HANOI, PEKING AND MOSCOW VIEWS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 8, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
MEMORANDUM IP c.
4858
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET CODEWORD
NSA Review
Completed
INFORMATION
September 8, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Hanoi, Peking and Moscow Views
of Southeast Asia
The CIA has prepared a memorandum (Tab A) entitled How Hanoi,
Peking and Moscow View the New Situation in Southeast Asia, which
includes two divergent views on the Communist threat to Thailand.
Annexed to the memorandum are three separate papers covering
Hanoi's, Peking's and Moscow's future policies toward Indochina
and Thailand.
The CIA Directorate of Intelligence concludes that practical restraints
-dictate that oVer the next-two-or three years there will be few desta-
bilizing developments in the region. The key points of their analysis
are:
-- Buoyed by victory, North Vietnam's leaders will inevitably
move to establish their country as a power to be reckoned with in the
region; the pace and tactics they adopt will be major determinants of
the relative tranquility of Indochina and Thailand.
-- Over the next two or three years, however, practical restraints
will temper the chances of destabilizing developments.
-- Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow will be limited in their capacity to
project influence in the region by the nationalistic sensitivities of the
Southeast Asian states and by the priorities of other goals.
-- The enormous tasks of reconstruction and development in the
north, and the consolidation of power and socio-economic adjustments
Hanoi will wish to introduce in South Vietnam will absorb most of North
Vietnam's attention and resources for the next few years.
TOP SECRET CODEWORD XGDS
MORI/CDF CO2858033 Pages 1-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
PIA No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
TOP SECRET PDEWORD 2
?
? The principal thrust of North Vietnam's efforts toward non.
Communist Southeast Asia and the non-Communist world in general
will be actively to broaden its diplomatic and economic ties with these
areas.
? The USSR and China are likely to have even less leverage over
Hanoi's policies in the future than they have had in the past.
While Moscow may maintain a slight edge over the Chinese in
Hanoi, any efforts to woo the Vietnamese into taking up the Soviet cause
against the PRC seem doomed to failure.
? Although the Southeast Asian region at large will be the scene of
jockeying for influence by the Chinese, Soviets, and Vietnamese, none
seems inclined to raise tensions recklessly. The best estimate is that
Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi have all concluded that improved relations
with the established governments of the countries will pay greater
dividends in the near term than support for revolutionary activity against
them.
However, Peking and Hanoi will not totally abandon the latter
course.
Developments in Thailand will be regarded elsewhere as a key
indicator of Hanoi's intentions ? but an increase in support to the in-
surgents from either North Vietnam or China, sufficient to endanger. 25X1
the non...Communist government of Thailand, does not seem to be in the
cards.
TOP SECRET CODEWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Lr
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
rl'OP SECRET CODEWORD
-- Increasing urban labor problems, intractable problems of
land reform and pressure from the farmers, and continued student
unrest are a constant drain on the energies of the government.
-- While Hanoi and Peking for the moment are placing emphasis
on developing their relations with. the established non-Communist
governments of Southeast Asia, this school believes that this policy
may well change in the next one to three years.
? With all the weaponry presently available to North Vietnam,
Hanoi has the means ? at low cost to itself -- to increase substan-
tially its support to the Thai insurgents.
I would additionally comment that no Thai Government has addressed
the insurgency with vigor. With only a minimal increase in support,
Hanoi could make the insurgency a significant problem for Thailand,
particularly in the Northeast; moreover, there is no reason to assume
that current problems in Vietnam will inhibit Hanoi from increasing
its support of the Thai insurgents.
Prime Minister Khukrit came away from his China visit in july believing
he had assurances from both Mao and Teng Hsiao-ping of Chinese succor
should the North Vietnamese attack Thailand. Even if the Chinese gave
such assurances, they no doubt realize that a direct North Vietnamese
attack on Thailand is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Complementary Chinese and Vietnamese support for Thai insurgents
has persisted since the insurgency's inception in 1962; however,
should Hanoi seek to annex part of Thailand to Laos, as some reports
indicate, rivalry and friction could develop between Hanoi and Peking
over the future course of the "revolution" in Thailand.
Dick Ober, Denis Clift and Dick Solomon concur.
TOP SECRET CODEWORD XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
? ?
, - .No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
11P
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
?
SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHMENTS
.July 16, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR FROEBE
FROM
SUBJECT: (3--;:ilanoi, Peking & Moscow.
tit
View the New Situation in SEA.
A CIA. Paper...
The Staff Secretary has assigned you primary
action on the attached letter/document, and
iequested that you prepare a summary paper for.
_
the President. .
A copy of the Lt freebirector Colby & this chit
wii-lgeto44e.res ? Clif ,Solomon , S tearman &
Quinn, who should provide input a.nd coordination
on your paper.
Two additional copies of the CIA paper are
available in the vault for check-out, and we have
requested additional copies. ?
Thank you.
MORI/CDF CO2145983 Page 4
MI
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
4IP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
.11EMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
SUBJECT How Hanoi, Peking., and Moscow View the New Situation
in Southeast Asia
1. The attached memorandum was prepared within the CTA at my
request. It may be of interest to you as a thought-provoking discussion
of a subject that will be important in the months ahead..
2. Please note that the "Overview". section presents two differing
view's concerning the threat likely to be posed by the Thai insurgency
over the next few years'. While :the arguments on both sides are well
reasoned, I personally ascribe to the view that the Thai insurgency will.
not in the next few years endanger the existence of a non-Communist govern-
ment in Thailand.
3. 1 am also sending a copy of this memorandum to Secretary of Defense'
Schlesinger.
. Colby
Director
AttachMent
Copy No. 3 - Secretary Schlesinger
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
w.
Top Secret
tr-T. ?We As"Viti,2
How Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow View the
New Situation in Southeast Asia
MORI/CDF
C03006465 pages
6, 8-65
25X1
15 July 197$ 25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
II! 25X1
AN OVERVIEFA1*
The end of the war in Indo-China introduces a period of
uncertainty and transition in Southeast Asia. Buoyed by victory,
North Vietnam's leaders will inevitably move to establish their
country as a power to be reckoned with in the region; the pace
and tactics they adopt will be major determinants of the relative
tranquility of Indo-China and Thailand. There will be some tension
and intermittent squabbling -- not only among Hanoi and its nervous
neighbors, but? among Hanoi and its wartime allies, China and the
USSR. Divergent national interests are emerging as each seeks
to exploit to its own advantage the diminution of American in-
fluence in the region.
Over the next two or three years, however, practical res-
traints will temper the chances of destabilizing developments
arising from the greater manifestation of Sino-Soviet rivalry in
Southeast Asia, serious friction between Hanoi and either, of
* This memorandum has been prepared within the .CIA; it was
? written by the Office of Political Research of the Directorate
of Intelligence (DDI). It consists of an Overview, and an
Annex containing three more detailed papers on certain aspects
Of the subject written by three different analysts. The
Overview has been coordinated with and concurred in by all
nffirgaq nf the DDI.',
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
.25X1
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Mir
her wartime patrons, or,the possibility of Hanoi adopting an
_ _ _ . . .
aggressive course of behavior toward her neighbors. Hanoi,
Peking, and Moscow will be limited in their capacity to project
influence in the region by the nationalistic sensitivities
of the Southeast Asian states and by the priorities of other
goals. Both Moscow and Peking in their rivalry with each other
will continue to be concerned with maintaining good relations
with Hanoi, if only to prevent the other from gaining any
major advantage. Although the potential for tension between
Peking and Hanoi is high, both probably will try not to allow
their differences to get out of hand.
The following paragraphs offer our best judgments on the
interplay of these various factors and on the probable course of
events in Southeast Asia over the next two or three years.
THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNIST ALLIANCE
The enormous tasks of reconstruction and development in
the north, and the consolidation of power and socio-economic adjust-
ments Hanoi will wish to introduce in South Vietnam, will absorb
most of North Vietnam's attention and resources for the next few
years. We believe that much of the energy Hanoi his left over
will be devoted to the problems of Laos and Cambodia -- problems
which will be important to the interplay of forces among Hanoi,
Peking, and Moscow, but will impinge far less directly on the
stability of other parts of Southeast Asia. This does not mean
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
that the North Vietnamese cannot give modest amounts of material
or even advisory support to the Thai insurgents, but it will
limit the scope of Hanoi's actions in Southeast Asia.
In line with this basically inward orientation, the principal
thrust of North Vietnam's efforts toward non-communist Southeast
Asia and the non-communist world in general will be actively to
broaden its diplomatic and economic _ties with these areas. Hanoi
will want to reduce its dependence on Moscow and Peking to the
extent possible in meeting its needs for foreign economic assis-
tance. While such aid will perforce continue to come largely
from the USSR and China, North Vietnam will do its best to widen
its range of suppliers. In the meantime, the Vietnamese leaders
will maintain the careful balance between Moscow and Peking which
has served them so. well in the past. The USSR and China are
likely to have even less leverage over Hanoi's policies in the
litiire than they have had in the past.
Hanoi's relations with Peking in particular will probably
show increasing strain. The two powers are essentially rivals
for political influence in the region. They will have competing
S.
objectives in their relationships with Thailand -- both with the
government in Bangkok and with the Thai insurgents in the country-
side. They also have conflicting claims to several islands (the
Paraceis and the Spratleys) in the South China Sea, and the
possibility of off-shore oil will only exacerbate this contentious
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
411
eamboidia Will 1.64 inother major area of rivalry between
and nanOi; bholeriYing and contributing to the tension in
their relations is a iii??ry of conflict and ethnic "prejudice.
Xn 6Ontriati 1146i6i5W h& ?? similar conflicts with Hanoi, and
ifiatiubtedlY
will strive to Maintain this advantage by continuing
AerOus aid ko4ram and by taking Hanoi's side in its territorial
6igbaera iiitfi the ike;
hafietheiki;Mil kOscow may maintain a slight edge over
fiiforts to woo the Vietnamese into taking
tip 416 &idag waifiit the pRc .60(10 doomed to failure. An
sdpport would leave Hanoi
Riiii4Efia& haiia giggaii66 and aithillish its independence of
Aeti6R = A 4eii lififi8i Elrlilia-hut to avoid -- while Peking
Wdia 7r1.164 ait fig threatening. Both countries clearly
hiN AR ifit@igt IR kb@piRgv1et ihiiuence in Hanoi within care-
ful 111,668i fi RiEUfii g8ai that will hot, however, deter Soviet
t6 riwasp Ben Hanoi And Peking.
PaiiEW6 fit leak over the next two Or so years,.
?A b 1i 111Z by Hanoi. Oathet Lao dependence
BR Trfifia aavies is so entrenched that there
lb littil4 Si 'A. 'being eUeCebbfully challenged either
Si
4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
China is a potential counterweight to Vietnamese influence
in Laos, but probably will not challenge Hanoi at the central
level. It will continue an interest inlgorth and Northwest
Laos, as a limited buffer zone along its border and possible
entry point to Thailand and Burma. Peking has deferred to
Hanoi's patronage of the Pathet Lao; there is no reason to expect
a significant change in this arrangement in the near future.
Cambodia offers quite a different picture. The hyper-nationalism
of the Khmer communist leaders will contribute to very contentious
relations with the Vietnamese, and will offE,17, a much larger
role as a counterweight to Vietnamese pressure. The prospects for
???,,
continuing disputes with Vietnam are high. Both the contested
delineation of their common border, conflicting claims to the
continental shelf in the Gulf of Thailand, and ethnic animosities
will fuel the flames. Leaders on both sides have indicated a
desire to keep the squabbling within bounds, but the composition
and policies of the Cambodian government are still very uncertain
and offer few clues to its future behavior.
China clearly has entree through its early support of Sihanouk
and its subsequent ties with the Khmer communist leaders. More-
over, China can offer material and technical aid and, with the
port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) now in communist hands, need
not use Vietnamese transport facilities to move its aid. Peking
will prefer to avoid assuming an adversary position against Hanoi,
- 5 -
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
but China's support will nonetheless permit the Cambodians to
remain largely independent of Hanoi's leverage, and Cambodia is
likely to become a point of friction in Peking's relations with
Hanoi.
Moscow's influence will remain marginal in both Laos and
Cambodia. The Soviet reluctance to break with Lon Nol will make
the development of cordial relations with the new regime very
difficult -- a problem illustrated by the unceremonious departure
of the USSR's mission from Phnom Penh. The recent Soviet approach
to Sihanouk with offers of aid -- however fruitless ? will un-
doubtedly be followed up with persistent efforts to re-establish
a presence in the country, ifsonly to prevent China from enjoying
a clear field. Soviet efforts probably will produce little political
return; the Khmer communists clearly see Peking as a more useful
counterweight against Vietnamese pressure. But as the Cambodian
regime shakes down and begins to open its windows to the world,
the Soviets -- with their noses pressed to the pane -- will be
back not enjoying much influence but greatly exciting Chinese
concerns.
In Laos, Moscow's limited influence in the-past was derived
largely from its role as one of the sponsors of the coalition
government. But it is increasingly doubtful that even a weak
facade of coalition government will survive Souvanna Phouma, and
its passing will mean the further diminution of the already limited
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
4110 lip
Soviet role. Soviet relations with the Pathet Lao were never
close and the current efforts to improve them are not likely to
meet with any significant success.
BEYOND INDO-CHINA
Although the Southeast Asian region at large will be the
scene of jockeying for influence by the Chinese, Soviets, and
Vietnamese, none seems inclined to raise tensions recklessly.
Our best estimate is that Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi have all con-
cluded that improved relations with the established governments
of the countries will pay greater dividends in the near term
than support for revolutionary activity against them. However,
Peking and Hanoi will not totally abandon the latter course. For
their part, the ASEAN nations will try to adjust to the changing
power balance in the region by improving relations with the communist
powers. Ite growing inclination toward neutrality in non-communist
Southeast Asia will probably be accelerated. But such adjustments
are likely to be cautious, with no dramatic shifts in political
alignments.
.The USSR will be less able than its rivals to capitalize on
the new atmosphere in the area which in any event has a low
priority in Soviet interests., With Moscow's attention largely
focused elsewhere, there is little chance that in the near future
the Soviets will seek or gain any significant military or strategic
position in the area. The USSft will continue its efforts to ex-
tend and improve its relations as a counter to Chinese power.
- 7 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Concurrent with these efforts will be accompanying warnings of
the threat of Chinese-inspired subversion and insurgency and, no
doubt, the periodic advocacy of an Asian collective security pact.
This counsel will fall largely on deaf ears. The Soviet Union
is still looked upon with great suspicion -- an image not likely
to dissipate soon.
For China, a heavy influence in Southeast Asia is very important,
but Peking continues to see the US presence as a useful counterweight
to the USSR. This is their overriding concern, and Peking thus is
unlikely to press for a further diminution of the American role.
Peking, in turn, is seen in some of the region's capitals as a
potential counterweight to pressure from Hanoi. While the Chinese
favor a restrained Vietnameseforeign policy, however, they will
try to avoid antagonizing Hanoi by :assuming too blatantly a compet-
itive posture.
North Vietnam's behavior will be carefully watched by the
ASEAN countries. 'Hanoi will find them willing to develop more
normal relations but apprehensive about Hanoi's intentions --
specifically, whether they embrace ambitions of further territorial
hegemony or a commitment to supporting revolution beyond Indo-China's
borders.
Developments in Thailand will be regarded elsewhere as a key
indicator of Hanoi's (as well as China's) intentions. Thailand's
border with Laos allows the easy support of the insurgents in the
- 8 -
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08;05 : LOC-HAK:539-7-'2-4
4IP lor
north and northeast. But an increase in support to the insurgents
from either North Vietnam or China -- sufficient to endanger the
non-communist government of Thailand -- does not seem to be in
the cards. Hanoi is not likely to choose this road unless it feels
utterly frustrated in its diplomatic relations. The insurgency's
limited capacity for growth and general affiliation with the PRC
make this an unlikely option for Hanoi to pursue. Moreover, such
a course would risk reversing Thailand's drift toward a more neutral
and compromising position.
In sum Southeast Asia will be the scene of much maneuvering
for advantage among Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi, in which tensions and
acrioany will frequently surface. But the internal and other pre-
occupations of all the parties and the desire and will of the
local regimes to maintain their independence argue against any
any power gaining a significantly ascendent position. Judgments must
be tentative. The abrupt end of the war caught everyone off guard,
and, undoubtedly, options and policies have not yet been clearly
determined. In any case, the communist sates of the area can be
expected to join the more radical foes of the US in international
gatherings. Their prickly, hypersensitive leaders will seek to
demonstrate their divergence from US positions on nationalistic,
ideological and economic grounds. Most of these problems, however,
are likely to be irritants rather than major dangers.
- 9 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
'? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
ANNEX
This Annex presents three more detailed papers, written
by three different authors from the Soviet, Chinese and North
Vietnamese viewpoints, on the subject of future communist
policies and interests in Southeast Asia. The three papers
are largely consistent with each other and with the Overview
though not in every detail. Each is of value, however, in
illuminating the complex relationships of the communist powers
in Southeast Asia from a slightly different perspective.
The three papers, and their authors, are --
-- The View from Hanoi,
? Peking's Policy in Post-War Indochina by
-- Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia, by
-12-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1 4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
THE VIEW FROM HANOI
Hanoi's victory in South Vietnam has brought into focus new
policy objectives that will modify its relationships-with its two
principal wartime allies, the Soviet Union and China. The most
obvious change is the diminished requirement for massive military
assistance, but the end of the war also gives Hanoi the opportunity
to break out of the relative diplomatic isolation imposed by the
war and to play a broader-and more independent role in international
affairs. Soviet and Chinese aid never gave its donors much leverage
over DRV policy, due to their rivalry for Hanoi's favor which the
Vietnamese leaders skillfully exploited. Nonetheless, Hanoi was
never comfortable with the potential for leverage that its over-
whelming dependence suggested and is determined to reduce it by
substantially broadening its political and economic contacts.
The intense nationalism of Hanoi's leaders raises the poten-
tial for friction not only in its relations in the region but in
its dealings with its old allies, most particularly with the PRC.
There are already signs of such friction in the current embroglio
over territorial claims in the Spratley and Paracel Islands. Hanoi's
criticism of the PRC's occupation of the Paracels not only reflects
Vietnam's drive to establish its national prerogatives, but the
basic ethnic distrust and animosity long felt toward the Chinede
but submerged for practical reasons during the Indo-China conflict.
This underlying tension in their relations can be expected to
-13?
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
1-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
11111
surface periodically, particularly when Hanoi suspects the Chinese
of maneuvering to contain its influence in the region.
Hanoi's pique at real or imagined short-comings in Soviet
political and material support has caused occasional strains, but
despite the overwhelming preponderance of Soviet aid, the Vietnamese
have always seen Moscow as a more distant, and thus less threatening,
influence -- one that was highly useful in balancing China's influence
but not a serious competitor with Vietnam's regional interests.
Moscow is also apparently enjoying the benefits of generous support
that preceded the final stage of the war at a time when Peking, al-
though equally forthcoming with aid, reportedly was counseling
restraint and compromise.
Gratitude is a transitory phenomenon, however, and Hanoi's
post-war goals will shape its future relations with both Moscow
and Peking. These initial objectives include the rebuilding and
development of a war-damaged economy, the reunification of north
and south, Hanoi's projection of its leadership in Indo-China, and
the establishment of Vietnam's legitimacy in the diplomatic arena.
Reconstruction and reunification are Hanoi's priority goals and
will absorb most of the country's energies and resources. These
priorities do not preclude an active foreign policy, although this
preoccupation should influence its tactics. Buoyed by the euphoria
of victory and a sense of momentum Hanoi clearly is in a mood to
amplify its influence. This mood need not manifest itself in
-14-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
military action, but should -- for the next two or three years at
least -- be projected in political and economic terms. Indications
are still tentative. The rapidity of the south's collapse took
Hanoi by surprise, and undoubtedly there is still some debate and
groping going on in the leadership councils.
REUNIFICATION
Although reunification is the primary goal of the North
Vietnamese leadership, it probably will not be pursued precipitously.
The PRG is emerging as a separate administration in the south that
will have separate diplomatic status and representation in inter-
national bodies and may hold "elections" to legitimize the communist
take-over. But there is no question that this political division
is an artificial one that offers little opportunity for the de-
velopment of separatist tendencies in the south. The leaders are
closely tied to the Hanoi regime. Politburo member Pham Hung,
formerly chief of COSVN, has surfaced as the secretary of the
southern party and the man who clearly is in charge. Moreover,
the components of the southern administrative apparatus are re-
portedly being staffed by personnel from North Vietnamese ministries,
and NVA troops are still present. This does not rule out occasional
manifestations of regional prejudice and personal pique on the
part of southern cadre, but Hanoi's control is too firmly entrenched
to permit any serious maneuvering for greater independence. In
any event the country's reunification was a goal long embraced
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
' No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
4IP lip
by Vietnamese on both sides of the DMZ; even the GVN emotionally
rejected the notion of permanent partition.
Hanoi would be sensitive to any efforts to encourage separatism
in the south, though it is difficult to see where such encourage-
ment would come from. DRV officials have expressed suspicions, in
months past, that the PRC was not anxious to see a united Vietnam,
but such remarks seemed to reflect Hanoi's pique at China's apparent
lack of enthusiasm for a renewed offensive. Nonetheless, as the
chances for such tendencies to take root could increase the longer
the two areas remain apart, reunification will probably be delayed
no longer than two or three years.
In the meantime, there are political and practical reasons
for continuing the pretense of an independent southern regime.
It is consistent with past communist claims and supports the legiti-
macy of the new rulers as rising from a local struggle rather than
invasion from the north. Unification of two areas with such different
social and economic structures will present serious problems. The
relative prosperity of the south and its consumer-oriented and
capitalist economy will not easily blend with the subsistence and
socialist economy of the north and could aggrevate discontent in
the north. Melding the two systems will not be easy, and in view
of the disastrous effects of harsh land reform efforts in North
Vietnam, the communist leadership may decide that a more gradual
approach will lessen the chances of political disruptions. Political
-16-
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
-
*" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 ? LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
11 lip
control must be consolidated as well. Some resistance is apparently
continuing -- how much trouble the communists will have with the
Catholics and other religious sects, such as the Hoa Hao and Cao
Dai -- is a questionable factor. As there are no national leaders
of any status who could organize an effective resistance, political
consolidation should not take long, but could be delayed if the
communists decide to work more slowly through accommodation to more
gradual stringent control in those areas where traditional anti-
communism has been strong.
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Reconstruction in North Vietnam was well underway before the
war's end and should see the total recovery of the primary capital
base of the economy (a very small base) by the end of 1975 or soon
thereafter. While North Vietnam's leaders are preaching self-sufficiency,
it is clear that they will require substantial development assistance
for some time to come. The south's agricultural potential may
eventually make Vietnam self-sufficient in food staples, but problems
of distribution and reorganization pending the integration of the
two economies will delay that day. In the meantime, the food
deficit in the north, and Hanoi's desire to develop a modern economy
and raise the standard of living of its population will demand
continuing commodity and project assistance.
The DRV's efforts to expand its economic contacts with the
non-communist world began a year or so ago and are now accelerating.
-17-
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
." No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IP
This is partly a reflection of Hanoi's determination to reduce its
dependence on the Soviet Union and China, and partly a desire to
reap the benefits of the technical superiority found in Europe and
Japan. Regardless of its economic needs, one should not expect
Hanoi to rush pell-mell into the commercial arms of the West.
Hanoi's approaches up to now have been very hard-nosed and the
very primitive state of the DRV's industrial base will impose
restraints on the amount and type of technology imported. More-
over, the DRV suffers from a severe shortage of capital and foreign
exchange and undoubtedly would be reluctant to get into the heavy
debt that normal commercial loans would involve. This need for
loans on very soft terms will limit non-communist involvement,
and force Hanoi to rely on the communist nations as principal
suppliers of capital investments.
As long as that dependence continues Hanoi will be strongly
motivated to maintain the balanced relationship so skillfully ex-
ploited throughout the war. Soviet efforts to woo the DRV leadership
into the Soviet camp with generous amounts of aid will probably
fail despite manifestations of Vietnamese hostility toward the
Chinese. China provides generous assistance -- slightly over half
of the north's petroleum and food imports are provided by the
PRC -- and while a decline in its aid might be offset by additional
Soviet assistance, such a tilt would diminish the independence
Hanoi so cherishes.
-18-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
PRIMACY IN INDO-CHINA
The DRV leaders have long seen themselves as the natural and
legitimate heirs to the former French Indo-Chinese empire. Their
sentiments are reinforced by centuries of historical contention with
the Thai (and Khmer) over the Lao and Khmer buffer zones between
Vietnam and Thailand. The old Indo-Chinese Communist Party was the
breeding ground of the independence movements in Laos and Cambodia;
the Vietnamese cadre inspired, trained and often directed the de-
veloping parties next door. Although the liberation of the south
had clear priority, the insurgencies in Laos and Cambodia were seen
as integral parts of a whole concept -- the parts moving in different
sequence but the finale encompassing a Communist Indo-China guided
by the Lao Dong Party.
Hanoi's goals in the area have had to undergo a certain refine-
ment. It is clear that the relationship between Vietnam and its
Indo-Chinese neighbors must adjust to the strains of old ethnic
animosities and to the political dynamics of the local situations.
Yet the minimum requirements of Hanoi's interests -- friendly powers
who defer to her basic foreign policy positions, buffers against
external threats from a historically unfriendly direction and the
exclusion of greater influence by any other foreign power -- should
be largely satisfied, though in Cambodia s case, not entirely. It
is clear, however, that Hanoi's once fond dream of controlling
an Indo-China federation is dead for the forseeable future.
-19-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
? 25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Cambodia presents the most, ambiguous situation ? one where
Hanoi's equity has been significantly called into question by the
independent-minded Khmer-communist leaders and where opportunity
for competition with Hanoi's influence more readily presents itself.
The North Vietnamese have probably realized for some time that
their ability to control the Khmer communist movement would be
doubtful. Strong ethnic animosity* provoked tension and conflict
between Khmer and Vietnamese forces from the start and only abated
when NVA forces withdrew to traditional border enclaves.
Since their victory, the Khmer communists have adamantly
asserted a particularly xenophobic independence, a clear determina-
tion to call the shots in Cambodia without outside interference,
including Hanoi's. The Cambodians are not turning to total isola-
tion and recognize the need for some assistance in operating and
developing the primitive industrial plant of the country, a realization
indicated by the early arrival of Chinese technicians following
the communist seizure of Phnom Penh. It is this very need that
undermines Hanoi's leverage. The North Vietnamese would be hard-
pressed to provide Cambodia with the assistance it requires, and
with the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) now available to the
* The Khmer empire once held sway over much of present-day South
Vietnam and was pushed beck by Vietnamese expansion southward.
Khmer memories of past glory are not dead, while the racially-
conscious Vietnamese, for their part, look down on the darker-
skinned Cambodians as a more primitive people.
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Cambodian communists, the DRV will no longer be the sole conduit
for foreign aid.
The Vietnamese appear to recognize and accept the Khmers'
nationalist sensitivities, a tolerance reflected in their frequent
references to Cambodia's "territorial integrity." Hanoi's attempts
to avoid a confrontation were reflected in its agreements to Khmer
demands for the withdrawal of the residual NVA forces in Cambodia.
But in view of the disputed territorial claims along their common
border (already provoking an occasional armed clash) and among
the off-shore islands, their patience with the Cambodians will
be sorely tried over the next few years.
Hanoi's careful cordiality has met with some reciprocation
from the Khmer leaders. Khieu Samphan, a key leader and primary
spokesman for the Cambodian communists, is the head of the recently
formed Cambodian-Vietnamese Friendship Association, a role that seems
to indicate his desire to keep any fraternal squabbles within care-
ful limits. But it is clear that Hanoi will have to compete with
China for influence with the Khmer leadership. Regardless of
whether or not Sihanouk returns, the FRC has developed entree
with the Khmer leaders, who recognize China's usefulness as a
counterweight against Vietnamese pressure, and who undoubtedly
will try to play the two off against each other -- much in the
manner that Hanoi successfully used with its supporters.
- 21
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7_7_4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
giP 25X1
The situation in Laos is quickly shifting to one in which
the communists will exercise control. While the edifice of coali-
tion government may be preserved, Souvanna Phouma's desire to see
the country unified, plus the impact of communist victories in
South Vietnam and Cambodia on both Pathet Lao ambitions and the
rightists' will to resist is rapidly shifting control into the
hands of the Pathet Lao.
The North Vietnamese have a close relationship with the
Pathet Lao leadership that appears to override any stirrings of
nationalist independence in the manner of the Cambodians. While
the party aristocrats such as Souphanavong and Phoumi Vongvichit,
might have the strong sense of nationalism Souvanna Phouma believed
might ease them away. from Hanoi's domination those leaders who
appear to exercise the real power, such as Kaysone and Nouhak,
have had careers even more closely entwined with the 'Vietnamese
communist movement. Moreover, the Pathet Lao's dependence on
Hanoi throughout the war was overwhelming. The communist vic-
tories were won by Vietnamese forces; Vietnamese advisors (and
troops) were present with Pathet Lao forces throughout the country;
and Pathet Lao leaders traveled frequently to Hanoi for consul-
tations.
Hanoi's primacy seems unchallenged. The PBC has maintained
close relations with the Lao communists, but Chinese interests
have not conflicted with Hanoi's prerogatives. Peking appears to
-22-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4 25X1
have acknowledged the Pathet Lao as primarily a Vietnamese client,
while Hanoi has accepted China's special interest in the northern
?
border area along her frontier. From all appearances, their rela-
tionship in Laos has been cooperative and not competitive. Chinese
attempts to undermine Hanoi's position woad cauie imm6aiate friction,
but such a development seems unlikely in view of the basic mutuality
of their interests there.? a buffer zone along their borders, a
corridor to Thailand.
Moscow's relations With the Pathet Lao have been less close
and its interests in Laos less pressing than China's. Soviet
political support has been more notable for the preservation of
the coalition in Laos than for Pathet Lao domination. The recent
visit by a Soviet delegation to PL headquarters at Sam Neua was
the first such occasion in five years, but despite Moscow's sudden
solicitousness toward the Lao communists, Soviet influence is
too remote to be very effective. Aggressive Soviet efforts to
ingratiate themselves with.the Pathet Lao would be an irritant
in their relations with Hanoi, but only a mild one.
The rapid communist take-over in Laos raises the question
of its future posture toward the outside world a posture that
should be influenced by Hanoi's advice. Will a communist Laos
close itself off from all but its socialist allies and emphasize
self-reliance a la Cambodian style, or will it follow Hanoi's
lead in opting for broader contacts? The instincts of the leaders
-23-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
in the caves at Sam Neua are undoubtedly far more hostile than
the urbane sophistication of their Vientiane representatives
suggests, so a turning-inward cannot be dismissed. Once the last
vestiges of American influence (such as USAID) are expelled how-
ever, Hanoi's example should encourage the Lao leaders to maintain
the border diplomatic contacts that at least some of the Lao leaders
seem to prefer.
VIETNAM AS A REGIONAL POWER
The DRV is moving quickly to establish its legitimacy and
influence in the region. Although the current dispute over the
military aircraft flown out of South Vietnam may delay the exten-
sion of diplomatic relations, Hanoi has indicated its desire to
formalize ties with those ASEAN nations who have not already done
so -- the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In Thailand's
case the former stumbling block of the US bases may have been
resolved by the scheduled departure of US forces, although there
were earlier signs that Hanoi might have been willing to accept -2
their continuing presence. The North Vietnamese were never as
sensitive about the bases in the Philippines and are unlikely to
make their removal a prerequisite to establishing formal rela-
tions.
It is clear that the departure of the US military presence
from the region is a long-range Vietnamese goal. The theme of.
a neutral Southeast Asia has already been advanced and no doubt
-24-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
VA
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
sr
will be emphasized in Vietnam's regional politicking. Hanoi appears
to envision a situation in which no one great power would have
dominant influence in the area and thus all could be more readily
played off and exploited by a regional coalition led by Hanoi.
For at least the next year or so, however, the preoccupations of
their tasks at home -- and ASEAN caution -- is going to. limitthe
projection of Vietnamese influence.
Thailand is clearly a special case. Both its geographic
proximity and long history of contention with the Vietnamese in-
creases the potential for future conflict. The communist take-over
in Laos virtually eliminates any remaining difficulties in providing
logistical support for the insurgency in Thailand's northeast.*
Moreover, there is a strong revolutionary fervor in the Vietnamese
leadership which has undoubtedly been stimulated by the successful
conclusion of the war after such prolonged frustrations. With
the momentum of events in their favor, there must be some tempta-
tion to take advantage of the mood of uncertainty among their
neighbors. Communist broadcasts and articles are replete with
revolutionary rhetoric that speaks of the revolution in world
* The communist insurgency in Thailand is active in three separate
areas -- a rather feckless and poorly supported campaign in the
south, one in the north that is supported by the Chinese, and one
in the northeast, which has been assisted by the Chinese and North
Vietnamese. All three operations come under the central guidance
of the Communist Party of Thailand, a fact demonstrated in the
occasional shift of personnel from one area to another.
-25-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
- i
No Objection to Declassification n Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
terms and of the "changing conditions" that now encourage its
growth -- arguments that are inconsistent with the non-belligerent
tones of restraint and reasonableness evoked by WV officials
to recent visitors.
Such euphoria is only natural, however, and probably re-
flects little more than the "high" of victory, and not near-term
policies under serious consideration. For a number of reasons,
Hanoi is not likely to significantly stir up the Thai insurgency:
the insurgency's inherent weaknesses, Hanoi's limited influence,
and political expediency. At present, the insurgency is too weak
to challenge the government's forces. In the northeast, its political
base is largely restricted to isolated villages along the Lao
border, where communist influence is less a product of popular
support than of communist terrorism and government neglect.
Bangkok dismisses the insurgency as involving only minority
groups (the people of the northeast are considered country bump-
kins more akin to the Lao than to "real" Thai) along the borders
and makes only a half-hearted effort to? suppress it, but if the
government was provoked into taking more determined action, it
could easily wreak havoc on the weak insurgent structure. It
mould be inconsistent with communist guerrilla warfare doctrine
to risk serious confrontation while the insurgent structure is
still so fragile.
-26-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7_7_4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
Moreover, the present nature of the insurgency imposes certain
restraints on its growth that simply expanding material support
would not overcome. The insurgency lacks strong political appeal
and there are not yet the serious internal problems in Thailand
that might generate broader support for armed insurrection. The
communists' bid for broader appeal had been further undermined
by the collapse of their two major propaganda issues -- the mili-
tary regime and the presence of US forces. Therefore, under
current political conditions in Thailand the insurgency has little
chance of developing into a serious threat. Hanoi's recognition
of the insurgency's limitations is reflected in the scant atten-
tion it receives in North Vietnamese propaganda, in contrast with
the coverage given Thailand's urban disorders. Hanoi obviously
sees these as more influential in Thai politics and could see
more useful opportunities in encouraging urban political organiza-
tions.
Hanoi's options are further restrained by its limited
influence over the insurgency. Even in the northeast, Hanoi can-
not ignore China's preferences, which currently favor the development
of normal diplomatic relations with Thailand. The Thai Communist
Party (CPT) is not anyone's toady, but its long relationship with
the Chinese party, reinforced by the Chinese ethnic background of
most of the CPT leaders, suggests that it would not adopt a policy
strongly at odds with Chinese wishes.
-27-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-7_4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
In any event, the Thai government's reaction to a serious
flareup of insurgent activity would probably redound against Hanoi's
minimum policy objectives in Thailand -- the recognition of the
DRV's (and PRG's) legitimacy and removal of any threat to Vietnamese
security. The present regime in Bangkok is anxious to normalize
relations with the Vietnamese and willing to pull away from what
it now perceives as a useless military partnership w;th the US;
but that regime's position is a fragile one. Hanoi's adoption of
a more aggressive policy could contribute to the regime's demise
and the return of a military government more cautious in dealing
with Hanoi and more anxious to preserve close ties with the
Americans.
Hanoi has not raised the spectre of insurgent threat to
the Thai. On the contrary, in the exchange of letters exploring
the approaches to formal relations, the DRV government made an
unprecedented acknowledgment of Thai apprehensions and offered
assurances (albeit obliquely) that they would not interfere with
Thailand's internal affairs. While these assurances were couched
in terms that linked them with Hanoi's own unhappiness with the
US forces in Thailand, Hanoi's willingness to discuss the return
of the local Vietnamese community (largely refugees who left
Vietnam in the 1950s) -- another area of concern to the Thai
government -- is a further indication of the give-and-take it is
prepared to engage in to improve relations.
- 28 -
) (
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
At the same time, the North Vietnamese will not completely
abandon their support of the insurgents. The level of support may
be a gauge of their frustration with state-to-state relations.
Should the circumstances change -- should a coup return a more
rigid and uncompromising regime to Bangkok or serious civil unrest
unglue the harmony of Thai society and lower its resistance to
communist influence -- Hanoi might find the insurgency a more
attractive option to support. Even then, the underlying national-
ism of the Thai communists would diminish their usefulness as a
vehicle of Vietnamese pressure.
In Sum....
The Vietnamese communists face prodigious tasks at home in
overcoming the damage and divisions of thirty years of war. While
these tasks will not preclude an active foreign policy, they should
absorb most of Hanoi's attention and resources for the next two or
three years and blunt any expansionist tendencies the Vietnamese
might harbor. Their continuing need for foreign economic assistance,
their guest for broader diplomatic and economic contacts, and at
least tentative indications of a desire to establish Vietnam's
position as a legitimate member of the regional community argue
for a period of non-belligerent behavior. The euphoria of victory
will no doubt express itself in other ways ? a demanding tone in
Hanoi's diplomatic approaches a stubborn, uncompromising posture
-29-
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
.? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
when it feels its national interests or claims (e.g., the offshore
islands) are at issue. Such feisty nationalism with its under-
tones of revolutionary fervor may provoke occasional tensions and
acrimony, but for now, Hanoi appears to be taking a generally
softer approach in its foreign policies.
-30-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
fr
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
111
PEKING'S POLICY IN POSTWAR INDO-CHINA
PEKING'S GOALS AND ASSETS IN POST-WAR INDO-CHINA
Peking's goals in Indo-China are to assert Chinese influence
without losing ground, to keep to a minimum the Soviet presence
there, and to prevent Hanoi from dominating the area. The Chinese
must now work toward these goals in a situation in which the US
is a diminishing enemy and thus in which China's strategic deterrent
role is no longer its principal asset.
The Chinese have new opportunities. They can now enhance
their influence with the Cambodian communists by supporting their
anti-Soviet and anti-North Vietnamese policy, while not openly
contending with Hanoi. They can further enhance their influence
with the Pathet Lao, and they may calculate that these communists
will be, as the Cambodians already appear to be, competitors with
if not opponents of the North Vietnamese.
However, this very independence of mind which the Chinese
already are exploiting is hazardous to Peking's policy in the
area. The Chinese must now adjust to Phnom Penh's actions and
needs, and this adjustment will require that they take a more
explicitly anti-US position on certain issues, thus cutting
across Peking's policy of rapprochement with the US. The Chinese
may also be impelled to take a harder line toward Thailand if
-31-
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
11P
-
Phnom Penh does so. Thus the Chinese are confronted with the
painful situation -- at least potentially -- of the tail wagging
the dog.
A. Chinese Influence
In trying to assert their influence without losing ground
to Hanoi or Moscow, the Chinese start with assets.
first with aid
and they have attained the first diplomatic presence in Phnom
Penh; they have a considerable presence in Laos; and they have
fairly stable ties with North Vietnam, and have given a high level
of aid to Hanoi, although there are tensions.* However, the
Chinese will have a problem restraining themselves -- of refraining
from throwing their weight around in Indo-China as a big power.
The Chinese have for centuries believed, and the Chinese
leaders apparently believe today, that China's size and power, as
well as superior culture, provide it with the right to assert
strong political influence in Indo-China. This is precisely the
great-power attitude which Mao has openly denounced in others,
but which in fact is at the very core of Chinese behavior in the
They have been
* Peking has shown distinct degrees of warmth in its relations
with the Indo-Chinese parties: warmest with the Pathet Lao,
somewhat less so with the Cambodian communists, and correct but
cool with the Vietnamese. This range of attitudes partly derives
from the Chinese perception of how close these parties are to
the Soviet party.
-32-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-7-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 20-1-0708/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
area. A clear expression of this was Peking's unsolicited advice
on the strategy for running the war against South Vietnam, at first
counseling the North Vietnamese to avoid negotiations and fight a
protracted war (1965-71) and then applying pressure on the North
Vietnamese to hasten along with negotiations and to compromise
in order to attain a cease-fire (1972-73). Another clear expression
of this great-power attitude was Peking's unilateral seizure of
the Paracel Islands in January 1974, despite Chinese knowledge
that the islands were claimed by the Vietnamese communists. The
antagonism it aroused in Hanoi points to the larger problem of
whether the Chinese will be willing to restrain themselves in
post-war Indo-China.
This great-power assumption of a right to predominant in-
fluence over China's small neighbors is as important as the very
practical concern with securing China's southern borders, and
? more important than the ideological commitment to advance rural
revolution in Asia. The US presence in Indo-China had challenged
the Chinese presumption to local superiority, and as that presence
has receded, the independence of mind of the communist leaders
in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Sam Neua has become correspondingly a
more significant prospective barrier to Chinese dominance. Al-
though Peking's help was highly important in the accession to
power of all three regimes in Indo-China, they probably will
prove to be no more grateful for Peking's early support than Mao
- 33 -
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
. .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 . LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
,r
NIF
himself has felt grateful for Moscow's post-1949 support, and will,
like the Chinese, be unsubmissive on important matters of policy.*
Should the Chinese leaders therefore, try to dictate a grand
strategy for Indo-China, or dispute territory, or interfere in
internal party affairs, the reaction from the new regimes will
undoubtedly be vigorously anti-Peking.
Hanoi's anger over the Chinese seizure of the Paracels and
Hanoi's action of seizing six Chinese-claimed islands in the
Spratleys in mid-April 1975, undoubtedly heightened Chinese aware-
ness of the potential for contention with the new regimes. The
Chinese now seem to be trying to exercise restraint, hoping to
avoid antagonizing the three Indo-Chinese parties, while extending
political support and material aid to all three. However, there
is in any case likely to be considerable tension (already evident
in Peking's relations with Hanoi) in the Chinese handling of the
ties between the new regimes and Moscow, especially if Phnom Penh
changes its strongly anti-Soviet policy.
B. The Soviet Presence
What had been the principal national security concern in
Indo-China for the Chinese ?.namely, to avoid situations which
* Peking is already confronted with the potential for such in-
gratitude in the case of Hanoi. The Chinese complain privately
that the Vietnamese war has cost China a fortune, and they wonder
whether the Vietnamese will remember this fact and be grateful.
-34-
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
(
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
_
GP
might lead to a Sino-American clash (conventional or nuclear) while
supporting North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao, and Cambodian communist
military actions -- has been displaced by anxiety lest the Soviets
now obtain enhanced opportunities to "encircle" China, politically
and with bases in nearby countries. The Chinese will work to
prevent this, primarily by positing themselves to be the principal
suppliers and political champions of the new regimes.
The Chinese are gratified at the initial advantage they
have attained over the Soviets in dealings with the new regimes
in Cambodia and Laos. A primary Chinese goal will be to keep
Cambodia -- and a communist-dominated administration in Laos --
deterred from eventually adopting the same policy as Hanoi, that
of balancing one major. power (the USSR) off against the other
(China). They have already indicated that they are aware that
the Soviet alternative provides the new regimes with some poten-
tial leverage over Peking's policy, but they insist that such a
potential will not hmpel changes in PRC policy. Actually, the
capability of the Chinese to prevent such balancing action may
decrease as post-war economic needs gradually replace the earlier,
more urgent military needs. ?
Globally, the Chinese will try to minimize the impact of
the events in Indo-China on the role the US plays as counterweight
to the USSR in the Sino-Soviet-US strategic triangle. While
gloating publicly about events in Indo-China as vindicating Mao's
- 35 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-5:1q_7_9_A
25X1
25X1
I
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
long-standing line on "armed struggle" as the only road to power
(itself an anti-Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute), in
private talks with visiting foreign leaders the Chinese have not
only avoided crowing over the US defeat but also have insisted
that the US, released from its Vietnam burden, can play a more
positive role in the Pacific area. Although the Chines stric-
tures against "hegemony" apply ultimately to the US as well as
the USSR, the view of the US as a counterweight to the USSR motivates
the Chinese to advocate strong US support for Japan, including
maintenance of bases there.* The Chinese leaders' attitude on
the desirability of US bases in Thailand and the Philippines in
the post-war era is less clear and may still be under considera-
tion. In any case, the Chinese leaders almost certainly will
continue to calculate that the US is still the most important
country confronting the Soviets globally, and that they must try
to manipulate this confrontation to their advantage.
Hanoi's anxiety about eventual Chinese domination has
kept -- and probably will continue to keep ? Sino-Soviet competi-
tion for influence in North Vietnam a fairly even contest, with
* The Chinese may, for tactical reasons, occasionally criticize
the presence of US bases in Japan. However, they apparently desire
that these bases remain and are, therefore, unlikely to launch a
propaganda campaign against them or against the US-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty.
- 36 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-Srica_7A
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
the Chinese unable to get the upper hand. North Vietnam continues
to place orders for a wide range of industrial products and other
equipment with the USSR and its East European allies. The Chinese
will have to accept this situation in the south as well, and they
undoubtedly were infuriated with the Vietnamese communists for
permitting (if not encouraging) the Soviet Union to precede China
in sending ships carrying grain to "liberated" Danang. However,
the Chinese have proven to be prudent, focusing on the Soviet
issue, and will probably avoid 2mly. attacking Hanoi on issues
in dispute.
C. The Contest with Hanoi
Beyond the competition with the Soviets (expressed mainly
in economic terms), a competition for favor with the new regimes
will be launched against Hanoi (mainly in political terms). The
Chinese, who earlier had professed to desire the advent of "a great
unity of the three Indo-Chinese parties," probably see considerable
advantage in disputes among these parties. Internecine disputes
are likely to impel these parties to Seek Peking's support -- a
situation which would increase Chinese influence in the area and
decrease Hanoi's capability to dominate the area.
It is clear to Peking that the emergence of the independent
Cambodian communist regime is creating problems for Hanoi. That
this would be true has been evident since 1972 when Cambodian
forces proved willing to engage North Vietnamese units in eastern
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOr_kin
-7 n
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
111! ler
Cambodia in bloody battles, on the issue of which troops were to
occupy which areas. Moreover, Cambodian forces have recently
seized at least one probable petroleum-bearing island in the Gulf
of Thailand which had been coveted by the Vietnamese. The Chinese,
if appealed to by the Cambodians, might profess to desire a com-
promise but, in fact, refrain from actively seeking a solution,
calculating that the irascible Cambodians would tie up the Viet-
namese in a long, bitter, inter-party struggle. Such a struggle
would tend to reduce Hanoi's pressure on Peking to return the
PRC-seized Paracels. Thus one of Peking's major goals -- namely
-
to keep Hanoi from dominating Indo-China -- is further advanced
to the degree that such disputes remain, or new ones arise, between
the Cambodians and the North Vietnamese.
In Laos, the Chinese apparently do not have a comparable
opportunity to gain advantage over the North Vietnamese, inasmuch
as the Pathet Lao still seem to accept Hanoi's advice if not
control, and to avoid disputes with Hanoi over territory. On
the other hand, the Chinese may seek to take advantage of their
geographic proximity -- and possibly to retain some part of their
presence in northern Laos -- to offer the Laotian communists a
counterweight to Hanoi.
In Hanoi itself, although the main levers of Chinese in-
fluence probably will continue to be material aid and political
support, the Chinese almost certainly will be alert to groups or
-38-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-7_4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/65 :TOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
..?
INF
individuals in Vietnam as potential instruments of Chinese influence.
They undoubtedly recognize that
the key figures holding real power behind the scenes of the new
government in South Vietnam are, in fact, high-level Lao Doing
Party officials who are loyal to the leadership in Hanoi. Never-
theless, they may believe that policy differences exist over whether
and/or when to discard the facade of a separate, independent, and
neutral government and carry out "unification." Despite the fact
that the south is under the control of North Vietnamese party
and army officials -- and in that respect, unified -- the Chinese
apparently believe that separate policies applied in the south
will provide them with leeway to maneuver. The Chinese presumably
would support those Lao Dong Party leaders who prefer to delay
"unification" indefinitely.
In sum, Peking has a good chance of successfully assisting
the most anti-Vietnamese force -- the Cambodians -- in a joint
effort to keep Hanoi from dominating Cambodia. The Chinese
apparently would have preferred the coalition in Laos to remain
composed of more neutralist, non-communist leaders than it now is,
but they are still in a good position to prevent Hanoi's total
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: L06-HAK-53q-7_9_4
25X1
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
INF
domination. They have a poor chance of moving the North Vietnamese
themselves into a warm Hanoi-Peking relationship, but will probably
avoid a public dispute with the North Vietnamese, as this would
assist Moscow toward an even better relationship with the Lao Dong
Party leadership than it now has.
PEKING AND THAILAND: DIPLOMACY AND INSURGENCY SUPPORT
Peking's policy toward Thailand seems to be similar to its
policy toward Burma, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia --
namely, a dual policy of (a) diplomacy on one level and (b) support
for Maoist armed insurgents in these countries on another level.
Mao personally reaffirmed that policy
in 1974, as did Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in late April 1975
when he told British journalists that China will continue to "support"
revolution abroad. It is precisely that "support" and North Vietnamese
assistance that has provided the communist insurgents in north and
northeast Thailand with a sufficient amount of professional military
training and modern weapons to sustain their anti-government guerrilla
activities. There is no indication that the Chinese will cease their
political support, which is mainly in the 'form: of inspirational
broadcasts beamed to the insurgents
Regarding material aid, there is evidence that the
Chinese (as well as the North Vietnamese) continue to train Thai
communist insurgents.
- 40 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
411
The Chinese will have to make a decision in the near future
on whether to step up their support of the Thai insurgents with
major inputs of weapons (and even advisers and combat cadres, as
they have done in Burma) to make the communist insurgency in the
northeast viable. Thus far, there is no evidence that such a
decision has been made. They seem to be content to rock along
with the insurgency at a low boil, while encouraging the Thais to
take the final diplomatip step -- breaking ties with Taiwan and
recognizing Peking.
More important than all other considerations is Peking's
apparent reluctance to have tension increase in Thailand at a
time when the Chinese desire a concession from the US regarding
Taiwan. The Chinese undoubtedly calculate that a significant
increase of their inputs into the insurgency would be apparent
to the US and would be held against them. They are worried that
the events in Indo-China already may have made it more difficult
for the US Administration to make a concession on the Taiwan
issue. Peking has hinted that it is not prepared to go beyond
low-level support for the Thai insurgents in the near future.
Moreover, it is unlikely that competition with North Vietnam
for influence in the Thai party leadership will impel Peking to
greatly increase its inputs. The Chinese have had the inside
track with the Thai party leadership ever since the Communist
Party of Thailand was organized and staffed with Chinese and
-41-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4 _ _
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
Sino-)Thai cadres, and Peking probably still has the dominant posi-
tion.
It is probable that following the establishment of diplomatic
relations with Bangkok, Peking will suggest to the Thai government
that it legalize the party. However, such a suggestion would be
intended primarily as a counter to prospective Thai government
requests that the Chinese cease supporting the insurgents ? a
counter that Mao himself adopted to deflect the request of Malaysia's
Prime Minister that Mao cease supporting the illegal communist in-
surgents in Malaysia.
In sum, low-level support for the Thai insurgents probably
will continue and the Chinese probably
will keep encouraging the Thai communists to fight on, but greatly
increased inputs are unlikely to be sent in from China in the near
future.
PROSPECTS
The Chinese have the determination, and some of the assets,
to play a major role in Indo-China ? mainly, Offering support
to the new regime in .Cambodia and the communist-dominated coalition
in Laos. In Vietnam however, tensions with the leadership in Hanoi
have reduced the advantage the Chinese previously had (from 1960--
1972) in competition with the Soviets. But they have not given
up on the North Vietnamese: they will try to keep their various
disputes in private channels, and will continue to provide Hanoi
with material aid and political support.
- 42 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HA K-539-7-2-4
111,
The Chinese are aware that China's ability to be the counter-
weight to Soviet influence is still important to the Vietnamese.
China's role as a counterweight, however, will not be sufficiently
important to provide Peking with a veto over Hanoi's foreign policy
decisions. The factor of a Chinese counterweight is not important
in the thinking of the Cambodians, as there is no Soviet presence
in Cambodia, the Cambodians are furious with Moscow for failing
to support them, and they will probably remain anti-Soviet for
some time to come.
Beyond this, the Chinese may be able to play some role as
"honest broker" in internecine disputes among the Indo-China parties..
In addition, they may choose -- with uncertain chances of success --
to counsel restraint to the Cambodians on specific issues: for
example, whether to attack the Thai border forces on the issue of
Cambodian-claimed territory and whether to continue to hold foreigners
(including crew members of seized foreign ships).
?
The principal concern for the Chinese in the near future will
be to keep the Soviet presence in Indo-China down to a minimum.*
In the unlikely event that the Cambodians or the Pathet Lao (with
North Vietnamese sanction) decide to allow the Soviets to come into
- 43 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: A
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
11.
their countries with technicians and aid in big numbers and amounts,
the Chinese undoubtedly would try to effect a reversal of this
policy; failing that, the Chinese would harden their attitude
toward these regimes. Thus the Chinese will be constantly active
and alert, monitoring the Soviet-related actions of the Indo-
Chinese parties, clearly unwilling to be passive in the Sino-Soviet
competition for influence.
The Chinese seem toiprefer that the Thai insurgency remain
at a low boil. They apparently calculate that Hanoi's perception
is roughly the same as their own, and that Phnom Penh (dependent
on the Chinese and Vietnamese) will not have the material equipment
to keep supplying the Thai insurgents even if the Cambodians were
willing to intervene to step up the insurgency. Major inputs of
personnel and material would be required, on something like the
scale of the North Vietnamese inputs in Laos and Cambodia, to
make the insurgency a genuine threat to the central government.
The main Chinese goal in Thailand for the near future is to gain
recognition of the PRC from Bangkok and to avoid tension-building
which might worry the US Administration. ',Although the Chinese
do not appear to be pressing Bangkok to remove US bases from
Thailand, they may come to feel that it is necessary to do so,
while desiring the continuation of an American diplomatic presence
to offset any Soviet presence in Bangkok.
-44-
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7_7_4
25X1
25X1 )
No 0,ction to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 ? LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
?
Somewhat farther down the road, they probably will aim at
obtaining a left-leaning Thai government, which would profess to
be "nonaligned and neutral," but which in fact would adopt all
major Chinese foreign policy positions. Such a future Thai regime
would have the advantage of not appearing to be a Chinese puppet,
but of resembling Cambodia under Sihanouk's earlier non-communist
but pro-Peking government, with which the Chinese were content.
The advent of such a regime would probably provide the Chinese
with a better chance to keep the Russians out than would be the
case with a communist Thailand.
-45-
NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7_7_4
25X1
25X1
?
.1,672
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
1:;6111-EY IN :SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Soviet -reaction to the denouement of the Indo-Chinese
'conflict Combinia satisfaction, relief, and a touch of uneasiness.
Moscow's mixed 'and somewhat contradictory attitudes flow from the
'nature 'of its Interests -and 'stake in the area.
SoutheaSt Asia ht-s neVer been an area of more than peripheral
iliar6'st to thb Sbviet union: It is remote from the borders of
th6 We66ra6hiC epicenters of Soviet interest,
1t ?tht :th Mit biiitnced by any economic or military
'14SiSSA istThgEeSS-nbmic links with the area are
SSMioolWel b61d6t Sf it wartime function as a chief
RoRtiiSutSr Sf trid ;Conomib 1d to the DRV. The relation-
?W tiiSt1411 RS gESTGITAS Sai-iinte to the USSR. Only a
minuacule portion of Soviet deliveries has been covered by North
Vi4it'aitirece:ert to 'the USSR. In 1974 Hanoi's exports to the
Soviet Union totalled Only $65 million, by comparison with an es-
'$ido million in Soviet military aid and $420 million in
-
Commodity imports. (This does not take into account the considerable
oin Si '66Snomi6 aid which Hanoi has received from other members
Si ihe Soviei bloe.)
Ne tiler has MokOw't telationship with Hanoi strengthened
ihe USSR'i &in military pt6ience in the area, which remains
z 2/16
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
?
C.4
4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
? W
nonexistent. Soviet naval activity in South Asian waters has had
the primary, immediate purpose of strengthening the Soviet presence
in the Middle East, and Persian Gulf areas. There has been no
Soviet naval deployment east of Sri Lanka, where Soviet naval ships
have been present only in transit. What modest interest the Soviets
have shown in the area has been directed at India and Singapore,
where they have intermittently and unsuccessfully sought the use
of existing repair facilities for naval combatants. As yet there
are no comparable repair facilities in either North or South Vietnam.
Moscow has in the past amply demonstrated its willingness
to give short shrift to the interests of Vietnamese communism when
these came into conflict with higher priority Soviet goals. Thus,
Moscow proved willing to back French communist support of French
claims to sovereignty over Indo-China in 1946-47 (to bolster the
PCF's struggle for power in post-war France), to endorse a peace
settlement in 1954 which "robbed" Hanoi of the fruits of military
victory (to support Moscow's first efforts at detente with the
West), and to entertain President Nixon in the aftermath of the
mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972 (to protect the budding detente
with the United States).
The USSR's objectives in Indo-China are essentially negative:
to deny influence to its great power rivals, the US and China.
The victory of Moscow's Vietnamese ally has meant some share of
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
reflected glory as well as -- at least temporarily -- excluding
the United States from the competition for influence in Indo-China.
At the same time, Moscow has been visibly relieved that the
wax is at an end. Its value as a means of allowing Moscow to demon-
strate its "revolutionary" credentials had been reduced by the
real and potential dangers it posed for US-Soviet detente. As
long as it continued, Moscow could not rid itself of residual
anxiety that events in Indo-China might somehow move in a direc-
tion which would threaten the fragile relationship with Washington.
Now that the Indo-China war has ended in defeat for the US-backed
regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh, the Soviets are concerned at
the possibility of an American backlash. Soviet leaders and dip-
lomats have taken care to avoid publicly gloating or associating
the US with the debacle of the anti-communist forces and have
privately disclaimed responsibility for or prior knowledge of the
final offensives of the communist forces.
Unease at the possible American reaction is more than matched
by Moscow's uncertainty at the implications that the installation
of communist regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh and the rapid erosion
of the political balance in Laos will have for the course of its
bitter rivalry with China. Although the regional rivalry between
the United States and the USSR has been more visible, it is China
that has been most crucial to attracting Soviet attention to Indo-
China. Indeed Moscow's direct involvement in the Indo-Chinese
-48-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
j
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-
.
411
lop
conflict as a major arms supplier followed on the heels of its
quarrel with Peking, and must be seen as a Soviet effort to bid
for the loyalties of Hanoi and to rebuff the Chinese challenge
to Moscow's position as the preeminent center of communism. This
challenge was fueled largely by Peking's charges that Moscow has
sold out the cause of revolution for the sake of detente with
imperialism.
GOALS AND POLICIES
A. Vietnam
The USSR's first priority will be to preveht the extension
of Chinese influence in the area. Yet the Soviets are also likely
to want to see conflict and instability in the area kept below a
level which could burden their broader interests.
Soviet efforts to counter China will center on Hanoi. Moscow
will seek to limit the degree of intimacy between Hanoi and Peking
and to back the DRV as a local barrier to the expansion of Chinese
influence. The Soviets have already given clear evidence of their
intentions.
25X1
25X1
AG
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
NMV
The Soviets have significant advantages over Peking in any
competition for influence in Hanoi, beginning with a somewhat better
bilateral relationship with the Vietnamese. Although both China
and the USSR aided North Vietnam greatly in its war effort, Soviet
help was probably more crucial and recognized as such by them.
Moreover, the occasionally erratic Chinese policy line dissipated
much of the profit China might have extracted from its aid to the
Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese
found
they could rely on Soviet assistance, whereas they could never be
entirely sure of Chinese support.
Equally important in buttressing the Soviet position in
Hanoi is the long history of animosity and suspicion between the
Chinese and Vietnamese peoples. These attitudes are kept alive
by simmering territorial disputes, the most important of which
are those over the Paracel and Spratley island groups in the South
China Sea. The Soviets have weighed in on the side of the Viet-
namese on both questions. Soviet propaganda has belabored as an
act of "imperialism" the Chinese occupation of the Paracels in
January 1974, and the Soviets were quick to echo Hanoi's announce-
ment of the "liberation" of the Spratleys earlier this month.
Moscow will do its best to keep the territorial issue alive as
a source of discord between the DRV and China.
-50-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
111!
Hanoi's immense needs for aid as it turns to the tasks of
reconstruction are also likely to give the Soviets advantages
vis-a-vis the Chinese. The two Vietnams received a total of about
$1.75 billion in economic aid last year, about $1,150 million in
the north and $600 million in the south. Vietnamese needs may
well drop this year, but will still remain large. The major share
of the burden of assistance to South Vietnam, previously borne
by the US, will have to be taken up by the USSR, if it is to be
taken up at all. The immediate needs of the Vietnamese are for
petroleum, fertilizer, and other commodities. Long term needs
will be for technical and material assistance for industrial de-
velopment. The Soviets apparently have been the first to promise
a large aid package.
However, the prospective aid burden is so great that the
Soviets are likely to encourage and assist Hanoi in its inevitable
efforts to diversify its sources of aid. Indeed, the Soviets
have already dropped a hint that they would approve of US aid
in the reconstruction of Vietnam, and they are likely to make
even more vigorous efforts in this direction in their approaches
to third countries. Despite their reluctance to assume the whole
burden, however, the Soviets are likely to bear whatever costs
are necessary to keep the upper hand over the Chinese.
It appears well within Moscow's capability to be the leading
foreign voice in Hanoi for the next two or three years, a position
- 51 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
1
1110
which will merely give it prominence rather than any real control
over Hanoi. The USSR is likely to encounter much harder going in
any efforts to see Hanoi through to a position of regional dominance.
What the Soviets appear to have in mind is a loose Vietnamese
hegemony over the other countries of Indo-China. Thus the Soviets
support the reunification of Vietnam -- although they defer to
Hanoi's judgment on timing and modalities -- in the interests of
seeing Hanoi's regional,position strengthened, just as the Chinese
view the prospect with obvious distaste for the same reason.
B. Laos
Soviet support for Vietnamese dominance over Laos and Cambodia
is also due to the lack of a better means of gaining some influence
in the area. The Soviets themselves do not play a major, role in
Laos, much less in Cambodia. In Laos the Soviet position is in
many ways dependent on that of the North Vietnamese, who have vied?
with the Chinese for dominance over the country and still maintain
'a substantial troop presence in the country. Soviet contacts with
the Pathet Lao, on the other hand, have been minimal.
Moscow's dogged support of the coalition government in Laos
through the latest phase in the political battle in that country
suggests that it is somewhat behind the pace of events. The Soviet
position does serve the purpose of denying Moscow's responsibility
for the destruction of the balance between the contending forces,
but there is no reason to doubt Moscow's frequent expressions of
25X1
No Objection to Declassificat_ion_i_nPart2010/08/05
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
satisfaction with the status quo in Laos. As recently as last
March, the authoritative Foreign Ministry official, Mikhail Kapitsa,
underlined Soviet preferences with the public comment that in Laos
the Soviets are "royalists."
Whatever the change in the political realities, the Soviets
will urge the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao to maintain the fig-
leaf of coalition government. If the Pathet Lao should choose to
dispense with this facade, the Soviets would, of course, swim with
the tide. In any event, in circumstances of Pathet Lao dominance,
the Soviets will follow their accustomed tactics of beckoning with
offers of aid warning against the diabolical intentions of the
Chinese, and urging the removal of Chinese forces from northern
Laos.
C. Cambodia
Insubstantial as is the Soviet position in Laos, it is in-
finitely better than that which they "enjoy" in Cambodia. Moscow's
relationship with the new communist rulers is little short of
calamitous. The Soviet embassy in Phnom Penh was fired upon and
looted by Khmer Rouge troops, Soviet representatives have been
roughed up, and the entire seven-man official Soviet community
in Cambodia was unceremoniously bundled out of the country with
other resident foreigners.
-53-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
25X1
there is evidence that Chinese technicians are on the ground in
Cambodia and that the Chinese have established a diplomatic presence
in Phnom Penh.
The failure of Soviet policy to keep up with the pace of
events has contributed mightily to Moscow's present discomfiture.
Moscow was cool toward the Khmer Rouge rebellion at its inception
because of the pro-Chinese proclivities of its leaders and because
its titular leader, Prince Sihanouk found asylum in Peking. Moscow's
reflexive hostility toward the Khmer Rouge was later reinforced
by its apparent miscalculation of the balance of forces in Cambodia.
As late as February 1975 Soviet spokesmen were insisting that neither
side in the ,Cambodian civil war was capable of victory, and that the
only solution to the conflict was a coalition settlement on the
Laotian model. It was not until late March that the Soviets moved
to break relations with the tottering Lon Nol government, much too
late to affect their standing with the Khmer Rouge.
Moscow's vistas are further darkened by the mounting signs
of friction between the Khmer Rouge and .the North Vietnamese. The
Khmer Rouge are moving with dispatch to expel the remnants of the
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, have preeented the Vietnamese
with a fait accompli with their occupation of disputed islands
in the Gulf of Thailand, and have engaged in sporadic border
Lighting with the Vietnamese. For the short run, at least, Soviet
hopes that Cambodia would fall under the sway of the North Vietnamese
seem without foundation.
- 54
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-sflq_7A
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
The Soviets so far have accepted the snubs and abuse which
the Cambodians have directed their way with relative calm. They
have not commented publicly on the ill treatment of their nationals
and the violation of their embassy, although they have protested
privately. Their only open show of displeasure was made during
Brezhnev'sNLE. Day speech, when he conspicuously omitted mention
of the Cambodians while extending fervid congratulations to the
Vietnamese.
The Soviets will probably opt to continue to extend the hand
of friendship-- and aid -- to the Cambodians in the hope that
they will eventually modify their hostility toward Moscow. In
somewhat similar circumstances, they have endured considerable
abuse at the hands of the Albanians while still continuing to
extend the olive branch from time to tiMe. At the same time, they
?
will be realistic enough to realize that there is no real prospect
of change in the immediate future; a circumstance which they can
accept with minimum discomfort as long as their relations with the
more important Vietnamese remain good. They might even see some
advantage in being completely disassociated from a Cambodia which
bids fair to be an abrasive presence in Southeast Asia.
D Regional Goals
It seems clear that the Soviets would prefer to see order
and stability return to Southeast Asia, and will counsel Hanoi
against the export of revolution. The pro-Chinese affiliations
- 55 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
IIP
of the existing insurrectionary or underground forces in the
region -- in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia -- provide a firm
foundation to this policy orientation, especially in light of
Moscow's recent experiences with the Cambodians. Their record
of performance in Laos and Cambodia underlines their distaste for
unpredictable changes which threaten to undermine more important
Soviet objectives in the West and in the major Asian countries,
such as Japan and India.
In addition to its internal logic, there is considerable
objective evidence that this is indeed the Soviet position. Soviet
propaganda has routinely attacked the Chinese for their "subversive
activities" in such countries as Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and
Thailand. The Soviets have in fact loudly condemned the various
Chinese-oriented insurgencies in these countries and denied their
communist credentials. Soviet preferences have also been evident
in the tone of public commentary on developments in Indo-China,
which have laid heavy stress on the tasks of "rehabilitation"
which lie ahead and on the significance of peace in Indo-China
for the prospects of detente.
The Soviets can be expected to try to capitalize on the new?
sense of insecurity felt by Thailand, Malaysia, and the other
Asian neighbors of the new Indo-Chinese regimes to promote its
scheme for an Asian collective security pact. This project,
which among other things would commit the signatories to avoid
-56--
25X1
IL/ , NO Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
L24.
25X1
?
I
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
lup
interference in each other's internal affairs, will continue to
surface from time to time in spite of its heretofore tepid recep-
tion by the Asian addressees of Soviet approaches. Despite Moscow's
pious denials, the Chinese are undoubtedly quite right in assuming
that it is intended to isolate China diplomatically from its Asian
neighbors.
While there is little reason to doubt Soviet preferences in
Southeast Asia, there is reason to question the Soviets' ability
to impose their preferences on the region or even on their erst-
while allies in Hanoi. Moscow may caution Hanoi against increasing
its involvement in the affairs of Thailand, but it would see little
profit in directly confronting a Vietnamese decision to act other-
wise. Hanoi is, at the moment, their only high card in the Indo-
Chinese game. However, because the Chinese are likely to retain
considerable influence over the Thai Communist Party, the Soviets
are unlikely to endorse its insurgency even if the Vietnamese
continue to aid it. Thus far, since the fall of Cambodia and
Vietnam, the Soviets have in fact continued to condemn the Thai
insurgents as Chinese "mercenaries."
PROSPECTS
The Soviets have no clear idea of what the future holds for
them in Southeast Asia. Soviet officials noted glumly as the war
In Vietnam ground to a close that there were too many unknown
factors to enable them to predict what the new constellation of
-57-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1
,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/05: LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
- J
forces in the area would be. They pointed out that these include
the quadrangular interaction between Peking, Washington, Moscow,
and Hanoi; relations between the North Vietnamese and the Viet
Cong; between the Viet Cong and other South Vietnamese; between
the Khmer Rouge and the Sihanouk loyalists; and between the Pathet
Lao and the other Laotians. They could have added to the list
relations between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese and between
the new communist regimes and communist insurrectionaries in
neighboring countries.
One unexpected result which could develop from the new situa-
tion could be a coincidence of Soviet and Chinese efforts to
maintain an American presence in the area, each for their own
reasons. The Soviets have already hinted at their interest in
furthering better relations between Washington and the two Viet-
nams, and in having the US assume part of the aid burden. The
Chinese, for their part, are loathe to see the Americans leave
the Soviets a wider freedom of action in the area.
-58-
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/08/05 : LOC-HAK-539-7-2-4
25X1
25X1