POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT OVER CERTAIN DISPUTED ISLANDS IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-15-12-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 5, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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goo
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
5 February 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Potential for Conflict Over Certain Disputed
Islands in the East and South China Sea
1. Per your instructions at the 25 January 1974 meeting of
the WSAG, the Central Intelligence Agency has prepared a memo-
randum discussing the Paracel, Spratly, Senkaku and Pratas Islands,
and the future intentions of China with regard to these islands. Five
copies of this memorandum are attached.
2. We are also sending copies to other members of the W SAG,
to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Directors of DIA and INR.
Geolge A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Copies 1 through 5
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Potential for Conflict Over Certain Disputed
Islands in the East and South China Sea
Key Judgments
The recent clash between Peking and Saigon over
possession of the Paracel Islands raises the possi-
bility of further fighting there and over other dis-
puted islands in the East and South China Sea--the
Senkaku Islands, Pratas Reef, and the Spratly Islands.*
Claims, capabilities and other factors vary in each
case, but certain common denominators affect all the
disputes: Peking has claimed all the islands, and all
may have untapped oil reserves.
--The principal problem revolves around Peking's
intentions. None of the other parties to the
dseems prepared to u.23t~,Crti.t-,u~"ke ? .tar'_
disputes r t? t' ?? ?.c. iiw'?~.3,.~.ca~,.Y
action.
--Despite Peking's aggressive actions in the Para-
cels, the evidence elsewhere thus far available
does not suggest a significant shift toward a
more aggressive Chinese posture.
--Peking would have far more to lose than to gain
by initiating hostilities in the Senkakus or at
Pratas Reef. Action in either place is highly
unlikely.
--China is in firm possession of the Paracels.
Its position there is not likely to be seri-
ously challenged.
--Peking will view the recent South Vietnamese
actions in the Spratlys as a direct challenge.
The tit-for-tat exchange of statements by
Peking and Saigon on the Spratlys obviously
raises the danger of 'a confrontation. Even so,
a military initiative there by Peking would be
politically difficult and militarily risky, The
odds are that Peking will avoid a military clash.
*Map at overleaf
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PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
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Spratly Islands, .Saadca
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INDONESIA
CELEBES
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enkaku Islands
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Discussion
1. The recent clash between China and South Viet-
nam for possession of the southern portion of the
Paracel Island chain (the Crescent Group), together
with South Vietnam's-subsequent action in landing small
forces on several of the Spratly Islands, raises the
possibility that further clashes over disputed island
territories in the East and South China Sea may occur.
Four separate island or island groups are. involved..
Certain factors are common to all, but each presents
slightly different problems involving claims, capa-
bilities and presence. The four are, in order from
north to south, the Senkaku or Tiaoyu Islands north
of Taiwan, Pratas Reef or Tungsha Island eastsoutheast.
of Hong Kong, the Paracel or Hsisha Islands lying
south of Hainan Island and east of Vietnam, and the
Spratly Islands lying west of Palawan Island in the
Philippines. The Nationalist and Communist Chinese
are rival claimants in each of these cases; the
Japanese are involved in the case of the Senkakus,
the Philippines in the case of the Spratlys, and the
South Vietnamese in the case of both the Paracels and
Spratlys.
Claims
2. None of the islands normally supports a perma-
nent civilian population; all require a regular supply
effort if they are occupied. Claims therefore rest ,
almost exclusively on usage, which amount essentially
to irregular visits by fishermen and guano collectors,
on the establishment of boundary markers in some cases,
and on records of exploration ranging from the third
to the nineteenth centuries, some better documented
than others.
3. The dispute over sovereignty in the Senkakus
arose much later than in the other cases. Japanese
inspection surveys commenced in 1,885 and the islands
were formally incorporated into the Japanese empire
in January 1885, though the islands were not included
in the territories ceded by imperial China to Japan in
May 1895. They were administered from Okinawa during
US occupation of the Ryukyus and were returned to
Japan at the conclusion of the occupation. The
expressed. US view at that time was that Washington
took no position on the validity of rival claims to
the islands. Chinese claims, both Nationalist and
Communist, were advanced following indications in
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1968 that oil deposits were present in the waters sur-
rounding the islands. Claims and counterclaims became
heated in 1970, 1971 and early 1972 as.the time for
reversion of the Ryukyus approached, but have since
largely died away.
4. Pratas Reef is, in effect, another of the "off-
shore islands." It is claimed only by the two rival,
Chinese governments, and neither side has publicly
made an issue of possession in recent years.
5. Conflicting claims to the Paracels date back
at least to the early years of this century. Chinese
claims were advanced in the first decade of the cen-
tury; decrees of the French, Bao Dai, Diem and Thieu
governments have placed the islands under one or another
Vietnamese province. The Japanese occupied the islands
during the Second World War. At the signing of the
Japanese peace treaty in 1951 both the colonial Vietna-
mese government and the Nationalist Chinese claimed the
islands. Peking advanced its own claim shortly there-
after. The Chinese Communists have consistently paid
far greater attention to these islands than to the
other groups under consideration. They have reiterated
their claim at irregular intervals since 1951; a large
percentage of the "serious warnings" directed at Wash-
ington by Peking in the late 1950s and 1960: involved
allegations of intrusions by US ships.or aircraft in
the Hsisha area. As in the case of the Spratlys, neither
the North Vietnamese nor the Viet Cong have laid formal
claim to the Paracels, and they have not endorsed claims
made by other countries.
6. The S~pratly Island group presents the most
complicated picture of all. South Vietnamese claims
were advanced, for the first time seriously, at the
time of the signing of the Japanese peace treaty.
Nationalist China advanced its counterclaims at the
same time. Communist Chinese claims were advanced at
the same time claim was laid to the Paracels and to
the Macclesfield Bank, which lies east of the Paracels.
In.the 1950s a private Philippine citizen claimed
several of the islands, and in 1971 President Marcos
stated that the Spratlys were, in effect, an inter-
national trusteeship of the allied powers of the
Second World War; this position was amplified.by
Marcos' implication that the Philippines, owing to
proximity and the dictates of national security. were
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SEAT
7. All the islands except'perhaps Pratas Reef are
visited from time to time by fishermen of -
various-nation-alities. None has remained for any appreciable length
of time.
S. None of the Senkaku Islands has been garrisoned
since the end of the Second World War.. Nationalist
fishermen were briefly ensconced on several islands
in the group in 1971, but departed without incident
under Japanese pressure. The islands are patrolled
regularly by the civilian Japanese Safety Agency.
Occasional Nationalist Chinese patrols have also
visited the group. The Nationalists have maintained
a modest garrison on Pratas Island since 1955. These
forces are supplied by sea on a regular basis. An
airstrip on the island makes an air link with Taiwan
pos?sib le.
9. Until this month the Communist Chinese and the
South Vietnamese tacitly divided the Paracels between
them, With Peking maintaining a presence ii the northern
Amphitrite Group and the Vietnamese present in the
southern Crescent Group. A Nationalist garrison de-
parted Woody island in the Amphitrites in the early
1950s; the Communists maintained garrisons on several
of the Amphitrites since the mid-1950s, principally
an Woody and Lincoln Islands. They have builtcommuni--
Cations and radar facilities on both Woody and Lincoln
and have established facilities capable of berthing
small vessels in calm weather at Woody. Chinese ships
have regularly patrolled the Amphitrite Group since
the 1950s. Upon their departure from Vietnam the
French turned over a weather station in Pattle Island
in the Crescent Group to the South Vietnamese. This
was the only permanent garrison maintained by Saigon
on the islands before last month's fighting, although
troops occasionally landed on other nearby islands in
the Crescents. South Vietnamese gunboats patrolled
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the Crescents on a fairly regular basis prior to the
clash. In 1959 some Chinese fishermen from the main-
land appeared briefly on one of the Crescent Islands
and were "captured" by GVN forces. This was the only
clash between Saigon and Peking prior to the middle
of last month. The Chinese Communists are now in
clear possession of all the islands in the Paracel
archipelago, and they show every intention of remain-
ing firmly entrenched there.
10. The Spratly Islands were generally uninhabited
from the end of the Second World War until 1956, when
the Nationalist Chinese established a garrison on Itu,
Aba, the largest island in the archipelago. -Tomas
Cloma, a private Philippine adventurer who claims the
islands for himself, has apparently appeared on one or
another of them from time to time. In July 1971
President Marcos dispatched a company of marines to
occupy three of the islands, ostensibly in response
to Taipei's long-standing presence on Itu Aba. More
recently, Philippine marines were reported in occupa-
tion of five islands in the group--Nanshan, Loaita,
West York, Thitu and Northeast Cay. Whether there are
Philippine forces actually present on all these islands,
however, is unclear. On January 30 Marcos told Ambas-
sador Sullivan without explanation that he was planning
,to withdraw the marine contingent and replace it with
civilians.
11. The first permanent South Vietnamese presence
in the Spratlys was established in the fall of 1973--
a 64-man Regional Force team on Namyit Island. Partly
in reaction to its expulsion from the Paracels, Saigon
on January 31 dispatched a small flotilla carrying more
than 100 additional troops to garrison at least five
more of the islands--Sand Cay, Sin Cowe, Spratly,
Amboyna and Northeast Cay. These forces were instructed
not to land if they found any of the islands occupied.
Press reports out of Saigon claim the forces are now
ashore, but there is no official word as to which
islands are now held by Saigon; in particular, it is
unclear who is in occupation of Northeast Cay. Com-
munist China has no forces at present .in the Spratlys
and has not patrolled these islands.
Capabilities
12. With the obvious and salient exception of
the situation in the Paracel archipelago, none of the
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various parties. involved in these disputes have re-
cently made military moves in clear expectation of a
new clash. Again with the exception of the Paracels,
and possibly Pratas Reef, none is so situated that it
can bring overwhelming force to bear in order to
achieve a quick and easy victory at arms. The Sen--
kakus are within easy steaming distance of Communist
Chinese naval forces and within range of Chinese.air-
craft, both fighters and tactical. bombers. If Peking
were absolutely determined to occupy the islands,. it
probably could do so even in the face of intervention
on the part of either the Japanese and the Nationalist
Chinese, or both. . In the event of this extremely unlikely
contingency, however, Peking could be faced with a battle
of considerable proportions, and securing of the islands
might not be quick. In the equally-unlikely event of
a conflict between the Nationalist Chinese and the
Japanese, the odds probably would favor Taipei as a
result of geographical proximity and readiness and
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13. The Nationalists seem determined to defend
Pratas Reef in the event of an attack, but they would
the island is witnin easy range
or communist navai and air forces, but approaching the
extreme range of Nationalist air capabilities operat-
ing from Taiwan. Nationalist planes could attempt
to bomb mainland naval forces in the area but could
not stay over the island. In these circumstances, a
determined push would almost certainly secure the
island for Peking.
14. Peking should have no difficulty in maintain-
ing its hold on the Paracels. The islands are within
range of both fighters and bombers stationed in southern
Kwangtung provinces and on Hainan Island, and within
steaming distance of naval forces stationed in the
same places. In addition, the Chinese Communists
could refuel at least a few of its vessels in calm
weather at Woody Island. Naval and air patrolling of
the archipelago is being maintained by Peking.
15. In respect to military capabilities, as in
other respects, the S2ratlys present the most proble-
matic picture of any of the disputed areas.. The
islands are beyond the range of Chinese Communist
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fighter cover and at the extreme range of tactical
bombers staging from Hainan Island. Moreover, Peking
would have difficulty in maintaining surface forces in
action in the archipelago; the islands are a good deal
further from naval bases on Hainan and the mainland
than the Paracels. These difficulties are multiplied
in the case of the Nationalist Chinese. The Spratlys
are beyond the range of Taipei's.aircraft, both
fighters and bombers, and further still from Nationalist
naval bases than from those of the Communists. Given
these problems, Taipei is considering withdrawal of
its garrison at Itu Aba in the face of a serious chal-
lenge. The Philippines could probably bring air power
most easily to bear in the islands, but its marine con-
tingent in the Spratlys is little more than a token
force which would be unable to defend against a serious
military challenge by either South' Vietnari or China'..
South Vietnam has available forces for further rein-
forcement of its military toehold in the Spratlys,
and its navy is adequate for resupply and rotation of
such forces, but it would face problems similar to
those of Peking in an actual battle. Air support
would be feasible, but difficult; it is unlikely.that
aircraft could maintain patrols over the islands.
Interests
16. The one factor in common in each of these
disputes, except perhaps that over Pratas, is oil.
Reserves beneath the East and South China Seas are
still essentially unproven, but all parties seem to
believe that considerable quantities are .there. The
petroleum factor figures most clearly in the case of
the Senkakus. Neither Nationalist nor Communist Chi-
nese claims to the group were seriously advanced
before indications that oil was present in the waters
surrounding the archipelago had surfaced, and it is
unlikely that Tokyo would have been quite so concerned
with those claims if oil reserves close to home had
not been at stake. Peking's frequent reiteration
of its claims in 1970-72, however, probably served
an additional purpose: it was a means of indicating
that Peking intends to play a major role in the eco-
nomic as well as the diplomatic politics of East Asia.
Moreover, Peking may have had it in mind that issues
regarding claims to mineral resources off coastlines
and island chains are certain to be discussed at the
forthcoming Law of the conference. Thorny problems
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involving the extent of such claims and of adjudication
of conflicting claims have apparently been under fairly
intensive research in Peking since at least 1970, and
the Chinese may have thought it expedient to state its
case with respect to the Senkakus, as it had to other,
longer-established claims, well in advance of the
conference. This factor may have played a small role
in the formulation of Taipei's and Tokyo's positions
on the Senkakus,.but apart from the oil question.their
major concern probably is to forestall physical occupa-
tion by Peking of islands, however small, that are in
close proximity to both Taiwan and Okinawa..
17. Oil is probably at best a minor consideration
for the two parties involved in the dispute over Pratas
Reef. This small island is merely another of the un-
solved problems growing out of the unfinished Chinese
civil war. For both the Nationalists and the Communists
the island is important, as are the other "offshore
islands," primarily as a symbol that the long duel
between the two parties is still not over.
18. Taipei's current interest in the Paracels
is perhaps more theoretical than actual. The Nationalist
government is concerned that its claim to sovereignty
.;=Haas not been seen .to lapse An assertion of .Chinese
sovereignty over territory also claimed by foreign
governments is an important consideration for Taipei;
for emotional and historical reasons, the Nationalist
government cannot affort to appear so "unChinese" as
to acquiesce in the absorption of such territory by
a foreign power. Practically, however, Taipei can have
no hope either of making good its claim or of exploit-
ing any mineral resources in the waters around the
islands.
19. Saigon, however, is probably much more prac-
tically concerned with the oil question; witness its
recent leasing of drilling concessions in coastal waters
south of the Paracels. In addition, the South Vietna-
mese probably view the islands as a potential base for
monitoring North Vietnamese/Viet Cong.sea infiltration
activities. Conversely, Saigon almost certainly con-
siders that the Paracels in the hands of a hostile
power such as China could pose a threat to South Vietna-
mese shipping and to its general security.
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20. For Peking the issue may be. the most compli-
cated of all. The Chinese Communist concern for the
assertion of sovereignty over islands "traditionally
Chinese parallels that of the Nationalists--its frequent
reiteration of its claim to the islands coupled with
its obvious sensitivity to alleged US intrusions into
waters it claimed as its own suggests that this has
been a real factor for China. its interests in the
oil issue parallels that of South Vietnam, and is
probably an important element in the current situation.
Peking's statement of January 11 partially laid claim
to the mineral resources in the waters around the
Paracels and other islands in the South China Sea.
Its strategic interest in the islands, however, is
somewhat different from that of Saigon. China obviously
does not feel threatened by South Vietnam, and there
is little reason to believe that at this time it is
particularly interested in securing a base to facili-
tate the movement of North Vietnamese men and supplies
into the south. On the other hand, Chinese activity
on Woody Island in the past several years strongly
suggests that Peking plans over the long term to con-
struct a forward operating base for its growing South
Sea Fleet. This would be a logical development if
Peking expects to continue to develop even a modest
blue-water capability. Moreover, the Chinese have
obviously been concerned over the growth of Soviet
naval power in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. It is
unlikely that they fear that Soviet activity would
expand into the South China Sea any time soon, but
they may believe it important to assert even a modest
Chinese presence in these waters. At the same time,
they may have in mind as a subsidiary consideration
that by making good their claim to the Paracels they
can convey a message to Hanoi that they rather than
Moscow are the central factor to be reckoned with in
and around Indochina.
21. Finally, questions involving Law of the Sea
are present here as they are in the Senkakus. The
Chinese claims to the Paracels, the Macclesfield Bank
and the Spratlys, if made good, would effectively span
the area between the Philippines and Indochina. Ocean
passage would not be affected even under existing laws
of the sea; the major sea lanes in the South China Sea
run well off shore between the Paracels and Spratlys..
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Manila has obvious rights in the trench between Palawan
and the Spratlys, and in any case Peking does not have
a naval force capable of dominating this area. But
through a combination of seabed mineral rights and anti-
pollution regulations it might over time establish a
strong legal position in waters in the area.
22. These legal concerns and strategic considera-
tions vis-a-vis the Soviets probably touch to some
degree on Peking's interest in the Spratlys as well
as the Paracels, although in the case of the Spratlys
China does not have an embryo naval base to protect.
The oil factor is undoubtedly at work here also, as
is the Chinese need to assert its traditional claims
of sovereignty, operative, as in the case of the Para-
cels, long before oil-was suspected to exist beneath
the surrounding waters. For Taipei the sovereignty
issue is almost certainly paramount, although the
Nationalists may entertain some. faint hopes, of drilling
for oil close offshore Itu Aba in the Spratlys. For the
South Vietnamese oil is probably a far more important
consideration: this was almost certainly the motive
that lead to Saigon's decree of last autumn that set
in train the events resulting in last month's clash
as well as to the concurrent garrisoning of Namyyit
island. South Vietnam's additional landings in the
Spratlys last week, however, clearly sprang from other
motives: the need for a face-saving ploy following
the defeat in the Paracels. Manila is also interested
in possible exploitation of oil reserves in the waters
off the Spratlys, but it also has a strong negative
interest in the islands--that they do not become a
potential staging area for hostile actions against
the Philippines.
Constraints
23. Running parallel to this medley of interests
in the various island groups, however, as a series of
rather strong constraints that tend to perpetuate the
status _quo. Given their close and important economic
ties, neither Japan nor Nationalist China wishes to
come to blows over the Senkakus, where neither could be
absolutely certain of the outcome. Nor are Tokyo and
Peking at all interested in a real confrontation over the
islands. For Japan there is clearly nothing to be
gained by incurring the emnity of China,'which could
well be the result of a blowup of the islands.
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. 24. For Peking the situation is not much different.
China has gone to some lengths to court Japan in the
past two years, and a policy of relative friendliness.
.toward Tokyo is a major element of Chinese foreign
policy. A confrontation with Japan runs the risk of
pushing Tokyo toward the Soviet Union--a major night-
.mare from China's point of view--not to mention the
obvious damage such a confrontation would do to Peking's
burgeoning relationship with Washington. Moreover,
an attempt to physically occupy the islands runs the
risk of a clash with both Tokyo and Taipei, which
greatly complicates the military picture for China.
A confrontation with Taipei alone--perhaps an impos-
sibility in any event--would hardly be more desirable
for Peking. The relationship with the United States,
which Peking seems to believe necessary to fend off
pressure from the Soviet Union, rests squarely on a
tacit understanding that force will not be applied in
Peking's continuing quarrel with Taipei; China has in
any event gone to considerable pains in the past year
.to indicate publicly and privately that it is looking
toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.
No aspect of Peking's interest in the Senkakus is
important enough to put its entire diplomatic position
at risk. Similar conditions hold true with respect to
Pratas Reef.
25. Somewhat different considerations obtain
with respect to the Paracels. In this case Peking
is in physical possession of the islands; it need do
nothing but stand pat. Taipei, for its part, does
not have the military ability to change the situation,
nor has it shown the slightest interest in doing so.
Nor does Saigon have the military strength to force
Peking to disgorge the islands. South Vietnam is
certainly not eager for war with China--especially in
circumstances where US support is virtually ruled
out--and it.is not about to divert substantial numbers
of ground, naval or air resources. from its internal
defenses, thereby exposing home territory to North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong inroads.
26. In the Spratlys constraints are also opera-
tive on all parties. The Philippines would be extremely
hard pressed to maintain their meager forces on the
islands in the face of a determined push by any of the
parties to the dispute. Their interest in the islands
does not appear to be acute, their legal claims are
obscure, and they appear at this juncture to be backing
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'IFECRET
rapidly away from even the possibility of a clash over
the islands. Manila has expressed concern over whether
its defense treaty with'the US would be applicable..
Taipei is too far removed from the Spratlys to bring
effective force to bear there in the event of a clash.
Since they would find it virtually impossible to
abandon or compromise their claims to the islands,.
however, they would probably find it equally impossible
to cooperate effectively with either Manila or Saigon
in defense of the archipelago;.reported South Vietnamese
overtures to this end appear to have fallen on deaf
ears.
27. On the face of it, Saigon has taken a much
more aggressive posture with respect to the Spratlys
than have the other parties to the dispute, risking
or even inviting a riposte by Peking to their recent
occupation of additional islands in the archipelago.
But Saigon probably calculates that the risk is per-
haps not all that great. Although Saigon's purpose,
at least in part, is to save face following the loss
of the Paracels, it is clearly anxious to avoid any
confrontation with either Manila or Taipei. Saigon's
landing instructions to its troops make that obvious,
and the South Vietnamese probably hope that the pres-
ence of Philippine and Nationalist forces on the
archipelago will 'in fact be a complication causing
Peking to think twice about responding militarily.
In the absence of these considerations the South
Vietnamese move would be simply foolhardy. Saigon
is operating in the Spratlys at, the extreme outer
edge of its military capability, and it almost
certainly hopes to avoid a fight.
28. In. fact, the South Vietnamese calculations
may not be too far off the mark. Peking would wish
to avoid .a clash with Taipei in the Spratlys for the
same reasons it would wish to avoid a flareup with
Nationalists on the other island groups; moreover, it
almost certainly calculates that a fight with Filipino
forces would evoke a far stronger negative reaction
in East and Southeast Asia--particularly in the ASEAN
forum--than did its relatively painless clash with
Saigon in the Paracels. An operation in the Spratlys
that avoided Manila's and Taipei's forces while taking
on those of Saigon, on the other hand, would be
extremely. difficult to carry out. Peking is probably
not certain precisely which islands the South Viet-
namese occupy--the Chinese have not attempted to
reconnoiter the area since theGVN troops landed.
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Nor, despite Nationalist and Philippine reluctance,
can the Chinese be certain that Manila and Taipei would
stay out of the action if a fight developed. Chinese
vessels would have to maneuver in shoal and poorly
charted waters without effective air cover, since
Peking like Saigon would be operating at the extreme
edge of its military reach. In short, an operation
against the Spratlys would be risky politically and
militarily.
Intentions
29. Insofar as they are. involved in the several
disputes, Japan, Nationalist China and the Philippines
are clearly on the defensive. It would be virtually
.impossible to make a case that Tokyo, Manila or
Taipei are looking for a fight; on the contrary, they
are concerned that a fight might be forced on them,
and they are clearly anxious to avoid one if possible.
Saigon's position is less clearcut with respect to
the Spratlys, and perhaps initially to the Paracels
as well, but in the latter case the South Vietnamese
clearly did not expect a major Chinese response, and
on balance it seems likely that they are banking on
avoiding one in the Spratlys. The problem, then is
: ,s.entiasly one of Peking '.s intentions. This problem
breaks into two parts: has there been a significant
shift to a more aggressive Chinese posture; and even
if the.re.has not, will Peking feel compelled to
respond to the South Vietnamese~'move in the Spratlys?
30. The first of the questions is easier to
answer than the second. Despite China's aggressive
actions in the Paracels, the evidence elsewhere does
not appear to indicate a general shift in Peking's
orientation. Peking's views on, and approach to,
larger issues remains essentially as they have been
the past two or three years; and Peking has not adopted
a new or noticeably more belligerent line on the immediate
issue of the island disputes in the wake of its victory
in the Paracels. On the contrary, the Chinese seem
anxious to put the matter behind them. Their statement
justifying their actions in that archipelago was
decidedly defensive in tone, stressing provocation;
their decision to release rapidly the South Vietnamese
prisoners captured in the fighting also suggests they
would like to give the incident a quick burial. If
Peking were no longer greatly concerned about the
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image it projects to the world, the prisoner release
might well have been delayed.
31. Continuity of previous policies seems
especially evident.in relation to the Senkakus problem.
As outlined above, there are overwhelming reasons for
the Chinese not to act provocatively in this situation.
They have in fact not even taken note of the Japanese
government's low-key reassertion of its claim to the
Senkakus in the wake of the Paracels action;
Statements issued from Peking in 1971 and early 1972
indicated clearly that China expected the sovereignty
issue and the question of rights to the waters
surrounding the Senkakus would eventually be settled
through negotiations. Such talks, however, might well
involve South Korea, which is engaged in underwater
exploration of oil resources in the areas well north
of the Senkakus, and perhaps North Korea as well.
As recently as-March 7:9 73 `Peking protested this
activity, again implying eventual negotiations were
in order. A new statement protesting a Japanese-South
Korean agreement on exploration was issued on February
4. The Korean factor is probably a complicating
one for Peking, since Pyongyang's own interests loom
in the background and this together with the obvious
difficulty of arriving at an effective arrangement
that would exclude Taipei's claims, may explain why
the Chinese are in no hurry to begin talks.
33. Whatever the case in the East China Sea,
however, there is no question that the status quo has
already changed in the South China Sea, and in the
Paracels the Chinese were the agents of the change.
The issue is whether or not the fighting in the
Paracels was deliberately provoked by Peking as part
of a concerted effort to absorb the Crescent group.
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low
te
A delibera
move of this sort would have obvious.
implications for China's future.course with respect
to the Spratlys. Unfortunately, however, the evidence
thus far available does not provide a definitive answer
to the question. At the very least, the Chinese had
at hand well prepared contingency plans'for action
in the Crescent group, but this would not be surprising
under the circumstances. The best evidence suggesting
premeditation is the fact that rotation in mid-December
of air units resulted in a sizable increase in the
total forces available on Hainan; but if the additional
aircraft were meant to provide a sufficient force for
planned operations against the Crescents, then it is
difficult to understand why. the Chinese found it
necessary to fly still more aircraft into Hainan once
the battle was joined. In addition a number of senior
military officials were out of the country at the time.
In the absence of conclusive evidence of premeditation,
it seems reasonable to suppose that.the widespread
publicity given Saigon's actions in the early stages of
the incident helped precipitate the denouement.
34. If this is the case, then the equally wide-
spread publicity given to the recent GVN landings
in the Spratlys could result in a similar outcome.
Saigon's actions there will be seen as clearly pro-
vocative in Peking; and they will have clearly changed
the status gMuoo, thus all but calling for a Chinese
response. In these circumstances some forceful Chinese
reaction cannot be ruled out. But the situation
in the Spratlys is very different from that obtaining
in the Paracels last month. Even if the Chinese had
determined an an operation to root out the Vietnamese,
they would have great difficulty in. carrying it out.
They could not in any case be absolutely certain that
they would succeed militarily, and an unsuccessful
operation would be far worse than none at all.
35. -Moreover, as noted above, the political
constraints militating against the use of force in the
Spratlys are as real as the military uncertainties;
the fact that three or four governments might become
involved in a brawl among the islands could in itself
preclude any Chinese move. Peking's response to the
South Vietnamese move, though toughly worded, was
predicable. Continued South Vietnamese assertions of
sovereignty over the Spratleys, such as that of February
5, could lead the Chinese to conclude it was necessary
to act, but on balance the odds seem to be against a
serious military move in the Spratlys.
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