EGYPTIAN MILITARY INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 20, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
THE DIRECTQR OF CENTRAL .INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, p. C. 20505
25X1
ZO April 1973
MEMORANDI~I FOR: Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the t'resident
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Egyptian Military Intentions
~A~
~tvC@"Cr i
ffOW~
fur current assessment of the Egyptian-Israeli military
situation remains that we do not believe that an outbreak of
Fighting along the Suez Canal is imminent. For some time,,
Sadat has followed a two-track approach of talking tough as
a tactic to buttress his negotiating position and to keep up
his image in the Arab wand, while at the same time remaining
prepared to search far a negotiated settlement. He may have
begun to take his own talk more seriously, but we do not think
he is at the paint o# decision on a military move against
Israel.
Attached is a more detailed assessment. It also touches
on some related dangers raised by the current activities of
the other Arab states, the fedayeen, the Israelis and the
Soviets.
dames R. Schlesinger
Director
Attachment
25X1 ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
 ,;~ No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
Copy
25X1
25X1
2Q 'Apr.i1 1973
EGYPTIP,N xNTENTZUNS AND RELATED DANGERS
We have received a number of reports that Presa,dent Sadat
is talking more seriously and more .frequently of breaking the
de facto: Arab-Israeli cease--fire. There is also evidence of
military activity on the Egyptian side that could be associ-
ated with a decision to renew. hostilities with Israel..
Kama a au i a~ntel igence chief, .that~fightingvmust
begin sometime within the next few months. Sadat .reasoned.
that .this was the only way that the international community
could be brought to intervene and procure for Egypt better.
terms than those the Israelis have offered so far.
Military indicators have been fairly numerous, but to.
date not conclusive. They include
-- A movement of SA--6 surface-to-air missa.les to firing
sites within 2O miles of the Suez Canal. The most recent
available photography shows four such sites.
-- The transfer within the'past month of jet fighters
from Libya (3Q ' .plus Mirages ) and Saudi Arabia (l.p Light-~
Wings) to. Egypt. Iraq is reported to have agreed t?.
send similar aircraft.
-- Movement of TU-16 bombers from Aswan to the :Cairo
area in late March. These aircraft carry air-to-surface
missiles, but we do not have evidence. that the missiles
themselves have been moved..,from Aswan.
TC.P SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
-- Relocation and reactivation of various Egyptian
.'air squadrons. .Some of the sYiuffling may have been
in anticipation of the arrival of the aircraft from.
Libya and Saudi Arabia.
oviet technical advisors have come
or ssist in readying Egypt's Soviet
equipment. In February, a team of Soviets is known
to have evaluated the operational status of .this equip-
ment; they .found it in poor condition.
We do not find in these indicators a pattern of plannin
for any specific military operation at a specific time.
If Sadat intends, as we.
wool expect him to ate" -has a ser~.ous purpose,. both a .ground
action and, an airstrike against Israeli targets across the
Canal, we should see eva.elence of further preparation by air
forces. Warning time, however, might be short. We probably
would not see preparations by ground forces that might be
used in an attack, because man units are already in place
between Cairo and the Canal
Sadat may be in the process of becoming more serious
about .the."loga.c" of military action against Israel. There
is also, however, a strong element in his current approach
of talking tough in order hopefully to strengthen his nego~-
tiata.ng position. We do not think he has abandoned all hope
for a negotiated settlement with Israel..
we are skeptical that Sadat has yet decided on a specific
military operation at a specific time (although there are of
course various blueprints on the Egyptian shelf). We believe
that at a given time in the near future he would probably
weigh the odds and decide against such a specific operation
unless his political survival were at stake. His domestic
situation is weakening, brat he does not yet appear at the end.
of his rope; he can still find excuses to justify de~.ay.
R T
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
TOP SECRET.
There are other factors than the military, however, that
give :cause. for concern,
The Arab states anci th'e feda~een, each for their own
purposes, ,are engaged a.n a campaign to raise tensions and
sharpen feeling against .the. US. This campaign is la.kely to
increase. It serves the same purpose as Sadat's talk and
maneuvers; to force the US to: reconsider its policy and
extract concessions from Israel... We believe that :Egypt is
orchestrating this campaign as best it can. The campaign has
xn it .the danger that it will carry even. friendly Arab
governments fa~'ther than they. me an to go in threatening US
interests. The new :turn in Saudi Arabian oil, policy i.s one.
immediate example of this; .the Lebaxiese performance at the
UN is another..
The Soviets may be helping tha:s campaign, ,despite their.
priority interest .in improving relations with ahe US as a
prelude to the :summit meeting. The `signs are tenuous but
suggestive?
-~- Amore militant tone in Soviet.statemerits, in the
UN and in a recent Swedish :press interview with:Kv~ygin.
--- Sov~.et .diplomats taking the line with third
countries---in the Midd~.e East and Australia, for
example---that Sadat is serious about military action.
With US diplomats: the Soviets have claimed that Sadat.
is un~.ikely to resume hostilities.
the
canar regar ing US parta.cipation in the Israeli raid
in Bea:rut :came :first from a Soviet journalist wha fed'
it to fedayeen leaders. Soviet media have reprinted
the.,Arab allegations.
-- ~khat Moscow has promised (but
not~c erivered on schc.dul.e) more modern aircraft to.
Iraq,. ,including TU.-2~ bombers.
TOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
 . No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3
The.Soviets certainly would not :urge Sadat to. start
fighting; they would counsel against such .action,.parti-
cularly it it .appeared to be undertaken recklessly. Moscow
nevertheless may calculate that tensions of the kind now
developing will set the stage advantageously, from its.
standpoint, for summit ,discussa,ons o~ the Middle East..
The Israeli leadersh'ip,.even though :it may have zecei:ved
an intelligence assessment .on Sadat's situation that is simi-
lar to ours, may believe that:Israe7: cannot affoxd to take. a
chance that .Sadat will either .delay or fumble when and if he
acts.. As Ambassador Dinitz.has indicated, some top Israelis
at .least h?ve:read the indicators to mean that Sada.t does in-
tend to strike.
The Israelis have repeatedly made clear that they do not
intend to ~ollaw Sadat's "logic." If the Egyptians make. a
move .across the Canal,,the Ssraeli reaction will be punishing.
It the Egyptians or other Arabs. appeared to be readying an
air bombardment mission, .and the ;Israelis were not cea~tain
that .they. could thwart. it completely, the Israelis would very
likely deliver. a pre-emptive strike..
In sum,. we do not believe :that an outbreak o~ fighting
along the Canal is imminent. We are entering a difficult
period, however, in which. both .Israelis and Arabs. will. be:
unusually sensitive to. US actions and policies regarding
this area .
TOP ~'I'~
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/08 : LOC-HAK-541-21-4-3