PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DECEMBER 18-29 AIR EFFORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-547-3-3-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/07/17: LOC-HAK-547-3-3-8
ON-FILE NSC
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SUBJECT:
URGENT INFORMATION
January 6, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: PHIL ODEEWd
Preliminary Assessment of December 18-29
Air Effort
DIA has provided a concise summary of Linebacker II results (Tab A).
Major damage was inflicted on the rail, telecommunications and
electrical systems. Considerable damage was done to storage areas
and transportation repair facilities although lucrative targets remain.
Quite rapid re air of transportation and electrical generating facilities
appears feasible. The highway and POL supply systems we're not struck
.extensively.
Despite the heavy damage done during the recent strikes, the DIA assess -
ment indicates a number of targets that were not struck. Many of these
targets, however, are in Hanoi and Haiphong or near the Chinese border.
In addition,- many targets will require periodic restrikes to prevent
rapid recovery.
Rail System. Prior to the resumption of air strikes, the rail system
north of 20 degrees had almost completely recovered from the"earlier
damage. During Linebacker II, 19 rail targets were attacked resulting
in train movement being effectively halted in the '.Hanoi and Haiphong
areas. The rail lines north to China are still operating and were little
affected by the strikes. NVN has shown its capability:to restore rail
operations rapidly and maintenance of the current degradation will
require restrikes. There are 26 authorized rail targets not yet hit,
particularly bridges and yards where destruction would impede rail
movements from China to the Hanoi area.
Highway System. No major strikes were directed against highways
and related facilities. All roads are operational in fair to good condi-
tion, permitting diversion of priority cargo from rail to road. Only
one highway-related installation (4 truck park) was on the authorized
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target list and there are several other truck parks which could be hit.
The most lucrative highway target is the Dong Dang truck storage area
which is very near the Chinese border.
Water Transport. Reseeding of mines was accomplished and the
major ports remain closed. Some inland waterway transshipment
points were damaged by B-52s. Seeding of MK-36 destructors at six
waterway junctions will degrade the water transport system. DIA
suggests several other areas where the seeding destructors would
further degrade NVN use of waterways.
POL System. Substantial damage was done to two POL storage depots
involved in distribution in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The pipelines
and associated storage areas through which POL is imported from China
were not hit. The 11 key receiving depots on the main POL pipeline
around Hanoi and north toward China are potential high priority targets.
Telecommunications Systems. Substantial damage was. done to the
radio system which was hit for. the first time.- There has been a.
partial disruption of national-level military command and control
communications and a reduction in circuits available to communicate
with NVN forces outside the country. Some radio broadcasting has
been eliminated. or forced to lower power which is affecting transmission
quality. Destruction of the remaining facilities, which are now overloaded
with priority tasks, is identified by DIA as a potential priority target.
Electric Power. NVN was suffering power shortages prior to the
resumption of bombing, with about 60 percent of the total capacity out
of operation. All four of the major power plans still in operation were
bit ?.s well as two plants on which.repairs were advanced. Assessment
of "results is not yet complete. However, it has been determined that
the Hanoi plant was severely damaged and put completely out of opera-
tions. Other plants received damage and are temporarily operating
below capacity. Thus, the percentage of inoperable power capacity has
been increased from 60 to 70 or 80 percent and restoration of earlier
damage retarded. If all major plants were out of operation, Hanoi and
Haiphong would be forced to rely entirely on small, local diesel stations
and portable generators which can satisfy only about 10 percent of normal
demand. Alternate transformer stations in Hanoi are identified as
possible targets as well as the power plants which are still operating.
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Storage Areas. Eleven of 14 authorized storage targets were attacked.
The considerable damage will slow the flow of war materials to the
south and the rehabilitation effort.
Industry. Five vehicle repair facilities, five shipyards and two
construction plants were hit. The most important results are eliminating
the only known facility for overhaul of armored vehicles and closing the
main cement plant (although damage to the cement plant was primarily
to storage facilities). Most vehicle repair was, however, already taking
place in the field at temporary locations. NVN had made little effort
to repair such facilities damaged by earlier bombing.
Air Defense. MIG reactions were sharply reduced by repeated strikes
at each MIG field. Over 20 known SAM sites have been specifically
targeted in addition to continuing suppression attacks. Nevertheless,
over 100 missiles per day were being launched, almost certainly by
relying on the mobility of SA-2 systems. Some shortages of missiles..
probably resulting from the high level, of firing, have been reported.
,Political /Psychological Impact. In a brief comment DIA states that.
there were indications that NVN anticipated new air strikes and some
evacuation action began early in December. Further steps to evacuate
the cities began after the bombing resumed.
The intensity of the U. S. air operations was almost certainly beyond
the expectations of NVN. Morale suffered, but there is no evidence to
indicate that the government will be unable to control the situation.
cc:: John Holdridge
Dick Kennedy
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