ANALYSIS OF ARAB-ISRAEL DEVELOPMENTS SITREP NO. 14, 0700 EST, DECEMBER 22, 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-545-5-14-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: December 22, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Pari ?013/O1/04: LOC-HAK-545-5-14-6
DEPARTMENT- OF STATE
BRIEFING. MEMORANDUM
sis
TOP SE.CRET/EXDTS/CODEWORD
To, : The Secretary'
From: .NBA - Alfred. L. Atherton, Jr.
XN1 -Harold if. Saunders
Analysis of Arab-Israel Det.rtl_ients
SITE? NO. 14, 0700TgtI December 22? 1976
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Ina news conference yesterday afternoon, Fahmi and
Khaddam announced that Sadat and Asad agreed to establish a.
?unified political command? to study ways of uniting their
two countries. While this step is far less Ambitious than a
tinion of the two states, it illustrates a growing consensus
between cairo and Damascus. This action, which we regard as
pritharily designed for maximum show with little impact on
institutional unity, has potential significance at the
international level. ?
? In the first instance, this move completes the informal
linking of the confrontation states:
?
?
--Egypt and Syria by yesterday's.announcement;
.--,Jotdan and Syria through a series of actions since
March 1975; and ?
--Lebanon and Syria by the Syrian occupation of the ?
country and support for Sarkis.
Egypt and Syria have also held open the door to Libya by
specifically mentioning the dormant Confederation of Arab
Republics. Syria is the obvious linch pin in these relation-
ships and is probably the prime mover behind the Egyptian-
Syrian announcement. while no Saudi reaction has yet been
heard, we assume the Saudis will support this closer Egyptian-
Syrian cooperation.
? CloSer ties between the two states suits Syrian foi:eign
policy goals. Asad was able to:
?
NSA & DOS review cornpleted
-reduce the Iraqi threat by further isolating Bactildad
and illustrating that Damascus is ta ER 572 steps
MORI P C0336
'toward Arab unity, while their rival k;
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2.. -
-rguaranted in part, at least, that Sadat will not
"again negotiate a unilateral peace agreement with
the Israelis;
"?expand Syrian activity in the peace process beyond
Lbs "Eastern front," thus reducing the possibility of
inter-Arab disagreements; and
.--strengthen his internal position by further legitimizing
his role in Lebanon.
?
Sadat also benefits from closer relations with Syria.
Yesterday's agreement has none of the liabilities of the 1958
United Arab Republic which saddled Nasser with a shaky Syrian
regime riddled with internal problems and which was condemned
by the conservative Arab states. Syria under Asad is a solid
partner, and closer cooperation is undoubtedly sanctioned by
the Saudis. In addition, Sadat may hope that this move:
--could result in increased aid from the Gulf States;
--may facilitate better relations with the Soviet Union
through Syrian good offices, resulting in greater flow
of arms;
--enables Sadat. to demonstrate- to the Egyptian people
his role as the leading force for Arab unity.
.With regard to the Arab peace initiative:, closer Syrian-
ciyptian ties could significantly alter the current balance:
--Asad and Sadat would be able to sell previously
unpalatable positions, to their'respective peoples in
the name of Arab unity.
--Sadat can resist US pressure by using as a shield the
need to preserve Arab unity.
-;-The Palestinians will find it difficult to -play the
. major Arab participants off against each other as a
. means of avoiding having to accept a more reasonable
approach.
,--The Israelis will meet firm Arab'resistance to any
return to step-by--step.
.FahMi and khaddam noted that each state willbe able to
send its own delegation.to a peace conference unless -they
agree to Send joint representation. In this way, no doers
were closed to any workable approach to negotiations.
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According to Embassy Tel Aviv, the ?Israeli media have
said that Rabin's resignation has caught all Israel's
political parties by surprise, and each is making frantic
efforts to prepare for the likelihood of spring elections,
Nevertheless, the leaders of the various parties say they are
willing, and able to meet Labor's challenge.
It appears that the opposition Likud Party, is maneuvering
to unseat the Labor government in the aftermath of Rabin's
resignation, Jerusalem Radio reported that Likud has contacted,
the National Religious Party and other Small Knesset.fationS,
with 4 view towar&foeming.an.alternative government to that
Of Labor. Likud is said to have already secured the support
of $7 .Knesset members, the same number as Rabin.
?
Embassy Tel Aviv commented that Israeli law provides
that?unless the Knesset votes to' dissolve itself?President
Katzir must consult within 21 days with the heads of the
various political parties to determine whether another
political leader?could garner majority support in the Knesset
to form a government. If not, Katzir may leave the caretaker
government in place. Likud appears to be attempting to round
up enough backing in order to confront Katzir with a consensus
that would put Likud in power. In our view, however, Likud ?
probably will fail to achieve the necessary majority, leaving
Katzir to endorse Rabin's caretaker government until the
elections. .
? Concerning the effect of early elections on the peace
process, AP quoted diplomatic sources in Israel as saying that
spring elections could enhance prospects for a Middle East
peace settlement by the end of 1977. However, in the period
before a new government is elected, the current momentum
toward negotiations will likely slow.
?
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In Lebanon, an early morning clash yesterday between Saioa
and the pro-Iraqi faction of the PFLP-GC flared into a major
firefight when Syrian troops intervened and shelled the
reectionists./
This is .
the first time since the current truce was established on
November 15 that Syrian forces have been directly involved in
the sporadic fighting between the different Palestinian groups.'
According to Reuter, the Phalange claimed that 13 shells had
fallen on East Beirut; they accused the pro-Iraqi rejectionist6
of firing on the Christian sector in an effort to widen the
fighting.
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OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Lebanon:
--Parliament: Beirut Radio announced that Lebanon's
Parliament would meet as scheduled tomorrow to hear
Sarkis' policy statement and to take the vote of
confidence in the new government.
--Press: Embassy Beirut reported that employees of 140rient-
le Jour were allowed to enter their offices in the an-Nahar
ETITTNIEg and resume work. However, the newspaper has not
reappeared, and is unlikely to do so until the use of
an-Nahar's printing presses can be negotiated (it uses the
same machines as an-Nahar). American reporters commented
to Embassy officers that an-Nahar's staff believe that
their daily will remain closed for several weeks.
25X3
--South Lebanon: According to.AP, clashes ieportedly occurred
between Christian's and leftists* in an unspecified area ?
of south Lebanon yesterday. We have no further InforMatior
25,X3,
on this report
?
-Al-Baath Editorial: A December 21 al-Baath editorial
commented that "several international resolutions and
positions have combined to give illusion that new oppor-
tunities exist for regional peace." However, the Arab
states will will not accept "peace at any cost", nor do
? they want a settlement in which the Palestinians "are not
primary .winners."
--UN-Israel: According to our UN mission, Israeli Ambassador
rfaiWris told Waldheim that his proposed visit to Israe1
would not be acceptable 9n the basis of the Egyptian MI
resolution. However, Waldheim would be welcome on-the.
basis of resolutions 242 and 338. Waldheim informed .
Herzog that he anticipated making his Mideast trip at 'th'e
end of January or early February, if it in fact materializes.
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TOPiECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
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Palestinians:
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In the analysis of the
perLP, three of the four major groups within Fatah--those
of Arafat, Khalid Al-Hasan.. and. Salah Khalaf--are-now
working closely together to preserve the best possible
political position for Fatah. Their roles are comple-
Mentary, as Fatah endorses the concept of the development
of Palestinian-Syria-Egyptian political cooperation. The
strength of the various Fatah cliques is dependent upon
two separate inputs: Arab country backing and internal
organizational numbers. Khalid Al-Hasan's point. of view
being generally consistent with the political Objectives.
in the Middle Bast of conservative Arab governments, his
influence deriving from such outsidebacking is on the
Increase. His strength within the Fatah organization is
no greater, however. . . .*
?
--PLA-Jordan: Embassy Amman reported that PLA .commander a .
Budayri arrived in Amman December 113 to discuss PL
,
matters with Jordanian military officials. Ambassador .
Pickering commented that Budayrils viSit is obviously '
meant as an assertion by the Jordanians that they remain
.relevant to the Palestinian issue as Mideast developments,
evolve. It may also signify that Jordan is willing toa
talk to Palestinian representatives from .outside Jordan.
? International:
--Huseynss Views: In a conversation with AmbassadovPiclpring,
?.king Husayn commented that what he had in mind concerning ?
a federation with Syria- was largely a strengthening of the
Syrian-Jordanian alliance rather than political confed'er-'
ation. Follow-up talks are in the hands of Badran and the
Chief of the Royal Court; Ambassador Pickering noted that
both are conservative on the issue of contederatien:
Husayn also observed that Asad is still suspicious 'about
. where Egypt is headed and what Sadat wanted from the peace
process; the King himself hopes to go to Cairo at a later
date. Concerning the PLO, Husayn said he continues to
receive overtures from them, and the Saudis raised the '
possibility of his meeting with PLO moderate Rhalid 'Al-
Hassan. In the long term, Husayn believes that East Bank
Palestinians and those elsewhere (i.e. West Bank) should
be given opportunity to be represented in and influence the
leadership of the PLO.
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-pyria Internal: Embassy Damascus reported that both..
government loyalists such as Chief of Staff Shibabl. and
dissidents such as liamoud Shoufi of the Foreign Ministry
haV0 downplayed the significance of 'acts of terrorism'
(such as. Khaddam incident) .to the stability of the
. .
Syrian regime-
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