SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-556-8-5-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 8, 1971
• Content Type: MISC

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SENIOR WASHJNGTON 5PECZAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
Wednesday, December $, 1971
Time and Place; 11:1.3 a. rn. ~ 12:02
White House Situati
n R
,
o
oam
NSS, AR
S
b
MY, DOS, OSD, JCS review(s) completed.
u
ject: South Asia .
Participants:
Chairman -Henry A. Kissinger
CIA - Richard Helms
John Waller
State -
U. Alexis Johnson
Joseph Sisco
ALD - Donald MacDonald
Samuel DePalma
Maurice Williams
Christopher .Van Hollers
C. Herbert Rees
David Schneider
Bruce Laingen
NSC Staff ~ Harold H. Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Defense W .
David Packard MORI cos2s
s~as R
/Ad
,
xr~ Robert O. Welander
Armistead Selden
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
James H. Noyes
Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
JGS -
Gen. John A. Ryan
Capt. Haward N. Kay
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that: ~?
(Y) CIA. would assess the international implications of the situation;
(2) Defense would assess Pakistan's rr~ilitary prospects ~ Kashmir;
(3) State would prepare a paper on our military supply options;
(4) State. would revise the cable to King .Hussein, telling him we are reviewing
the matter of his providing aircraft obtained from the U. S. to Pakistan and
giving him the reasons why we avant to hold up for the time being.
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Dr. Ki:s sin er: Disk (Helms ), where do we stand?.
(Mr. Helms briefed from the text at Tab A. )
Dr.__Kissin~,exc What records are the Paks destroying?
Mr, 'Helms; Military records -- not intelligence records.
2..
Dr. Kissinger; The southern paxt af. Azad Kashmir -.. is that the part
the Paks took in T947?
Mr. Helms: Yes.
Mr. Sis co: (to Helms) How long do you think. the Paks can hold out in the East?
Mr. Helms: Forty-eight hours -- if it were not for the rivers, it would be over
by now.
Dr. Kissinger; (to Ryan) What is your assessment of the military sittia: Lion in the
W est?
? Gen. Runs We still think the Indians plan a holding action .._ we donut think
they will push very hard,
Dr. Kis sin er; Haw long would it take them to transfer their troops fxom East
to West?
G_en. Ryan: It would take a long time for a transibr of all their divisions., .but
their airborne division cor~l.d be transferred in five or six days.
Mr. Williams: It is 2$ hours by train from Calcutta to New Delhi, to give you
some idea of tix'ne. This would mean, of course, clearing the rail line and
using it exclusively for txoop transport.
Gen. Ryan Haw much they would want tatransfer to the West is debatable.
The Indians already have superiority in the West.
?
Dr. Kis singers We have orfrriajor problem -- what stance should we take toward
a possible debacle in West Pakistan as well as in the East2 Before we get to
that, Maury (Williams ), what is the situation on refugee aid?
Mr. Williams: The recommendation of the World Bank was that the total cost
of the refugee relief should be compensated to India to pxotect the Indian
development program, The total was~700 million, of which the US quota
would have been $250 million. This was not done, however. Instead, we
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made $90 million in direct commodity contributions ~-- F'L-480 food, other
coxxxmodities, and some to U. S. voluntary agencies. It was agreed to .provide
$22..8 million in cash to the UN High Commissioner far Refugees and to
UNICEF, but 3/4 of that turned out to be in terms of .commodities.. The Indians
have complained bitterly about this, _claiming that this did not compensate
them for their casts, which was the purgose of the exercise.
Mr. Sohnson: Avery small ;~.maunt o# U. S. dollars have flowed to the Indian
economy -- about $5 ar $b million.
Mx. Williams: The net result is that the Indians. have last foreign exchange.
We still. have $1.8 million unallocated which we were holding for the U. S.
voluntary agencies, but the whale relief effort has now been suspended.
Mr. I~issi:n~er: Far bath India and.Pakistan?
Mr. Williams: Both.
Mr. Kissinger: I want to make it clear, that the President wants all relief to
be made available in kind -- no cash! I also want to be sure that nothing is
done ixi the future -- the next tranche of the development loan, PL-480, etc.
without approval hexe. He doesn't want anything to slide through.
Mr. Williams: There is no next tranche -- I can assure you nothing can. slide
through.
Mx. Kissinger: If the situation i.n the West worsens, what would be the next
turn of the screw?
Mr. Williams: The only thing left to do in this area is to take possession o.f
the goads already under contract. We have done everything shoxt of that.
Mr. Sisco: In the post-war context, these other issues, -- PL-4$0, loans, etc. , --
will be very important.
Mr. Williams: I want to be sure everyone understands that the free foreign
exchange proposal made by the ti~iorld Bank far India was not acted on by any _~
of the donors. India has gained no net foreign exchange. _
Mr. Packard: On the contracts, da we commit funds to India in advance or at
the time of the contract?
Mr. Williams: These goads go undex loan agreements, and the money is paid
to U. S. banks. We have to stag payment and take possession of the. goods. We
would have to pay the suppliers and would have to settle the claims that would.
arise. It would be messy.
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Mr. Packard: It could be done, but it would be quite a job.
----Mr. -Kissinger: Why da you say it would be messy?
Mr. Williams; 'The' U. S. Government would have to take possession of the
goods and' would have to settle all the claims of the companies.
Mr. Packard: First we would have to locate .all the stuff.
Mx. Williams: We would have to make arrangements for storage, pay ware-
housing .charges.
Mr. Packard: We can do it, but it would be difficult.
Mx. Johnson: Have. we any precedents?
Mr. Williarn.s: Only small amounts in .cases where diplomatic relations had
been broken. Even those claims took years to settle.
_Mr. Kissixa~er: Haw is India handling next year's development program? Are
they negotiating ,with you (AID) now?
Mr. Williams: No, nothing is under negotiation with India.
Mr. Kissinger: What about youx budget for next year;
Mr. Williams: We'll have to look at that. It's a question whether AID will.
survive next year. There's an important vote on the fiitureof AID in the House
at 11:00 this morning. We're a hostage to the Mansfield Amendment.
Mr. Ki~sin er: You'll survive.
Mr. Williams: Of course, what goes into the budget does not consitute a
commitment to a country.
Mr, Sisco: But it has an important psychological effect.
Mr. Williams: We can mention it as a contingency.
Mr. Kissin er: We have orders to put nothing in the budget for India. (ta
Williams) I' 11 have to discuss this with you. A $10 or $ 20 million cut won't
satisfy the President. Nor does he want any stories that AID recommended
a big budget and the wicked White House cut it out. You should put your minds
to work on a much smaller budget for next year, no matter what eventually
happens in the present situation.
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Let's now turn to the key issue., If India turns on West Pakistan, takes Azad
Kashmir and smashes the Pak aix and tank forces, a number. of things seems.
inevitable. Should we, in full conscience, allow the liberation of the same
disintegrating forces in West Pakistan as in the East? Baluchistan and other
comparable issues are bound to come to the fore, as Mrs. Gandhi indicated
to the President and as she told a Columbia University, seminar in New York,?
I understand. Pakistan would be left defenseless and West Pakistan would
be'turned into a vassal state. We have to decide some questions -~ the military
supply questioxx, for example. I have reviewed the cables to Jordan which
enthusiastically tell Hussein he can't furnish planes to the Paks. We shouldn't
decide this an such doctrinaire grounds. 'The question is, when an .American
ally is being raped, whether or not the U. S. should participate in enforcizig
a blockade of our a11y, when. the other side is getting Soviet aid. I don't know
what the decision will be, but we have to consider this in brca dex~ terms..
That's why I'm holding up your cables. In .any event, they should be toned dawn.
Mr. Sisco: We should tell hIussein to keep his options open. The question of
military supply iari the context of East Pakistan is one thing. ' .I# the' situation
evolves in the West as Henry describes, and there is a serious risk to West
Pakistan, that's so-rrxzthaxag else. Personally, I doubt that that is the Indian
objective, but it may be.
Mr. Johnson: (Foreign Minister) Singh told (Ambassador) Keating that India
had no ixitention of taking "any" territory. He was presumably referring to
Kashmir.
Mir. Sisco: I wonder if they-re not making a distinction here -- Kashmir is a
disputed axes. I suspect they're really talking about something other than that
strip of Azad Kashmir that Dick (Helms) referred to. 25X1
Mr. Johnson: (to Helms) Your briefing this morning said there was no Chinese
buildup in the area.
M~^. Helms: They already have enough forces there to rattle the sword. They
have the people there to make same motions.
(Mx'. Sisco left. the meeting.)
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?
Dr~n~er: We have two military supply questions: 1) to get King Hussein
into a holding pattern on provision of aircraft to Pakistan, while the President
considers the issue; and 2) how to convey to the Indians and possibly the
Soviet Union that a turn of their attention to West Pakistan would present some
problems.
Mx. Packard :.The basic problem. is that we can't authorize Tordan to do any-
thing we can't do ourselves. If a third country has some planes that we don't
have, we could authorize them to supply them to Pakistan. In these
circuna.stances, it might be better. for us to supply the planes directly, but
we can't authorize Jordan to do~ it unless we are authorized to do it ourselves.
Mr. Johnson: We would have to make a judgment ' that Pakistan is eligible to
make such purchases and. then notify the Congress.
Dr._ Kissinger: If we hadn't cut' off arms to Pakistan, this pxablem wouldn't. exist.
Mx. Packard: That's xaght.
I]x~.-Kissinger: We didn't analyze what the real danger was at the time we took
that step ~-- we ail failed there. If we had undexstood the implications .._____,.
I was wrong too -- we were ,all wrong.
Mx. ~~ackard: There's another issue an Jordan -- if they delivex the planes to
Pakistan, we will have to replace them, since we can't afford to let Jordan
weaken its elf.
Mr. Johnson: And we don't have the MAP to do that.
Dr. Kissinger: What as the judgment of this gxaup? We have a country, supported
and equipped by the Soviet Una an, turning one-half of anothex country into a:
satellite state and the other half into an impotent vassal. Leaving aside any
American interest in the sub-continent, what conclusions will other countxies
dxaw from this in their dealings with the Soviets? Dick (Helms), would you do
an analysis of this?
?~tix. Helms: Don't we have same obligation under CENTO?
Mr. Johnson: No legal obligation.
Dx. Kissinger: We had no legal obligation to India in 1962, but we came to the con.,
elusion that if China should overxun India, it would present us with great problems..
J.'ve read the bilateral treaty, and it's not easy to escape the conclusion that some
conditions which would warrant some involvement of the constitutional pxocess
axe close by. If India succeeds, what would be the impact in the larger threatre of
would affairs?
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T?.C ~~..,iei.,~, ~ v,u.~ru1..1.1Y .c:./ vVU.s.YY Vttu
Mx. Packaxd: It would negate SEATOe
Mr. Johnson; An India attack against Pakistan is excluded from SEATO.
-~vSr, . Pa.ckaxd; But as a practical matter, SEATO wdu}.d be down th.e drain.
Ur. Kissinger: We have been talking far two yeaxs about a Security Council
guaxantee far the Middle .East, What is the impact of the recent chain of
events on other areas axld expectations in other areas?
Let's look at the military supply question, We could say that we have done
ezrerything two weeks too late.. If we wait until India takes Azad Kashmir,
then take. action an military. supplies for Pakistan, we would merely infuriate
the Indians and demonstxate our impotence. If we had cut off aid twn weeks
ago, it might have had some influence on the situation in the .East, instead of.
being a grandstand play. ,Let's look at this whole pictuxe.
Mr. Packard:. We should consider some way that would help West Pakistan hold
it's own.
Dr. Kissinger: How?
.. Mr, Tohnson; I agree this should be examined. We should consider exact7.y what
effect mi,la.ta~y supplies .could .have.
Dr. Kissinger: There are two separate problems: the thxeat of military supply
and the fact of such supply. pace a war in West Pakistan is engaged, provision
of planes by ,Tardan might combine all the disadvantages. I'm more interested
in the deterrent effect. If it were done as a taken before the war, it would be an
indication that, .while we don't accept what has happened in East Pakistan, we
can't do anything about it, but if they move in West Pakistan, it would be a whole
new ball game.
Mx. Johnson: We might introduce this element in aux comeback to (Ambassador)
Keating xeplying to his report of his conversation with Foreign Ministex Singh.
Mr. Van Hal_len: Singh said the Indians had no territorial ambitions -- we could
pick ha:m. up on that.
13r. Kissinger: If they succeed in destroying the Pakistan Army, they don't need
any territorial ambitions.
Mr. Van Hollen: We could pick up both elements -- ask far specific Indian
assurances on Azad Kashmir and that they da not seek to destroy Pak forces
S.n the' West.
pr. Kissinger: We should also make it clear that if they do, they wall face a new
situation. ~~
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~ ?? . .w..~ v?..L,u rr t11LL
?
Dr. Kissin-gerc I donut think they have the punch.
Mx. Helms ? I agr ee,
Mr. Johnson: Qf course,.. the Paks axe trying to bite off Kashmir.
Mr. Belden: We have a new report indicating that the Paks. may have knocked out
as many as 120 Indian planes on their first attacks on those four airfields.
Mr. Helms: Qur 1962 assurances to Ayub made it clear that we would come to
Pakistan's assistance in the face of aggression agaixa.st Pakistan from Tndia.
Mr. Van Hollen: That was in the context of our assurances to India when China
moved in. This was .overtaken by the events of 7.965, and our legal people don't
think the Paks k~ ve a binding case in international law.
Mr. Johnson: If we want to assist Pakistan, we can find a basis far doing it.
Mr. Van Hollen: If we make a policy decision to assist Pakistan militarily, we f'
don't have to worry about it.
Dr. Kissinger: If the word of a Gauntry has any legal meaning, it seems to me this
would apply. The Paks haven't raised it with us yet, of course,
Mx. Packard : There is the practical problem,. though -- if we do anything, we
should do something effective.
Mr. Helms: I agree. If we don't win, don't do it.
Mr. Packard : We should take a good look at it.
Mx. Williams: Tn 1965, the. Paks closed our base at hhshawar and fox all practical
purposes left CENTO. With the fall of East Pakistan two days away, I think an
attempt to get acease-fire in West Pakistan needs to be made diplarra tically.
Mro Johnson_ But that would stop the Paks in Kashmir.
Mr. Williamsc But if they will be chewed up, we might be doing them a favor,
Dr. Kissinger: ,,Dick (He7.m,s), would you get us by tomorrow an assessment of
Pakistan's capabilities in Kashmir.
Mr. Helms: Xes.
Dr. Kiss finger: We need foux things tomorrow:
1) the assessrxxent of the international implications of the situation;
2) an assessment of Pakistan's military prospects in Kashmir;
3) our stance on the military supply question;
4) revision of the cable to Jordan to get word to King Hussein to stay
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in a holding' pattern, that we are reviewing the situation, and that we share his
concerxx and do not consider this a trivial issue.
if v~re're too enthusiastic about telling him not. to da anything for Pakistan, he may
think we would txeat his country the same way in a comparable situation.
Mr. Johnson: We have done a new version of the note protesting the Indian
blockade (circulated at the table and attached at Tab B), but I don't think we
should send it, There is nothirAg to be gained. We have already protested
the attack on our ship, and thex?e's not much puxpose in doing anything more.
Dr. Kissinger: Except to show our displeasure with the Tndian action.
Mr. Jahnaon: The Paks have also declared a blockade.
Dr. Kissinger: With what?
Mr. Johnson: Oxx paper ,they have taken the same action as India.
Dr. Kissingex: W'e .could protest to Pakistan too.
Mr. Van Ho11en: We could make a paper protest to the Pakistanis.
Mr, Johnson: We don't have a legal case tv protest the blockade as such. The
two courxtries have declared a state of wax ,between them and, under this
declaration, they have the right of blockade. It's more a question of how the
blockade is carried out. Firing on an American ship is an illegal act, and we have
protested that twice. We can protest that again.
Dr. Kissinger: Formally? We don't know how it was done -- we just saw a
press statement.
Mr. Van I-ioTlezx T called iz~ the Indian Mirxister, a,nd the Secretary called in the
Indian 1Lmbassadar.
Mr. Johnson: We would have no problem with a :formal protest in writing on the
Buckeye State incident. Zt would be difficult to protest the blockade, however.
If we want to continue any even-handedness, we waald have to protest to Pakistan
also.
Dr. Kissinger: We're not trying to be all that even-handed. The president
has told all of you what he wants -- do any of you have any doubts as to what he
wants? He doesn't want to be completely even-handed. Iie's trying to get
across to the. Indians that they are running a major risk in theix relations with
the US. If every time we do something to the Inc~Sa.ns, we have to .da the san~,e
thing to Pakistan, we will be participating in the rape of Pakistan, given the
difference in their strengths. This blockade pxatest is a tactical decision that
doesn't bather me one way or the other, Ain I misrepresenting what the President
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has said? You have all heard him, He said to look for things we can do to get
the message across to India.
Mrs Packard: We have some reports that India may be experiencing a little
ccuzcern about aux attitude. Maybe we should pour. it on a little.
---Mr-.-- Johnson.: W e cazx d o it.
Dr. Kissinger: Why should ore do anything to ease India's state of mind? If
Inctia is xinad, they won't. get any less mad if we don't do Borne of these things.
M~~s. Gandhi is scold-blooded, tough customer. She won't become a Soviet
satellite out of pique. Wave had one NSC x'xa,eeting on this. If anyone
disagrees that this is the President's intention, we can have another meeting.
On the blockade, I don't care. But we shouldn't ease their minds about our
intend otes.
Mr. He1rns: Have we a policy decision on the evacuation of white faces front
Dacca?
Mr. Johnson; There's a meeting going on in New York now. It's not ablack-white
issue. The evacuation is in the context of UN and third-country personnel,
who happen to be white, We're working with ~fense a:~ this in New Park,
Dr. Kissinger: On the question of a massacre, does anyone know what is
happening in the areas India has occupied? Will we know if there is a massacre?
Mr. Helms: Yes, but we won't know developments minute by rilinute.
Mr. Johnson: We put something in, the GA resolution on that.
Mr. Van Hollen: Ta recap the assignments, CxA will assess the overall
implications, Defense will assess Pak capabilities in Kashmir, State will
give you the options on military supply, and we wi11 redraft the message to
Hussein.
Dr. Kissinger: Let him know that we understand his problem and give him the
reasons why we want to hold up for the time being,
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