PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF DECEMBER 18-29 AIR EFFORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-538-1-1-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM W
r ka - 0 r7 Ibl- a Y .- 1P
WASHINGTON
DIA, DOS, and NSA URGENT INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
January 6, 1973
HENRY A. KISSINGER
PHIL ODEEN
MORI/CDF C05480852 pages 1-4
C03316668 pages 5-15
Preliminary Assessment of December 18-29
Air Effort
DIA has provided a concise summary of Linebacker II results (Tab A).
Major damage was inflicted on the rail, telecommunications and
electrical systems. Considerable damage was done to storage areas
and transportation repair facilities although lucrative targets remain.
Quite rapid repair of transportation and electrical generating facilities
appears feasible. The highway and POL supply systems were not struck
extensively.
Despite the heavy damage done _during'the recent strikes, the DIA. assess-
ment indicates a number of targets that were not struck. Many of these
targets, however, are in Hanoi and Haiphong or near the Chinese border.
In addition, many targets will require periodic restrikes to prevent
rapid recovery.
Rail System. Prior to the resumption of air strikes, the rail system
north of 20 degrees had almost completely recovered from the earlier
damage. During Linebacker II, 19 rail targets were attacked resulting
in train movement being effectively halted in the .Hanoi and Haiphong
areas. The rail lines north to China are still operating and were little
affected by the strikes. NVN has shown its capability to restore rail
operations rapidly and maintenance of the current degradation will
require restrikes. There are 26 authorized rail targets not yet hit,
particularly bridges and yards where destruction would impede rail
movements from. China to the Hanoi area.
Highway System. No major strikes were directed against highways
and related facilities. All roads are operational in fair to good condi-
tion, permitting diversion of priority cargo from rail to road. Only
one highway-related installation (a truck park) was on the authorized
TOP
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target list and there are several other truck parks which could be hit.
The most lucrative highway target is the Dong Dang truck storage area
which is very near the Chinese border.
Water Transport. Reseeding of mines was accomplished and the
major ports remain closed. Some inland waterway transshipment
points were damaged by B-52s. Seeding of MK-36 destructors at six
waterway junctions will degrade the water transport system. DIA
suggests several other areas where the seeding destructors would
further degrade NVN use of waterways.
POL System` Substantial damage was done to two POL storage depots
involved '.n distribution in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The pipelines
and associated storage areas through which POL is imported from China
were not hit. The 11 key receiving depots on the main POL pipeline
around Hanoi and north toward China are potential high priority targets.
r
Telecommunications Systems. Substantial damage was done to the
radio system which was hit for the first time. There has been a
partial disruption of national-level military command and control
communications and a reduction in circuits available to communicate
with NVN forces outside the country. Some radio broadcasting has
been eliminated or forced to lower power which is affecting transmission
quality. Destruction of the remaining facilities, which are now overloaded
with priority tasks, is identified by DIA as a potential priority target.
Electric 'Power. NVN was suffering power shortages prior to the
resumption of bombing, with about 60 percent of the total capacity out
of operation. All four of the major power plans still in operation were
hit as well as two plants on which repairs were advanced. Assessment
of results is not yet complete. However, it has been.determined that
possible targets as well as the power plants which are still operating.
'dem'and: Alternate transformer stations in Hanoi are identified as
and portable generators which can satisfy only about .10'p'ercent of normal
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the Hanoi plant was severely darrlaged and put corsapletely out of opera-.
tioris. ' Other plants received damage. and are 'temporarily operating
?.belo;w. capacity .?' .Th.u.sthe .. percentage of inoperable power., capacity has
-been increased from 60-to-'70 or 80.percent and restora:tion`of 'earlier
damage retarded. ? If all major. plants.. were.out of operation, -'Hanoi" and
Haiphong would be. forced to rely entirely on.snmall, local diesel stations
TOP SECRET [UMBRA
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TOP SECRET/ BRA
a
Storage Areas. Eleven of 14 authorized storage targets were attacked.
The considerable damage will. slow the flow of war materials to the
south and the rehabilitation effort.
Industry. Five vehicle repair facilities, five shipyards and two
construction plants were hit. The most important results are eliminating
the only known facility for overhaul of armored vehicles and closing the
main cement plant (although damage to the cement plant was primarily
to storage facilities). Most vehicle repair was, however, already taking
place in the field at temporary locations. NVN had made little effort
to repair such facilities damaged by earlier bombing.
Air Defense. MIG reactions were sharply reduced by repeated strikes
at each MIG field. Over 20 known SAM sites have been specifically
targeted in addition to continuing suppression attacks. Nevertheless,
over 100 missiles per day were being launched, almost certainly by
relying on the mobility of SA-2 systems. Some shortages of missiles,
probably resulting from the high level of firing, have been reported.
Political/Psychological Impact. In a brief comment DIA states that
there were indications that NVN anticipated new air strikes and some
evacuation action began early in December. Further steps to evacuate
the cities began after the bombing resumed.
The intensity of the U. S. air operations was almost certainly beyond
the expectations of NVN. Morale suffered, but there is no evidence to
indicate that the government will be unable to control the situation.
TOP SECRET /UMBRA
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 AAA7-73
', ~ A No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/08: LOC-HAK-538-1-1-2 z za Drssem
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13
,~`I% ~relo~~~arp Assessment of Linebacker 11
December 1972
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IS & .'T /SENSITIVE INFOR MA1IQN
CODEWORD January 17, 1973
2v .l iA N M l FOR MR. K i II~iG :
Je,"lrnut 6.onne afcIdt
Fxv,nch _Fears of U:. ,soviet Colle sioi and
"Neutralization." of Germany
i ompidou's visit to Brezhoev high 25X1
light two current Frecach concerns and T ornp.idou's efforts to deal with
them. These concerns are.:
?.- that the and the c;ovirt Lraion have been colluding against
"W"est ,uropeaa, speeificaily French, intnreests in MBFi., and
thy; German question; and
that th^ cud res iIt of what tike : reach conceive to be C a iet
;1" FR deals and of the itx)pletrentation of the "d'.-east ; crna -`?.at t G,,rt as
treaty will be a tneutraltzeed G rmalay
"d'ar /SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
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SENSITIVE
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Much of this surfaced in a clearly backgrounded I. g. 1o ade story from
J oscow pa biiahed ost the day before Pompidou'a visit. It complains that
although the itussians had courtesously kept France istforrnead of the
Summit talks in May, this had changed after your visit to Moscow in
&epteaaber, and the k 'reach are no longer being kept au cram on US
w,oviet talks. The deal on scenarios and your "WterventiO.n" in tho your
Power Berlin declaration in October is a triumph of bipolarity. The
U.S. and the Soviet Union make all the key decisions and and then invite than
_ aaropeans to sign.
But Franco can assert itself, since P ipidou remains the only possible
opaaan partner for Moscow and because there have bees signs of
rerceat troubles In the Soviet-L- r+ laticnship (62 M.Qarade cites: V letanaaa ,
vase so, Pompidou
cia-layra in the natural gas deaf, at.sad a 1~1,.L'Y." issue).
knows that the rietsss give priority to relations with 4'aaash.ingteaa , not
Paris.
A Paris cable quotes Pompidou as saying at aaa January I? press conference
ek that B.rezhanev had asked ranee to participate in N-113x' As that
_.._ France could not change her position suddenly, but that he had "noted
with interest" both the "detailed conception" of Soviet views on MU FR
and Soviet reasons for vanting French participation. Tutu adds that this
translates into an increase in flexibility in. the French MI3F position.
Soviet Union's pleas or. NI F had had some effect on i'osnpidou.
QP, ,~:~ t rW;w SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
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40 Ip
5 EC' /SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
By putting out this lire: prior to his visit to BrezItn.ev, Potnpidou was
poett:,ring again as Russia's ofaly uxop an intc-,tggAl xr 1"M
,.han pio:a of llarop~-"'a icatereat against the two superpowers, and
the a.rilyr stata:arra.n capa.ite of convincing rez ev that lie sho
his deplorable propensity to bllateratisrs; with Washington,
pose ~nhanccs ?ornpido4'b prospects :,Ith the &Imctorate.
More itr; portico for us, he rva:y lie 2si.gnallitxi; a d#,tnaztd that v e cut hi
into our deciairacx-n,iaktrg on . urop.:?an s c:ar'ity issues. at an earth stage
if we vivant his slapport in and M BI R. 1`h-Iv alternative is a ra,raco-
Garrrtan aligriraesnl against us on aorre of th me sorneth,ing our "'E.rnbaaayr
in Bonn, sc ses Mast paragraph of Tab !t) is already h ginning. This
co is through niost clearly in his press conference remark that
Brezhsa v had provided him + :ith a cl-tailed explanation of the a iet
position -- the irpxication evidently i its that it was Netter that-, any
we have gi.veaa hint. (':c his is dislage