate
immediate approaches to the local governments at the highest level. In
New Delhi and Islamabad, they will urge both Indians and Pakistanis, in
the strongest terms, to practice restraint in the current situation. The
Soviet Union will be asked to appeal to the Indians for restraint, while the
Shah of Iran will be requested to make a similar appeal to Yahya Khan.
-_It should be made clear to both.the Indian and Pakistani governments that aid
will be suspended if war breaks out.
--An inter-agency working group is to be established under the direction of
Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson to monitor the India-Pakistan
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Dr. Kissinger : Dick (Helms) is going to tell us what's going on.
S War seems most likely to come, as it did in 1965, from a series of miscalculations,
but we cannot rule out a deliberate decision by one side or the other. Mrs. Gandhi
could still decide to invade East Pakistan to end the refugee influx. The total
has passed nine million, with 30, 000 more arriving every day.
Dr. Kissinger: Do you believe that? Do you think nine million is an accurate
figure?
Mr. Helms: Well, it may not be accurate, but even if it's only seven million, it is
still a lot of refugees, with still more coming and practically none returning. In
any case, by mid-November. Mrs. Gandhiwill come under increased pressure to
take military measures. Parliament reconvenes then and many members will
call for action against Pakistan.
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in the next few weeks. Yahya himself has given the British the impression that he
is considering such action, but he has assured our DCM he is not. He may be
trying to bring Western pressure on India, or he may think an attack would help
by bringing international pressure on both sides.
In East Pakistan, the guerrillas have become more active as the rains taper off.
The secessionists and the Indians both want a speedy solution, even at the risk of
war, to prevent radical leftist elements from taking over the independence move-
ment. We have reports that up to 100, 000 Indian-trained guerrillas will be
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'SECRET/EXDIS/ CODEWORD
infiltrated into East Pakistan over the next two months.: This force would try
to seize an area in northeast East Pakistan where a provisional government-
could be established. India would then recognize the Bangla Desh,, which-
would almost certainly send the Pakistanis to war.
J
greatly. reduced service, and there is some danger of severe food. shortages in
parts of the East by November.
Dr. Kissinger: We are indeed fortunate that the Indians are such reasonable
and pacific people. Tom (Adm. Moorer), how do you assess the military
situation?
The secret treason trial of Mujibur Rahman has antagonized. the. East. 25X1
he has been sentenced to life imprisonment. Yahya. car, 25X1.1
uphold the sentence, commute it or let the matter lie. His decision, will: be:- "-
indication of how conciliatory he intends to be toward East Pakistan., Production
in the East is well below last March. Most workers have not returned to their,
Jobs and guerrilla sabotage is a problem. Foreign shipping companies have
Mr. Johnson: We have received a separate report which, indicates that. some
40, 000 guerrillas will be infiltrated into East Pakistan by- October 15..
Mr. Helms: We do have trouble with these figures, but. when the weather gets
dry they will be infiltrated in n-ambers, and whether it is 40,.000 or 100, 000 or'
something in between, there is no question that there wil be a lot of them..
The Indians believe that snow and bad weather in the north- will keep Pakistan.
from over-running Kashmir and would hinder Chinese aid to the Pakistanis.,
and that the guerrillas eventually will be successful in East Pakistan.. The
civil administration in East Pakistan cannot cope with the enormous social,
economic and political problems, and in a few areas the guerrillas have set
up their own administrative structure. The Pakistani government. has made
little headway in winning over the people of East Pakistan, and popular support
for the insurgents seems to be increasing.
Adm. Moorer: The most important factor is that the Indian-shave. a. four to one
ratio in ground forces. With regard to air forces, the outcome depends in.lar:ge
part on who pre-empts.
Dr. Kissing I remember a while back the story of the Indian pilot who crashed
near Dacca. The Indians are such poor pilots they can't even get off the ground.
Adm. Moorer: You're right, the Indians can't compete with the Pakistani pilots.
The air units of both sides will deteriorate rapidly. The restraints on our aid
program have already led the Pakistanis to cannibalize some F-86's in order to
keep the rest in the air. After six more months of restraints, they would have
to do the same with the F-1041s. In combat, attrition and a lack of spare parts
would wear them down quickly.
Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take? Two or three weeks?
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ffECR:ET/EXDIS-/CODEWORD 4
Adm.. Moore'r.:: I was aboutto say four to six weeks,, but it could be less. The
na-sal forces: don't amount to much, The Indians would undoubtedly try to
blockade East-, Pakistan and probably, could do so. The Pakistani Army would
give- a good account of itself -but would -fail on the logistics problem. The
Tndian-Army,-eventually would gain:a.superior position because of its numerical
advantage.. They have large: numbers on.the ground, but then they may consider
it nece:ss.ary. to. keep five or: si:c divisions on the Chinese border.
LYr.. Kissinger: Am I right-in understanding that we have no evidence of a
Chinese buildup?
Adm.. Moores: You are right.. There :is -no such evidence. The main factor
hire is- that neither side can fight :a. war :of attrition. They should begin running
aut of s_upplies: in four to six.weeks; .and India will prevail because of superior
numbers.
Mr., Johnson:. This is especially true in East Pakistan, where they will have a
numerical-advantage of regular forces plus the support of the Mukti Bahini.
Dr.. Kis sin er.:: Well, Alex [Johnson], where do we stand politically?
M'r.. Yohns-on:: It's a mess, although-there is one new element that is encouraging.
The: Shah (of. Iran) had a. meeting.with:l Yahya [Khan] and pressed him strongly
to reach a political settlement.
Mr.. Van Hollen: The Shah_urged-YYahya to cut his losses, told him frankly that
ha didn't. have a.. chance in. a -mihtary-showdown and urged him to seek a
political- settlement.
Mr.. Sohnson: We have been in. touch. with the Bangla Desh people and have
tried to encourage the development of a dialogue between Bangla Desh and
West Pakistan, but they are insisting on complete and unconditional
independence immediately.
Dr:, Kissinger: You mean:.that'-s ::their :starting point.
Mr. Johnson: Yes, their initial position. Mujibur [Rahman] is the key. If
Yahya would release Mujibur- and make a deal with him...
Dr. Kissinger--- I think that's inconceivable! Unless Yahya's personality has
changed 100% since I saw him in July.
Mr. Johnson: I agree that it's unlikely, but we have had some indications.
Mr. Van Hollen: Ambassador Farland recently proposed to Yahya that he
make a deal with Mujibur and what is interesting is that Yahya did not take
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the usual negative attitude. This may indicate that they [the Pakistanis] are
planning to deal with Mujibur, but this is highly speculative, and I think we must
assume the contrary until we get more evidence.
Mr. Johnson: With thousands of Bahini being introduced into East Pakistan at the
onset of the dry season, Yahya may feel more beleaguered and may become more
interested in seeking a settlement. On the other hand, with the end of the
monsoon season, Yahya's army will have greater mobility.
Dr. Kissinger: When he was here last week, Gromyko claimed that the Russians
are restraining the Indians. Are they doing this? I haven't seen anything on this.
Mr. Helms: All our evidence indicates this is true.
Mr. Johnson : I agree with that. 25X1
Dr. Kissinger: In what way? I have seen no such information. Are you holding
out on me? I don't seem to be getting my copies of cables.
Dr. Kissinger: The Indians have great ability for determining the impossible and
then demanding it.
Mr. Johnson : The Soviets were quite firm in telling the Indian representatives
who went to Moscow that they [the Soviets]. would not support Bangla Desh.
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Dr. Kissinger: So you are the one who has been holding back my cables, and 25X1
thought all along it was Joe Si s co.
Mr. Johnson: The Soviets don't want hostilities if they can be avoided.
Dr. Kissinger: When 1, was in India recently I formed the opinion that if the Indians
were prepared to accept slow evolution in Pakistan, we could work effectively with
them, and they would eventually get most of what they want. But they keep lumping
all these things together; the refugee problem, independence for Bangla Desh,
Pakistani forces on their borders. In their convoluted minds they really believe
they can give Pakistan a powerful blow from which it won't recover and solve
everything at once. If they would cooperate with us we could work with them on
90% of their problems, like releasing Mujibur or attaining some degree of autonomy
for Bangla Desh, and these steps would lead eventually to their getting it all.
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Mr. Van Hollen: The Indians don't have complete control over, the Mukti Bahini.
They couldn't stop them all if they wanted to.
Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Saunders) Weren't you with me when-I7 talked: with the
Indian] Army Chief of Staff? He was so cocky,. he thought he could defeat everyone
in ;sight, all at the same time. We can't,ask them to shut off the guerrillas. It
will get us nowhere.
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Mr. Van Hollen: We could ask them to try to curb the guerrillas-..
Dr? Kissinger: No, that's a non-starter. We can't ask them_ta.cut`_off-aid to the-
guerrillas. It's an internal affair.
Mr. Helms: When you fatten up guerrillas they become. a different force. They
aren't guerrillas any longer.
Dr. Kissinger: Yahya is a slow learner. He is very deliberate,. butif-you force
,him to make a decision, his Moslem instinct may assert itself,and perhaps he will
start taking rapid action.
?
Mr. Johnson : You may be right about that.
Dr.-Kissinger : When I was in India in 1962, they told me, how they-were. going to
squeeze the Pakistanis along the front. They were so clever they got themselves
into a war.
Adm. Moorer: If the Indians really want to, punish the Pakistanis.,,. they-may be ready
to go all the'way to a break to do it.
Dr. Kissinger: Let's get this completely dear. Do the Indians really-understand
that we will cut off aid if they go to war?
Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, the Secretary (of State) told them that..
Dr. Kissinger: This is of the utmost importance. The Indians must understand that
we mean it. The President has said so. In fact, he tells me every day. Are you
sure the Indians got the message?
Mr. Van Hollen: I believe so. I will double check, but the Secretary has been seeing
them in New York.
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Dr. Kissinger: Please make sure. What about Yahya? Does he understand that we
will suspend aid if he starts hostilities?
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5: RET/EXDIS/ COD EWORD
Mr. Van Hollen: [ Ambassador ] Farland told him that in a conversation just
recently, but we can ask Farland to tell him again. '
Dr. Kissinger: They[ the Pakistanis.] should have no illusions on this point.
Mr. Helms: We should make another effort to be sure this is clear. If war
breaks out, we will aIl look back and regret not having made that one extra effort.
Mr. Johnson: It is possible that the Pakistanis may strike out against India
because of some minor incursion.
Mr. Packard: I agree, we want to hold them back as much as possible.
Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Van Hollen) When did the Secretary last see- -
the Indians?
Mr. Van Hollen: The Secretary saw them last week, in New York.' He saw
Singh [Foreign Minister Swaran Singh J.
Dr. Kissinger: How did it go?
Mr. Van Hollen: It was the usual circular argument, the Indians complaining about
attacks on Bengalis and about the Pakistanis generating refugees.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe that the Pakistanis are generating refugees.
Do you believe it?
Mr. Van Hollen: Oh, yes, it's still going on. Pakistani army or militia units will
round up a group of people in reprisal for a guerrilla attack or act of
sabotage and threaten to kill them, so they go across the border.
Mr. Packard: But that's at the local level. Those are small local units acting on
their own authority. The government is not sanctioning that sort of thing and the
military commanders in West Pakistan are opposed to it.
Mr. Van Hollen: That's right. Thegovernment in Islamabad is opposed to the
generation of more refugees, but they haven't been able to stop local units from
doing it.
Dr. Kissinger: We have some Contingency papers here, but they are not as good as
we can do. The China paper suggests a public admonition to China to desist
from aiding Pakistan. I can assure you that that is the leasty thing the President
will want to do. He has too much 'going on his China policy to jeopardize it in this
way. And besides, I'm not sure it's a good idea.
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Mr. Johnson: We can more usefully engage the Soviets in this matter. Do. you
think it's worthwhile talking with them about possible restraints on the Indians?
Dr. Kissinger: Alex (Johnson), ,I'm glad you raised that point, because I want
to ask you to set up an inter-agency working group to look at this question.
We should have someone approach the Russians, perhaps Gromyko, or whoever
you think would be best, you know better about these things, and tell them that
this situation (in South Asia) is building to a crisis.
Mr. Van Holler: We can tell them some of the information we have, let them
know we are trying to restrain Yahya and ask them to help - do the same with
the Indians.
Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, we have very parallel interests here. (to Mr. Johnson)
Can you get some people together quickly and develop some ideas on how this
can be accomplished, say within the next 48 hours?
Mr. Johnson: It just so happens that I have a draft telegram on this subject all
ready. I was going to raise it with you.
Dr. Kissinger: Let's see the telegram.
Mr. Johnson : I have it right here.
Dr. Kissinger: Johnson let's me go through all this discussion and then pulls
out a bloody telegram.
Mr. Johnson: This was prepared just last night.
Dr. Kissinger: Who will it goto?
Mr. Johnson: Everyone involved: New Delhi, Islamabad, Moscow and including
Tehran.
Dr. Kissinger: When Alec Home was here the other day he said that he had been
of the opinion that the Pakistanis were at fault, but now he thinks the Indians are
equally guilty. He said he thought that Swaran Singh was the worst of the lot.
Mr. Johnson: Another thought that has occurred to us is the possibility of exploring
what might be done on a multilateral basis, perhaps at New York, by getting the
Soviets, French and British all involved, with U Thant or someone like that
taking the initiative. Any proposal made through such a group would have to be
relatively easily balanced. It would have to deal not only with the forces on the
borders but also the problem of the refugees.
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? Mr. Packard: This is a good telegram:
Dr. Kissinger. It's a damn good telegram:
Mi. Johnson: The Secretary will be seeing the head of the Pakistani UN delegation
soon.
Dr. Kissinger: What's his name?
Mr. Van Hollen: Mahmoud Ali, he' s a kept Bengali.
Dr. Kissinger: In outline, the telegram is excellent, When do you think it should
go out?
Mr. Van Hollen: As soon as possible.
Dr. Kissinger: Tonight?
Mr. Van Hollen: The sooner we can get it out the better.
Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) In view of that cable that came in from Pakistan
earlier today, it may be better to send the Pakistani part as a separate telegram
in reply to the incoming. This looks like an abrupt answer.
Mr. Johnson: We can send a separate reply to Pakistan and take into account
receipt of the other cable. Perhaps we can also introduce in our reply the idea
of proposing Security Council action.
Dr. Kissinger: I would rather leave that idea out at this time.
Mr. Johnson: We have had indications that the Pakistanis may be willing to work
something out through the UN.
Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think they were all that eager.
Mr. Johnson: I had a little concern 'that these indications may have been a case of
the Pakistanis laying the groundwork for a re-emptive strike. It was just a hunch
on my part.
'Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they would do it before I've been to China. I just
don't think they would do it.
Mr. Johnson: There is no point in getting started on UN action unless there is
prior agreement between the Soviets and ourselves. That must be our first step.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think the Pakistanis will launch a pre-emptive strike, but
we should not mention any approach through the UN until the President has
considered the question.
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10
Mr. Johnson: We want to avoid unilateral action by the Pakistanis in the Security
Council. That only means confrontation and would accomplish nothing.
Mr. Van Hollen: Perhaps the US, British, Soviet and French delegations could
make a combined presentation in the UN.
Dr. Kissinger: That could be a good approach, as long as it doesn't become a
.squeeze play on the Pakistanis.
. Van Hollen: We have to squeeze both sides to get any kind of agreement.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me just emphasize that before we get started on any action
through the UN, we must go to the President. So this telegram will go out
tonight. (to Mr. Saunders) Will you see that it goes out?
Mr. Van Hollen: We'll get the telegram out, and I'll notify Sisco.
Dr. Kissinger: You want to try to get Sisco to quiet things down? So far, I've
only seen him stir things up. So, first, we send this telegram and second, we get
word to Yahya.
Mr. Van Hollen : We will send instructions to our Charge in Islamabad to get in
49, touch with Yahya right away.
Dr. Kissinger. And you will do absolutely nothing in New York unless we first
go to the President?
Mr. Van Hollen: Right.
Mr. Saunders: Shall we also ask [Ambassador] MacArthur to discuss it with the
Shah and appeal to him to raise the issue again with Yahya? A copy of the cable
is going to Tehran.
Everyone agreed.
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