INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS RAISED IN MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-545-18-1-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-545-18-1-6
MORI/CDF
002379399
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORT)
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSTNGER
FROM: J'AN M. LODA.U',/HELMUT SONNENFELD
SUBJECT: Intelligence Questions Raised in Moscow
t
As you recall, there were a number of questions raised in the Moscow
discussions on which .the Soviets appeared to be confused or perhaps
were intending to mislead us. Among these were:
Whether the new Soviet ICBMs are really new missiles
or merely modifications of alder systems,
The Soviet claim that none of their ICBMs carry mare
than three RVs.
-- 'The Soviet claim. that a U5 ICBM was tested carrying
5 RVs and that POSEIDON carxies 12 RVs.
-- The Soviet references to their "164" bombers.
We have reviewed the Soviet claims with the intelligence community and
DOD. The key conclusions of our review are discussed below.
1. Are the new Soviet ICBMs really new missiles ar merely
modifications of existing systems?
This question arose when Brezhnev indicated that all of the "new"
Soviet ICBMs are really just modifications of existing missiles. At
one point, he even said "new" ICBMs would violate the Interim
Agreement.
On this point, we suspect that Bre~hnev confused new ICBMs with
new ICBM launchers, {the construction of which would violate the
Interim Agreement). Zt is the Soviets existing ICBM launchers that
are being modified to accept their new missiles.
We also asked CIA to evaluate whether the new ICBMs could conceivably
be xnodi.ficatians of existing missiles.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWOR.D
Caxnpletely Outside System
April 10, 1874
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OSD Review
Completed
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You may wish to consider raising this point in your talks with Gromyko
on the of? chance that the Soviet military has deliberately misled the
leadership.
2. Do the Soviet ICBMs carr~r more than 3 RVs?
?
?
than 3 R.Vs (though at one point he indicated the possibility o? up to 5).
Brezhnev asserted on several occasions that his ICBMs have no more
T'OP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD
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~t is at least possible that Brezhnev was genuinely confused on the
subject. Perhaps he was referring to existing MRV systems such as
the SS-11 MOD 3 now being. extensively deployed, or possibly he had
been poorly briefed. (You will recall last year at Zavidavo, Brezhnev
claimed eight warheads far his new heavy xriissile which has not been
proven out. )
Beyond simple confusion, yr a deliberate Soviet attempt to mislead us,
(which could not possibly succeed), we can find no plausible explana~
tion fvr the Soviet statements.
3. Soviet Claims About U5 MIR.Vs
At one point Bxezhnev claimed the U5 had tested an ICBM with five
MIRVs; at another paint he claimed Poseidon carried twelve RVs.
~ On the two ICBM que s tians ,
the~~ias never launched an ICBM with five RVs. In the weeks prior
to your Moscow visit the US launched three ICBMs, including;
-- A Minuteman IX carrying the Emergency Rocket Communica-
tions System and na reentry vehicle. The missile failed and
was destroyed in flight.
-- A Thor rocket placing a weather satellite in orbit.
-~- An Atlas rocket which launched a s%n~le maneuvering
reentry vehicle.
Nvne of these vehicles could plausibly have looked like five RVs to the
Soviets.
This apparently is standard Soviet practice in rn.oni.taring our missile
tests. As we surmise it, the Soviet approach to monitoring our ICBMs
relies heavily on U'5 open source literature for much of their intelligence
data; they apparently monitox our tests with trawlers to confirm that
things are pretty much as expected. In fact, if we secretly prepared and
tested an ICBM with five RVs the Soviets would probably never know it.
TOP SECRET/5EN5x'TIVE/CODEWORD
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]'n suxn, we can ?ind no plausible explanation ?or the Soviet claim.
On the Poseidon question, we can identify some indications of how the
Soviets might have concluded that Poseidon carries twelve R.Vs. Far
example, early literature on Poseidon included reference to a con?igura-
tian of twelve RVs plus a penetration aids package. On the other hand,
Poseidon has never actually been tested with twelve RVs. Poseidon can
actually carry up to fourteen R.Vs and it is routinely tested in the made --
the most recent fourteen RV test was in January -- and is also tested
with payloads of ten and six R.Vs. These are the three basic payload
config~u:?a.tions that we have actually deployed. As actually deployed,
Poseidon has an average of ten RVs permissile; same Foseidans are
deployed with Fourteen.
From a SALT standpoint, we have usually counted Poseidon as carrying
ten RVs. On the other hand, the Soviets would be justified i.n trying to
credit it with its maximum tested payload, i. e. fourteen RVs. (This
tends to make the passibility of a deal based on RVs less attractive froxxa.
the US standpaint since our 500 Poseidons could theoretically carry
7, 000 RVs. )
4. Soviet References to Their "160" Bomber - Brezhnev offered
on several occasions to trade their contemplated "160" bomber for our
P -1.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE /CODEWORD
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