CIA AND LAM SON INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-537-4-11-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 12, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/11/05 : LOC-HAK-537-4-11-9
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INFORMATION
April 12, 1971
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: Tom Latimer
SUBJECT: CIA and Lam Son Intelligence Failures
Director Helms has provided you with some interesting reading regard-
ing Lam Son and intelligence. As a result of press allegations that
there were intelligence failures in connection with the Lam Son opera-
tion, his staff prepared a memorandum listing the charges and the "facts. r-
The upshot of the CIA memorandum (Tab 1) is that there was no failure
on CIA's part. Director Helms' covering note to you states that he has
sent a copy of this memorandum to the PF1AB. (Tab A)
The CIA memorandum breaks the press charges down into four sets of
failures:
a) the intensity with which Hanoi would react
b) Hanoi's reinforcement capability
c) the enemy's anti-aircraft artillery capability
d) the enemy's armor capability.
On the question of Hanoi's intentions:
A CIA. memorandum dated 21 January 1971 (Tab 2 in Nelms'
memo) was done at your request and it noted Hanoi's antici-
pation of allied ground attacks against its infiltration routes
in south Laos.
It also noted the large deployments of North Vietnamese troops
to protect those routes, deployments which put the Communists
"in a good posture to contest such an operation vigorously and
promptly. "
CIA observed that the Communists might evade combat for a
few days or longer but in the face. of a sustained allied drive
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"Hanoi would be likely to do whatever it could to make the
position of the South Vietnamese in Laos untenable and it would
be prepared to accept the heavy manpower losses this might
entail. "
- CIA concludes that, far from failing to predict Hanoi's response,
it "came about as close to calling the shots as one is ever likely
to come in the real world.''
As for the enemy's reinforcement capability, the CIA memorandum states:
- A CIA /DIA /State memorandum dated 14 December 1970 (Tab 3)
flagged in detail the expansion and buildup of Communist tactical
strength in south Laos then in train.
-- It estimated overall NVA combat strength in south Laos at about
27, 000 men -- 22, 000 infantry plus S. 000 artillery, armor and
anti-aircraft -,. augmented by about 8, 000 Pathet Lao.
The 14 December memo stated that the largest concentration of
the newly arrived NVA forces was in the vicinity of Tchepone
and that elements of the 320th, 308th, 2nd and 304th NVA divi-
sions were in the Tchepone area.
- - It also noted that one or more of the nine regiments of the
304th, 308th, 320th and 325th NVA Divisions not then in Laos
could be deployed southward.
On 3 February 1971 a CIA memorandum (Tab 4) updated the
14 December 1970 memorandum and flagged the presence in
the Tchepone area of 11, 000 NVA combat troops, plus a pool
of about 70, 000 in immediately adjacent areas, any of which, it
noted, could be easily deployed to the Tchepone area.
That memo explicitly stated that Hanoi could add some 10, 000
men to its U, 000-man combat force in the Tchepone area within
a week.
On the anti-aircrafr artillery question. CIA states:
Both the 14 December 1970 memo and an 11 February 1971
memorandum (Tab 5) noted the enemy's anti-aircraft artillery
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strength clearly and accurately and the 11 February memoran-
dum, issued eight days before major enemy resistance
commenced, stressed that Lam Son 719 would be resisted
with all the resources that Hanoi could muster.
Regarding the armor issue:
CIA memoranda prior to Lam Son 719 did not highlight the
probable enemy use of tanks but the 14 December 1970 memo
did make explicit reference to the 5, 000 NVA artillery, armor
and anti-aircraft forces in south Laos.
The 3 February 1971 update specifically noted the presence of
the 198th Armor Battalion and located it as being possibly at
the intersection of Routes 23 and 9, a short distance from the
Lam Son operation area.
CIA's conclusion is that the charges and allegations of intelligence failures
regarding Lam Son 719 are demonstrably without fact.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/11/05: LOC-HAK-537-4-11-9