MEETING WITH JAMES R. SCHLESINGER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-539-3-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1975
• Content Type: MISC

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
CM-
MEETING WITH JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Thursday, July 24, 1975
IT: 00 p.m. (45 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Henry A. Kissinger
1. PURPOSE
4 ,40
tri4/7,5
To hear Secretary Schlesinger's views on the future of the
Intelligence Community.
U. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Secretary Schlesinger requested a meeting with
you to discuss intelligence. We anticipate that he will empha-
size the future structure and management of the Intelligence
Community. The written comments which Secretary Schlesinger
has submitted on the Rockefeller and Murphy Commission
recommendations are at Tabs A and B respectively. In his
comments, Secretary Schlesinger characterizes most of the
thirty Rockefeller Commission recommendations as "thoughtful
and constructive". His memorandum specifically addresses
only the ten recommendations which he feels would benefit
from revision. Secretary Schlesinger considers the ten Murphy
Commission recommendations on intelligence for the most part
!treasonable and sound". He points out, however, that success
in carrying out the recommended structural and procedural
changes does depend on such factors as the manner of imple-
mentation, the selection of key personnel and the clear definition
of organizational tasks and roles.
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OSD, DIA reviews
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Two important points which Secretary Schlesinger covers
in his memoranda, and may wish to discuss with you are the
roles of the DCI and of PFIAB . Secretary Schlesinger favors
separating the position of Director of CIA and that of the
President's intelligence advisor and manager of the Intelligence
Community (Tab B, response to Recommendation No. 46).
Secretary Schlesinger questions the advisability of expanding
the functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, as recommended in the Rockefeller Commission report.
He points out that full implementation of this recommendation
would place PFIAB in direct competition with the statutory
members of the National Security Council, with OMB and
with Congressional oversight committees (Tab A, response?
to Recommendation No. 5).
For your convenience, the thirty recommendations from the
Rockefeller Commission report are listed at Tab C; the ten
Murphy Commission recommendations on intelligence are
included in Secretary Schlesinger's memorandum at Tab B.
In early 1971, while serving in 0M13, Secretary Schlesinger
submitted a report recommending a fundamental reorgani-
zation of the Intelligence Community (copy at Tab D). This
report was the basis for President Nixon's directive of
November 5, 1971 for the Organization and Management of
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community (copy at Tab E) .
In his report, Secretary Schlesinger made a strong case
for a powerful Director of National Intelligence. Almost
the entire intelligence budget would be appropriated to
the office of the Director of National Intelligence. And,
in addition to budgetary control, the Director would be
responsible for operating the government's principal intel-
ligence production and national estimating organization.
B. Participants: Secretary Schlesinger and General Scowcroft
C. Press Arrangements: White House Photographer only. Meeting
not to be announced.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/XGDS
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Ill. TALKING POINTS
1. I welcome this opportunity to hear your views on intelligence
and the Intelligence Community.
2. I have seen your written comments on the recommendations
on intelligence in the reports of the Rockefeller and Murphy
Commissions.
3. I am not yet prepared to discuss the comments received from
other agency and department heads on the recommendations
in these Reports. We all recognize the critical importance
to the national security of the decisions which must be made
in the coming months on the future structure and direction
of our intelligence agencies. These decisions must be made
deliberately and with full consideration of diverse views
and contributions.
4. I am particularly interested in your views because you have
had the, experience of seeing the Intelligence Community from
several key vantage points. After preparing a detailed proposal
for intelligence reorganization while you were at OMB, you
had the opportunity, as DCI, of observing the Intelligence
Community operating under the reorganization directed by
President Nixon in 1971. And, of course, in your position
as Secretary of Defense you now manage the major portion
of the Intelligence Community's budget and resources.
5. I will give your suggestions and advice careful consideration
in reaching my decisions on how the government should structure
and control its future intelligence activities.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/XGDS
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Attachments
Tab A - Secretary Schlesinger's memorandum of 25 June 1975 on the
Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
Tab B - Secretary Schlesinger's memorandum of 19 July 1975 on the
Murphy Commission intelligence recommendations.
Tab C - List of the Rockefeller Commission recommendations.
Tab D - The 1971 Schlesinger "Review of the Intelligence Community",
submitted to President Nixon by Henry A. Kissinger and
George P. Shultz.
Tab E - President Nixon's November 5, 1971 memorandum on the
Organization and Management of TheU.S. Foreign Intelligence
Community.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/CODEWORD/XGDS
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THE SECF:11TARY OF DEFENSE
'WASHINGTON. U. C. 20301
25 June 1975
NEMORANDUM FOR The President
FROM: Secretary SchlesiagerA4s41
1 *
SUBJECT: Comments on the Rockefeller Panel Recommendations
Host of the recommendations In the Report are thoughtful and
constructive. .If implemented, they should significantly reduce
the likelihood of the CIA again becoming embroiled in controversial
domestic activity. Several of the recommendations, however, could
benefit by some additions or deletions. The following comments are
addressed to those specific recommendations:
Recommendation (1)
"Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947 should be
amended in the form set forth in Appendix VI to this Report. These'
amendments in summary would:
Vake explicit the CIA's activity must be related to foreign
intelligence.
() Clarify the resnonsibilitv.of the CIA to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure..."
COID1F.NT:
Present language in the National Security Act makes the DCI
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods. The
Commission's recommendation would revise the Act to assign the
functions to CIA as an agency. The DCI rather than the CIA should
continue to be assigned this responsibility.
Recommendation (3)
"The rrvsident sheuld recommend to Congress the establishment of
a joint cormirtee on invelli,ge_nre to ossnme the oversight role currentiv
played by the Armed Ser.elees.ComAttees."
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COMMENT:
As written, this Recommendation suggests that such a joint com-
mittee would have jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community
not just the Central intelligence Agency. If so, its creation would
result in curious jurisdictional problems between committees. For
example, Defense agencies such as DIA and NSA would come under the
purview of the joint committee, both Armed Services Committees and
.both Appropriations Committees. If any recommendation is made on this
point, I urge that Recommendation (3) be rewritten to call for the
establishment of a Joint Committee on the Central Intelligence Agency
rather than a Joint Committee on Intelligence.
Recommendation (4)
?
"Concryees should give careful consideration to the question of
whether the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent, be
*made public, earticularlv in view of the revisions of Article I
Section 9, clauSe 7 of the Constitution."
COMMENT:
Once CIA's budget is made public there will certainly be increased
pressure to rale public the budgets for each of the other intelligence
agencies such as NSA, DIA, the NRO, etc. Publication of a lump sum -
for any single year for any one of the intelligence agencies might be
-relatively harmless but over a period of several successive years such
-publication will reveal changes which could point towards sensitive
new projects.
?
Recommendation (5)
-?.?. _ ?
"(0 The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligerice
Advisory Board should be expanded to include oversieht.of the CIA.
This expnn-!cd overs lit board should be corvosed of distinguished
citizens with varyin!! bacttgrounds and exoerience. It should be
headed by a full-time Chairman and should have a full-time staff
appropriate to its role. Its functions related to the CIA should
include:
(1) Assessing compliance by the CIA with a
? statutory authority.
(2) Assessing,the quality of foreign Intel-
21mece collection.
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(3) ik2?,a.111A_IIIS.?slalitmJILisisqlza_1115.1tka
Aigence.estiMates..
(4) Assessing the quality of the organization
of the CIA.
(5) Assessing. the quality of the management
Jof the CIA.
(6) Making recommendations with respect to the
above subiects to the President and the Director of
Central Intelligence, and, where a DTO riate the
Attorney General.
(b) The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.
It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and
activities on its own initiative.
(c) The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to?
report directly to the Board, after having, notified the Director of
Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate."
COMMENT:
? This Recommendation, if fully implemented, would place the
PFIAB in direct competition, not only with the statutory members -
of the National Security Council but also with OMB and Congressional
oversight committees. The members of the National Security Council
are in the best position to assess the quality of the intelligence
collected and produced by CIA. Moreover, the PFIAB ought to retain
a certain flexibility in its charter so that it can be used effectively
by the President for ad hoc projects and oversight functions. The
President currently has sufficient authority to utilize the Board in
. a broader oversight fashion, if he so chooses.
Recommendation (7)
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"(a) Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central
Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence and
integrity. In making this appointment. considerations should be
given to individuay outside the career service of the CIA, although
romotion? from within should not be barred. Experience in intellience
service is not necessarily a prere uisite for the position; management
and administrative skills are at least as important as the technical
expertise which can always be
found in an able deputy.
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(b) Althouch the Director serves at the pleasure of the
President, no Director should serve in that eosition for more
than 10 years,"
COMMENT:
It is a good idea to limit the tenure of the DCI; however,
if this is to be effective, it needs to be written into the
National Security Act.
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. Recommendation (8)
?
"(a) The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
should be reconstituted to provide for two such deputies, in addition
to the four heads of the acencv's directorate. One deuuty would act
? as the achlinistrative officer, freeing the Director from day-to-day
management duties. The other deputy should be a military officer.
servicing the functions of fostering relations with the military and
?.providing the Agency with technical expertise on military intellience
requirements. ? .
?Cb) The advise and consent of the Senate should he required for
the appointment of each deputy director of Central Intelligence."
COMMENT: .
There is much merit to this Recommendation. Creation of a Deputy
Directorate for a military officer woad be accomplished by designating
the Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community as that position.
Care should be taken however, in filling the other Deputy spot. One
should be alert to the possibility that the CIA professionals might
attempt to freeze out the DCI and keep him ignorant of what was actually
happening within the Agency itself.
Recommendation (9)
"(a) The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status
equivalent to that of the DeDIAV Directors in charge of the four
DireCtorates within the CIA..."
COMMENT:
It is not necessary that the Inspector General be upgraded to
a status equivalent to the Deputy Directors at CIA. It is more
Important that he be given authority to conduct thorough investigations.
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Recommendation (19)
Na) In cases involving serious or continuing security
violations as determined by the Security Committee of the U.S.
Intelligence Board, the Committee should be authorized to recom-
mend in writing to the Director of Central Intellieence (with a
copy to the NSC) that the case be referred to the FBI for further
investigation, under procedures to be developed by the Attorney
General..."
COMMENT:
The National Security Act assigns to the DCI responsibility
for protecting intelligence sources and methods. The Security
Commfttee of USIB provides staff support to the DCI. Recommendation
(19) should be rewritten as follows:
(a) "In cases involving serious or continuing security
violations, as determined by the DCI, the DCI should refer the
case to the FBI for further investigation, under procedures to
-be-developed by the Attorney General."
Recommendation (20)
ane CIA and other comnonents and agencies of the intelligence
community should conduct periodic reviews of all classified material
? originatine within that Department or Agency with a view to de-
classifying as much of that material as Possible. The purpose of
such information that should properly be disclosed."
COMMENT:
Automatic downgrading of classified waterials.and periodic'
review are provide for in existing directives. In particular,
. Executive Order 11652.
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Recommendation (21)
"The Committee endorses legislation, drafted with appropriate
safeguards of the constitutional' rie,hts of all affected and to
individuals, which ?would make it a criminal offense for employees
or former employees of the CIA willfullv to divulge to any un-
authorized person classified information pertnining to foreien
intelligence or the collection thereof obtained during the course
of their employment."
COMMENT:-
. Because of the serious and growing problem of protecting highly :
sensitive information affecting the national security from unauthorized
disclosures, it is recommended that the language of the fourth line of
Recommendation .(2.1) be amended to read: "Employees of any Federal
Department or Agency willfully to divulge..."
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20301
JUL 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Secretary Schlesinger0
SUBJECT: Comments on the Recommendations Regarding Intelligence in the
Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
The recommendations for the most part are reasonable and sound. It should be
noted, however, that while the structural and procedural changes which the
Commission recommends may be helpful, their success depends on a number of
factors not addressed in the Commission report, such as the manner of im-
plementation, the selection of key personnel, and the clear definition of organi- ?
zational tasks and roles. Comments on specific recommendations are as follows:
Recommendation #46: The DCI should have an office in close proximity to the
White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.
Of more importance than the physical location of the DCI's office
is the question of whether or .not-the DCI should retain his role as
Head of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is my view that as long
as the DCI is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
clandestine services at CIA, he will be unable to perform ade-
quately his larger role as the President's premier intelligence
advisor and as leader and coordinator of the entire intelligence
community. Therefore, I believe that the DCI should be given an
office in close proximity to the President only if one is prepared
to redefine his role so that he is no longer responsible for directly
managing the CIA arid instead, is responsible for managing the
intelligence community and producing national intelligence esti-
mates. I further believe that other arrangements should be made
for managing the CIA.
Recommendation #47: The CIA should be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency
(FIA), an its Director the Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) .
Concur.
Recommendation #48: In order to best utilize the PFIAB:
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-- each incoming President should review and make such changes in PFIAB 'a
membership as may be required to give him high personal confidence in that
body's values and judgement; that
-- he make himself directly available to the Chairman of PFIAB upon the latter's
request; and that
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the PFIAB staff should be increased in size, and drawn in part from sources
outside the intelligence community.
Concur.
Recommendation #49: Covert action cannot be abandoned, but it should be employed
only when clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after a careful
process of high level review.
Concur.
Recommendation #50: As the sensitivity and risks of covert action require appropriate
review and consultation:
? covert action should only be authorized after collective consideration of its bene-
fits and risks by all available 40 Committee members, and that,
? besides granting initial approvals, the 40 Committee should regularly review the
continuing appropriateness of activities still being pursued.
Concur.
Recommendation #51: PL 93-559 be amended to require reporting of covert actions
to the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any requirement
for the personal certification of the President as to their necessity.
I wholeheartedly endorse this proposal which calls for PL 93-559 to
be amended to omit any requirement for the personal certification of
the President.
Recommendation #52: The NSCIC should be actively used as the principal forum
for the resolution, short of the President, of the differing perspectives of intel-
ligence consumers and producers, and should meet frequently for that purpose.
The recomrnenation describes an appropriate role for the NSCIC
In meeting the intelligence needs of senior policy makers. However,
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the effectiveness of the NSCIC will be highly dependent on its ability
to call upon the limited time of decision makers and upon its flexi-
bility in developing different methods to identify and communicate
top level demands. Moreover, the Commission's comment envisions
an NSCIC focused principally on improving intelligence products
rather than on improving the management of the process by which
users and intelligence producers relate. This may be an entirely
appropriate role, but product evaluation and guidance is a time con-
suming and demanding role which necessarily restricts the scope
of the committee's activities.
The recommendation does not respond to the needs of lower level
users of intelligence?the Departments, Services, special agencies,
staffs to senior decision makers, etc. These organizations probably
represent the greatest body of consumers of intelligence data. To
meet their broader needs a process is needed:
-- Which resolves both the short term and longer range
needs of consumers.
-- Which provides effective guidance to intelligence pro-
ducers to meet the needs of both major decision makers
and the larger body of less visible users.
? Which monitors and improves the interaction of intel-
ligence producers and users, such as review procedures
for individual products or groups of products.
The NSCIC recommendation only addresses a portion of these needs.
Recommendation #53: While the intelligence agencies should retain and exercise their
improved competence in the analysis of international economic issues, the Depart-
ments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, and the Council of Economic
Advisors must maintain similar capabilities focused on the analysis of issues involving
their own responsibilities. We believe that, in all four of the Departments, those
capabilities should be significantly strengthened.
ft
Concur.
Recommendation #54: A small staff of the highest quality, drawn from within and
without the intelligence community and responsible for the drafting and review of
NIEs , should be established. This staff, reporting directly to the DFI, should be
charged with reporting clearly any important differences in the views of concerned
agencies, and the reasons for such differences.
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There is no particular advantage to be gained by returning to
r- :the old ONE format which has recently been replaced by the NIO
concept. The key element is the ability to find first-rate people
to write the estimates.
Recommendation #55: a. Under the direction of the DFI, the IC staff should ex-
pand "Perspectives for Intelligence" into an annually revised multi-year plan
for the allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence community. The plan
should be reviewed in USIB and approved by the NSCIC. b. On the basis of
the multi-year plan, the IC staff should prepare an annual Consolidated Foreign
Intelligence Budget. After review by IRAC and OMB, this document should guide
the budget submission of each of the agencies and departments Of the intelligence
community to OMB ? It should also provide a basis for the consideration, by the
proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security, of the funds to be
annually authorized the intelligence community.
There are two points which ought to be made regarding this recom-
mendation. The recommended role for the DFI presupposes that he
his been divested of the special responsibilities which he has his-
torically borne in the clandestine operations area as indicated in
my comment on Recommendation #46. Only under such circumstances
can the DFI's leadership over intelligence community budgetary
matters be?accepted by other elements of the community as legitir' nate.
Thus, the feasibility of this recommendation depends upon structural
reforms which The Murphy Commission has not recommended.
The second point is that as long as the Secretary of Defense has re-
sponsibility for the performance of intelligence elements in the De-
partment of Defense, requisite authority for budgetary matters,
particularly those bearing on the efficacy of the fighting forces, must
be commensurate with the responsibility. Turning such authority
over to a committee will either be disruptive or a sham. Reviews
conducted should not be provided to Committees any more than
other documentation outside the President's budget.
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Recommendations from the Rockefeller Commission Report
RECOMMENDATION (1)
a. Make explicit that the CIA's activities must be related to foreign
intelligence.
b Clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure. (The Agency would be respon-
sible for protecting against unauthorized disclosure within the CIA, and it
would be responsible for providing guidance and technical assistance to
other agency and department heads in protecting against unauthorized
disclosures within their own agencies and departments.)
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's existing authority to collect foreign
intelligence from willing sources within the United States, and, except
as specified by the President in a published Executive Order, prohibit
the CIA from collection efforts within the United States directed at securing
foreign intelligence from unknowing American citizens.
RECOMMENDATION (2)
? The President should by Executive Order prohibit the CIA from the
collection of information about the domestic activities of United States
citizens .(whether by overt or covert means), the evaluation, correlation,
and dissemination of analyses or reports about such activities, and the
storage of such information, with exceptions for the following categories
of persons or activities:
a. Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being considered
for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or indirectly, or others
who require clearance by the CIA to receive classified infor-
mation;
b. Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA facilities
or personnel, provided that proper coordination with the FBI
is accomplished;
c. Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal activities
relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper coordi-
nation with the FBI is accomplished.
d. Information which is received incidental to appropriate CIA
activities may be transmitted to an agency with appropriate
jurisdiction, including law enforcement agencies.
Collection of information from normal library sources such as
newspapers, books, magazines and other such documents is not to be
affected by this order.
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Information currently being maintainted which is inconsistent with
the order should be destroyed at the conclusion of the current congressional
investigations or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen its files and eliminate all material
inconsistent with the order.
The order should be issued after consultation with the National Security
Council, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
Any modifications of the order would be permitted only through published
amendments.
RECOMMENDATION (3)
The President should recommend to Congress the establishment of a
Joint Committee on Intelligence to assume the oversight role currently
played by the Armed Services Committees.
RECOMMENDATION (4)
Congress should give careful consideration to the question whether
the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent, be made public,
particularly in view of the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7
of the Constitution.
RECOMMENDATION (5)
a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA. This expanded
oversight board should be composed of distinguished citizens with varying
backgrounds and experience. It should be headed by a full-time chairman
and should have a full-time staff appropriate to its role. Its functions related
to the CIA should include:
I. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory authority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
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5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above subjects
to the President and the Director of Central Intelligence, and,
where appropriate, the Attorney General.
b. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA. It
should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and activities
on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to report
directly to the Board, after having notified the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION (6)
The Department of Justice and the CIA should establish written
guidelines for the handling of reports of criminal violations by employees
of the Agency or relating to its affairs. These guidelines should require
that the criminal investigation and the decision whether to prosecute be
made-by the Department of Justice, after consideration of Agency views
regarding the impact of prosecution on the national security. The Agency
should be permitted to conduct such investigations as it requires to deter-
mine whether its operations have been jeopardized. The Agency should
scrupulously avoid exercise of the prosecutorial function.
RECOMMENDATION (7)
a. Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central
Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence, and
integrity. In making this appointment, consideration should be given
to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA, although
promotion from within should not be barred. Experience in intelligence
service is not necessarily a prerequisite for the position; management
and administrative skills are at least as important as the technical ex-
pertise which can always be found in an able deputy.
b. Although the Director serves at the pleasure of the President,
no Director should serve in that position for more than 10 years.
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RECOMMENDATION (8)
a. The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should be
reconstituted to provide for two deputies, in addition to the four heads
of the Agency's directorates. One deputy would act as the administrative
officer, freeing the Director from day-to-day management duties. The
other deputy should be a military officer, serving the functions of
fostering relations with the military and providing the Agency with technical
expertise on military intelligence requirements.
b. The advice and consent of the Senate should be required for the
appointment of each Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
RECOMMENDATION (9)
a. The Inspector General should be upgraded to a status equivalent
to that of the deputy directors in charge of the four directorates within
the CIA.
b. The Office of Inspector General,should?be staffed by outstanding,
experienced officers from both inside and outside the CIA, with ability
to understand the various branches of the Agency.
c. The Inspector General's duties with respect to domestic CIA
activities should include periodic reviews of all offices within the United
States. He should examine each office for compliance with CIA authority
and regulations as well as for the effectiveness of their programs in
implementing policy objectives.
d. The Inspector General should investigate all reports from employees
concerning possible violations of the CIA statute.
e. The Inspector General should be given complete access to all
information in the CIA relevant to his reviews.
f. An effective Inspector General's office will require a larger staff,
more frequent reviews , and highly qualified personnel.
g. Inspector General reports should be provided to the National Security
Council and the recommended executive oversight body. The Inspector General
should have the authority, when he deems it appropriate, after notifying the
Director of Central Intelligence, to consult with the executive oversight body
on any CIA activity (see Recommendation 5).
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RECOMMENDATION (10)
a. The Director should review the composition and operation of
the Office of General Counsel and the degree to which this office is
consulted to determine whether the Agency is receiving adequate legal
assistance and representation in view of current requirements.
b. Consideration should be given to measures which would strengthen
the office's professional capabilities and resources including, among other
things, (1) occasionally departing from the existing practice of hiring
lawyers from within the Agency to bring in seasoned lawyers from private
practice as well as to hire law school graduates without prior CIA experience;
(2) occasionally assigning Agency lawyers to serve a tour of duty elsewhere
in the government to expand their experience; (3) encouraging lawyers to
participate in outside professional activities.
RECOMMENDATION (11)
To a degree consistent with the need for security, the CIA should be
encouraged to provide for increased lateral movement of personnel among
the directorates and to bring persons with outside experience into the
Agency at all levels
RECOMMENDATION (12)
a. The Agency should issue detailed guidelines for its employees
further specifying those activities within the United States which are
permitted and those which are prohibited by statute, Executive Orders,
and NSC and DCI directives.
b. These guidelines should also set forth the standards which govern
CIA activities and the general types of activities which are permitted and
prohibited. They should, among other things, specify that:
- Clandestine collection of intelligence directed against
United States citizens is prohibited except as specifically
permitted by law or published Executive Order.
- Unlawful methods or activities are prohibited.
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Prior approval of the DCI shall be required for any activities
which may raise questions of compliance with the law or
with Agency regulations.
c. The guidelines should also provide that employees with information
on possibly improper activities are to bring it promptly to the attention of
the Director of Central Intelligence or the Inspector General.
RECOMMENDATION (13)
a. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelligence
that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic mail openings except with
express statutory authority in time of war. (See also Recommendation 23.)
b. The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelligence
that mail cover examinations are to be in compliance with postal regulations;
they are to be undertaken only in furtherance of the CIA's legitimate activities
and then only on a limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of
national security.
RECOMMENDATION (14)
a. A capability should be developed within the FBI, or elsewhere
in the Department of Justice, to evaluate, analyze, and coordinate intelligence
and counterintelligence collected by the FBI concerning espionage, terrorism,
and other related matters of internal security.
b. The CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelligence
committees to foreign intelligence matters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to continue to look to the CIA for
such foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence as is relevant to FBI needs.
RECOMMENDATION (15)
a. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what
are essentially internal security tasks.
b. The CIA should resist any efforts, whatever their origin, to involve
it again in such improper activities.
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c. The Agency should guard against allowing any, component (like
the Special Operations Group) to become so self-contained and isolated
from top leadership that regular supervision and review are lost.
d. The files of CHAOS project which have no foreign itntelligence value
should be destroyed by the Agency at the conclusion of the current congres-
sional investigations, or as soon thereafter as permitted by law.
RECOMMENDATION (16)
The CIA should not infiltrate dissident groups or other organizations
of Americans in the absence of a written determination by the Director
of Central Intelligence that such action is necessary to meet a clear danger
to Agency facilities, operations, or personnel and that adequate coverage
by law enforcement agencies is unavailable.
RECOMMENDATION (17)
All files on individuals accumulated by the Office of Security in the
program relating to dissidents should be identified, and, except where
necessary for a legitimate foreign intelligence activity, be destroyed at
the conclusion of the current congressional investigations, or as soon
thereafter as permitted by law.
RECOMMENDATION (18)
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should issue clear guidelines
setting forth the situations in which the CIA is justified in conducting its
own investigation of individuals presently or formerly affiliated with it.
b. The guidelines should permit the CIA to conduct investigations of
such persons only when the Director of Central Intelligence first determines
that the investigation is necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods
the disclosure of which might endanger the national security.
c. Such investigations must be coordinated with the FBI whenever sub-
stantial evidence suggesting espionage or violation of a federal criminal
statute is discovered.
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RECOMMENDATION (19)
a. In cases involving serious or continuing security violations, as
determined by the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence
Board, the Committee should be authorized to recommend in writing to
the Director of Central Intelligence (with a copy to the National Security
Council) that the case be referred to the FBI for further investigation,
under procedures to be developed by the Attorney General.
b. These procedures should include a requirement that the FBI
accept such referrals without regard to whether a favorable prosecutive
opinion is issued by the Justice Department. The CIA should not engage
in such further investigations.
RECOMMENDATION (20)
The CIA and other components and agencies of the intelligence
community should conduct periodic reviews of all classifeid material
originating within those departments or agencies, with a view to
declassifying as much of that material as possible. The purpose of
such review would be to assure the public that it has access to all
information that should properly be disclosed.
RECOMMENDATION (21)
The Commission endorses legislation, drafted with appropriate
safeguards of the constitutional rights of all affected individuals, which
would make it a criminal offense for employees or former employees of
the CIA willfully to divulge to any unauthorized person classified infor-
mation pertaining to foreign intelligence or the collection thereof obtained
during the course of their employment.
RECOMMENDATION (22)
The CIA should not undertake physical surveillance (defined as
systematic observation) of Agency employees contractors or related
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personnel within the United States without first obtaining written approval
of the Director of Central Intelligence.
RECOMMENDATION (23)
In the United States and its possessions, the CIA should not intercept
wire or oral communications or otherwise engage in activities that would
require a warrant if conducted by a law enforcement agency. Responsibility
for such activities belongs with the FBI.
RECOMMENDATION (24)
The CIA should strictly adhere to established legal procedures
governing access to federal income tax information.
RECOMMENDATION (25)
CIA investigation records should show that each investigation was
duly authorized, and by whom, and should clearly set forth the factual
basis for undertaking the investigation and the results of the investigation.
RECOMMENDATION (26)
a. A single and exclusive high-level channel should be established
for transmission of all White House staff requests to the CIA. This channel
should run between an officer of the National Security Council staff desig-
nated by the President and the office of the Director or his Deputy.
b . All Agency officers and employees should be instructed that any
direction or request reaching them directly and out of regularly established
channels should be immediately reported to the Director of Central Intelligence.
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RECOMMENDATION (27)
In accordance with its present guidelines, the CIA should not again
engage in the testing of drugs on unsuspecting persons.
RECOMMENDATION (28)
Testing of equipment for monitoring conversations should not
involve unsuspecting persons living within the United States.
RECOMMENDATION (29)
A civilian agency committee should be reestablished to oversee the
civilian uses of aerial intelligence photography in order to avoid any con-
cerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-developed system.
RECOMMENDATION (30)
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI should
prepare and submit for approval by the National Security Council a detailed
agreement setting forth the jurisdiction of each agency and providing for
effective liaison with respect to all matters of mutual concern. This agree-
ment should be consistent with the provisions of law and with other applicable
recommendations of this Report.
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?
control systems
THE WHITE HOUSE jointly
? ? WASHINGTON
1,diEMOR7.NDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Review of the Intelligence Community
16"-Gdo 3
Your expression of serious concern about the performance and
cost of the intelligence community has led to a detailed
review of the community's present structure and a searching
analysis of how you might improve its operation. The review
shows that the overriding weakness of the community is the
absence of authoritative leadership. Appearances to the
contrary, the community lacks both a leader and a staff
unit -- intimately involved with programmatic issues but
without a vested interest in any particular collection system
or program -- to solve recurrent problems of overlap and
duplication, make efficient choices between new and comoeting
systems, and consider the balance between various methods of
collection and between collection and production. The Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI), while nominal head, suffers from
his many burdensome and often conflicting roles; in addition
he directly controls only of the community's current
budget The United States Intelligence Board
(USIB) - in which the DCI 'is assisted by the heads or the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the Service intelligence chiefs, and State/INR - has also
proved incapable of decisive action with respect to community
matters. Even within the Department of Defense which con-
tains 85 percent of the resources, effective direction and
control is lacking.
In the absence of leadership, the community has accumulated .a?
host of serious problems. The National Security, Council
Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) iwhich established ?the division
of responsibilities and govern community relations are largely
obsolete. The blurring of traditional community boundaries has
caused its activities to become increasingly fragmented and
functionally disorganized. Under the impact of new technology,
a generally unhealthy and costly competition in. collection ? has
been fostered, largely without guidance or planning. At the
same time, the concerns of the intelligence consumer and the.
welfare of the producer have been relegated to the sidelines.
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These conclusions are not new. Presidential commission, the
PFIAB, special study groups, and BOB/OMB have often expressed
dissatisfaction with the performance and cost of the intelligence
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411
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-
., iriity and recommended various piecemeal organizational.
reforms. In the absence of. forceful and persistent leadershie.
and under the impact of continuing technology change, these
reforms have largely failed. We believe that the solutisn to
the community!s problems and achievement of your objecti7es
requires major ?changes in. the organization and functionin:s of
the community. ? These changes must attack three .major-problams:
(1) the .leadership of. the community as a whole, (2) direction
and control of Department of Defense intelligence activities,
and (3) the division of functional responsibilities.
We recommend the following major changes:
The role of the DCT should be mifica and CIA re?
structured so that they are separated from direct
-responsibility for the conduct of intelligence .collec-
tion and ?covert action operations which, along. with
'residual activities, would be inherited by a new
agency; the DCI would acquire a strong Presidential
mandate to plan, program, and review all intelligence
resources and continue to produce all national intel-
ligence required by the President, the NSC, and other
national level consumers. A reorganization tlan ?fe)r
acjeny is required.
h Director ofDefense Intellivence should be created
in order to direct and control all Defense intelli-
gence resources; the, DDI would concentrate on rational-
izing Defense collection and procezsing capabilities.
Substantive intelligence production would remain. under
'the Defense Intelligence Agency, which would continue
to report through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The. 1,7SCIDs should ho revised to redraw current functional
boundaries among intelligence agencies; in particulsr
11SCID 01 should be changed to make the United States
Intelligence Board strictly an advisory body to the DCI.
As the attached report indicates, there are other courses of.
action, both more and less radical, that you could .take in
light of your. objectives. We believe, however, that our rec-
ommendations constitute the right steps at this time. They
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.%
focus on the establishment of leadership centers both within
the community as a whole and within the Department of Defense;
they require minimum legislative action and cause minimum
disruption of the community commensurate with your concerns;
and they leave you the option. of further modification later.
If you approve the recommended actions, we will prepare the
necessary implementing letters and directives.
"Henry A. Kissihger
Enclosures
TOP SECRET
George P. Shultz
6.4 ?
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4
nitn(1.1.0 vt
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NSA, NRO reviews
completed
A REVIEW OF THE -
INTELLIGENCE COMINIT
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onfile OMB release
instructions apply
' March 10, 1971
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I.
H.
.
VI.
?
VIII. CHANGING FUNCTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND COSTS 39
IX. TOWARD IMPROVEMENTS. IN THE PRODUC'e 44
APPENDICES
? 411
TABLE OF CONTENTS
' Page
INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INTELLIGENCE
1
COST TRENDS
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRODUCT
ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMAS
13'
-SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
'
20
?
LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY ..
25
.DEPARTMLCT OF DEFENSE LEADERSHIP ......
34
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?
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INTELLIGENCE
The operations of the intelligence community have pro-
duced two disturbing phenomena. The first is an impressive
. rise in their size and cost. .The second is an apparent in-
ability to achieve a commen'surate improvement in'the scope
and overall quality of intelligence products.
During the past decade alone, the cost of the intelli-
gence community has almost doubled. At the same time, spec-
tacular increases in collection activities have occurred.
Where satellite photography is concerned, the increases have
led to greatly improved knowledge 'about the military capa-
bilities of potential enemies. But exparded collection by
means other ,than photography has not brought about a similar
reduCtion in our uncertainty about the intentions, doctrines,
and political processes of foreign powers. Instead, the
growth in raw intelligence -- and here satellite photography
must be included -- has come to serve as a proxy for improved
analysis, inference, and estimation.
The following report seeks to identity the causes of
these two phenomena and the areas in which constructive change
can take place. Its principal conclusion is that while a
number of specific measures may help to bring about a closer
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relationship between cost and effectiveness, the main hope
'for. doing so lies in a fundamental reform of the intelligence
dommunity's dedisionmaking bodies and procedures.
This conclusion is advanced in full recognition that
reorganization will, at best, only create the conditions in
which wise and imaginative leadership can flourish. In the
absence of reorganization, however, the habits of intelligence
community will remain as difficult to conrol as was the per-
formance of the Department of Defense prior to the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958.
?ev".
? I
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3
.COST 'TRENDS
To understand the phenomenon of increasing costs, it
is necessary to consider briefly the organizational history
of the intelligence community. The National 'Security Act of
1947 and the National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs) of the late 1940s and early 1950s established
the basic division of responsibilities among agencies and
departments. This division had its origins in traditional
distinctions between military and non-military intelligence,
between tactical and national intelligence, and between
communications (COMINT) and non-communications (or agent)
intelligence. Thus, CIA was directed t employ clandestine
agents to collet "non-military" intelligence and produce
"national" intelligence. The Department of State was made
responsible for the .overt collection of "non-military" in-
telligence. The National Security Agency (NSA) was estab-
lished to manage COMINT collection. The Military Services
were instructed to collect "military" intelligence as well
as maintain tactical intelligence capabilities for use in
wartime. Al]. were permitted to produce "departmental" in-
telligence to meet their separate needs. While not ideal,
this division of functions and responsibilities worked rca-
sonably well into the mid-1950s.
Since that time, these traditional distinctions and
the organizational arrangements' which accompanied them have
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become increasingly, obsolescent. The line between "military"
and "non-military" has faded; scientific and technical in-
telligence with both civilian and military applications has
become a principal area of endeavor, for almost all intelli-
gence organizations Similarly, under the old distinctions,
the national leadership -- namely the President and the NSC
1- concerned itself with "national" intelligence, while pre-
sumably only battlefield commanders cared about tactical in-
telligence. But a rapidly advancing technology which has
revolutionized the collection, processing, and communication
of intelligence data casts doubt on the validity of the dis-
tinctions.
Simultaneously, technological advan-es have created new
collection possibilities which do not fit conveniently within
a structure based on traditional distinctions and were not
covered in the original directives. Satellite photography,
telemetry intercept, electronic intelligence (ELINT), acoustic
detection, and radar have become some of the most important and
7-vital methods of intelligence collection not currently covered
by any uniform national policy.
The breakdown of the old distinctions and the appearance
of new collection methods has been a simultaneous process
raising a host of questions about intelligence organization.
Is MINT related to COMINT, is it technical or military in
;:.:t .? ? ?,*.
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nature, is it of primary interest to tactical or national
consumers? Where should the radar tracking of missile or
the acoustic surveillance of Soviet ballistic missile sub-
marines fit? Is telemetry more similar to COMINT or to
ELINT; who should analyze it? Who should be responsible for
satellite photography? On the More mundane, but nonetheless
critical level, questions arise about the organizational re-
sponsibilities for such topics as Sihanoukville supply in-
filtration, VC/!VA order of battle, and missile deployments
in the Suez Canal area. Are these military or non-military
issues? Is the intelligence about then tactical or national?
Who should be responsible for. collection and what collection
resources should be tasked?
In the absence of an authoritative governing body to
resolve these issues, the community has resorted to a series'
of compromise splutions that adversely affect its performance
and cost. In general these Compromises have favored ?multiple
and diffuse collection programs and the neglect of difficult
and searching analytical approaches. .The most serious of the
.resulting problems ? are outlined below 3,r1 brief form, and dis-
cussed in more detail in the appendices..
.1. The distribution of intelligence functions has become
increasingly fragmented and disorganized.
? The old distinctions among national, departmental,
and tactical intelligence are out of date. Today,
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CIA is as likely to produce intelligence relevant
to, say, NvA/vg order of battle As DIA or MACV,
just as MACV produces many reports that are of
\interest to the national leadership.
0 Similarly, the relatively neat ordering of collec-
tion functions that existed after World War II has
broken down. CIA now engages in a wide range of
collection activities -- aircraft and satellite
photography, BUNT, COMINT, radar, telemetry as
well as clandestine, and overt agent collection.
NSA has added telemetry and ELINT to its COMINT
capabilities. The Services now have a full panoply
of sensors to perform a variety of functions --
tactical intelligence, surveillance, early warning,
and so oa.
Table I illustrates how almost all major com-
ponents of the intelligence community are in-
.volved in each of its various collection and
production functions.
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2. The community's activities are dominated by collection
competition and have become unproductively duplicative.
Despite past massive increases in
the collection of photography, COMINT, ELINT, radar
and other sensor data, sizeable additional collec-
tion capabilities are planned to become operational
this calendar year:
0 The blurring of traditional boundaries has encouraged
community members to engage in a competitive struggle
for survival and dominance, primarily through new
technology, which has resulted in the redundant
acquisition of data at virtually all levels --
tactical, theater command, and national.
* Gross .redundancies in collection capabilities have
become commonplace as exemplified by aircraft in
. both. CIA and Defense which collect photography,
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IAN-COMINT
411 gRoninystems Jointly
and by aircraft which compete with satellites in
the collection of BUNT.
o Collection capabilities remain in operation beyond
their useful lives. As older systems lose their
attractiveness at the national level, they are
taken over at the command or tactical level where
they duplicate higher level activities or collect
data of little value.
Simultaneously, compartmentalization within various
security systems has served to hide or obscure com-
petitive capabilities from evaluation, comparison,
and tracaeoff analysis.
3. The community's growth is largely unplanned and un-
guided.
O Serious forward planning id often lacking as decisions
are made about the allocation of resources..
O The consumer frequently fails to specify his product
? needs for the producer; the producer, uncertain about
eventual demands, encourages the collector to pro-
vide data without selectivity or priority; and the
collector emphasizes quantity rather than quality.
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4. The community's activities have become exceedingly ex-
pensive.
The fragmentation of intelligence functions and the
competitive drive for improved collection technology
are important reasons. why the cost Of intelligence
has almost doubled during the past decade.
o A significant part of this cost growth is attributable
to the acquisition of expensive new systems without
simultaneous reductions in obsolescent collection.
.0
programs.
In the absence of planning and guidance, internally
generated values predominate in the community's in-
stitutions. These values favor increasingly sophisti-
cated and expensive collection technologies at the
expense of analytical capabilities.
Few interagency comparisons are contemplated. Po-
.tential tradeoffs between PHOTINT and SIGINT, between
PHOTINT and HUMINT, and between data collection and
analysis are negleCted.
While the budgetary process might be used to curb
some of the more obvious excesses, it cannot sub-
stitute for centralized management of the community.
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III. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRODUCT
In a world of perfect information, there would be no
uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capa-
bilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information,
however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part. Con-
sequently, the intelligence community can at best reduce the
??
uncertainties and construct plausible hypotheses about these
factors on the basis of what continues to be partial and
often conflicting evidence.
Despite the richness of the data made available by modern
methods of collcction, and the rising costs of their acquisi-
tion,*it is. not at all clear that our hypotheses about foreign
intentions, cap.abilities, and activities have improved com
mensurately in scope and quality. Nor can it be asserted with
confidence that the intelligence community has shown much in-
itiative in developing the full range of possible explanations
in light of available data. Among the more recent results of
this failure to acknowledge uncertainty and entertain new
ideas in the face of it, has been a propensity to overlook
such unpleasant possibilities as a large-scale exploitation
of Sihanoukville by the NVA to transship supplies, a continu-
ation of the SS-9 buildup and its possible MIRVing, or Soviet
willingness to invade Czechoslovakia and put forces into the
Middle Ea t.
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iiimmiimmimm No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-539-3-1-9
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- 11 -;
.r.Difficulties of this kind with the intelligence product
are all the more disturbing because the need to explore and
test a number of hypotheses will, if anything, expand as the
Soviets project their military power and come to play a more
direct global role. Yet there is no evidence that the in-
telligence community, given its present structure, will come
to grips with this class of problems.
The community's heavy emphasis on collection is itself
detrimental to correcting product problems. Because each
organization sees the maintenance and expansion of its col-
lection capabilities as the principal route to survival and
strength with the community, there is a strong presumption
in today's intelLigence set-up that additional data collec-
tion rather than improved analysis, will provide the answer
to particular intelligence problems. Tt has become common-
place to translate product criticism into demands for en-
larged collection efforts. Seldom does anyone ask if a
further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth
its cost.
The inevitable result is that production remains the
stepchild of the community. It is a profession that lacks
strong military and civilian career incentives, even within
CIA. The analysts, with a heavy burden of responsibility,
find themselves swamped with data. The consumers, at the
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- 12
same time, treat their product as a free good, so that demand
exceeds supply, priorities are not established the system
? becomes overloaded and the quality of the output suffers.
As if this were not enough, production, instead of guiding
collection, is itself guided by collectors and the impetus
of technology. Since the military are the principal collec-
tors, they are more likely to focus on the needs and interests
of their own Services than on the issues of concern to the
national leadership, and they continue the wasteful practice
of counterpart targeting. Under such difficult conditions,
it is not surprising that hypotheses tend to harden into
dogma, that their sensitivity to changed conditions is not
? articulated', and that new data are not sought to test them.
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- 13 -
'IV, ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMAS
Questions about cost and product might exist even if the
intelligence community possessed strong leadership. It is
noteworthy, however/ that they have arisen under conditions
the most marked of which is a lack of institutions governing
the community with the authority and responsibility to re-
solve issues without excessive compromise, allocate resources
according to criteria of effectiveness, and consider the re-
lationship between cost and substantive output from a national
perspective.
This lack of governing institutions ',terns fundamentally
from the failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to
anticipate the "constitutional" needs of a modern and techno-
logically complex intelligence community. The primary intent
of the Act, understandably, was to prevent a recurrence of the
Intelligence confusions and delays that occurred prior to
Pearl Harbor. These problems were seen as having resulted
from defects in the central processing, production, and dis-
semination of intelligence. The critical need, accordingly,
was to create an organization which would have access to all
intelligence and report its estimates to the national leader-
ship.
In 1947, the size and cost of individual programs were
relatively small, and the scope and nature of the management
?
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control systems jointly.
- 14
problems associated with today's community were not antici-
pated. Conserfuently the issue of how to plan and rationalize
thecollection of intelligence did not seem of great moment,
and the Act did not explicitly provide for a.mechanism to per-
form these functions or evaluate the scope and quality of its
product.
There is another reason why the 1947. Act did so little
to provide strong leadership for the community: powerful in-
terests in the Military Services and elsewhere opposed (and
.continue to oppose) more centralized management of intelli-
gence activities. Partly, this opposition arises from the
belief of the Services that direct control over intelligence
programs is essential if they are to conduct successful mili-
tary operations; partly, it results from bureaucratic concerns.
The Services are reluctant to accept assurance that informa-
tion from systems not controlled by them will be available as
and when they require it.
Despite such opposition, the National Security Act of
1947 did stipulate that the CIA would coordinate the "in-
telligence activities" of the Government under the direction
of the National Security Council. However, the Act also made
clear provision for the continuation of "departmental in-
telligence". Since then, three Presidents have exhorted the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to play the role of
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- . . 1 5 - .
community leader and coordinator, but his authority over the
community has remainea tanimal. While the DCI has been the
*catalyst in coordinating substantive. intelligence production,
he has made little use of such authority as he possesses to
manage the resources of the Community.
Realistically, it is clear that the DCI, as his office
is now constituted, cannot be expected to perform effectively
the community-wii.le leadership role because:
As an agency head he bears a numbar of weighty op-
erational and advisory responsibilities which limit
the effort he can devote to community-wide management.
?
o He bears a particularly heavy buyden for the planning
and conduct of covert actions.
O His multiple roles as community leader, agency head,
and intelligence adviser to the President, and to
a number of sensitive executive committees, are
mutually conflicting.
He is a competitor for resources within the community
'owing to his responsibilities as'Director of CIA,
which has large collection programs of its own; thus
he cannot be wholly objective in providing guidance
for community-wide collection.
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?
? He controls, of the community's re-
sources and must therefore rely on persuasion to
influence his colleagues
\and management of the
regarding the allocation
which is
appropriated to the Department of Defense. Since
Defense is legally responsible for these very large
-resources, it feels that it cannot be bound by out-
Side advice on how they should be used.
25X1
? 25X1
0 The DCI is outranked by other departmental heads who
report directly to the President and are his immediate
supervis.ors on .the. National Security. Council.
In spite of these handicaps, the DCI has established
several institutional devices to assist him in leading the
community. They are the National Intelligence Program Evalua-
tion Staff (NIPE) and the National Intelligence Resources
Board (NIRB). However, the principal agencies have largely
ignored or resisted the.efforts of management by these bodies.
AA a conSeguence, the NIPE and the NIRB have concentrated on
developing improved data about intelligence programs and
better mechanisms for coordination. Because of their work,
both institutions could prove useful to a strong community
leader; however, their contribution to the efforts of the
currently constituted DCI is small.
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- 17
In the absence.of an effective institutional framework
Within which one official could be held responsible and ac-
countable for the performance and cost of the intelligence
community, the United States Intelligence Board (USI)3), origi-
nally established to advise the DCI has become a sort of
governing body for the community. However, the USIB has proved
generally ineffective as a management mechanism for several
reasons:
o It is a committee of equals who must form coalitions
to make decisions.
0
It is dominated by collectors and producers who avoid
raising critical questions about the collection pro-
grams operated by their colleagues.
o .As a result, USIB's collection requirements -- which
are an Lggregate of all requests, new and old -- mewl
all things to all agencies, thus leaving them free
to pursue ? their own interests.
o 'Since policy-level consumers are not represented on
the Board, they are unable to give guidance as to
? priority needs.
Even within the Department of Defense, there is no cen-
tralized management of intelligence resources and activities.
Although the Assistant Secretary for Administration has been
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given a responsibility in this area, together with a small
Staff for resource analysis, his efforts to master the Defense?
intelligence complex have proved of little avail for several
reasons. First, not all Defense programs come under his pur-
view, and this limits his ability to do cross-program analysis.
Second, he remains responsible for his functions as Assistant
Secretary for Administration.
Below the level of review provided by an Assistant
Secretary, manac,ement leadership is still absent. The
Directors of DIA and NSA are themselves unable to control
the activities of the components supposedly subordinate to
them but operated by the Military Services. Because of a
history of Comp::omises and "treaties", the Director of the
National Reconn;.issance Office (NRO) is similarly unable to
control a large part of his program which is run by the Deputy
Director for Scimce and Technology (DD/S&T) in CIA.
This lack of lower-level leadership shows up in the fol-
lowing ways:
0 The current failure of NSA adequately to direct
Service cryptologic activities, organize them into
a coherent system, or manage MINT activities.
Large-scale Service-controlled tactical intelli-
gence assets, .inflated by the war and partly .dupli-
eating both national and allied capabilities, but
programmed and operated outside of the community.
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- 19
Fre
r:0 A host of unresolved problems concerning* organization
and the allocation of resources within both General
Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and non-GDIP
activities, including: duplication in the collection
of ELINT
internally overlapping
activities among varous mapping, charting, and
geodesy agencies, and the several investigative
services; and inadequate supervision and control of
counterintelligence activities.
It follows from this analysis that the President's ob-
jectives can be achieved only if reform addresses four or-
ganizational i,sues:
? The leadership of the intellige/ce community as a
whole.
o The direction and control of Defense intelligence
activities.
o .The division of functions among the major intelli-
gence agencies.
? The structuring, staffing, and funding of the
processes by which our raw intelligence data are
analyzed and interpreted.
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V. SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
The effectiveness and efficiency of the intelligence
community depend on a number .of organizational variables.
Among the most important of these variables are:
v
0 The power over resources avai)able to the leader of
the community. How much power the leader can ex-
ercise, particularly over collection programs, will
determine the size of the economies that can be
achieved within the community.
The size and functions of the staff provided ? to the
? leader cf the community. The effectiveness of a
national intelligence leader wifl depend not only
on his power over resources, but also on how well
informed he is about issues and options within
the community, which, in turn, i a function of his
immediate staff. Among the potential functions for
such a staff are:
?
ma.
WI% WW1
The planning, programming, and budgeting of
resources.
Control over resources once allocated.
Supervision of R&D.
Inspection of ongoing programs.
Production and dissemination of national estimates.
TOP SVC11.ET ?
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11? vi
IP It ntrol systems jointly
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21 -
Net assessments of U.S., allied, and opposing
capabilities and doctrines.
0 The future role of the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB). As matters now stand, the USIB is both
a.parliament and a Confederate head Of the community.
If more authoritative leadership is established, the
USIB could become simply. an obstruction unless its
role is specifically redefined. Since the leader of
?
the community, however powerful, will need close and
. continuing relationships with pro4ucers and collectors
as well as consumers, one possibility would be to re-
constitIte the USIB so as to forlIalize these relation-
ships on an advisory basis. In any case the future
role of USIB should be addressed as part of a com-
prehensive review of new institutional arrangements
for .the functioning of a reorganized intelligence
community.
Future Defense Department control over the resources
under its jurisdiction. Even without changes in the
community as a whole, major improvements in effective-
ness and efficiency could be achieved if Defense were
to master its own massive intelligence operations.
However, a number of community-wide issues would still
remain, and substantially firmer Defense management
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Trontrol systeMs jointly?
- 22-
?
of its intelligence resources could prejudice the
ability of a future leader of the community to ex-
ercise his own authority.
The 'urisdiction of 'either a national leader or A'
Defense leader over the Military Services. The three
Military Services are estimated to spend about $1.2
billion a year on intelligence activities apart from
their support of the national agencies. Yet these
activities, which partly duplicate national intelli-
gence programs, are reviewed in isolation from them.
If the Services retain control c/er the assets for
this 'tactical" intelligence, t.,ey can probably weaken
efforts to improve the efficiency of the community.
At the same time, there is little question about their
need to. have access to the output of specified assets
in both peace and war. }low to combine overall re-
source management. and control with this access is an
issue that will require resolution.
0 The future functional boundaries of the major in-
telligence agencies. Collection and production
activities do not now tend to be consolidated by type
in particular functional agencies. Important econo-
mies can probably be achieved by rationalizing these
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-? 23 -
activities. However, it should be noted that economy
and organizational tidiness, without concomitant
strengthening of the community leadership, might be
achieved at the cost.of creating even more powerful
vested interests and losing diverse and usefully com-
petitive approaches to collection problems.
.? .The number and location of natioAal analytical and
estimating centers. The National estimating machinery
no doubt will have to be preserved under the leader
of the community in order to continue production of
national estimates and inputs to the NSSM process.
The, continuation of DIA and the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) as producers
is essential as well. Beyond that, improvement in
the intelligence product will probably depend to a
large extent on increasing the competition in the
interpretation of evidence and the development of
hypotheses about foreign intentions, capabilities,
and strategies. This may require not only the
strengthening of existing organizations, but perhaps
the addition of new estimating centers. In addition,
some entirely new organizational units may be needed
. to perform currently neglected intelligence analysis
functions, for example, to conduct research on im-
proved intelligence analysis methods and techniques.
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IIP? lip?.11tontrol systems jointly
o The role of the independent review mechanisms. Be-
cause of the secrecy surrounding the operations of
the Intelligence community, the need for strong in-
dependent review mechanisms within the Executive
Branch remains particularly important. Since the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB), the "40" Committee, the Offic6 of Science
and Technology (OST), and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) already exist to perform this
function, the only issues are how they can be
strengthened, to what extent they need larger and
more pe::manent staffs, and whether new review
boards should be created, especially to evaluate
the ana.J.ytical and estimating activities of the
community.
Subsequent sections do not address all of these issues;
nor do they exhaust the list of organizational possibilities.
Only the most salient options are presented with respect to
the leadership of the community, the Department of Defense,
and functional reorganization. Each is described in schematic
form.
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Control systeAs ointly
2
VX . . LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY
. ? The effectiveness of a new leader of the community will
_depend critically on his ability to control intelligence re-
sources and make his decisions stick. . Basically, there are
three different roles he can play in this respect, each with
different organizational implications. They are:
? As legal or direct controller of all or most intelli-
gence resources.
?"' As de facto manager of most resources even though
.they ar!r?.. not appropriated to him.
."; As cool:dinator of resources that are appropriated
elsewhere, as now.
Although each of the three basic approaches could be in-
stitutionalized in a number of different ways, the principal
options that accord with these roles are listed below.
? A Director
'the bulk of the
to his office.
of National Intelligence (Option M, with
intelligence budget appropriated
That office would control all the major col-
lection assets and research and development activities, which
are the most costly programs of the community and are most
likely to yield large long-term savings. The Director would
also operate the Government's principal production and
national estimating center and retain the CIA's present
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GP IIT . . up Wontrol systems jointly.
responsibility for covert action programs. Defense and State
would retain production groups, both to serve -their own leader-
ship and to provide competing cente?s in the analysis of in-
telligence inputs to the national intelligence process. The
Defense Department would maintain budgetary and operational
control over only the selected "tactical" collection and
processing assets necessary for direct support of military
forces', although these assets should.be subject to the DNI's
review.
This option affords a number of advantages:
.0 It pinpoints responsibility; the President knows who
is in charge.
?
It permits major economies through rationalization of
?
the community's functions and through the elimination
?of duplicative and redundant capabilities.
.
It establishes a management system which can deal com-
. prehensiely with the implications of evolving tech-
nology and make efficient choices between competing
collection systems.
o It brings producers and collectors closer together
and increases the probability that collectors will
become more responsive to producer needs.
O It allows the Director to evaluate fully the con-
tribution each component makes to the final product,
?
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'27 -
. .
enabling ready .identification of low performance
elements and permitting subsequent adjustments to
their mission.
? It irovides one responsible point in the community to
, which high-level consumers can express their changing
?
*needs.
* It facilitates the timely selection and coordination
. of the intelligence assets necessary to provide in-
telligence support to the President in periods of
crisis.
Creation of a DNI has at /east five potential disadvan-
tages:
* It gives still further responsibilities to the DCI.
Axajor criticism of the present confederate organi-
zation is that the DCI is overloaded and cannot be
expected to perform well ?the many functions now
assigned to him. As noted, these include substantive
advice to the President and to several high-level
committees, day-to-day management of a large operating
program, appearing as a witness before Congress, and
. running numerous sensitive collection and covert
. action projects. It should be noted, however, that
with adequate staff, and competent deputies, the
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- 28 -
Director should be .able to delegate responsibilities
and ease his task. Also, under this 'option, the
. DCI's power would be commensurate with his present
%responsibilities.
o This option could generate substantial resistance
from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
? over the transfer of intelligence functions to a new
agency. It would also necessitate fundamental changes
in the National Security Act which might cause major
congressional resistance and open debate on a range
.of sensitive national security issues.
.?
O Even if all U. S. Government intelligence assets were-
transfeired to the Director, there would remain the
serious and continuing problem of finding ways to
meet the intelligence needs of Defense without, at
the same time, causing the Services to reconstitute
their own intelligence activities, even at the expense
of other programs.
O There could be adverse reaction from the news media
and the public to a consolidation of such sensitive
activities under the control of one man, even though
so many of them already are controlled, in principle,
by the Secretary of Defense.
?. TOP SE611r.r2
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- on.trol systems jointly.
. ?
-29
? It is possible that this option will continue the
present dominant influence of collectors relative
to producers and consumers in the intelligence
process.
A Director of Central Intelligence (Option #2), with a
strong Presidential mandate and a substantial staff. NSA,
NRO, and DIA would remain under present jurisdiction. The
CIA would be divided -- one part supplying the DCI staff and
intelligence production component, the other part, principally
current CIA collection organization, comprising a new agency
under a separate director. The DCI would have senior status
within the Government and would serve as principal intelli-
gence adviser t'.) the NSC. He would produce all National
Intelligence Estimates and other national intelligence re-
quired by top level national decisionmakers, and would control
the necessary production assets, including NPIC. This would
include continued management of a national intelligence
process that involved the participation, and inputs from,
other intelligence production organizations.
Under Presidential directive, the DCI would review and
'make recommendations to the President on the Intelligence
plans, programs, and budgets of his own office, a reconstituted
CIA, and the Department of Defense. He would also present a
consolidated intelligence budget for review by the OMB. By
TOP SECRET.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-539-3-1-9
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t \ ? - 30 - ,
. .
this Means the Director would be able to guide resource allo-
cation and influence ?erimmunity organization.
? Although Option fl offers the 4reatest promise of
achieving the President's objectives, this option has ad-
vantages over it and over the present situation in the fol-
lowing respects:
O The DCI would be freed from the day-to-day managemen't
, 4-4
tasks incumbent upon the head of a large operating
agency with major collection and covert action re-
sponsibilities. This would enable him to devote
? .most of his attention to substantive intelligence
matters, the tasking of collectors, and community
resource management issues as they relate to his
production activities.
O This option eliminates the present situation in
which the DCI serves as both advocate for agency
programs and judge in community-wide matters, a
role which diminishes the community's willingness
to accept his guidance as impartial.
The reforms could be accomplished, without major
legislation, by a reorganization plan and Presidential
directives to the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and
? the head of CIA.
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- 31
6 This option would offer improvements in efficiency
and effectiveness without the major disruptions in
the community required under option one.
%
? 0 It would enhance the stature of the community leader
?while.avoiding the potentially dangerous concentra-
tion of power inherent in option one.
Option #2 has several potential disadvantages:
Responsibility for the community as a whole would
be more diffuse than under option one.
* The abiLity of the DCI to supervise the detailed
,activiljes of the operating.parts of the community
would be weaker.
O The new DCI, compared to the DNI under option one,
-would have to rely on persuasion and the process of
budgetary review rather than directive authority in
order to eliminate redundant and duplicative activi-
ties, resolve trade-off issues, and reduce overhead.
o Be would lack the ability to mobilize, deploy, and
target collection assets in a time of crisis, unless
given specific Presidential authority.
A Coordinatlorl of National Intelligence (Option 43), who,
under Presidential mandate., would act as White House or NSC
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control systems jointly
? ? - 32 -
?
overseer of the Intelligence Community, directing particular
attention to:
":"? \ Intelligence resource and management issues
s ? .
o Representing the concerns and *needs of national
policy level consumers.
.? Evaluating the suitability of intelligence output in.
light cf consumer demand.
Under this arrangement, CIA, Defense, and State intelli-
gence responsibilities would remain essentially unchanged.
The Coordinator would express the views and concerns of the
President and the National Security Council on product needs
and quality; he would provide guidance on present and future
collection priorities; he would critique and evaluate the
current performance of the community, identifying gaps and
? oversights; and he *would conduct studies of specific intelli-
gence community activities as required. But he would not be
responsible for the actual production of intelligence. Nor
would he have any direct control over resources.
This option *offers two advantages:
o The creation of this position would provide a means
for more direct representation of Presidential in-
terest in the Intelligence Community. Consumer
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vontrol systems jointly
- 33-
?
representaion in the intelligence process would be
'? .
enhanced.-
O No legislation would be required, and the President
?
would be spared a number of bureaucratic battles.
The option marked disadvantages:
O There is the potential for unproductive competition
between the Coordinator and the White House staff.
Achievement of the President's management and re-
source control objectives is unlikely.
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??111? Wontrol systems jointly
NM. ? DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEADERSHIP
'Although the President has indicated his desire to in-
stitute community-wide reform, changes within the Department
of Defense alone could improve the allocation and management
of resources and reduce the overall size of the intelligence
budget. Provided that care is taken in making them, these
reforms need not be incompatible with subsequLt decisions
about the governance of the community as a whole.
Within the Department of Defense, there has never been
an individual with formal responsibility for management of
all DOD intelligence activities. The D,3puty Secretary of
Defense historically has been charged with this task, but he
has very little staff to assist him and can devote only a S
modest amount of time to the complex intelligence issues that
arise within his domain. Consequently, if the problems of
Defense intelligence are to be resolved in a fashion satis-
factory to the President, it will be necessary either to
create a Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) with specific
responsibility for the Department's collection assets, or
provide the Deputy Secretary with major staff support in the
form of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Neither of these posts would be incompatible with options
two and three relating to community-wide leadership reform.
However, the DDI concept conflicts with option one, in which
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111,11kontro1 systems .jointly
- 35 -
the bulk of U. S. Intelligence resources would be appropria-
ted to a Director oi-National Intelligence.
? .74._pixilf_24..12.9..nst would have the auth-
ority and responsibility to direct and control all Defense
intelligence activities. He would allocate all the Defense
intelligence resources, including those for tactical intelli-
gence, the funds for the NRP, and budgets for other national
programs under departmental jurisdiction. Be would report to
and represent the Secretary of Defense in all matters re-
lating to the management of intelligence resources; review
the need for, and conduct of, sensitive intelligence collec-
tion and operations; review all Defense intelligence "require-
ments" with resource implications in order to evaluate need '
and determine priorities; serve as the principal Defense
? representative on the USIB; and monitor other DoD programs
which have clear implications for the collection of intelli-
gence. Under this option the DDI would be able to reorder
? completely the Defense intelligence collection structure as
deemed appropriate.
The DIA would be involved in collection management only
if so directed by the DDI, and would concentrate on the pro-
duction of finished intelligence for the Secretary of Defense
and other national consumers.
'It is important that the Director of Defense Intelligence
be responsive to tasking by the community leader, who would
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ip
- 36 ems jointly
?
6e the principal substantive intelligence official of the
Government. Both the.cammunity leader and the DDI should re-
ceive authoritative guidance about national consumer interests.
This could be provided by. a Council of Intelligence consti-
tuted within the NSC and with the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretaryof Defense as its members. The restructuring
of USIB and revision of NSCIDs can help in establishing the
appropriate DCl/DDI relationship.
The post of DDI has great prospective advantages:
? It would provide for the concentration of resource
management authority in one individual, which would
allow authoritative comparisons and decisions about
competing collection programs.
o. It would provide for the centralization of direction
and control over all Defense intelligence activities,
including- conduct of sensitive intelligence collec-
tion operations.
But there are possible drawbacks as well, in that the
position would:
o Concentrate great power at a single point in Defense.
This could possibly diminish the community leaderis
'access to information, as well as his ability to
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11111. auntror systems jointly
? 37?
task collection systems in support of national in-
telligence production, and design balanced collec-
tion piograms, in support of his production respon-
sibilities.
O Superimpose a large staff over those of other major
intelligmanagers within Defense (the Directors
of DIA, NSA, and NR05? although a reduction in
various coordination staffs should be possible at
the same time. ?
?
An Assis.tant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD/I)
.who would act as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary
of Defense. His responsibilities, would be similar to those of
the DDI, except that he would not exercise direct control over
Defense intelligence collection programs, and would not be a
member of USIB unless the Board were reconstituted to advise
the DCI on the allocation of collection resources.
This option has a number of advantages:
O It allows for effective cross-program analysis within
Defense. .
?
? It avoids the concentration of power inherent in the
DDI option, if that is considered a danger.
?
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-tontrol systems jointly
-
38
Compared to the DDI, an ASo/I would be more likely
to respond to the needs of the present DCI or the .
community-wide leader established under either option
two or three.
The post has a number of potential weaknesses in that.,
compared with the DDI, it would probably:
-0. Lack both the strong mandate provided to the DDI
. and direct authority over Defense intelligence
. activities, including those carried out by the
program managers.
?
o .Make the ASD/I Vulnerable to "encl. runs" by major
coMponents within the Defense intelligence com-
? .munity who might wish to appeal directly to the
.Deputy Secretary of Defense.
?
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7
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25X1
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? InALAAN-COMINT
? Ilkiltontrol systeifis jointly
MAV,
40
Vo achieve further economies, particulary without major
reorganization, will be difficult for several reasons.
O Savings that we foresee as immediately feasible
are likely to be counterbalanced to a considerable
. degree by further pay and price increases.
O With the heavy R&D costs for proposed new systeths,
such as the nearly real-time photo satellite,
25X1
.
there already is built into the budget a strong
. upward bias which may prove difficult to control,
particularly considering the intense interest in
.high-techriology and expensive new systems for SALT
and other purposes.
The U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia will permit
.reductions in SIGINT and HUMINT resources, but they
will only partially offset the above cost increases.
? Some of the largest savings can only result from
shifting and consolidating current activities in
such a way as to redraw the functional boundaries
of the major intelligence organizations.
Despite these difficulties, it is the case that func-
tional boundaries can be withdrawn without a major reorganiza-
.
? ?
tipn of Defense intelligence or the community as a whole. We
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lp .11111111control syst ems jointl?s
.- 41
?
should stress, however, that actions of this character will
still leave a number of 'conmunity-wide issues unresolved and
at the same time arouse all the opposition of the military
Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, with the ?
rapid evolution of technology, further changes in boundaries
and comparable upheavals 7 will probably have ??follow in
the future.
With all these cautions, there are a numbeX of specific
functional actions that can be taken at the present time.
Among the most important are the establishment of NSA as a
truly national cryptological service with authority over al
signal intelligdhce, and the consolidatimi of a number of
activities now operated separately by tha Military Services.
The effect of these changes should be to achieve economies
.of scale, eliminate excessive dliplication, and promote com-
petiiion.among like activities so as to weed out the less
? productive programs.
The following table of possible savings; while only an
estimate, indicates what economies might be feasible as a
'result .of redrawing functional boundaries, consolidating
.activities, and eliminating duplication:
?
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11. IP ' isplivilvxu.i. yotems ointly
.- 42 -
25X1
A major issue arises in connection with changes of such
?
scope and magnitude. It is whether, we should attempt to make
the reforms now, or await more general reorganization and a1-
. low the head of the community to exercise his judgment and .
.authority in instituting them. Our current judgment ip that
reductions of this magnitude should be attempted only after
. .a reorganization has significantly improved the capabilities
of the community to direct, control, and monitor program
TOP SECRET
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'I
? .4
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IP IP ? griliontroI systems jointly
- 43 - ?.?
changes. We also believe that the economies should be ef-
.
?
fected over a period of years. Without these two conditions,
the reductions could prove illusory or transient, and a
heavy price in disruption and lowered morale might follow.
It should be noted that the anticipated savings come
primarily from collection activities; major analytical and
estimating capabilities are not affected. Their improvement
is the subject of the next section.,
?
??
*i!
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? ? ?
? ? ?
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?
?
.4 TwvmAN-COMINT
?
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? ?? 111 111.7
- 44
. ?
?
IX. TOWARD IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PRODUCT
Much of the emphasis by the intelligence community and
the bulk of its resources go to the high technology necessary
to overcome barriers to information in the USSR and China.
Yet this stress on the technology of collection -- admittedly
important -- comes at a time when improved analysis is even
more important.
Because of the keener competition from the Soviets, and
the. narrowing gap in relative resources devoted to defense,
the U. S. must refine its evaluation of foreign capabilities,
intentions, activities, and doctrines rather than assume that
it has the resources to insure against all possibilities.
?
The community must also improve .its current political esti.,.
mates and find ways of becoming more responsive to.naiional
consumers and their concerns.
?
amportant improvements, in performance may be. feasible
without major. reorganization: But preliminary investigation
suggests that higher quality is much more likely to come
about within the framework of a coherently organized com-
munity which is focused on improving output rather than in-
put: Indeed, it seems a fair assumption that the President
would be willing to rebate some of the potential savings from
the community if he had any hope of improved performance as
.a consequence. As of now, however, he has no such assurance
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1111100Ontx6I systems jointly
45
?
and may reasonably argue that, for current performance, he
should at least obtain the benefit of lower costs.
Evep if we knew how to measure the benefits of intelli-
gence, it would be difficult'to relate specific changes in
programs to improvements in performance. Nonetheless, ex-
perienced observers believe that the following steps - all
of them comparatively inexpensive -- should increase the use.:-
fulness of the product to the.national leadership:
* Major consumer representation to and within the in-
telligence community, perhaps through a restructured
USIE, a high-level consumer council, or other insti-
tutioni..lized ways of communicating consumer needs,
priorities, and evaluations to intelligence producers.
* Assessment of the intelligence produCt through quality
control and product evaluation sections within the
? production organizations themselves.
* Upgrading existing analytical centers to increase
the competition of ideas, including a DIA with improved
. organization and staffing as a major competitor to CIA
in the area of military in'telligenee.
* Periodic reviews by outsiders of 'intelligence products.
of the main working hypotheses within the community,
and of analytical methods being used.
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%PIP 11,41,control.
- 40 systems jointly
?
.? A net assessment group established at the national
level which. .along with the NSSM process, will keep
'questioning the community and challenging it to re-
fine and support its 'hypotheses.
Stronger incentives to attract.good analysts, better
?
career opportunities to hold them as analysts instead
of forcing them to become supervisors in order to
achieve promotion, and a more .effective use of per-
sonnel already trained and experienced in intelli-
gence.
? Increased resources and improved organizational ar-
rangements within the intelligence community for
research on improvedmethods of analysis and esti-
mation.
?
?
. at is probably premature to recommend the detailed
measures necessary to improve the quality and scope of the
intelligence product. In the near future, this issue should
be Consid6red at greater length by the leadership of a re-
organized community. Indeed, the leadership should be
specifically charged with the task of product improvement
. ?
as a matter of the highest priority. What steps will prove
feasible will depend on the particular type of reorganization
?
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BYEMAN-COMINT
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grip.
seloctedi and in the present eircumstan6es, it may be well
to be guided in the choice by considerations of economy in
the.use of resources. But it should be stressed in con-
clusion, that improvement of.the product at current budget
levels is simply another way of achieving the efficiency that.
is so desperately needed within the intelligence community
as it is presently constituted.
? .
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ergie-
? .
THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP sEc.1-177,T,"?::-.--7.?.-
MEMORANDUM FOR:
dm*
WAS KINGTON
ON-FILE TREAS,OMB RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
November 5, 1971
NRO,NSC,DIA,DOS,DOE,FBI,OSTP reviews completed
The Secretary of State
The Secretary .Treact:'"y
A444.-7. Secretarl, 04 r.C*5Mnt.a
The ;,tterney ccrai
The Directar of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
The- Chairman, Coint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
The Chairman, ;Itomic Energy Co.7.mission
SUBJECT: Organization and Y.anage:r.ent of the U.S.
Foreign Intelligence Community
I have recently rev4ewed.and accepted reca=endaticns on
ways in which to improve the functicnin9 of the jntelligence
community. This establishes a set of gealc and
directs organizatianal and manag=ent changes to attain them.
It also expressos ny? concern about major resource manage:zent
and substantive =reduction proble:as as guidance to the community
for further changes in the future.
The need for an improved intelligence product and for
greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to
intelligence is ur7ent. Resources available for use by the
intelligence comnunity will be increasingly constrained and
'may have to be reduced. At the same time the product of the
intelligence cor=unity will be of increasing importance to
. U.S.-security and national interests as:
0.11.????
the relative strength of Soviet and other potential
military forces grows with respect to those of the
U.S. 'where previously U.S. superiority was unquestioned;
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*TOP f71=7.7/5Y=1,41V:L.
-2-
the intertional environment grows more co=plex;
and fin .z1, co.=,-.rcia1 and economic factors
assume gter sin'ficance;
-- the need fcr timely intelligence becomes greater.
I. 01Y4ecti-:es
Among the ma:cr?objectives that 'must be attained if the
efficiency an efftl-=ss f the intelligence co=unitv
are to increase su'tstantiF.11y are:
-- The re riven of the U.S. intelligence effort
with resect to national requirements rust be subject
to continuing review.
-- Authoritative and responsible leadershin for
community as a whole ..must be assured.
-- A more efficient use of resources by the. r.cmmunity
in the collection of intelligence information must
.Vtiliation Of the ::li""st" available
?must be i conszAlance.With apprevee, requzrements of
U.S. security and i nationz::1 interests.
-- Assignment of intelligence functions within the
coMmunity must be reviewed and revised to eliminate
? inefficient, Unnecessary or outmoded activities.
-- The quality, scope and timeliness of the community's
product must be improved.
The prcr.,Is!.en of intelligence and its utilization must
enhance thc, formulation of the foreign, military and
economic colicies.of the U.S. Government and the
planning for and conduct of military operations by
U.S. forces.
II. The Necessary Conditions ?
A number of specific conditions are necessary to the
achicvoment of these objectives.
TOP qt-TIFT/17-ft-/^,--"T.,,-..1
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. .
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The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) must
delegate direct. authority to the Deputy Director of
Central. Intelligence (as far as is possible without
legislation) for the plans, programs; and day-today
operations ? of the CIA, and must assume overall
leadership of the community.
-3-
-- More effective review of intelligence product cuality
and policy must be provided to the DCI, especially
. by high-level consumers of substantive national
intelligence.
.1E11m*
Major issues within the intelligence community must
be addressed in such a way that the DCI plays a
major role in their resolution. The DCI must have
an increased and restructured personal staff to allow
him to discharge his augmented responsibilities.
The DCI should be supported by two major co=ittses
of the intelligence community, each of which he
Chaiis, with clearly defined advisory functions
embracing hi c; resi7onsibilities related to intelligence
production and requirements on the one hand and 7...o
intelligence budget and allocation of resources on
the other.
Intelligence collection programs, largely financed
and managed by the Depa nnt of Defense, must come
under more effective management and coordination
with.other intelligence programs.
The NSCIDs and DCIDs must be rewritten to reflect
the changes directed heein and others as they occur,
particularly to reflect reassignment of functions. ?
XII. Measures Decided Upon
? After careful consideration, I have decided that the
measures listed below are to be taken now to move toward
attainment of the stated objectives. They are designed
primarily to: (1) enhance the authority and capability of
the DCI to provide the required community leadership, (2)
provide. review and guidance regarding the substantive
prcduct, and (3) more effectively restructure intell-
igence activities.
TOp SrCRETAWYVAVCOMINT
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?
. ?
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IIP III
I am di-,,n,'4ng the Director of Central Intelligence
to assume .leadership of the community in planning,
reviewing, coOrdinating, and evaluating all intelli-
gence programs and activities, and in the production
of nation:- intel14conce. T shall to him to
improve the psrform:Ince of the community, to provide
his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of
all intelligence p:oras and activities (including
tactical intiligence), and to'recomment.: the annropriate
allocation of resources to be devoted to ini-,1"gonce.
OPE 41m?
-4-
He will thus assume four major re nonsibilities:
???,t 041k
Planning and reviewing all intelligence activities
and the allocation of all intelligence resources.
Producing national intelligence required bv the?
President and other national consumers.
.chairing and all intelligonce co=un.lty
advisory boards or committees.
Reconciling intelligence iroments and priorities
within budgetF:ry .conztraints.
So that he can underta.):e this community
leadership role, I am requesting the DCI .to submit to me
.within 20 days his plan ?for the.snronriate-delegaticn of his
,current operational responsibilities and for increased sta'f.
support for his new role,
?MM. WEIN
41???
I am directing the Director of Central Intelligence
to prepare and submit each year, through U.:3, a
consolidated intelligence progra.a budget, including
tactical intelligence. All information required
from all departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch is to be made available to him in order that
he may provide me with an annual detailed review of
the needs and performance of the intelligence community.
I am creating an Intelligence Resources Advisory
Committee, chaired by the Director of Central
Intelligence, including as members a senior
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ikOP SFCRE1111,117a... ?
representative from the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, the Office,of Management and
Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This
committee is to advise the DCI on the. preparation
of the intelligence budget and the allocation of
.
resources among programs, ensuring that they are
employed in accordance with ao=iroved requirements
and that there is no unwarranted duplication.
-- I am also directing that the USIB be reconstituted
under the ehairnship of the DCI including as
members the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
(Vice Chairman); Director of Bureau of intelligence
and Research (INR), State Department; Director of
National Security Agency (NSA); Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and rer..resentatives
of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic
Energy Commission (ABC). The USIB will advise and
? assist the DCI with ct to the production of
national intelligence recuirements and nriorities,
supervision of the dissemination and security,
of intelligence material, and the protection of
intelligence sources and methods. .
I am authorizing the DCI to call upon all depart-
ments and agencies of the E::ecutive Branch of the
Government to-orovide requisite information to these
two committees and to invite additional participation
in their. deliberations as faay be required in his
judgment.
-- I am also establishing a National Security Council
Intelligence Committee (NSCIC). Its members will
be the Attorney General, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, who will
chair the committee. It will give direction and.
guidance on national substantive intelligence needs
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? TOP SECRET/FAMIll= ?
. air
' and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelli-
gence products from the viewpoint of the intelli-
gence consumer.
As a related matter, I am directing that a Net
Assessment Group be created within the rational
Security Council Staff. The group will be headed
by a senior staff neer and will be. responsible
for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence
products and for producing net assessments of
U.S. cabilities vis-a-vis thcne of foreign
governments constituting a threat to U.S. security.
I am directing the retention of the present management
structure of the National Reconnaissance Office.
-- I am directing the Department of Defense to issue
such directives as are required to establish no
later than January 1, 1972:
. A unified National Cryptologic Command under
Director, NSA for the conduct of USG communica-
tions intelligence and electronics intelligence
activities.
. A single Office of'Defense Investigations.
. A consolidated Defense Map Agency by combining
the three Service mapping organizations under
arrangements that permit optimum efficiency
and economy in production without impairing
legitimate requirements of the separate Services.
. The retention of the DIA to be fully responsive
to tasking by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
matters involving essential intelligence support
for military planning and operations.
-- I am directing staffs of the NSC, DCI and .OMB, in
consultation and coordination with the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to make ap-
propriate revisions not later than December 1, 1971
.to the NSCID's and other directives as needed to
puplement the provisions of this memorandum.
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TOP SECRET/1111:7
IV.- Remainina
-
The chan7!cs 7r.a...e directed at this time are 1im4tr,d,
but I fully -::xpoct f....rther chanas in the intelligencn c=unitv
consistent with msxim.:. prac,..icable attainment of my cves.
By far the larg-.2.st nortion of the intelligence budcLt
is devoted to collecion. It is here- that suvins mt br-
sought. Futtlr,:t asants of ro12s and :nission:5 within
intelligenc-a bv com-
promises amz)ng ag,nnci.)s.
The need to ma%e some savings is so urgent that I have
directed the Office of :!anagemc,nt and Pact, jcintl with
the DCI and Secrctar-., of Defenze, to review the a:v 1973 budget
fcr intelligence and ti.) submit specific reductions from
current prci.l.rr-s, with particular attent:,on to tactical
intelligence.
Significant improvement in the intelligence przduct is.
also needed. The .1:SC:C will afford gu4dance -regarding
consumnr need:;. Other changs in the-co:Is=a.r-Ilro.!.uc-:r re.7..-
tionShip may enee7:,.. to acieve a more effective rcconcili:.-.-
tion of the dt:::oands from consum.2rs'with the ii .ed ressurcs
available for in',-114-,-,nce production. It seems desirable
in this connection, that resouccs dcvotnd to analysis and
.productien increase ant: that a d:erminod .-,r=s---t be
made to ungrfie nais personnel and anE.lysis
More rewarding for intelligence nnalysts, includinc
the opportunity to reach-high salary levels while remaining
analysts, Should be considered. An early task of the DCT
should be the prEFaration of a comprehensive program focused
upon improving the intelligence Process and product.
cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget .
Assistant to the President for. :Zational Security Affairs
TOP
7z..L.:2-d ? "
- I No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19 :1:0C-HAK-539-3-1-9