SOVIET ABM DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-553-4-7-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 7, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

ON-FILE NSC
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IN
APPLY*
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IP
NGA, DIA, OSD
Reviews
Completed
WiMORANDIDA FOR THE PRESIOTNT
111016 Heavy A. Kiststagari
1111131SCT: Soviet ADMOr relArpousts
Pialtimil boa hiarvrartiled home
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7- NI
SW 016411111 ASU 4*Plermitale, woadgW. els
Ilisese ballads adasno ilageswe Abram* *Chas** attack.
silditicast radars sad AIM. win* deptints4, thas syneas would
Hinestalattalty biomes Om earability foil Wiese *plait 0411114
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The DIA roaseas that the two radar sites wider eatsi*ct1*s sear
China sad the possible sits sear Moscow tarnish a. basis to
paittidato that the Soviets aro buildiag as early wars*/ radar
setwork agaiast China. This widens* ia wit yet casalsst. hamartrer,
fir* the following reassess
Cute completod, the two new radars our Chia* wwild sot after
complato sewerage of Chiaa. To fill tho gap is coverage, these radars
would haw to bate twig* the coverage of lbw eidtr radar. of tits same
type. sad one exist's* **Aar would bawl to be doubled ta capacity.
DIA believes that this kw:rmo is capability is peosible. liewever,
there is Jos yst no evideata that it wIll la fact occur.
The posted* sew radar war Macaw could suppleanwat the
two sow radars near China if it to of tha type DIA suspects. iioweeor,
bowsaw Ow radar has awe bass cosetrected* Its characteristics as.
largely wilmows. Moreover, if it ware cosetruetall ea its present *Ito,
it aloft would off,* hicecaploto coverage of Chia*, sad it would be
partially redundant with the owithars fa*. of a, atroilar radar located
newt the sow *its. This radar face has *WM, boos woad by the Soviets
as far as as koww, but we do *et kaaw why.
I believe that DIA has provided the meet pisusibi. explasaties for Vie
new Soviet radar devolepesontsi 1.5. that the Soviets are deplayiag
* liattiatic rolosilio early warning system oriented toward Chios.
09011, possible wiplasationa or* that the illaviats aro:
adilbss to their apace surveilLiaco pabilitios,
ildhig a capability to meatter Claiaoso adsoll. test
activities
adding as warsing capability spinet tke possibility
that 0,,1. Ponablea aubmarises might deploy is the ladlas Ocala
.54 .1* the Hos of Okhotsk near Japan.
They could of avers*, have sews or all of them& four purposes
is mind
DIA gee. ta to poetulato that the sidethig AIM system ar
*wild be eagissded to cover a Chines* ICShi attack tracked by the sew
radar system. Tho extolls* ABM system has, accordiag to DIA, soma
fraigT.
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11,
Zati
oapability agoinat tk. Claws. Tb. Soviets coold burnoose it. ep*bUit
by oosoploting portions of diets ASIA network that wow* sesepoodel some
rpm sign. There is no evidiesso as yet of additiaaal AIM daployisents
Hounworn. &Mot tasting of ABIA fatereepters eastbmissi.
Mk notes, howorer. that U air dodoes* ndosilee awed toe ouppliod
wit* adequate data by the aro ruler's they might be jibed fignioot
Chi Was. Howirror. "tbor capability of the tar defolsoo
sideollosj
Al$14 role 1. stIll unoloar.
Tido OViihrillei ii atrssg oagesgb to suflsetthat the &Mots will probably
*germ Iota sot la SALT that both esautrios obould znatiatiiti
i1asUe110111111141 ospOility agabast China and third coutrloa. oisosna
elorkmaii that all4 Soviets horn a stronger incenthe to build a tight
ASIA than we do, fooled as they are with tba Iltritfah asul Trost&
etiologic fume asel with the prospect of early Chines* deployment of
Moodtens Sang* Salliotie Misolloo which could kit largo areas of Os
&rile Ode*.
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dr.
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? '" ? -
TOP SECRET
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
19 June 1969
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger.
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506
Dear Henry:
We have discussed the capability of the Moscow
ABM system to meet a CPR threat. I asked DIA to
review our information on this system to determine
whether we could add to the estimate contained in
NIE 11-3-68. Their enclosed brief summarizes our
estimate.
The principal change to the NIE concerns the
latest HEN HOUSE radars at Sary Shagan and
Mishelevka. These radars are consistent with a
Soviet objective of developing a China oriented ABM
system.
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TOP SECRET
David Packard
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POSSIBLE REORIENTATION OF SOVIET ABM EFFORTS TOWARD CHINA
1. Summary - While there is no conclusive evidence of a Soviet
reaction to the Chinese missile threat, a chronological correla-
tion of Soviet HEN HOUSE radar deployment with Chinese missile
development indicates, with a reasonably high degree of confi-
dence, that the Soviets are building a ballistic missile radar
network against the Chinese (see enclosed map). The ABM-1 system
presently deployed around Moscow (GALOSH missiles, TRY ADDS
radars, and the DOG HOUSE radar at Naro Fominsk) is primarily
directed toward the U.S. ICBM and SLBM threats. However, the
present ABM launch sites are assessed to be able to defend
against an unsophisticated Chinese threat. In addition, comple-
tion of the suspect DOG HOUSE-type radar at Chekov and the ABM
would substantially in-
erease the capability for defense against China. The SA-5
mis-
sue system widely deployed throughout the Soviet Union could,
if 4...t?has 'a-n ABM role, be used to defend against an unsophisti-
-
/
cated and light ballistic missile attack from China, if provided
with adequate radar data from the HEN HOUSE radars.
2. HEN HOUSE Deployment - The Soviets built the R&D
at Sary Shagan prior to April 1960. Since then they
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HEN HOUSE
have deployed
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EXCLI.r.:EO FRO!!
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four slightly different configurations. The first type, the
"bowed" type, were started in mid-1963 at both Olenegorsk, on
the Kola Peninsula, and at Skrunda in Latvia. Both are con-
sidered operational and cover the CONUS ICBM and the North Atlan-
tic POLARIS threat. The second and third types, i.e., the"THIN
BOY," with low elevation coverage and "FAT BOY," with high eleva-
tion coverage, were started during the 1963-64 time frame with
what appeared to be a
the two in combination providing coverage from
near 00 to 900. Only the western looking THIN BOYs are assessed
to_have emitted signals, while the easterly looking THIN BOYs,
apparently completed in 1966, have never emitted. The FAT BOYs
appear to have a lower priority in construction than the THIN
BOYs, and to date only the westerly FAT BOYs at Sary Shagan are
assessed' to have emitted signals. Before the rest of this type
HEN HOUSES were completed, a fourth type, similar to the bowed
type, were
'8tarted at Skrunda in 1967 and, about one year later,
----two new ones were started at
The
only plausible postulation at Skrunda is that thh?riew type has
a 560 azimuthal sector which,- when combined with the older ones
?which-bave'320 will give the Soviets complete coverage from
2
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roughly Gibraltar to 350 East. Extending this postulation to
Sary
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and including Modifying the easterly 25X1
looking "THIN BOYs" for 560 sector coverage with the radars at
Sary Shagan and Mishelevka, the Soviets would have complete
coverage of China as shown on the enclosed map. Both MRBM and
ICBM trajectories from likely locations in China were flown on
a computer against Soviet targets, Results indicate on the order
of eight minutes warning time is available for most targets in
eastern USSR.
3. liat_C_c,2E2:e1_._a_,tio_n_aTi.HENHOUSE)2_pm_eloep_tversusChines.?
Missile Threat - On 27 October 1967, the Chinese tested a missile-
borne nuclear weapon. Throughout 1967, there was apparently a
large number of possible troop missile firings. Photographic
coverage to date has not revealed a Chinese missile deployment.
However, it must be realized that the HEN HOUSE is a long lead
time item, i.e., three years, and if the decision to react was
made, it would have happened probably in 1967 or 1968. It should
,
also be pointed out that while the Soviet missile complexes would
be vulnerable to a Chinese MRBM attack, the Soviets could not
launch ICBMs at the Chinese from these short ranges and, in addi-
_Um, they would have to hold a large reserve for possible attack
against the U.S.
3
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time three SA-5 sites are located at Sary Shagan and one at
Mishelevka. Also, SA-5 sites have been deployed at many areas,
such as the highly industrialized center at Sverdlovsk. If this
missile system could be provided with adequate radar data by HEN
HOUSE radars, it might be utilized, especially against a less
sophisticated and light MRBM, IRBM, or ICBM attack from China.
1 Enclosure (map, TSCW)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 May 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviets Mark Time on ABM Deployment
Summary
The Soviets apparently have decided to await the
results of further research and development before
expanding their ABM defenses beyond the four launch
complexes currently being completed around Moscow.
These four complexes--comprising a total of eight
launch sites and 64 launchers--were all started be-
tween 1962 and 1966. Five or six of the launch sites
are probably operational, and the last two are ex-
pected to be phased into the system in late 1969 and
early 1970.
Plans have changed several times during the
course of deployment. Four additional complexes
were included in the original planning but have since
been dropped. Two of these were abandoned in 1964,
and the other two were stopped in varying stages of
completion by the fall of 1967. Now, some modifica-
tion of several tracking radars may be under way.
The Soviets have moved slowly in providing a
'second acquisition radar in the Moscow area to supple-
ment the coverage of the existing Dog House radar.
Site preparation and construction of support facili-
ties began more than three years ago, but the first
footings for the radar itself have only recently been
installed.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research
and coordinated with the Offices of National Estimates
and Scientific Intelligence.
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Meanwhile, ABM developmental efforts are moving
ahead at the Sary Shagan missile test center. Con-
struction is continuing on large new radars, work
has begun on a new ABM launch facility, and an im-
proved interceptor missile--probably a modified
Galosh--is being tested.
The Soviets may still plan some future expansion
of the ABM defenses at Moscow. Despite the curtail-
ment of launch site construction in the fall of 1967,
the Soviets went ahead and completed support buildings
at two of the suspended complexes. In addition, rock-
et fuel storage at the support facility for the Mos-
cow ABM sites exceeds current needs.
In contrast to the halting progress on the Moscow
ABM facilities, the ballistic-missile early-warning
system has continued to expand. Three additional
radars for this purpose have been started since mid-
1967. One is at Skrunda on the Baltic Sea coast,
where it will supplement the coverage of two existing
early warning radars in the northwestern USSR. The
other two are in the southern USSR, facing China and
a possible Polaris threat from the Sea of Okhotsk.
All three new radars probably will be operational in
1971.
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