BREZHNEV'S MEETING WITH ZARODOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 20, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26 : LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2~'a~.de System3
4 ~._
riiE 1~TC7RA~ dDUM
NATTCONAL SECU7tI'TY COUNCIL
/SENSITIVE
CQDE'VtT?R77 ACTIC7N
5eptexnber 20; 7.975
MEMC7RANDUM_~412, SECRETARY KISSINGER
y.,
F.ItOM: Mx. lift
SUBJECT: Brezhrze~r's Meeti.n.g with Zarodov
The information memorandum for your signature to the Presidezxt at
Tab A would review Brezhnev's recent meeting with Konstantixz Zaxadov,
Chief Editor of the communist journal Problems cif Peace and .Socialism.,.
and the possibility that this znay signal a hardex line by the USSR with.
Euxopean Gamm.unist parties -~ a line against communist party aceomxnada-
tion with the socialists a~.d other mare moderate parties in. Europe.
7~,ECUMMENDATI4N
That you sign the xnexnaranduxxx at Tab A,
SENSITTV'E
co~~~va~,D
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26 : LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26 : LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2
THE WHITE I-LOUSE
.TOP SECRET /SElVSITNE xNF`O.RMATION
CODEWORD
MEMC?RANDtJM FOR THE PRESIDENT ~
FROM: Henry .A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: A Hint of Leadership Trouble fox Brezhnev and Possible
Sova.et Pressure far a New Hardline by West~European
Comzx~unists
A tense Moscow Radio announcement on September l7 that Genexal Secretary
Brezhnev had ~rrxet with Kanstantin Zarodov, Chief Editor of the international
carnmunist journal Problems of Peace and Socialisxn, has led CIA analysts
to speculate that Brezhnev and other advocates of detente ixx the Soviet leader-
ship believe thexnsel,ves politically vulnerable xight now and that the CPSU
may be considering pressures an West Euxapean communist parties to take
a new hardline toward cooperation with socialist and other moderate parties.
The fallowing paragraphs review developments leading to the Brezhn.ev?
Zarodov meeting and suzr~:xxa.arize CIA thinking as to the ixnplicatians.
$ack~,raund
On August b, Pravda published an article by Zarodov entitled "The Leninist
Strategy, `and Tactics of Revolutionary Struggle; " =Probably prompted ~~? in
State INR's view -- by recent events in Portugal, France and Italy as well
as preparations far the European Cammun.ist Confexence, the article strikingly.
reasserts Soviet hardlin.e.revalutionary doctrine and contrasts sharply with the
prevailing view in Moscow that the formation of united fronts with socialist
parties is the best way to influence the policies of capitalist stags and to
prepare the way for the eventual socialist revolution --- a view Brezhnev has
been closely identified with in the past. It attacked "opportunists" and
"rnaderates" in the caxnrnunist rnoverrxent who are willing to compromise
revolutionary goals in order to preserve tactical alliances with socialist
parties, and accused "modern conciliators" of being willixa.g to dissolve the
communist party in an "arxxorphous organization ax alliance, "
']COF SECRET/S.ENSITIVE
conEWORn
MORI/CDF 002859506
Pages 2-4
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CODEWORD ?~ 2
While Zaxadov's tough talk seemed to be a qualified endarsexnent of the
Portuguese Party's policy, he cleaxly was taking issue with the stance of
the k'rench, Italian, and possibly Spanish Communist parties -W and they
reacted accaxdingly. The French Party on August 8 reiterated its intention:
to use'the electoral xaute to attaa.n.political dominance, ..and on August l2,
the Italian Party paper, L'Unita, stated that "we view the relationship
between democracy and socialism quite differently from the manner in
which it is delineated ir.- the doctrinaire scheme of the article published by.
~.'ravda. " On September 13, the Yugoslav press revived the quarre]:,
warning West European parties that Moscow -- "having tried unsuccessfully
to dominate .the Yugoslav and Chinese xevolutions" -~ ''is n.ow attemptin25X1
force the European parties to comply with Soviet ideological guidelines and
:y
foxeign policies. "
Ponomarev met with. an Z~alian 25X1
Can~munist Forty dele atian i.n Moscow from Au st b~q anal the 'Dint
CPSUwPCx staterrxent 25X1
published on August x no xe ec a aro ov a.n.e, res once to
latex Western inquiries about the axticle, that it
had been a "bureaucratic mistake. "
Cax~clv.sion
Some sense can be made of Brezhnev's meeting with Zaradov only in the
context of developments in August and September ..a such as the Sinai agree
xn.ent and setbacks to the Portuguese Conarnunist Party -?- that have le?t the
Kremlin detente team of Brezhnev, Andropav, Gxechko and Gromyko wlner~
able to charges that they have been lax in defending Soviet great power and
ideological interests out of concern to preserve detente with the West.. As
bitter pills as the Sinai agreement and unexpected difficulties in relations
with the U, S. must be, the declining fortunes of the Portu~a.ese party,
following the Ghilean debacle, undoubtedly has left a particularly sour taste
in the mouths of those leaders troubled by the conflicting pxiaxities of detente
with the West and the health of .the interna.tian.al comxnun.ist movement.
If detente is presently under heavy fire in Moscow, as the foregoing pxesumes,
it would be totally charactexistic of Brezhn.ev -- feeling the chill wind of.
political vulrxerability -~ to choose a meeting with the hardline Zarodov as
? a way to ,trim, At the same time, `Brezhnev is too experienced`i.rz Kremlin
TO?~ SECy2.F~'T/SENSZTIV_l; .
G?D EWORD
_~ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26 : LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26 : LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2
TOP SECRE'T'/SENSTTT~I'E
CODEWOT2~D 3
politics a:nd pronouncerrxents to be oblivious to the ixnplicatians of so
prarn.inently assaciatin.g himself with the anti-detentist Zaradav -W in
the eyes of observers in the USSR, in Western Europe and its communist
parties, and ixx the U. S. Whether the xneeting with ~aradov hints currexxt
Kremlin sympathy far his line (with aI1 the consequences far Soviet detente
policy) or is merely a risky tactical maneuver by Brezhnev to protect a
vulsa.erable political flank remains to?be seext.
TOP SECRET/SENSTTTVE
COT~EWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/26 : LOC-HAK-539-7-4-2