ENEMY MANPOWER SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-559-26-2-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 5, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
AC
Febr ry5, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Laurence E. Lynn Jr. 2 <
SUBJECT: Enemy Manpower Situation
? You asked John Court to summarize the enemy's manpower
situation and its strategic implications based on the VSSG Enemy
Capabilities Panel's report. Attached at Tab A is a memo for
the President on this problem.
In addition, you may find a brief report on infiltration estimates
(Tab B) to be of interest.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you forward the enclosed memo (Tab A) to the President
summarizing the VSSG Panel's results to date.
Enclosures
Tab A-Memo to the President
Tab B-Report
---gre-R-SPOKE
S./
NSA review completed
NSC, DIA, and Army
reviews completed.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/11/19: LOC-HAK-559-26-2-1
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MEMORANDUM Nj C, Cf.-12.3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SPOKE
INFORMATION
February 6, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
? FROM: Henry A. Kissinger e:
SUBJECT: Enemy Manpower Situation in Vietnam
This memo summarizes the enemy's manpower situation and its
strategic implications over the first six months of 1970.
The Enemy's Current Strength
The Washington intelligence community is in rough agreement that
the enemy's current manpower situation is as follows:
-- The enemy's military forces number about 280, 000 -
310, 000 men including at the most 150, 000 main force regulars,
80,000 support troops, and 80, 000 guerrillas.
-- Despite heavy infiltration and recruiting, the enemy military
forces have declined by about 28% (100, 000 men) over the last two
years with about half (40,000 to 50,000 men) of the decline occurring
during 1969.
Enemy Losses
? The enemy's manpower losses are caused by combat deaths, deaths
caused by wounds or illness, desertions, and Allied captures.
However, over the last two years, the enemy's overall losses,
particularly combat deaths, appear to have been largely determined
by the enemy's activity rates.
? When enemy activity is high, as during January-June 1968,
the enemy's overall losses have run about 32, 000 men monthly -
SECRET /SPOKE
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SECRET/SPOKE
20,000 combat deaths and 12,000 losses from other causes. By
sustaining these losses, the enemy was able to initiate an average
of about 470 attacks monthly.
-- When enemy activity is moderate, as during January-June
1969, the enemy's overall losses have averaged about 27,000 men
monthly - 16,000 in combat deaths and 11,000 from other causes.
At this manpower cost, the enemy was able to launch about 370
attacks monthly.
-- When enemy activity is low, as during June-December 1969,
the enemy has been able to hold his overall losses to about 20,000
men monthly equally divided between combat and non-combat losses.
During this period, enemy-initiated attacks averaged 233 monthly.
Thus, the enemy has, to a large extent, been able to control his
losses by increasing or decreasing the aggressiveness of his forces.
While there is no real limit on these fluctuations in enemy losses,
the enemy probably considers that a certain level of activity is
necessary to maintain the momentum of his war effort and his control
of a portion of SVI?I's population. Moreover, allied-initiated operations
undoubtedly impose certain losses on the enemy as the price for
retaining his forces in South Vietnam even if they are inactive.
For these reasons, it is likely that there is some minimum level of
losses that the enemy will either choose or be forced to sustain.
Looking at enemy losses during past periods of low activity, this
minimum loss rate may be about 20,000 men monthly, including
10, 000 combat deaths.
Enemy Manpower Gains
The enemy meets its manpower requirements from two principal
sources - infiltration and recruitment. Judging from recent
experience, the enemy can count on these sources of manpower to
provide replacements at the following rates:
SE CRET /SPOKE
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SECRET/SPOKE
-- Infiltration will provide most of the enemy's manpower gains.
While only about 15, 000 infiltrators will arrive in South Vietnam during
January-March 1970, the enemy increased its manpower in the pipe-
line to South Vietnam by about 15, 000 men in January alone. If
additions to the pipeline continue at this rate, the enemy could
infiltrate 60, 000 men into SVN during the first six months of 1970.
-- Recruitment. While the enemy is capable of increasing his
recruiting in SVN for a short period of time, his recruiting rates
have been low (4, 000 to 6, 000 men monthly) in recent months and he
may not be able to increase them greatly without a strong and
successful effort to increase the population he controls and the
recruiting base it affords. Without such an increase, the enemy
cannot count on more than about 36,000 new recruits during the first
six months of 1970.
If recruitment and infiltration follow this pattern, the enemy will
add about 100, 000 men to his military forces during this period.
However, these additions will enable the enemy to offset his likely
losses only if he maintains a low rate of activity. If the enemy
maintains a moderate or high rate of activity, his losses will more
than outnumber his manpower gains and the overall strength of his
forces will continue to decline.
Thus, even with the recent increase in infiltration, the enemy
probably cannot build-up his forces unless he decreases his activity
below the lowest levels of the recent past or greatly increases
recruiting.
Future Enemy Options
The current enemy manpower situation is not bright. If recent
trends in infiltration, recruiting, and losses continue, the enemy
will continue to suffer a slow attrition in the strength of his military
forces. However, this decline is not inevitable and the enemy could
build-up his forces if he chose to. In particular, he could:
-- Reduce his activity to a virtual standstill (10, 000 losses
monthly) while maintaining an infiltration rate of about 15, 000 men
SE CRET /SPOKE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/11/19: LOC-HAK-559-26-2-1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/11/19: LOC-HAK-559-26-2-1
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SECRET /SPOKE
monthly. By June 1970, the enemy might be able to increase his
force level by about 30,000 men by June 1970.
-- Step up infiltration to 25,000 men monthly, as during early
1968, while maintaining his present low activity rates. By June 1970,
the enemy's forces could be increased by 30,000 men.
However, these strategies would not allow the enemy to carry out
a countrywide offensive for longer than a month without suffering
some reduction in his force strength. For instance, the enemy
losses in combat deaths alone were almost 40,000 men monthly at
the height of the 1968 Tet offensive. An offensive confined to a
particular region such as the Delta would, however, require far
smaller inputs of manpower and be more reasonably given the
enemy's manpower resources.
Summary
To maintain his force levels, the enemy will have to continue
infiltration at its January rate of 15,000 men monthly while
holding his activity to the low rates of late 1969. By further
increasing infiltration or greatly reducing activity, the enemy
could build-up his force levels for an offensive by June. However,
the most likely prospect is that the enemy's force strength will
continue to slowly decline.
SECRET /SPOKE
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SECRET/SPOKE
INFILTRATION ESTIMATES
Our knowledge of enemy infiltration into South Vietnam has, since
late 1968, been based largely .on intercepts of uncoded enemy rear-
..
area communications. These communications frequently provide
detailed information on the number, strength, and destination of a
large portion of enemy infiltration groups.
The COMINT estimates of infiltration heading toward South
Vietnam through the infiltration pipeline are agreed to be the most
accurate aggregate indicators of the enemy manpower situation:
-- Intercepts are obtained on a large portion of the infiltration
groups. For example, in 10XX to 11XX group series, about 92
(81%) of the 113 possible groups (including A, B, C suffix groups)
have been identified through intercepts.
? Collateral evidence (prisoner interrogations and captured
documents) has verified that a large portion of the groups reported
moving South have arrived and that most groups moving South have
been reported. For example, in the 10XX to 11XX series, 55 out
of the 92 groups reported or about 60% have been later located in
South Vietnam.
-- Collateral evidence has also verified that the "gap fill"
groups implied by the numbering of infiltration groups but not
actually reported in intercepts exist and have been correctly
included in the estimates. For example, of the 21 "gap fill groups"
in the 10XX to 11XX series, collateral intelligence has revealed
that at least 14 or 67% are actually in South Vietnam.
The estimates of enemy infiltration are based on direct
information on enemy activities and have been independently
corroborated using collateral evidence. These characteristics
alone make them almost unique among the available enemy man-
power indicators. However, there are two possible sources of
serious inaccuracy in the data that could have policy significance:
SECRET/ SPOKE
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SECRET/SPOKE
-- The COMINT intercepts involve uncoded enemy communi-
cations. The enemy could presumably mislead us on their
-infiltration if they were aware that our infiltration estimates were
based on communication intercepts.
-- The rear-service communicationSintercepted do not cover
all groups infiltrating to South Vietnam, particularly organized
units moving outside the regular infiltration pipeline. If the enemy
chose to infiltrate in large units under conditions of radio silence,
we could be seriously mislead about their infiltration.
For these reasons, the infiltration estimates may be somewhat
lower than true past infiltration' and could be seriously misleading
in the future should the enemy make a concerted effort to confuse
us. However, at present, the estimates are both accurate and
reliable.
Infiltration Arrivals
1968-1969 1969-1970
October 6,700 600
November 9, 100 500
December 7,000 4,000
January 5,100 2,800
February 10, 900 6,100 *
March 14, 200 3, 700 *
*Projected.
October
November
December
January
February
March
SECRET/SPOKE
Infiltrators Moving South
1968-1969
2, 800
5, 200
30, 700
19, 800
25, 000
17, 100
1969-1970
5, 000
9, 500
6, 300
14, 200
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/11/19: LOC-HAK-559-26-2-1