CHINA'S STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-538-1-13-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/08: LOC-HAK-538-1-13-9
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
W
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL-
TOP SECRET/,CODEWORD_
MEMORANDUM.FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
? INFORMATION
July 6, 1973
FROM: PHIL ODEEN W
SUBJECT:
- China's Strategic. Attack Programs
The U. S. Intelligence Board has just published NIE 13 -8 -73 an China's
Strategic Attack Programs (Tab A), The NIE is a concise review of the
various Chinese programs with emphasis on what the PRC has achieved
rather than on where it might. be going. The basic NIE is summarized
. below:
China has arrived as a Nuclear Power
MORI C05307886
Pgs 1-3 ONLY
000575514 Pgs 4-5
ONLY
China has about a hundred delivery vehicles - half missile and
half bomber -- and the nuclear warheads to make them effective.
The delivery vehicles are sufficiently survivable to provide the
beginnings of a credible retaliatory capability against the USSR.
Chinese Bomber Programs
China has about 60 Tu-16 Badger medium bombers with a 1650 nm
radius that can reach all of East Asia and the USSR to the Urals.
Moreover, China is continuing to build these bombers. However, there
is nothing to indicate that the Chinese are developing an intercontinental
bomber.
.Chinese Missile Programs.
China began deployment of the CSS-1 MRBM with-a 600 nm range
in 1966 and now has 15 to 30 deployed at fixed soft sites and in a semi-
mobile mode in the field. -
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD Classified by Philip A. Odeen
Classified by 011454
Exempt from general declassification
schedule of,EO 11652 exemption cat 58(1), (2), (3)
Declassified on: Data Impossible to Determine
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TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
The CSS -Z IRBM has a range of 1400 nm.and became operational
in 1969. There are 25 to 40 deployed at fixed soft sites, usually
housed in deep tunnels.
The CSS-3 with a range of 2, 700 to 3, 500 nm would be able to
reach Moscow but not the U. S. Three silos are being built for this
missile, which could become operational in 1974.
The CSS-4 is a true ICBM, comparable to the SS-9 and Titan II.
It should cover the U.S. but is not expected to be operational until 1976
or later.
China has a submarine missile program but no flight tests of such
a missile have yet been detected. Moreover, there is' reason to believe
,that the nuclear reactor for their submarine. may be causing problems
at this stage. As a result it is estimated that the earliest that a
submarine-launched missile system could be operational is 1977.
Chinese Capabilities
t l Mme)
U.S. forces and basee in the Far East are all vit...aP .a.sy range
of Chinese missiles and bombers currently operational, as are Soviet
forces in southern Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Interestingly, the
deployment of missiles has'sbnwa. no particular anti-Soviet bias.
When the CSS-3 is deployed with its threat to the western USSR,
the Chinese will have a good retaliatory system against the Soviets.
The CSS -4 and the S LB M will extend their' nuclear missile capability
to the continental U. S.
China's Ap roach to Strategic Programs
Economy of means. Less testing has been done by the Chinese
than by the U. S. or USSR. Use is made of proven systems where possible,
such as designing the CSS-3 to use the CSS-2 as a first stage. Few
troop training missile firings have been detected.
-- Emphasis but not urgency. Considerable resources and priority
have been given to the programs, but the pace of? development has been
deliberate. There is no sense of a 'crash" program or attempts at
concurrency in programs to shorten development time.
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD_
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U
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 3
-- Slowdown since 1971. In the past two years the number of
tests, of both missiles and warheads, has slowed. Whether this is
a result of Lin Piaots death and the subsequent change in military
leadership, other demands on the economic base, lessening of tension,
or some other causes is not apparent. However, the Chinese apparently
do not feel impelled to push as hard as before 1971.
Future Forces
At current levels of effort, the Chinese could have about 140
Tu-16 bombers, 140 IR/MRBMs, 15 ICBMs and 2 SSBNs by 1978.
With increased efforts, they could have 200 bombers, 200 IR/MRBMs,
30 ICBMs, and 2-3 SSBNs (a successful development program and
reallocations of resources could increase ICBMs to some 40 missiles
and SSBNs to 4 or so boats). In any case, the Chinese capability will
amount to a small deterrent force.
Summary
There is no doubt that the Chinese intend to be an important
nuclear power. Moreover, they are on the verge of attaining significant
retaliatory capability to deter nuclear attacks. - However, the size of
their force and of their current programs is small compared to the U. S.
and the USSR.
TOP SECRET L CODEWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/08: LOC-HAK-538-1-13-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/08: LOC-HAK-538-1-13-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/08: LOC-HAK-538-1-13-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/08: LOC-HAK-538-1-13-9