AN INTERESTING ANALYSIS OF U.S.-JAPAN HISTORY (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-55-5-4-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 16, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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if ~1i tANI.)t);'~'I
V
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
5593
INFORMATION
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
November 16, 1974
It 0.110: W. R. SMYSE
It,) ECT:
An Interesting Analysis of U. S. .-Japan
History
Au,t ,t h"d are two documents that I recommend for background reading
..? The first (at Tab A) is a study of U. S. -Japan relations,
slt-tan by it young professor at Southern Illinois University, Eugene
T r?nt, Reviewing the history of those relations between 1898 and
1911, 1)r. Trani concludes that the U. S. changed its demands of
I~-Ga ly and a that ,,, L.at the Japanese ere able to a.c-commodate
x~~:4~atY 1~Ua?cyuilapwne...s.....e w
~i .,
to i~ttc:ric:an dexxxa~xd5 tlar~e 4}.i~.~.s but not the fourth. The foi:irt,
It+d to war.
:iI CRET XGDS 5B (1), (2), (3)
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Four A'n`_rican Fiddlers ~i ii: i ~Yeir I' ar Ea uteri ?.i unes?
A Survey of .J~1 ~iT1E.Sr,- i~TTl~v~ 1Ci3:1 C:la .o :s, 1393 -1941
Eugene P, Tram.
Southern Illinois University
and
Woodrow W.json International Centr',, for
Sc1,^1ar
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Any survey of Japanese-American relations 1),.-ttvicen 1595 -!I'd
1';t t1 must be just that -_ a survey, The subject is too broad, too complex,
,i~i[icant to lend itself to a neat ttiirt;r--page package. 1 Many issues
too sit,
wd the interaction between the two major non-European powers that
C: me; to maturity during that period. Territorial acquisitions. immigration,
the power balance in Asia, naval rivalry, China, economic competition,
and other issues -- all stand in the way of generalization about the. period.
Yet some comments can be made. The forty-three years from 189
to 19.11 can be discussed in a variety of ways, and one of the most interesting
and important is to go beyond the events of interaction:, whether formal
cii1aiuii.,acy or informal contact, and look to the roles of the United States and
Japan. How did the United States view Japan? What role did the United
States see for itself in the Pacificwhat and wharole for Japan? Did'f:tiese# roles
change? These questions, of course, introduce others. What about the
Japanese and their roles? But emphasis here will be on the United States
and the roles it defined, as expressed by four major American statesmen
of the period.
To approach this topic in terms of roles poses difficulties. The
distinction between government and people is perhaps most obvious. Some-
times government leaders hold certain beliefs about American behavior in ?
disagree. There
East Asia, with which the people, or at le?st some of them,
have been disputes within the government, between the president and officials
in the State Department, the Depart.,nonts of the Nary and Arn.Y and other
envies. about the Far East. And events sometimes 0utrun p1c-an:i, and a
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,fie xl c irre.pec'tive of and even in apposition to the
l c
action can 1 F
Cour,c of nci lc)41 there were
c
i
Yet between 1S
ro1C government has set up.
United States and
f
f
or
or
holes
views in America of te r generally acceptcd `i
to these roles that this essay is directed.
Japan. It 1s...
ited States and ;Japan,
U
n
f the
ing coliflict o
riod of iYxcreas
pe
The p
betwe ach approximately a
breaks into four. divisions, e
en 1898 and 1941,
2
each division a
I
n
each with different American roles. decade 101"2; and cacl
figure stands out as spokesman for the role of the moment. The first
major f
The
re Roosevelt.
d
o
d b Theo
m 1898 to 1909, was dominatey division, fro
keel at Japan with a mixture of admiration and suspicion.
-~
United Stater s loo
Roosevelt played for Japanese listeners was "Expand to the
11c:xe the tune Roos In that decade
1970
.
it The second division was froirx 1909 to
Mainland. ed the
t
It chan
States viewed Japan as a modern imperial power.
the Uz7ited with a gxa~ving
it per cei.vecl for itself, and that it perceived for Japan,
role p
d to help China, which country it saw as the hope of the
belief in the nee
eriod in Japanese-
r
ar
p
e
future in East Asia. The significance of that eleven.-;
' s only now beginning to be understood. The tune of the
American relations is ) was +'Imperiali:sm
hayed most frequently by President Woodrow Wilson,
decade, played of calm in
Is Over." The third division, from 1920 to 1931, was a p
peacetime ecoroxYZies, concentrated
relations as each country changed to P ~ world War I. The
economics, and worked to consolidate the gains of tMIC
States accepted Japan as a major power in the Pacific.
United States C~h;.Lxlc~:a
"International Cooper,stian,'+ and the pri.ncip,11 rnusi ciRtt1
was
from 1931 to 1R,11, has oft,,.,, lie^t, 'Cc~{~.~rx?~~d
last clivisiotx,
,vans Ilughes. Th.
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W
ostilit}r, and Japan appeared an ai;ressoz, nation. Wlli1c
of h
d
--
to as a deca
?zs not inevitable, strikingly absent from. ticks decade was any
war pence ,
"j The Axx~eric~.n tune
eaceftil solutions.
+~sifnificant dxGpositian tca>ard p
ic was "Stop the Aggression, it
ed by I-Jenny L. Stim.son,
la
a
y
dc, p
c
of the c
bout these different An
titi,liat is most i~tc:re 7er:ca.n tunes and the roles
sting a
after much diffkcUlty and with rriany.
they ascribed is that the Jilp.anese9
d to the first three tunes but decided to play their own
dance
in the 1930s.
ion and its spokcsmafl are
i
s
each div
Some specific comments about
owors
the end of 1598 the United States and ,:span stood as p
in order. By ~1 points of dis-
not merely major interests in Fast Asia but with major with c~ci, It
zt. Their re up until that year had been generally ;g
lations
agxeexne. that opened
was the United States, throu h Cornmodare Matthew C. Perry
Japan in 1853. interchanges for the next thirty-five years were cordial. a.s
build up strength to protect itself from the West. As Japan
Japan worked to
Americans
'zed trade with the United States benefited both countries.
moderns while
went to Japan,to preach technology, Christianity and democracy,
to the United States to trade and study. The United St.ateS
Japanese carne
rit of JLpane.ttcrw
i
the S
p
'5 graduating class of. 1881 symbolx..ec1
Naval Academy 8
in the last half of the 19th centi:ry? ArnOngthe throe
Amexican relations ?
Ux u 5otokichi, latex one cif. the naval licrroc-+ of the
Japanese grar,uates was y
Russo-Japanese War. The American graduates included John W. We'clc:z,
later senator from. Ma ssachusett.s and Warren G. 1 arding; 9 ssect'(4ar~y of -%%,a ,
and Ovington Weller who was to serve as senator from Ma2'Yla>>rel.4
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' cans looked with adm.aration as the Japanese Quickly ma: tered much
ArneMr.i
treated t6ei ican visito-. 3 wit- kindness, and adopted
...Western technology,
s
y
a more democratic form of government. There were moments of controver
and issues of contention but generally Japan was viewed as a country that
s ro ressive and increasingly democratic, follclWing in the footsteps of
wa p g
the United States.
to change at the end of the cen-t'particularly with
began
Feeling the su
ccessful conclusion of wars by each nation, the Sino-Japanese War
which ended in 1895, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. Before that
time the interests of the United States in East Asia were limited. Trade
twas important , and there were missionaries in much of Asia. America had
p
i-f
territorial outpostN in or touching the x acific: Ca i ortlia, Alaska, into ?e5t
in Samoa. But Washington had no real Far Eastern. +olicy. With 1898 and
annexation of Hawaii and then the acquisition of Guam and the Philippines as
a result of the war, the government was forced to think seriously about the.
Far East. Japan, fresh from a smashing victory over China, loomed large
diplomatic horizon. The Sino-Japanese and Spanish-American Wars
on the
marked the real emergence of the victors as expansionist pavers in East
Asia. From that point on, a collision of the interests of the United States
and Japan, though not necessarily in war, was nearly inevitable.
r-
Events of the years from 1898 to 1009, so important in Jap;tint t,
relations, can best be understood by following the reaction of cane
American rAmerican,
Theodore Roosevelt. While the majority of Americans tboil};lit
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about contacts with Japan, T11 was representative of. many ~ylic~ "VA,
little
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rted the A-rnerican Movement into world.
Tc: vas an expar.:-,YOnist and sui no
came to a close. For a variety of reasons he
affairs as the 19th century
ssar for the advancement of the United States,
believed expansion nece y
He vicwPCl world affairs
for the rest of the world. with benefits resulting urin his
relations and felt a keen affinity' for Great Britain. D
in strategic r served in
tion o: klaw~aii,
nexa
he called for the an
a
s
'rle:ntial ye
, tFc1
pre..pr,..sj sL. or
the war against Spain, favored keeping Guam and the Philippines, pp
av
y.
the open Door Notes, and argued the case for a large n
as ous decline as
in obvious
itain v
ntury began, and Br
ce
As the roleir' the
a world powers Roosevelt believed the United States had a large g
the position of both the (,rnitecl 5tat:'.s
to define
a n d sought
Far r_,astc`rn picture
Throughout his public if, hp was torn between aclmi-
and Japan in East Asia,
and fighting qualities and concern about th?air
ration for Japanese efficiency pagainst
tat lapan's protest
ita
th. While he had expressed irr xxmilitar y s treng
lid worried about the
d a
exatian of Hawa, an ii in 1897,
Axnexican a.nn res
P ident in 1901
pre
Philippine Islands after 1898, by the time he became
ation bad overcome fear . He supported Japan's IIf pasiti
admir c~n of
t" not japan aid not threatr.r~ in-iaoxtant
17xominence in Fast Asia? He decided
"c~,:--~sion,
bar rit
1Ie saw the Japanese as a 'x t.a..._.r ._.... w,s....___..._.__._.
American interests. a protector of the
server of the balance of power in East Asia, a
C~w wlril:ll IICT 11,16
ssapre
for
taC)n
,Y
abil.i.zer of China, a na
tial st ,. w.
a poten
door, and as little respect. He supported the E1.ngl?-Japancsr~ allianc:c, c:r7nc-l.--rl~'cl in lr)q"1..
lArr-c:rie::-r- l?'ecrot A',ian
r War to prate:cit. He understood the necessity of avoiding
A r1leric an pr'c>l~lc. r~i-t piy
especially on the Chinese mainland. The
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support such a war, and TR thought with good reason, as even the
would not
would
uccessful conclusii5n of much a war not guarantee American interests
s
there. 6
Roosevelt had set up roles for the United States and Japan. While
the American government had commercial and naval interests in the Far
East, it had limited power. Japanese interests, es-,ecially on the mainland,
seemed not to conflict with those of the United States. While Japan and the
United States were potential naval and commercial. rivals, they should work
together. It was with that view that Roosevelt supported Japan in its war
with Russia in 1904-1905 which ended with a peace treaty signed at the
Portsmouth Navy Yard, just miles from this present conference. 7 To, be
sure, Roosevelt was aware of the possibility of Jap getting "puffed with
pride," should the Japanese decisively defeat the Rwssian.s. He hoped that
Japan would not threaten American interests in China, if victorious. But he
recognized that Japan would have special interests on the Asian mainland,
and supported the Japanese claim to Korea. At one point he even talked
about a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Far East. TR hoped to arrange a
balanced antagonism between Russia and Japan after the war,
That outcome proved impossible. Japan's defeat of Russia was so
decisive and other events intervening in Japanese-American relations so
important that TR had a change of heart as to the Japanese role in East
Asia. At that point he began to play for the Japanese a special tune, "Expand
to the Mainland. " After 1905, Japan moved to close the door in Manchuria
and the Sino-Japanese rivalry intensified. Roosevelt's mind was elsewhere.
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V
Not only. were there problems in Europe, but even in the Far East the whole
pan than ;ed, at least in his
T.. :
relationship betwi:;z;. 10
mind. He became more concerned about possessions in the Far East,
referring to the Philippines in 1907 as the United States's "heel of Achilles,"
and became alarmed over an immigration crisis between the two countries, 8
He saw that Japan could expand either to the west or east, and hoped to trade
off an increased Japanese presence in China for guarantees of the security
of American possessions in the Pacific and a solution to the immigration
crisis. The period from 1905 to 1909 was difficult for him, given Japanese
disappointment over the Portsmouth peace, the continuing immigration issue,
a real war scare, and naval expansion. There was continued Japanese
expansion in Fast Asia but y mR saw stucl, a course as natural.
The most important part about the President's view of the new
situation was his belief that the open door-in China was not worth war with
Japan. He believed that the United States should do what it could to preserve
its interests in China. But it should recognize Japan as the dominant power
on the Asian mainland. In short, he gave a green light to Japanese expansion
in Manchuria. One of the best expressions of this belief appeared in a letter
to Secretary of State-designate Philander C. Knox on February 8, 1909,
shortly before leaving office. 9 He noted that Japanese-American relations
were of "great and perrnanent_importance." While Japanese immigration to
the United States had to stop, the Washington government should "show all
possible courtesy and consideration." The Taft administration had to 1.lnder-
stand that "Japan is vitally interested in China and on the Asiatic nzaitllancl
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and her wiser statesmen will if possible prevent her getting entangled in a
war with us, because whatever its result it would hamper and possibly ruin
Japan when she came to deal again with affairs in China. " Since the Pacific
Coast of the United States was defenseless and "'we have no army to hold or
reconquer the Philippines and Hawaii, " the United States had to avoid war.
TR felt that China nd:Lxznerican-interes-t_s in that country were insignificant
in the broader context of Anl r-ica's_.Far__Eastern policy. Consider how
different things might have been, had such a philosophy been at work during
the 1930s.
It is interesting that the Japanese after long discussion and with
reluctance, for they wanted to combine peaceful economic expansion to the
tune
and concentrate on continental expansion. Thy It that this was a course
that would avoid conflict with the United States -- something which had
become a concern of military planners in the United States. 10
The years from 1898 to 1909 saw initial controversy in Japanese-
American relations. 1898 had begun with the United States a minor power
in East Asia, with little involvement in that area. By 1909 all that had
changed. Russia was nearly gone from the East Asia equation, smashed
by Japan. Britain, France, Germany maintained interests in the Far East,
but as the years marched on-to 1914 and the grand collision in Europe.
these nations took less interest in Asia. Japan and the United States
remained and by 1909 both had large stakes in the Far East. During the
years from 1898 to 1909 all the major issues of Japanese-American relations
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e. ?ade, e pinsiar., naval. rival;,y, irnnhigr?.ttion, had all
came to the for
become obvious. But there was no war. Tl;c American govex nment, and
especially- Roosevelt, recognized that J
onversations he assured Stimson of continuity on the nonrecognition theme.
Stimson was to have more influence than he might have expected, for ms
stand attracted some very influential Americans. Most important he
-found a receptive audience with Hoover's successor in,the White Ilousce,
.States that would justify more than condemnation. The Japanese ignored
' zson's o ,position, except as a way of gaining domestic support. But
Stxz P
mericans conde*_x~ned Japan lout saw little in the inter eat of the L1nite:c.}
A
sanctions or force, there was little that could have been expected. }Y10-'It
In the end Stimson's policy failed. Without the resort to econor-r7zc
It was appropriate that St.imzzson returned to rhea Ciclaz.ttt,t t' , Y# ,
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w
his policy h;, d gained much acceptance, both within the a.cimini-
for by then stratro
n and among the people. Stixnson out of office had continued to urge
In October, 1c?37, in the wake of Japanese a-;t;rCS Sion upon
5anctiab.s.
a governmental ban on trade with Japan. But FDIC
China, he appealed for g
d
ease. By 1940 things were diffc re eat, and Stinason
still hoped for p
' ce to those advocating a hard-line against Japanese moves in the
his von.
His view of the Oriental mind reappeared. He told the British
Pacific.
year that "to get on with Japan one had to
that
ambassador in August o
gh unlike other countries," ! He told President Roosevelt the
treat her roL , .._..:.__... .
Same thing, that history had "shown that when the United States indicates
ua e and bold. actions that she intends to carry out a clear and
by clear lang g
affirmative policy in the Far East, Japan will yield t'o that policy eve11
1146
icts with her own Asiatic policy and conceived interest.
though it confl
oader threat to Arncr.i.ca,
When the Japanese seemed to become part of a br
in the Far Fast and Europe, the American people and Roosevelt shared his
The Japanese response came on December 7, 1941.
views. ~l~rch r such
fact
the route to pearl Harbor. The most strilc ng; ct. to Irrt' cE
o l toll]')' t~t'--~, 1C~fi1 `.'4';1^I
rl
were indlv,c raa
cfuJ. resolution Of c:if`ic.ultit~s th;1t r;tich s;c~vc~1?r:rt~tr'rtit trlirtr.~~~i
tunities for pcac the r?Yi7rsc C;ttit~ri
f that conference will be an interesting account of thiG; (1erc,. liorr.
0
1 within both governments seeking corr~px orr~ise, am 01)1)()r-
1C
a
written. A conference of American and Japan0sc k~i ~t.ot ian , at
has been
Ja an, July 14-18, 1969, dealt with that qucstiun by lool.irat; at
1-lakone, 1'
Publication of tirr: i~t