SOVIET STAKES IN THE INDO-PAKISTANI CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-28-2-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 9, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Soviet S'takes' :in the Thd'o-Pak"i's"t'ani- Crisis
S 1 nTriary
The .USSR's. preference is for a stable subcontinent.:
In the Soviet. vied,: only China or the 'West--most likely
the former--would profit from '.renewed Indo-Pakistani
hostilities.. In the present. crisis,- Moscow has sought
to restrain both sides from taking actions that would
exacetabate..tensi'ons Moscow'a. efforts: with the .Pak-.
.istanis have had little. 'visible. effect,. but the So--
viets, probably do deserve some. credit for the restraint
that India has show thus 'far.
Directorate. of Intelligence
.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
9 July 1971 ,
INTELLIGENCE. MEMORANDUM.
Indian Foreign Minister. Singh':s. visit.to Moscow in
early June 'alerted th:e.Soviets::to India's growing frus-
trati:on over. therefugee problem. In their efforts. to.
soothe the Indians ,' however, the .Soviets` -may have, un-
wittingly given Singh some inflated ideas. on the extent
to which Moscow .is willing to support India against
Pakistan. Consequently, ' the .Soviets may find it neces-
sary before '.too long to. disabuse the Indians of the no- ,
tion that Moscow would approve any overt Indian military
move into East Pakistan.
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1. The Soviets were slow to recognize the
'crisis that developed in Pakistan early this year.
After the Tashkent Conference in early 1966,"Soviet
leaders had devoted considerable time and attention
to making sure that the agreement signed then.did not
come undone. In the years immediately after Tash-
kent, at virtually every high-level meeting with In-
dian and Pakistani leaders the Soviets encouraged the
two countries to work toward better relations'. Mos
cow acted not only out of its. concern to. protect its
achievements. at Tashkent but also out of the realiza-
tion that internecine squabbling on the subcontinent
worked mainly to China's advantage and hampered Mos-
cow's own efforts to. improve its. position there.
2. One of the consequences of the first armed
clashes on the Sarno-Soviet border in March 1969, not
surprisingly, was a renewed Soviet effort to lessen
tensions on the subcontinent.. In may 1969, Soviet
Premier Kosygin made three separate trips to South
Asia,,only one of which had been long-planned. Al-
though-the main purpose of the visits was to line up
the governments of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
on the USSR's side in the dispute with China, Kosy-
gin also used the occasion to lobby for renewed ef-
forts toward regional economic cooperation. This
and other Soviet attempts. to shore up their position
in Asia (e.g. Brezhnev's proposal for a system of
collective security in Asia) brought only mixed re-
sults, and Soviet leaders soon turned their atten-,
tion elsewhere. Throughout 1970 and early 1971,
the'leadership focused most of its attention on de-
velopments in Europe and the Middle East and prepara-
tions for the'24th Party. Congress.
3. In part because of Moscow's preoccupation
with. developments, elsewhere, Soviet policy in the
present crisis has been largely reactive. When
Moscow realized in late March that Pakistani Presi-
dent Yahya was going to fail in his efforts to
achieve some sort of peaceful political accommoda-
tion with the East Pakistanis, the Soviet Consul
General in Dacca met with Yahya to urge moderation.
Once the fighting began, the Soviets'lost no time
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in. trying to get it stopped. Soviet 'Premier Kosygin
and President Podgorny both.sent personal messages.
that over the longer term,.this would redound to
Peking's benefit
5. In the next two months, Moscow. confined it--
.self: to. behind-the-scenes: efforts: to. defuse .the
.'crisis. Once it had. become clear that the East-Paki-
stanis were not .going to. be able-to mount an effec-
tive resistance to West Pakistani forces immediately,
the'Soviets backed off a bit and tried to repair, the.
strains Podgorny's statement had caused on its.rela--
tions with West Pakistan. They told the Pakistanis
they deplored the bloodshed and still thought Yahya
ought .to resolve his differences withthe'East
Pakistanis peacefully. They also said, however.,
that.the USSR.continued to support a unified Paki-
stan and did not intend to take sides in the dis-
pute., This line was :further.espoused in Soviet
propaganda that denied any intention of interfering
in. Pakistan.'s internal 'affairs.
. cal groups in East Pakistan,.and the-Soviets fear
.structi.on could only reinforce the more extreme radi-
political force there--the Awami League. Its. de-.
hoped that . the. publication of the message would bring
additional pressures on the West Pakistanis to stop*
fighting. The obvious sympathy for the plight of
the East Pakistanis that was conveyed by the message
suggests it was worded with an eye to the East
Pakistanis as well as the Indians. The. Soviets do
not welcome the breakup of Pakistan; but neither. do
they approve of the decimation of the only moderate
to Yahya asking him to seek a peaceful solution of
his differences with the East Pakistani leadership,
though only .Podgorny's representation was ever made
public.
4. Podgorny's appeal on 3'April was probably
designed to serve several purposes. For one thing,
Moscow probably hoped that it would help assuage".the
Indians, who had made widespread appeals. to. the .in-.
ternati.onal community to do something to. haltthe.
bloodshed. In addition,.the Soviets probably also
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6 Moscow's desire to. preserve its: "special
relationship" with the Indians prompted it to take
a somewhat different line .in New Delhi, but the ob-
jective of Soviet policy remained. the same.' There
:the Soviets professed sympathy for the East Pakistani
cause and general---though noncommittal--concurrence
with India's. view that the concept of'a unified Paki-
..stan had been rent beyond repair and that the emer
gence of an independent East Pakistan was inevitable.
When the Eangla Desh government was established in
mid-April,, however., the Soviets were the first to.
caution against premature .Indian recognition of the,
new.g.overnment,,advising instead that India allow
"other. countries to take the lead. (No other coun
.`try has yet been so inclined,,a factor that Moscow .
. doubtless anticipated.)
8. Moscow also offered immediate assistance
to. India to help cope with the influx of refugees,
but the problem soon grew to such enormous propor-
tions that the Soviet contribution seemed a mere
pittance.. It was not until Indian Foreign Minister
Singh visited Moscow in early June that'Moscow
really focused in on the dangers inherent in the
refugee problem. Concerned over the mounting ten-
sions in Indo-Pakistani relations and desirous of
assuaging the Indians, the USSR again decided to.
speak out critically about West Pakistan's handling
'of. the situation in the East.. In the. communique
issued.at.the.end of Singh's visit on 8 June, the
Soviets and the Indians called for "immediate meas-
ures" to stop the flow of refugees from East Paki-
stan and the creation of proper conditions so that
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the refugees could return home safely. In his. elec
tion speech .on 9 June,. Kosygin also devoted consider-
able attention to the situation on the ' subcontinent.
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He specifically referred to the "tensions mounting
in Indo-Pakistani relations" as a result of. the.ref-
. ugee problem and again appealed to. West Pakistan to,
take the. necessary steps to. solve the: refugee problem.
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12. Moscow's response was a a
o abl in New Delhi.
whatever the nature of the assurances Moscow
.gave to. Singh, it is very unlikely that the USSR in-
tended them to-be taken as an indication of Soviet.
support for Indian military action against East Paki-
stan. Moscow".s behavior. vis-a-vis the Pakistanis
suggests. that the Soviets have not given up hope that
Yahya will ultimately be able to achieve some sort:
of ma us yi trend's With the East Pakistanis
Although these Soviet state-
ments are undoubtedly exaggerated for their effect
in Pakistan,.they presumably reflect the other side
of the more balanced impression the. Soviets may have
expected Singh to take away.
The Future
13. Prime Minister Gandhi has stated that.In--
dia.would not take "an adventurous step" against
Pakistan. Upper echelon Indian military leaders,
including.Army Chief Manekshaw, advise against a
military move into East Pakistan, not because they
.doubt their ability, to. wage a successful campaign,
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but because they fear that the Pakistanis would-at-
in the fall, when the monsoon rains will have stopped
and transportation will be easier.
terry have indicated that they would prefer to fight
tack from the west and the Chinese would intervene
in the north--presenting an undesirable three-front
war. 'If a war is to be fought, however, the mili-
14. Pressures on the Indian Government to take
"unilateral action" against East Pakistan are mount-
ing.
They believe that the international community
would do little more than criticize India for initiat-
ing hostilities and that the Chinese, while they would
probably support Pakistan with military equipment,
would not.'commit troops. The "young Turks" in Mrs.
Gandhi's Ruling Congress Party are'also taking"an in-
creasingly hard line toward Pakistan, and the opposi-
tion politicians and a growing number of influential
.editorial writers are recommending recognition of
"Bangla Desh". and, if necessary, unilateral action.
15. Mrs. Gandhi has taken a number of political
steps--including the passage of an internal-security
act and the imposition of "President's Rule" in West
Bengal--in recent.weeks that could facilitate a uni-
lateral move into East Pakistan. None of these seems
as 'important,. however, as her attempt to line up So-
viet support.
16. We cannot be certain how Moscow will field
her formal request,. but judging from past performance
it is likely that the Soviets will attempt to. dissuade
,the Indians from taking direct military action.
17. Moscow would in any case be likely to take
issue with those Indians who argue that the Chinese
would not intervene. The Soviets. could point to Chi-
nese statements on behalf of the West Pakistanis and
to the. increased economic and military assistance that
.China has provided to Pakistan since the outset of
the crisis to argue that such an estimate is by no
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means a foregone conclusion. They could point out
that even if Chinese troops do not actually cross the
border,.they may make threatening military moves-(as
they did during the Indo-Pakistani crisis over Kash-
mir in 1965) that would tie down large numbers of In-
dian troops on the,Sino-Indian border. The Soviets
could argue that a military move into East Pakistan,
therefore, would be sheer adventurism and one that
Moscow could-not support..
18. Moscow might also suggest.that the time is
not yet ripe for such 'a move. and that a combination
of military and political actions might better ac-
complish the same goals. The.. Soviets may counter-
propose that the Indians continue their efforts to.
strengthen the East Bengali liberation forces--Mos-
cow may even agree to supply the necessary materiel
for this purpose--until such a time as these forces
themselves-are strong enough to carve out a hunk of
East Pakistani territory.* In the interim, Moscow
might promise to increase diplomatic and economic
pressures on the West Pakistanis to. persuade them to
come to some form of accommodation with the Awami
League. . The Sovieta might also undertake to give
greater. diplomatic support to. efforts by "Bangla
Desh" to achieve international recognition and to
provide India with additional economic assistance
to help in coping with the refugee influx.
19. The danger, however, is that what the So-
viets eventually tell the Indians may not be suf-
ficientto discourage them. Indian policy toward
Pakistan will ultimately be determined by a host of
complex and often contradictory considerations.
? Only a clearcut Soviet threat to cease all military
and economic aid in the event India moves militarily
against East Pakistan will have a good chance to
deter Indian policymakers. At present,. the Soviet
leaders seem to feel that, barring an unexpected.
worsening of the situation,. there will be sufficient
time to make clear to the Indians that Moscow's
overriding interest is to prevent the chaos that
might result from wider. hostilities.
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