SALT -- VERIFICATION PANEL MEETING, 9 FEBRUARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-555-6-1-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 9, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
- URGENT INFORMATION
Phil Odeen/Hal Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: SALT ? Verification Panel Meeting, 9 February
The purpose of this meeting is to review the status of the negotiations
now 'U.-1qt the Vienna session is over. (The talks ended last Friday.)
Moreover, the meeting should consider how to prepare for SALT VII
in Helsinki, which starts on March 28 after this seven-week recess.
Finally, the meeting provides a good opportunity to discuss again the
OSD Hard-Site Defense proposal.
The last Verification Panel meeting was on December 23, during -
the Christmas recess. You will probably want at least one more Veri-
fication Panel meeting and an NSC meeting before the talks resume on
March 28. These other meetings could best be scheduled after mid-March.
What You Should-Get From This Meetin2
You should:
-- Get agreement that the Working Group begin work on any new
papers which will be needed. These should include: (1) a paper on the
language of the Joi.nt Draft Texts and any accompanying interpretatiOns;
_ and (2) a paper on. the unresolved issues at SALT which have not been
recently studied (e.g., mobile ICBMs, soft-pad ICBMs).
-- Make it clear that there will be adequate opportunity for
everyone to present their views on the substantive issues in March.
Hence, the President and you do not want anyone in the meantime to
wage a campaign in Congress or the press for particular viewpoints.
-- Get discussion of fhe Hard-Site ABM proposal pushed by
OSD and also supported, though in different form, by the JCS.
NSS, DOS, JCS, OSD Reviews Completed
MORI/CDF C03323034
? -
c4thc,Lx.4 coei
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TOP SECRET /TALENT KEYHOLE 2
NEW INTELLIGENCE
The important intelligence issues at this point are:
-- Have the Soviets started any new ICBM silos?
? When and what will the Soviets test at Tyuratam -- modified 25X1
SS-9s and SS-11s or new missiles?
-- What is the meaning of the ABM R&D at Sary Shagan?
At the Verification Panel meeting, you should ask CIA to give a briefing
on the latest intelligence. Carl Duckett suffered a mild heart attack last
week and is hospitalized. Bruce Clarke will probably give the briefing...
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TOP SECRET/TALENT-KEYHOLE
REVIEW OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS
3
Negotiations since the recess did not result in any- change in the Soviet
position on ABM levels or on excluding SLI3Ms from the freeze. There
was some_progress on minor issues; the remaining differences in the
Joint Draft Texts are mostly on major issues such as .ABM levels.
The key remaining issues are:
A. Defensive Limitations
1) ABM levels. We have stuck on our 2- or-1 proposal. The Soviets
reaffirmed their December 15 proposal of two sites for them (Moscow plus
ICBM defense) and one site for us.
However, in informal meetings of Garth.off with Kishilov and Sernenov,
the Soviets have hinted strongly that an acceptable compromise is 2-for-2
in which each side would get protection of NCA and one ICBM field.
-- When asked about 2-for-2 in which the U.S. had protection of
two ICBM fields and not Washington, Kishilov said this would endbunter
greater difficulties because it would allow the U.S. a greater advantage
in the number of ICBMs defended. However, Kishilov did not reject it.
(Semenov did not address this variant.)
The Soviets proposed equal interceptor levels of 150 and ruled out higher
levels of ABM interceptors. They also termed inappropriate more than
two ABM sites for each side.
Additionally, Kishilov and Semsnov told Garthoff that a I-for-1 deal
in which the Soviets get Moscow ABM and we get Safeguard would not
be feasible. The, argument is that the Soviets must have ICBM defense
(other than that provided by Moscow) if we get ICBM defense.
2) Radar constraints, We continue to press for limiting ABM
radars to four modern ABM radar complexes (MARCs) for each side
(though the Soviets would also be able to retain their existing Try Add
radars). The Soviets have finally accepted the MARC concept and hint
that they will agree to 6-8 MAR Cs.
On other large phased array'retdars (OLPARs), we continue to press for
veto rights over constructton of .new OLPARs with a power-aperture
product of greater than 10 watt-meters squared. The Soviets resist any
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TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE 4
constraints on OLP.ARs, but some on our Delegation believe Soviets
might be flexible.
B. Offensive Limitations
1) Freeze on SLBMs. We modified our proposal to freeze number
of tubes and not boats. We would explicitly- allow replacement of old
SLBMs with new SLBMs. The Soviets continue teresist any freeze on
SLBMs.
We have not proposed allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs.
The Delegation (less Allison) requested authorization to explore this,
but we never acted on the request.
2) Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs). We seek a strict
limit preventing increases in the number of MLBMs. The Soviets say
they will promise not to convert "light" ICBMs to "heavy" ICBMs, but
they balk at any definition of terms.
3) Soft-fixed ICBM .Launchers and Mobiles. We want a freeze on
all ICBMs (which implies 'a ban on mobile ICBMs since neither country
now has any). The Soviets position is to freeze only ICBM silo- launchers,
but not soft pads or mobiles. They have implied that they will agree to
include soft-pads, but suggest that it will be more difficult to get mobiles
included.
4) Freeze dates. We proposed July 31, 1971 as the date after which
no new construction on ICBMs or SLBMs can be started. The Soviets
proposed July 31, 1972 or the effective date of the agreements, which-
ever is later.
-- If the Soviets have not begun any new ICBMs since last July,
-then the difference in the freeze dates for ICBMs would not be impbrtant.
(They have so hinted in Vienna.)
-- As for SLBMs, the Soviets will have started about 9 more
Y-class submarines in the period between our proposed date and theirs.
5) Duration and Withdrawal.
should be a minimum duration for
argued that termination shoutd not
progress in the follow-on negotiati
matic termination after 2 years.
We have not yet said what we think
the offensive agreement, but have
be automatic and should be tied to
ons. The Soviets have proposed auto-
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At the Verification Panel meeting, you should call on Ambassador Smith
to bring everyone up to date on events in Vienna.
PREPARATION FOR SALT VII
The present concern over preparations for SALT VII should focus on:
-- Getting the necessary analytical work done prior to the
Verification Panel and NSC meetings starting in mid-March.
-- Insuring that the confidentiality of the Talks is respected.
A. Inter-agency Papers
We have recently completed interagency papers on:
? "SLBM Launcher Limits." While this examines the possibility
of allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs, it focuses on the
issue of how essential is it to ,include a freeze on SLBMs in the interim
agreement.
? "Higher Level ABM Options in SALT." (See Tab F.) -This
examines in considerable detail ABM options which involve increases
over our present proposal in the number of ABM sites and interceptors.
It includes much discussion on Hard-Site Defense.
-- "Alternative ABM Levels." (See Tab G.) This summarizes
all the ABM options which have any agency support, briefly summarizing
the pros and cons. It was designed mainly to answer potential criticism
that we recently had looked only at higher-level ABM options.
Er_copapers is needed.
Two additional papers would seem to be needed. They are:
I. Cpnsideration of Unresolved Issues. We have already studied
adequately the issues of ABM levels and the inclusion of SLBMs. But,
there is a need to consider the strategic implications, negotiability, and
agency views on other issues which are still unresolved -- e.g., mobile
ICBMs, soft-pad ICBMs, the freez1 dates, duration and withdrawal.
TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
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TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
2. Review of the language in the Joint Draft Texts and accompanying
interpretations. The JDTs and the interpretations are ad referendum to
the Delegations and to the governments. We should smoke out as soon
as possible any latent problems with the agreed language in the present
drafts, rather than to wait until the agreements are ready to be signed.
This paper could also examine the issue of how to handle the as.sisi.
interpretations - -e. g., by a int statement in a plenary meeting,b
each side initialling them. This issue caused considerable confusion and
debate among the agencies the past two weeks.
-- Some (including OSD and JCS) thought that the interpretations
should be as formal as possible, i. e. they should be initialled.
? Others apparently thought a plenary statement was sufficient.
Agency Views. Except for ACDA,the informal views of members of the
V. P. Working Group essentially track with the suggestions above.(Tab D)
ACDA did question whdther a pa'per was needed on the agreed language
of the Joint Draft Texts. It argued that such a paper might be an excuse
for other agencies to raise old substantive issues again.
-- The JCS and OSD would like to look at the JDT simply to make
sure that the language does what the Delegation thinks it does. We can
control them from reopening old substantive issues. Moreover, the
White House never has had a chance to review the language carefully; it would
help to have the benefit of agencies' views.
If the decision is made to do a paper on the JDTs, ACDA would like the
paper to be done in the Backstopping Committee (which Smith would chair),
rather than by the -Ve-rification Panel. A-CDA says that this would keep '
you a little removed from any battles over details.
-- The JCS would prefer the V.P. Working Group. We also
believe the Working Group would be a better forum. Phil Odeen chairs
that group and we consequently have better control over the timing and
content of the papers done there. Hence, you will have better control over
what issues are surfaced for your decision and which are not. At a
minimum, you will probably want tb have a voice on how to handle the
interpretations accompanying the JDTs.
TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
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TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
At the Verification Panel Meeting, you should ask Ambassador Smith how
he thinks we might proceed during the recess. You might also ask if the
Delegation would like an opportunity to present written views on this.
.After soliciting other views, you ought to direct the Verification Panel
Working Group to undertake the necessary studies (noted above). These
studies should be completed by early March when you return from China.
B. Protecting Confidentiality.
As we get nearer to the SALT agreements, pressures are sure to mount
from Congress and the press for more information. And, those who fear
their views have a dim future within the bureaucracy might try to generate
some outside support.
At the Verification Panel meeting, you might remind everyone that there
will be a fair hearing of the issues and everyone's views during the
Verification Panel and NSC meetings in March.
You might then get tough and emphasize that the President and you are very
concerned about any leaks during the coming months. You should remind
everyone that Congressional briefings, if requested, should deal only with
the formal SALT sessions and not speculate about possible U.S. fallbacks.
Moreover, CongressiDnal briefings and public statements on SALT are to
be cleared through the White House.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Any of the substantive issues listed earlier could be raised by someone
during the meeting. You should be able to defer discussion of them by,
pointing out that the meetings in March provide the more appropriate forum.
-- The Delegation a few w-eeks;ago did request authorization to
explore on a non-commital basis the following: 1) the principle of equal
ABM interceptors; and 2) allowing freedom-to-mix from ICBMs to SLBMs.
However, these issues can be treated in March like the others.
On the other hand, you might want to discuss the OSD Hard-Site Defense
proposal at this time. As you recall, Secretary Laird is seeking an ABM
arrangement (Tab B) whereby:
1. For now, the U.S. would get.the one Safeguard site at Grand Forks
and the Soviets would get Moscow ABM.
TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
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TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
2. After three years or upon mutual agreement:
? The U.S. could deploy an ABM defense of Washington.
? The U.S. could deploy Hard-Site Defense (HSD) at Grand
Forks.
-- The Soviets would be allowed to deploy HSD at one ICBM field
which meets agreed geographical limitations. (OSD had earlier proposed
that the Soviets be allowed to protect equal numbers of silos as the U.S.,
i. e., 150. This would have meant that the Soviets would be allowed to
protect as many as 3-4 ICBM fields. OSD now believes that the Soviets
would accept defenses of one ICBM field.)
-- For each side, Hard-Site Defense would include 1000 short-
range interceptors or more. Many short-range radars would also be allowed.
Before the U.S. would make the detailed ABM proposal, OSD thought the
Delegation should first be directed to explore whether the Soviets were
willing to accept four fundamental principles of the Hard-Site approach.
The Delegation, of course, was never directed to undertake such explorations.
However, Paul Nitze and the OSD staff in Vienna pursued much of the
desired exploration without receiving guidance.. This activity caused Gerry
Smith and others considerable distress on occasion.
The OSD principles and the Soviet responses are discussed below:
-- (1) Acceptable geographic limits on location of the ICBM ,defense.
In response, the Soviets have indicated that they will accept some geographic
constraints, though the exact form is still uncertain.
-- (2) Strict qualitative limits-on the capabilities of the Hard-Site
Defense interceptors and radars. In response, the Soviets have advocated
some qualitative limits on HSD interceptors and radars. What they will
accept is still not clear, but OSD believes that it would be acceptable.
-- (3) Strict controls on Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs),
i.e., those situated elsewhere about the country. In response, the Soviets
continue to oppose any controls in their official statements., including one by
?Shchukin in a recent mini-plenary". The informal statements of everyone,
except possibly Shchukin, also oppose such controls.
TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
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9
However, OSD is optimistic. Their rationale is that the Soviets noW
argue for control over ICBM defense components, including ABM radars.
It would be illogical for the Soviets to allow all other radars to be uncon-
strained. Hence, the Soviets will come around to OLPAR constraints.
And, in a conversation with Nitze, Shchukin implied that the issue would
be discussed again in Moscow over the recess.
-- (4) The numerical levels on ABM interceptors for ICBM
defense would be open after a given period, unless a limit was agreed to
on the follow-on agreement. No one on the U.S. Delegation has probed
whether the Soviets would accept unlimited interceptors for HSD. Such
probing would have been a clear breach of the instructions.
However, in discussing the Soviet proposal of 150 total interceptors,
Garthoff reports that Kishilov said that there should not be higher levels of
ABM interceptors. Moreover, it would reflect a major shift from the
recent trend of the negotiations toward lower numbers of interceptors.
In summary, there is evidence that the Soviets would accept the first and second
principles, -- i.e. geographic limits and qualitative limits on HSD
components. The evidence would suggest that the Soviets will resist controls
on OLPARs, though OSD sees reasons to be optimistic. Finallyx there is
little evidence to predict the Soviet reaction to the fourth principle of unlim-
ited interceptors.
Putting aside the OSD principles and focusing on the detailed OSD_proposal,
the ABM deployments essentially boil down to the issue: is assuring the
survivability of an additional 100 Minuteman (and possibly less) worth the
probable negotiating and political problems as well as the uncertainties
of allowing the Soviets Hard-Site Defense?
The remaining negotiating problems were described above.
_ -
The political problems include:
-- This is a one-to-one arrangement in the short-term. (We
would have to stop construction at Malmstrom; the Soviets would not have
to stop anything.)
-- We would be vulnerable to the political argumjnt that we were
increasing ABM deployments in the long term, not limiting them.
? We would have to obtain Congressional approval for ABM defense
of Washington and for HSD.
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As for the strategic issues, this system (when deployed in 1979-80)
would be able to assure at a maximum the survival of about 100 additional
Minuteman, and possibly less. This number would be in addition to the about
100 or more Minuteman which would survive without HSD.
As we have written you in detail earlier (Tab E), the actual number of additional
survivors would be smaller if some technical difficulties with HSD are not
solved or if the Soviets make determined efforts to deirelop an effective
counterforce threat.
-- The Soviets could by the 1980's develop and deploy a counterforce
threat which could reduce the number of Minuteman down to less than 50,
even if we deployed OSD' s proposed HSD. (This would involve extensive
MIRVing, accuracy improvements, and increased yield-to-weight ratios.)
Assuming that an additional 100 Minuteman were saved, the strategic
significance of this incremental number is questionable.
-- If Minuteman alone were used to retaliate against the Soviets, 100
more Minuteman could account for about 5-8% more Soviet fatalities. (Against
zero or NCA ABM, TOO Minuteman could cause about 15% fatalities, 200
about 20% and 300 about 25%.)
-- However, we presumably would also have some surviving bombers
and SLBMs. In most cases the addition of 100 or more Minuteman survivors
would increase Soviet fatalities by about 1-5%.
HSD for the Soviets at one ICBM field would give them some protection of
those ICBMs at the field. And, by cheating which we could not detect, the
Soviets would be able to provide protection of about 12% of their total
population if the ICBM field were east of the Urals.
-- If the Soviets were allowed-to defend an equal number of silos (150),
then they could also provide protection of abbut 23% of the Soviet urban
population. This percentage would grow to 45% if the Soviets were not
limited by geographical restrictions and deployed HSD west of the Urals.
Agency Positions. Any further exploration of the OSD principles or any
eventual proposal of Hard-Site Defense would have to be directed over the strong
opposition of .ACD.A (including 4mbassador Smith) and State Department. (See
letter from John Irwin at Tab C) -CIA has taken no general position, but
raises questions about the verifiability of the OSD proposal.
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TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE 11
The JCS have recently modified their 3-for-3 ABM proposal to include
a vague Hard-Site Defense option. The JCS representatives have been
very hesitant to spell out any details, essentially saying only that each
side should have the right to deploy, after consultation, an agreed number
of additional "limited-range" ABM interceptors and radars in defense of
two ICBM fields.
However, there are differences between the JCS and OSD. The JCS would
like 3-for-3 ABM sites initially (versus 1-for- I of OSD) and would like the
option of HSD defense of two ICBM fields (versus one for OSD). Probably
more important than the numerical differences, the JCS would (contrary
to OSD):
? Probably be against strict qualitative controls on ABM radars
and ABM interceptors;
-- Almost certainly be against each side having a veto power over
the other side's construction of Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARs).
At the Verification Panel meeting, you should point out that any authorization
to explore Hard-Site Defense further or to make a specific proposal would
require an NSC meeting and Presidential consideration.
In discussing the substance of OSD' s Hard-Site Defense proposal, you should
focus on whether there is a need to obtain qualitative controls on ABM
radars, on ABM interceptors, and on Other Large Phased Array Radars
(OLPARs). This issue still marks the major area of difference between
OSD and JCS.
- OSD has said in the past that it would not support the mutual
right to deploy HSD -unless such controls were agreed to.
The JCS is very chary of qualitative controls.
You might specifically address OLPARs since there is considerable
uncertainty whether the Soviets will accept any constraints here. Moreover,
the JCS has been particularly opposed to controls on OLPARs.
Conduct of the Meeting
Your talking points bring out the issues and analysis contained in this
memorandum.
TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
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TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE 12
A The order of the meeting might be as follows:
1. A CIA briefing on the latest intelligence.
2. Gerry Smith reporting on the Vienna negotiations.
3. Discussion of the preparations needed for SALT VII.
4. Your reminder of the confidentiality of the Talks.
5. Discussion of the OSD Hard-Site Defense proposal.
-- On this issue, Arch Wood (of OSD) has a presentation on the
OSD proposal. Secretary Laird directed this after his breakfast meeting
with you, and Gardiner Tucker reports that Laird has asked often about
preparations for the briefing. You might feel that this briefing is unnecessary
since we have just completed an interagency paper which extensively examines
the OSD proposal and since Tucker spent some time discussing the proposal
at December's Verification Panel meeting.
Your talking points are at Tab, A.
411
TOP SECRET/TALENT KEYHOLE
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