CHINA'S VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-541-15-1-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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November 21, 1975
CHINA'S VIEW OF.RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
China continues to see the United States as a major piece
in the international chess game, but it seems to be more skepti-
cal of the immediate and tactical advantages of the relationship
than perhaps it was in the 1971-1973 period. The Chinese at
this stage do not seem prepared to see the US connection de-
teriorate sharply, but they also do not seem prepared to make
many sacrifices to keep it on course. Although the Soviet union
continues to receive the lion's share of adverse Chinese propa-
ganda, in the past year the decibel level of anti-US rhetoric
has risen somewhat; moreover, Peking obviously has no qualms
in accepting such strains as the flaps over the Chinese cultural
troupe and the US mayors' delegation have produced.
The Chinese entered into the present relationship with the
Soviets very much in mind, and this consideration is still para-
mount in China's view of the Washington connection. Because of
its possible salutary effect on Soviet attitudes the Chinese
have very much wanted the President's visit to take place. Their
reading of the political atmosphere in the United States in the
wake of the Vietnam debacle, however, appears to have suggested
to them that the trip might have been deferred. To ensure that
it took place on schedule, throughout the spring and summer they
were busy passing the word in all quarters that President Ford
would be welcome in China, that Peking considered the visit im-
portant, and that there were no preconditions attached to it.
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At the same time domestic audiences were being conditioned to ex-
pect little in the way of substantive advances in the bilateral
relationship as a result of the trip. Specifically, they were in-
formed that a breakthrough on the Taiwan problem was unlikely.
These themes have also been prominent in Chinese conversa-
tions with foreigners. Chinese leaders and diplomats have stressed
that China remains patient concerning the Taiwan problem and that
it is in no hurry to see the issue resolved. Teng Hsiao-ping in
particular has stressed, in conversations with visitors, the
proposition that China would prefer a peaceful resolution of the
issue; in a recent discussion with New Zealand journalists he
claimed that force would be contemplated in the "liberation" of
the island only if Washington refused to accept the three condi-
tions China has set forth for US recognition: a break in relations
with Taipei, withdrawal of US forces from the island, and abrogation
of the Mutual Defense Treaty. In general, however, he and other
Chinese officials have been much less specific, leaving the option
of use of force open.
In contrast to this rather relaxed view, however, recent in-
ternal directives and instructions have painted a gloomier view
of the Taiwan situation. One assessment, issued in conjunction
with a directive calling for the streamlining and modernization of
the Chinese armed forces, claimed that there was a real possibility
that Taipei, and Chiang Ching-kuo in particular, would seek to es-
tablish a working relationship with Moscow, and that in this even-
tuality China would be compelled to use force to recover the is-
land. Another instruction also issued in connection with the di-
rective calling for modernization of the armed forces stated that
a senior military leader had been entrusted with the task of preparing
a plan for conquest of the island within a five-year period.
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An actual attack on Taiwan would divert considerable mili-
tary resources from China's defense against a possible Soviet
thrust; moreover, such an attack would not only destroy the nascent
relationship with Washington but also that with Japan while souring
relations with Western Europe and scaring off the nations of South-
east Asia. For these reasons it is unlikely that China is actually
contemplating a move against the island, particularly within the
time period mentioned in the documents. Nevertheless, these di-
rectives and instructions may well represent an accommodation to
those who may be arguing that the current relationship with Wash-
ington has brought recovery of Taiwan no nearer. Teng Hsiao-ping
in fact is reported to have remarked in connection with the instruc-
tion to prepare plans for conquest of the island that China "will
no longer allow the United States to drag China by the nose" on
the subject of Taiwan. The five-year deadline mentioned in the
instruction would correspond with the 1980 elections in the United
States and could mean that Chinese leaders were considering stepped-
up pressure on Washington if it appeared at that time that the
United States was prepared to postpone resolution of the problem
indefinitely.
Signs of frustration regarding current US attitudes do not ap-
pear to be confined to this bilateral issue but also seem to spill
over into areas of greater ultimate importance to China. Peking
seems genuinely concerned about what it considers to be a deteriora-
tion of the balance of military power between Washington and Moscow.
The Chinese appear to believe that Washington's overall interna-
tional posture is defensive, while that of Moscow is aggressive;
they seem concerned that the United States is entering at least a
temporary period of neo-isolationism and probably fear that quarrels
between the executive and legislative branches could limit Washing-
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ton's freedom of action. US congressmen have been repeatedly ad-
vised to build up the American military arsenal, particularly in
the area of conventional weapons. in this connection the Chinese
have generally pointed to the possibility of a conventional war in
Europe.
A parallel concern for the Chinese is continuing US efforts
to cement detente with the USSR. They almost certainly believe
that far greater US time and energy is expended on furthering the
Soviet relationship than is expended on the Chinese connection,
and that this effort has tended to strengthen Soviet self-confi-
dence while correspondingly weakening the US will to resist puta-
tive Soviet encroachments. They also seem to suspect that the
Executive Branch's defense of its Soviet policy in the public
forum and in Congress tends to create "false illusions" both among
the US public and in Western Europe. The current negotiations con-
cerning Soviet purchases of US wheat, for example, are almost cer-
tainly viewed in Peking as an example of US "defensiveness" and
willingness to relieve Soviet distress. Given the multifaceted
nature of the current US-Soviet connection compared to the much
more limited connection with Peking, the Chinese probably now sus-
pect that Washington has pursued ties with China largely as a means
of securing a "better deal" with Moscow. Politburo member Yao Wen-
yuan implied as much in a recent conversation with a foreign "Marx-
ist-Leninist."
Peking, to be sure, sees such events as the Sinai II agreement
as a positive development, but in the Middle East as in Europe it
does not seem convinced that US staying power is very great, and the
Chinese have warned the Egyptians and other Arabs to be prepared for
a Soviet riposte. In any event, gains in the Middle East are prob-
ably offset in Chinese eyes by what they consider to be the deleteri-
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ous effects of the Helsinki summit on the situation in Europe. They
seem genuinely to subscribe to the somewhat simplistic view that at
the conference the US gratuitously accepted the legitimacy of the
Soviet position in Eastern Europe.
This point, of course, was made over and again by the Chinese
to the Secretary's party during his recent visit. Unabashed refer-
ences to "Munich" in conversations with newsmen accompanying Dr.
Kissinger injected a note that had not been present in Chinese al-
lusions to US policy since the Secretary's initial visit in 1971.
This rhetorical overkill doubtless is an index of genuine Chinese
concern, but the sharpness of such remarks, coupled with Chiao Kuan-
hua's pointed references to detente at the opening banquet, suggests
that Peking may see some utility in publicizing their differences
with Washington so long as movement on fundamental bilateral issues
does not seem possible and at the same time the US remains relatively
"passive" with respect to the Soviets -- even though Moscow might
take some satisfaction from this public display of pique. The
vituperative references to detente and CSCE were almost certainly
authorized well before the Secretary began his visit, but public US
acknowledgement just before Dr. Kissinger's arrival that normaliza-
tion would not be completed this year may have suggested to the Chi-
nese that the Soviets were bound to draw somewhat negative conclu-
sions as to the state of Sino-US relations in any event.
In view of the attention the Chinese devoted to US detente
policy during Dr. Kissinger's visit and in view of the favorable
attention they had devoted to former Secretary Schlesinger's state-
ments over the past year or two, the time of Dr. Schlesinger's depart-
ure from office -- after Dr. Kissinger's visit but before that of the
President -- must have been somewhat disturbing to Peking. The evi-
dent delay in firming up arrangements for the advance technical mis-
sion's visit to China clearly was related to what must have been
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an exhaustive examination by the Chinese of the implications of this
development. Some elements of this putative review were probably
embodied in NCNA's unprecedented round-up of selective -- and nega-
tive -- US and foreign reaction to Dr. Schlesinger's departure is-
sued on November 7, but Chinese leaders almost certainly take a
more sophisticated view of the direction of US foreign policy and
of the current state of US domestic politics than this relatively
low-level broadside would suggest.
Peking, for example, almost certainly drew some encouragement
from the public disclosure of the current impasse in the SALT II
negotiations and have probably concluded that a final agreement
would be difficult if the present stalemate lasts appreciably into
an election year; this presumably would mean that a Brezhnev visit
to the United States paralleling that of the President to China
would not occur. Significantly, instructions Peking has been is-
suing to its officials stationed abroad continue to portray the
President's trip in a positive if not euphoric light. Moreover, at
least one official, apparently drawing on material supplied by Pe-
king, has suggested that US leaders privately take a more sober and
balanced view of detente than the Chinese seem to think is indicated
by public US statements on the subject.
In fact, the departure of Dr. Schlesinger may have caused the
Chinese to examine the roots of their policy toward Washington; to
the degree that they have done so they appear to have drawn the con-
clusion that the US connection still serves fundamental Chinese in--
terests -- the President's visit, after all, is still going forward.
However, Peking's recent return to the theme that China must be pre-
pared for war with the Soviets, which had been in abeyance for two
years, suggests that its view of the international scene, and by ex-
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tension of the US connection, has darkened in the past six months
or so. The Chinese, nevertheless, probably doubt that the factors
they seem to believe limit US flexibility in the international
sphere are permanent. And in any event they clearly do not, at
this juncture, wish to run risks even greater than those they now
face by reactivating an unlimited quarrel with Washington or per-
mitting a public breach in the current relationship.
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