COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY POSTURE TOWARD THE USSR (1960-1970)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-537-4-10-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 9, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
01 4'~
FROM: K. Wayne Smith r ~?~
INFORMATION
April 9, 1971
SUBJECT: Communist China's Military Posture, Toward the
USSR (1960-1970)
This CIA report (TabA) discusses changes in the CPR military posture
which have been caused by the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations
between 1960 and today. The focus is. on the geographical region near
the USSR/CPR common border and CPA redeployments there in response
to the Soviet troop buildups.
Disengagement: 1960-1965
During the early years of deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, changes
in the CPR military posture were limited to its northern border and were
confined to civil measures including:
-- Resettlement of native inhabitants ethnically related to the people
on the Soviet side of the border.
-- Expansion of border defense stations and increases in the fre-
quency of border patrols.
-- Settlement of the border areas by province Production and Con-
struction Corps (a para-military organization used much as a territorial
army).
During this period the Soviet threat to the northern border of the CPR
was virtually non-existent and security of the area was a very minor
concern to the Chinese military.
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The Soviet Build Up: 1965-1970
In 1965, Soviet forces situated along the CPR northern border included
a small force of:
-- 11 -12divisions containing 78, 000-85, 000 men.
-- 500 fighter/attack aircraft and 190 tactical aircraft.
These Soviet forces were concentrated in the Far East military district
and were apparently deployed to counter U. S. forces in Japan and Korea
rather than to pose a threat to the Chinese border.
At the same time, the CPR forces in the northern sector were concentrated
in the southern sector of Manchuria where they were in position to counter
U. S. forces in Japan and Korea. In 1965 therfore, both Soviet and CPR
troop concentrations were deployed to meet the common threat from U. S.
and allied forces in Japan, Korea, and at sea (see map, page 3).
However, in later 1965, a methodical build-up of Soviet strength along the
border began and continued through 1970 until -
-- Ground forces more than tripled from 11 to 34 division and from
75, 000 to 350, 000 men.
-- Some 800 more aircraft were deployed to support the increased
land forces. The 500 fighter attack aircraft there since 1960 also remain
in the area.
The majority of Soviet forces (80%) are today situated in the far eastern
USSR around Manchuria in the same positions from which the Soviet
invasion of JJaa Lanese-held China emamated in 1945. This deployment
threatens not only Peking itself, but the Manchurian industrial centers
of Shen-yang, Kirin, and Dairen. The rest of the Soviet forces are
concentrated on the northwestern border of Sinkiang province in Western
China (see map, page 3).
The Chinese Reaction: 1965-1968
The Chinese capability to respond to the Soviet force buildup was severly
constrained between 1965 and 1968 by:
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- - The threat which the CPR perceived in the U. S. combat force
involved in South Vietnam and bombing North Vietnam. According to
the CIA, this forced the CPR to keep the majority of its troops
garrisoned near the Southern border to be in position to meet a
potential U. S. invasion.
-- China was plunged,into a Cultural Revolution in mid-1966.
Military production, recruitment and training were all disrupted and
the Army's attention was diverted away from foreign affairs and towards
internal problems.
Some improvements to the forces stationed along the northern border
were made during this period, but these were a result of nationwide
force improvement programs rather than a direct reaction to the Soviet
buildup of forces. These measures included:
-- The construction of ten new airfields (4 in the east(Manchuria)
and 6 in the west (Sinkiang) ).
-- The establishment of an early warning radar network all along
the northern border.
-- The subordination of the Production and Construction Corps to
the explicit control of the armed forces removing its para-military
character and making it more of a territorial army.
No substantial increase in Chinese troop or aircraft deployments had
been observed des- ite the massive Soviet buildu Substantial measures
were taken, however, to build the defenses of the Shuang-Cheng-Tzu
missile test range
By 1969, certain events turned China's attention to the north including:
- - A lessening of tension on the southern border as. the U. S. bombing
of North Vietnam was restricted to the southern section.
An. increase of tension between Soviet and CPR forces which led
to fighting at Damanskiy (Chen-pao) island and probably convinced Peking
that a large scale attack by the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility.
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- - The ending of the Cultural Revolutuion.
Shortly after the Darnanskiy Island incident, the CPR Ninth Party Congress
started a compaign of "preparations for war" which included new activities
of digging air raid shelters, stockpiling strategic materials and storing
food.
These measures appear to have been a short term reaction to the
Damanskiy conflict but were accompanied by several national military
developments of long term strategic importance. These include:
-- At least four and perhaps five armies (160, 000__- 200, 000 men)
were moved from the southern region to the central and north/central
regions where they could more quickly respond to a Soviet attack on the
northern border -- this redeployment represented a long range re-orienat-
tion of ground forces away from their historic pre-occupation with defense
against an attack from the sea.
-- Training activity within all branches of service was increased
and command and control capabilities were improved so that tactical
centralized control of all Chinese units was possible.
-- A re-alignment of the northern military regions was imple-
mented which divided the border military region near southeastern
Mongolia (inner Mongolia) between the three bordering regions of
Lan-Chou, Peking, Shen-Yang. This is undoubtedly symptomatic of
an increase of military concern for the security of the border regions.
-- Troop concentrations in the border regions were increased
from the 1965 level of about 590, 000 men and 440 aircraft to the current
level of 635, 000 men and 950 aircraft. The increase in CPR deployments
was spread evenly along the border opposite the highest Soviet
concentrations.
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The Current CPR Posture (see map, page 7 )
Deployments of CPR troops in the northwest appear to be configured in
enclaves to protect the Urumchi region in Sinkiang and the Shuang_-ch
eng-tzu missile test range area. The CPR probably does not believe
it necessary to defend the entire northwestern region because of the
comparatively light Soviet troop concentrations in the area (60, 000 men
and 125 aircraft).
Considering the paramount importance of the industrial region in
eastern Manchuria the deployments of its defenses are puzzling. Two
armies have been withdrawn from the area and the six remaining are
garrisoned in the southern third of the region. There are also no signs
of fixed defenses along likely invasion routes. This posture probably
does not reflect complacency on the part of the CPR, but rather a
decision that defense in the northern half of the province would be
impossible since the area is surrounded on three sides by the Soviet
Union. Another less likely interpretation is that this deployment
represents a CPR belief that it could advance its centrally located
armies quickly to the north before the Soviet army penetrated dangerously
far into Manchuria and they therefore do not have to be forward deployed.
Given the scope of the CPR defensive problem, and the disparity in
firepower and mobility between CPR and Soviet land forces, it is doubtful
that the favorable force manpower ratio which the CPR enjoys will be
sufficient for the CPR to hold a Soviet attack. Most observers agree
that the Chinese would not be a match for a Soviet attack at least in the
forward areas. How far the Soviet armies could advance, however, in
face of stiffening CPR resistance, lengthening supply lines, and Chinese
guerilla attacks, is an open question.
Strategic Implications of the Current Posture
The events of the past two years have resulted in a shift in the Chinese
military geographical center of gravity away from the southern coastal
region towards the north. With forces more centrally located the CPR
land forces are in a better position to react to an attack from either the
north or southern coastal regions. .
Although these deployments do not provide a blueprint for China's military
doctrine they do offer some good clues:
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- Where absolutely necessary, as. on the southern coast or north
trated in this area.
northern strategy since defense in depth is not possible in the coastal
regions and most of the countries' urban industrial power is concen-
important targets further inland. This is not inconsistent with their
.made .to conduct a continuing conventional: defense along the routes to
of Shuang-Cheng-tzu an immediate defense is planned with provision
Where there arelarge stretches of land between the CPR and'
Soviet forces and there is little of value to defend, (as in- the north-
western region of Sinkiang) distance itself is considered the defense.
"Peoples War" tactics employed to attack lengthening supply lines as
-Where enemy strength could be brought overwhelmingly `to- bear
and cut off CPR troops as in the northern region of Manchuria, the
Chinese would be willing to give up a great deal of territory without
opposition.. Main forces would be withdrawn from these areas and