WHO INVITED WHOM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-536-12-1-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
INFORMATION
October 13, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER RODMAN~'~
SUBJECT: Who Invited Whom?
The attached chronology gives the full record of public and private
statements relevant to the question of which side took the initiative
to propose a Presidential visit to China. The record suggests that
the invitation evolved out of initiatives on both sides:
State review completed,
pgs 1-6
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The U. S. tool-, the initiative and pressed for the idea
of sending a U. S. special representative to Peking
or receiving a Chinese special envoy in Washington.
(This began in the Warsaw talks in January 1970, and
we later raised it in special channels. The Chinese
responded positively on December 9, 1970.)
MORI/CDF Pages
1-6 per C03318090
Aside from a casual comment by the President in an
October 1970 TIME interview, the first Tnention of
a Presidential visit came from the Chinese on January 11'
1971. (They repeated it on April 21, 1971, following the
President's public remark about his daughter's-honeymoon. )
Chou En--lai's message of May 29, 1971, treats the idea of
a Presidential visit as Mao's "suggestion" which the President
"accepts. "
Chinese ploymanship about our seeking the invitation seems
to have begun in Chou' s talks with you in Peking. (Chou told
you the President's honeymoon remark in April prompted the
invitation.) Ho has been getting the sequence wrong, too:,
Last week he told a group of Americans that the special-envoy.
idea was agreed to after the Presidential visit idea was broached.
The key steps in the process are'fnarkedin red on the attached chronology.
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
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WHO INVITED WHOM?
Jan. 20, 1970
Feb.. 20, 1970
May 3, 1970
June 15, 1970
Arnb. Stoessel at Warsaw meeting tells PRC
Charge' that U. S. "would be prepared to consider
sending a representative to Peking for direct
discussions . . . or receiving a representative
from your Government in Washington," PRC
Charge' expresses interest. (Tab 1)
At next Warsaw meeting, PRC Charge' states that
"if the USG wishes to send a representative of
ministerial rank or a special envoy of the U.S.
President to Peking for further exploration of
questions of fundamental principle between China
and the United States, the Chinese Government
will be willing to receive him. " (Tab 2)
U. S. assures Chinese following Cambodia operation
(thru Winter and Walters in Paris) that U. S. has
no aggressive intentions, and that "Dr. Kissinger
is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the
Communist Chinese side if this can be done .secretly..
(Tab 3)
U. S. (thru Walters) suggests creation of a regular
channel thru Walters, and states our readiness "to
send a high-level personal representative of the
President to Paris, or some other mutually con-
venient location, for direct talks on U. S. -Chinese
relations." (Tab 4)
Oct&S, 1970 President, in TIME interview following Jordanian
crisis, says: "If there is anything I want to do
before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't, ' I
want my children to. (Tab 5)
Oct. 25, 1970 President asks Yahya in Washington to tell Chinese
in Peking that U. S. is willing to send high-level
personal representative (e, g., Murphy, Dewey, or
HAK) to Peking or other convenient capital to, open
direct secret communications. (Tab 6)
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Oct. 26, 1970 Ceausescu tells President he believes PRC wants
to improve relations with U. S. President declares
U. S. readiness for talks with PRC and exchange
of high-level special representatives.. (Tab 7)
Dec. 9, 1970
PRC replies to oral message delivered by Yahya:
Chou En-lai, after coordinating with Mao and Lin
Piao, states that "in order to discuss this subject
[U. S. vacating Taiwan], a special envoy of Presi
dent Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."
Chou notes that this was first U.S. message sent
"from a Head thru a Head to a Head, " and Chinese
attach importance to it because Pakistan is a great
friend of China. (Tab 8)
Dec. 16, 1970 U. S. replies thru Pakistani channel welcoming
Chinese willingness (as expressed at Feb. 20, 1970
Warsaw meeting) to receive U. S. representative
to discuss outstanding issues. U. S. therefore
"believes it would be useful" to begin discussions
at an early convenient moment on bringing about a
higher-level meeting in Peking. (Tab 9)
Dec. 24, 1970
Jan. 11, 1971
HAK, in end-of-year backgrounder, says: "We
remain prepared,. at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to
talk to the Communist Chinese about differences
that divide us. " (Tab 10)
Amb. Bogdan delivers message from Chou En-lai
declaring that "if the U. S. has a desire to settle
the [Taiwan] issue and a proposal for its solution,
the PRC will be prepared to receive a U. S. special
envoy in Peking. " Chou added the comment that
since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and
Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking.
(Tab 11)
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April 16, 1971 President tells American Society of Newspaper
Editors of a recent conversation he had had with
his daughters on the possibility of their going to
China someday. "I hope they do. As a matter of
fact, I hope sometime I -do. II (Tab 13)
April 21, 1971 Message from. Chou En-lai delivered April 27
"reaffirms [PRC] willingness to receive publicly
in Peking a special envoy of the President of the
U. S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U. S.
Secretary of State or even the President of the
U. S. himself for direct meeting and discussions.
(Tab 14)
April 27, 1971 U. S. message dispatched via Walters proposes set-
ting up reliable channel and says that HAK would be
prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on U. S. -
Chinese relations." (This message dispatched
before receipt of above; received by Chinese April
29.) (Tab 15)
April 29, 1971 President in news conference says: "I hope, and,
as a matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China
sometime in some capacity -- I don't know what
capacity. But that indicates what I hope for the
long term. "" (Tab 16)
April 30, 1971 LIFE publishes Edgar Snow report of Dec. 18, 1970,
interview with Mao. The PRC foreign ministry,
Mao had said, was considering the matter of ad-
mitting Americans, including the President, to
China. "He should be welcomed because, Mao
explained, at present the problems between China
and the U. S. A. would have to be solved with Nixon.
Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a
tourist or as President. "" (.Tab 17)
May 10?, 1971 President, replying thru Pakistani channel to Chou's
message of April 21, says he "is prepared to accept
the suggestion of Premier Chou .En-tai that he visit
Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of
the People's Republic of China." President proposes
preliminary secret meeting between HAK and Chou
to exchange views and explore possibility of Presi-
dential visit. (Received by Chinese May 17) (Tab. 18)
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May 20, 1971
May 29, 1971
U.S., in note informing PRC of May 20 SALT
announcement and pledging to make no agreement
directed against PRC, suggests arms control as
agenda item for proposed preliminary secret meet-
ing. (Received by Chinese May 22) (Tab 19)
Chou En-lai, in formal response (received June 2),
says he "has reported with much pleasure to Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared
to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct
conversations with the leaders of the People's
Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has
indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit
. . . Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger
to China as the U.. U.S. representative who will come
in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with
high-level Chinese officials to prepare and make
necessary arrangements for President Nixon's
visit to Peking." (Tab 20)
June 4, 1971 President, in reply, says he "kooks forward with
great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meet-
ing and discussions with the leaders of the People's
Republic of China, " and he "appreciates the warm
welcome extended. by Premier Chou En-tai to his
personal representative, Dr. Kissinger." (Tab 21)
July 9-11, 1971 Chou En-lai tells HAK in Peking that "from the very
beginning, [the President] took the attitude that he
was willing to come to Peking. " He says President's
remark about daughter's honeymoon prompted
invitation. HAK tells Chou that "this idea resulted
first from your initiative which we are happy t'?_ __.._...:.:.
accept. " (Excerpts from Peking MemCons, Tab 22)
July 15, 1971 Joint announcement of Peking summit:. "Knowing of
President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the
PRC, Premier Chou En-lai . . . has extended an
invitation to President Nixon . [who] has accepted
this. invitation with pleasure.'' (Tab 23).
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July 16, 1971
naturally we can invite him .. . ".(Tab 25)
said that he hopes to visit China. And of course
HAK,asked at San. Clemente backgrounder if he
knew . before his trip that President :would be, in
vited, replies: "Essentially, yes. .1 knew, and of
course the President knew that there was an interest,
a mutual interest in. a. visit. " (Tab 24)
July 19, 1971. Chou En-tai, in interview with delegation from
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, explains
Nixon visit by saying that "at the present date, in
contacting your government to normalize relations
we must contact those who are in authority in your
country. But in your country, your system is that
you have a president, and your president said that
he wishes to move towards friendship and he also haE
a desire to come and we have invited him to come.
published August 10: "He. [the President] expressed
August 5, .1977 Chou En-tai tells James. Reston,, in interview
(Tab 26)
October 5, 1971 Julian Schuman, in .UPI dispatch from Peking, quote.
Chou En-tai as saying: "He [the President] publicly
expressed his wilUngness to come to China and
negotiate. We had made no response. It would not,
have been proper for a state so antagonistic.
Therefore we agreed to Kissinger's coming." (Tab 2
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
?TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
June 30, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: LARRY HIGBY
FROM: WINSTON LORD/JOHN NEGROPONTE
.,SUBJECT: President's May 24 Evening at the
Soviet Dacha
Attached is the full record of the atmosphere at the President's
May 24 evening with the Soviet leaders in the country Dacha. You
will note that we have incorporated the earlier June 13 material so
as to make this a self-contained piece. Also, as indicated, we have
on file separately the sensitive full transcript of the substantive meet-
ing itself.
Frankly, we have not appreciated being badgered on almost a daily
basis with phone calls and memos about this subject. As has been
explained on several occasions, we have both been travelling con-
tinuously since Moscow (Tokyo, Peking, and Saigon) and have been
? swamped not only by the travel, but getting ready for the various
meetings and the follow-up on them, in addition to the usual business
press of time-sensitive work such as the President's press conference.
Despite this recent schedule, we sent you the June 13 memo which we
acknowledged was incomplete but was pegged to the original request
we received to give impressions of the Soviet leaders, not details of
the dinner.
I hope the attached finally closes out this project. We recognize the
importance of having a good historical record. On the other hand,
there are sometimes even more urgent items of business which have
to do with the making of history which has to take precedence over the
recording of history.
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