SUMMARY OF CIA MEMORANDUM ENTITLED ENEMY STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MAY 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 14, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

C 1fW
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8
NSC Staff Summary
rSENSITIVE
Summary of CIA Memorandum Entitled
Enemy Strategy and Capabilities in Indochina Through May 1972
The memorandum is divided into two parts:
a)A brief overview of Hanoi's probable political and military intentions
through the remainder of the dry season;
b) A more detailed presentation of Hanoi's military capabilities in South
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos including the current movement of NVA
troops and supplies to the various Indochinese military fronts.
L OVERVIEW
Hanoi's probable political intentions. As in the past, North Vietnamese
military strategy will be designed to make political gains in South Vietnam,
Paris, and the U. S. In this respect, Hanoi has almost certainly come to
believe that military successes in Laos and Cambodia are not only needed
to protect supply lines but can be important in furthering its political
objectives in South Vietnam. Hanoi's most immediate political- objectives
are discrediting Vietnamization and eliminating the U. S. commitment to
the GVN, including continued U. S. military supplies for the RVNAF.
Hanoi is likely in 1972 do focus on the latter. In this connection, they
undoubtedly view the U.S. Presidential election as an opportunity. Although
aware of diminished anti-war pressures in the U.S., Hanoi will attempt to
create a political climate which (Hanoi hopes) will make it difficult for any
candidate to be elected without committing himself to a complete cessation
of U. S. military support for the Thieu regime.
President Nixon's trip to Peking provides another point of focus. The
Chinese have reassured Hanoi, to some extent, but have not allayed all
North Vietnamese suspicions. Hence, Hanoi will almost certainly attempt
to demonstrate politically and militarily coincidental with the President's
trip that North Vietnam controls its own destiny and will not be swayed by
.1
Diplomatically, Hanoi will probably hold to the PRG's "7 points" at least
through February if only to forestall any softening in the Chinese position
in connection with the President's visit, It also seems logical to assume,
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8
however, that Hanoi is searching for a more effective diplomatic posture
with which it hopes to'revitalize U. S. dome stir-opposition to the war.
Any new DRV formulation will exploit the POW issue more fully than before,
possibly by offering more explicit assurances regarding prisoner return.
Hanoi's military intentions and capabilities. Hanoi's military pressures
will attempt to create and sustain an impression of undiminished capacity
for carrying on the war. In the main, North Vietnamese actions will
attempt to generate headlines without running great risks of costly defeats.
NVA personnel infiltration into South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is
running somewhat ahead of last year's pace, but the enemy logistic effort
is lagging considerably behind. However, the absolute tonnage difference
is not great and could be made up in a matter of weeks if the Communists
soon initiate a higher input level.
Hanoi cannot launch a nationwide military offensive throughout South Vietnam
on anything approaching the scale of Tet 1968. We concede to Hanoi a
general capability to mount"impressive highpoints of military activity that
would fall far short of the levels of offensive action postulated in the April
1971 SRG study but which could still have harmful military or psychological
effects. Short of this, Hanoi has many options that cannot be- viewed with
complacency.
In terms of the_ various Indochina regions, the following enemy-intentions
appear likely:
-- Laos. In north Laos, the Communists will continue to press Long
Tieng. If they take it, they may move further west and to Vang Vieng or
to the junction of Routes 7 and 13. They will harass Luang Prabang but
aril] probably not launch a direct-assault. In the south, the NVA will
consolidate their control of the Bolovens Plateau and may. put pressure
on Pakse or other Mekong river towns. Again, however, a direct assault
on these town is believed unlikely.
-- Cambodia. The Communists have a wide range of options. They are
expected to attack in one or more areas along Route 6; in the Tonle Toch
region east of Phnom Penh; or in the area northwest of Phnom Penh. They
might temporarily seize a provincial capital and increase pressure in the
Phnom Penh environs, but a direct assault on the capital is unlikely.
SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8
SECRE ~ENSITIVE
- South Vietnam. Widespread main force action is not expected.
There will almost certainly be heavy attacks in-the central highlands
of MR II, and possibly some offensive action just south of the DMZ.
Otherwise, four types of enemy action seem likely:
-- Some of the larger cities are likely to be' shelled and
attacked by sapper units.
-- A provincial capital -- especially in the western highlands --
might be seized temporarily in order to shake confidence in the
ARVN and to garner headlines.
-- The usual seasonal upsurge in terrorist incidents and
other small scale actions.
II. LOGISTICS AND MANPOWER
Logistics. Soviet military assistance for Hanoi increased in 1971,
primarily in terms Qf air defgnse equipment. Shipments of foodstuffs
from Hanoi's allies also rose sharply to offset losses from last year's
floods. The North Vietnamese continued to increase their logistical
buildup (protected by increased AAA defenses) in the Panhandle of North
Vietnam.
Manpower. -`Hanoi has sufficient manpower to-support the war at present
or greater levels. An estimated 150, 000 were called up in 1971 (about
the same as in 1970). Reportedly, the January '72 callup will be bigger
than usual. Men called up early this year could begin infiltration in this
dry season.
Logistics: Start of the 1971/72 Season. As is normal, truck traffic from.
North Vietnam into the Laotian Panhandle has increased sharply in
November and December, except that the apparent volume of traffic is
significantly lower than last year.
On the other hand, traffic between southern Laos and northern Cambodia
is about 3 weeks ahead of the enemy's 1970 timetable. The logistic system
in northern Cambodia now has a much greater capability than it had last
year at this time. ""
SECREq SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8
Organizational Changes in Southern Laos. The recent formation of
additional Binh Trams (supply bases) and transportation groups could
have substantially increased the enemy's capability to move supplies
in the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle.
Logistical Input Trends. So far the Communist dry season resupply
effort has been lagging well behind that of last year; however, the
significantly upgraded logistic system could be used to make up this
short fall in a few weeks.
Personnel Infiltration. So far in this dry season,-about 60, 000 troops
have been detected in the infiltration pipeline -- compared with 50, 000
for the same period in the 1970/71 dry season. Infiltration this dry
season could go well over last year's total. About a third of those
detected this year are destined for the B-3 Front (western highlands)
which represents an unprecedentedly heavy movement to this area.
In general, enemy force levels in December 1971 were slightly lower
in South Vietnam, compared with 1970, and somewhat greater in Cambodia
and Laos.
Overview for the Remainder of the Dry Season
Logistics. --With the exception of the inputs needed to sustain a- countrywide
offensive in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the logistic requirerrlents for
all remaining options could still be met during this dry season.
Manpower. North Vietnam probably will have to provide about 100, 000
infiltrators to maintain its current force levels -- and fighting postures --
in South Vietnam, southern Laos, and Cambodia. Infiltration could be
-stepped up to increase Hanoi's strategic options -- excluding only a sustained
countrywide offensive in South Vietnam .and Cambodia.
Enemy Capabilities - - Regional Analysis
Northern South Vietnam
GVN Military Region 1. The, Communists-could dramatically increase
their forces in northern MR I (by as many as 3 divisions) if they opted for
offensive operations and were confident the ARVN wouldn't make thrusts
into Laos or North Vietnam.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8
SECRET ~CNSITIVE
GVN Military Region 2. Given the heavy reinforcement of the 13-3
Front, we can expect some level of offensive activity in the central
highlands. Logistic problems probably rule out a sustained offensive
in the coastal provinces of MR-2 --- unless large numbers of ARVN
forces are diverted from this area.
Southern South Vietnam
GVN Military Region 3. Logistic and manpower shortcomings limit
the enemy's ability to launch a sustained offensive in MR-3. The Communists
will probably-conduct probing attacks along the MR-3/Cambodian border
in the hope of exploiting weaknesses in ARVN defense -- as at Snoul last
year.
GVN Military Region 4. The enemy's logistic and manpower
weaknesses virtually rule out any major offensive action in MR-4;
although he could increase harassment.
Cambodia. Here the Communists have a strong position. In the absence
of a significant ARVN presence in Camdobia, the Communists could
overrun any given government position.
Northern Laos. A major logistic and troop buildup gives the Communists
__a strong position in this area. They will continue moving west as their
logistic capability is extended.
SECRET SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/14: LOC-HAK-559-28-3-8