LETTER TO LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER FROM CARL MARCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 2, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/16: LOC-HAK-535-19-1-6
J. W. FI/IJBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN
JOHN SPARKMAN. ALA. GEORGE P. AIKEN. VT.
MIKE MANSFIELD. MONT. CUFFORD P. CASE. N.J.
FRANK CHURCH. IDAHO JACOB K. JAVITS. N.Y.
E VART SYMINGTON, MO. NUGH SCOTT. PA.
CIJUEORNE PELL. R.I. JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
GALE W. MC GEE. WYO. CHARLES H. PERCY. ILL.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE. MAINE RaRERT P. GRIFFIN. MICH.
GEORGE MCGOVERN, S. OAK.
HURERT H. HUMPHREY. MINN.
CARL MARCY, CHIEF OP STAFF
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIEF CLERK
B rs G" T__
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
November 2$ 1973
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger
Executive Assistant to
The Secretary'of State
Washington, Dr C.
Dear Larry:
In response to Marshall Wright's request of
November 1, the Committee agreed to send a copy
.of Secretary Kissinger's testimony of October 31
to you for the personal use of the Secretary. This
copy is to be returned to the Committee within ten
days, no copies are to be made of the transcript,
and it is not' to be circulated within the Depart-
meat.
I was instructed to send the transcript
directly to ybu.
I would be glad to explain the reasons for
the Committee,'s sensitivity in sending copies of
its executive' transcripts outside the Committee if
you.feel that'' necessary.
DOS and DOE reviews
completed.
Enclosure'
Sincerely yours,
t
Carl Marcy
CC:. The Honorable Marshall Wright
Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations
Washington, D. C.
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 c~ Ab I 'Auih. 0wll"
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i try' ~#utr~ t
Report, of Procec$irgs
0 ".3
Hearing het4 before
CO111NI 2 ON FOi aI,11'
BR?IP1,70 ON f lID I BAST "I 3_
dnezda,T, October 3.1,, 1973
i'JWsashittgton,1D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste tu"r,ned over
to the Committee for destructjon ',
WARD, & PAUL,
410 FIRST STRE}T, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2O003
(202) 644-611Q
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 &all
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C O AN 11 N T S
cTATF 4ENT OF
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,
The Secretary of State
BAGS.
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i BRIEFING ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
'Wednesday, October 31, 1973
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United States Senate,
~._ Committee?on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:00 o'clock
a.m., in Room 5--116, The Capitol Building, Senator J. William
Fuibright (Chairman) presiding.
Present:. --Senators Fulbright (presiding), Sparkman,
Mansfield, Church, Symington, Pell, Muskie, McGovern, Case,
Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy and Griffin.
Also present: Senators Johnston, Huddleston, Nelson,
Haskell, Abourezk and Hathaway..
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones and Mr.
Dockery and Mrs. McLaughlin of the Committee Staff.
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The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary
of State to commune with us about his recent activities.
Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Secretary?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A.
KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE ?
Secretary Kissinger. I don't have a statement, Mr.
,,Chairman; I leave it entirely up to you whether you want'me to
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make a few informal remarks or whether you propose to ask
questions.
The Chairman. Perhaps the best way is to give us an.
informal background,. and I wish to pursue a subject, we all
have subjects we wish for a few minutes. There will he a lot
more here, they are all tardy.
Secretary Kissinger. If the Chairman and gentlemen'
will let me discuss briefly some of the principles we have
followed and where we are and where we expect to go from here.
You gentlemen remember the meeting at the end of the
first week of the crisis, and, therefore, I won't go over the
events of that week in detail except to sum up again what the
basic principles were which we tried to follow throughout'the
events of the last two and a half weeks.
First, we wanted to bring about cessation of hostilities
as rapidly aS possible.
Secondly, we wanted to bring cessation about under
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c:=.dit:.ons it c'.which e?? w cudd Z~wzr- h maz ;iu;- ~-
o?~nor wu,uy ~~
play a co:structjv- ro1= 'aftc=r ~;~- c asp frr _: -hS move
'-car~.rds :: dur hl -, and las . _= g p ac= .
Thr .J cJ . t cl o _. e ,--d
use cc :s ~ruc'-i v:=1Sr th.
r ' '? o s h!ps on w,h Ch !?r 2 `t wV. 'i.ha pa s ac of th world w-411
ultina YlV d s';7tnd , which is .i th d. h d cur
Y C.+y+. ~. rafts 7
*r ``x our Europ a:: -s =.r.: cK oth-n.r had r l~
our
S
tt'.}1 ..nd w
~ ._ '1i ::1 :: gr = c:. t :alla:' 1 ~r Tl^.,'?1 ?' ~ ~ IJc:'l t;";:Cl to
,,,_,
avoid v5nts from sliding towards -_ confrontation tat. -tight
haw : ?calcuaabl cv .srur*-c=s.
' nallv
w hav- always ba cc:ariit~~:d to the survival of
Isrc. _1 and to thaz ma I'., .:?a3 C of is s :curi tv Th?=sr w-ors
~hr nri:c7plws fallow d thrcughcu . thz crisis.
Duri_g ti.c-, f i r ss -- w sk L'Iy. ? r ti C r ~.rr nt ?d w ~~~
situation
of a :.n to thy. cry G . That beg---~Ln on
T1lS1n. slay of thM t tia = k, ilcrn ni`i al drab succsss .s of th
s
of ba-' tla turned on thy. Syrian front a. d a, sort Of stal`ma .
dsveion-d cn yhs Sir
Ile melds major 4'.ffor;.s during first ]-
:ig 1 CJo.=c ti ,.o bring F.b^u -
c a sa fire 4n placa and w z thought this --- 1 pr,;.swni this is
an a.xScutivr: a ssiw:t.
Ths Cha1?rlian. This is an ax3cutive sassiv72~ sv rybody
unde-r s t finds --hat.
S cr::4axV i is ing-r. T`?" h -,A
!l Ci._ an ~5:xwangcrl:.;'i?.~ ~J had
t= a 4ik cC1 with t ho t s })Cut a cF asa firs in pl C::
a ~`~ T =~ awl r a a"A
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the
I met You gentlemen on
ht would happen on Saturday.
what we thong were vcxY restrained in. our
we
While this Was going on lanes to comb
Wa 5ust pitted a few planes
. mint because, as You know'
lies to Tarsal.
suPP token equip .
really carry a great deal of
here to pick up
can't really that
Senator, P as$eng er Planes ds
re only three plane loa
e uipment` I think there we
q
Y.. after'
first Alec
went d1.;: irlg that that i-s the day
t
4~~n~v?. Would put vote would
s`=cur.Council rn and the major itY
would.absta tians
oV~et Unions we understand that the EgYP
had been ga.ven to at the tim that
deVelop and we fire. This was
d then accept the cease Thisi.s
woul Friday of that week.
on the Saturday of to - we.
cease fire which we thong
,
met with this committee the
- ft varietY of reasons , one Of
had axr ang the British to introduce the
which was ed fell apart reso--
' the refusal of
o a1oDy
al of the Egyptians to g
lution the refua
Another one was
ited Nations would Put
in the Un
e cease fire to the
mom, other countries
to go along with it at that
were prepared
Israeles
case- lace of resolution
Senator Which one w ~
f ire in p
:i`-?singer cease
Secretary
13.
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Senator Case.. The thing they are hasseling about going-
back to the line now?
Secretary Kissinger. That was not the case then..
fact, at that time we were in the-:fortunate position there was
a straight line on every front.. At that point we were faced
.with a continuing massive Soviet airlift into the area and
an inability to bring about a cease fire, and the Israeles
running out of amunition to a point where their airplanes were
ordered to land with unexpended amunition, testifying that
bombs were more. important than airplanes and, therefore, we
felt we had no choice except to start a substantial airlift
of our own.
During this whole period we were in constant touch with,,
as I told you at our last session with each of the Arab
capitals, with the Soviet Union, with our West European
allies, despite the stories that are now being spread, which
I will come to in a minute, and with the Soviet Union.
Our reasoning in starting the airlift was it was an
absolute necessity. Without the airlift Israel probably would
have collapsed, and because it was running out of amunition.
Secondly, since we could not get the agreement either
of the Egyptians, the Soviets or the'West European allies to
promote a cease fire in the United Nations under the condi-
tions that existed, we felt that until a military balance
was re-established no one would talk to us and we, therefore,
W IPA mss. rI .1 F? r^'3 .9.1 C*N E?"I t^V
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tried to bring about a restoration oz zne n~aaiL.u~ x ~ituataron
as rapidly as we could, offering constantly to the Soviet
Union and to our West Europeaxi allies our readiness to support
a ceasefire in the United Nations as soon as .a consensus cool
be developed-in the United Nations.
Throughout this crises we made a great effort to use the
security Council as the forum where the settlement would take
place, and the only reason, as I told you when we met last
time, why we did not introduce a resolution of our own was
because we did not want to get a crystalization of lines before
there was any consensus that had formed, but every day we
talked to the Secretary General and to the key members.to.see
whether we could crystalize a consensus behind the Security
Council resolution.
I had a?very long conversation with Dobrynin on Saturday
night, the 13th,, when we started the airlift, and said we
were really coming to a critical point, that if we could not
work together on bringing this war to a conclusion, then
Soviet-American relations would,-the whole concept of detonate
would be difficult and then we would be driven step by step
by the rivalries in the area into confrontations which could
not be in the interest of world peace or?in the interest of ou
two countries or in the interest of the area. And Dobrynin
said to me at that time that he considered that conversation
so important that he reported it verbatim to Moscow.
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The Chairman, with whom I tried to stay in. the closest.
contact during this The Chairman. You did.
Secretary Kissinger. -- crisis, and to whom I gave
almost I would say daily reports, ~ometimesseveral times a
day, took the important step of himself calling Dobrynin
with a similar message, without endorsing individual steps,
but simply pointing out that we were.at an important point.
As .a result of this the Soviet leaders on Monday morning
-- that would have been ;October 15,-- informed us that they
were going to make another effort to bring the war to a con-
clusion and they were sending Kosygin to Cairo, they said
they would not beat the propaganda drum about. our airlift and.
they asked us not to justify it on anti--Soviet grounds in
order to-keep the temperature down.while they were engaged
in an airlift which we did.
Kosygin left for Cairo on the morning of October 16 and
stayed there for three days. I won't go through all of the
exchanges that took place during that week between ourselves,
our allies, the Arabs and Israeles, and our theme to the
Arabs daily was please remember you will need to deal with
us after the war` is over and, therefore, keep yourself from
taking irrevocable steps, and on the whole the Arabs, while
they put on certain oil embargos did not engage in the sort
of anti-American campaign throughout the Arab world that
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happened in the 1967 crisis..
Now, of course, we were in the closest contact with the
israeles. 'The battle turned about the 17th or 18th. Kosygin
returned to Moscow on the evening of the 18th. On the evening
of the 18th we received a Soviet proposition which, however,
was not yet acceptable. It called for a cease fire, it did no
call for negotiations, and it called for an Israelie with-,
drawal to the 1967 borders, which was pretty much the program.
We told the Soviets that we would have a counter proposal
within 24 hours and we would let them know by Friday evening
what our response would be.
I.am being very detailed and I hope we can keep the
secrecy.
During the day on Friday, we received a letter from
.Brezhnev which said we are at the point of having to make
some irrevocable decision. and we have to decide whether to go
one way or another and my colleagues would, therefore,
appreciate it very much, it is addressed to the President, if
you could send the Secretary of State to Moscow for urgent
consultations designed to speed an end of the war.
We asked whether Gromyko could instead come here. We
were told no, they had to make these decisions collectively,
that Kosygin was just back from Cairo and they would appreciat
it if we came to Moscow.
Under those conditions the President then decided to
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send me to Moscow where I had very extensive - -
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true or
is it true that it was so urgent that it was stated that it
was not a matter of days but a matter of*hours?
Secretary-Kissinger. That is correct, that is exactly.,
right, Senator. It said it is not just a question of days,
.we have to make our decisions in a question of hours.
We knew that some of the airborne divisions were on alert
and we felt after again close consultation with the fsraeli
government, we felt that we should respond and the President
therefore sent me. I left at midnight that night, arrived
in Moscow the following. evening, Moscow time, immediately
went into a five-hour cession. with Br-7hnP-v, which was
extremely emotional on his side. We met again the next day
for six hours and came up with the Security Council resolution
338 which had the following three part-s.
one, immediate cease fire in place.
Two, a call for the implementation of Security Council
242, which had been accepted by all of the parties six
years earlier.
And, three, call for the immediate negotiation between
the parties under appropriate auspices to bring about a just
and durable peace.
Of those three provisions, only the first are really
operative provisions. The first for cease fire in place and
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the third for negotiations among the parties.
Security Council Resolution 242 was.adopted in 1967 pre-
cisely because it could be interpreted by each party in its
own'way. It calls in effect fora,just and durable peace in
secure and recognized borders and. anyone can interpret exactly.
what it means. He does better than anyone has yet been able
to do in the history of these negotiations. But it is a sort
of a code word on which all.parties could unite.
The most significant part was the third part of that.
resolution. For 25 years the Arabs had refused to sit down
with the Israelis in face to face negotiations. Even the road
settlement which established the State of Israel was achieved
by indirect an which fl lph Bien che- rpnvec between
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the parties and in the same group but they never met face to
face.
Now, the Arabs will be committed to face to face negotia-
.tions with the Israelis under appropriate auspices,, which
probably we believe will be under UN sponsorship with the Unite
States and Soviets playing the principal role. The reason
being that this is the sponsorship that is most acceptable to
all of the parties. If we had the whole Security Council, the
Chinese will move to the left of the Russians, the British
and French will move between us and the Russians, and the
permanent members are going to spend more of their time fight-
ing among each other than making a constructive contribution,
, E c+ r 1 Ev
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and by the consent of everybody so far there have been no
dissents. We and the Soviet Union are.going to provide the
auspices for this negotiation.
- That has been a very significant step.forward.
Now, then, what about the event since then? If this war
had ended the way normal wars end, all of the attention would
then have moved from the cease fire to the implementation of
the third part of the resolution, that is to say, to the
direct negotiations, Unfortunately what happened was that the
Israelis had broken through the center part of the Egyptian
line and had captured a big slice of the West Bank so that the
war ended with the Israeli-Egyptian armies toward the line of
communication of each other.
On October 22, after the.. c.eas.e fire .want into effect,.
after the cease fire went into effect, the cease fire was
broken for reasons which we can-no longer determine, each
side claiming the other side had broken it, but there is no
dispute about the fact that it was the Israelis who scored
the major gains after the cease fire was broken and the major
gain consisted of the Israelis cutting the last'line of com-
munication of the Egyptian third army on the East Bank of the
Sinai so that 30,000 Egyptians found themselves in a trap
which was completed after the cease fire went into effect, and
last week almost all of the maneuvering that went on last week
concerned the fate of the third army and the attempts to induce
 l u
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56
the Israelis to go back to the line of October 22, wherever
that line might have been, but wherever the line was it was nol
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'across the last road.
.-We took'the position
should be re-established,
the line was but we could
that in principle the cease fire
that it was hard to determine where
not refuse a Security Council call
for restoration of a cease fire line that we had been instru-
mental in establishing.
During the week'we were deluged with increasingly menacin
Soviet notes, including one, there were a number of other
indicators. Seven out of eight of the Soviet airborne divi-
sions were put on alert. An airborne command post was
established in Southern Russia. The number of. ships in the
Mediterranean went up, the Soviet ships went up to 98.
naval flotila was heading for Egypt. Then we received an
extremely menacing letter on Wednesday night. It was in these
circumstances that we felt a menacing letter that had a dead-
line on it, unfortunately, that we felt we had to take certain
precautionary military measures.
This situation was resolved the next day.when the Soviet
Union agreed that military contingents of the major countries
should not be sent to Egypt. Since then we have stood down
the alert and we are back to trying to promote the ceasefire.
We have started in the meantime very actively diplomacy
with all of the parties.
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As you know, Golda.Meir is coming here tomorrow. The
Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt has been here for three days.
I have had extensive conversations with him on two problems.
One, how to make effective the cease fire that was established
and how to bring about a solution to what. has become-the
Egyptian third army problem.
Secondly, how to begin the process of negotiations to
lead to a permanent settlement.
This morning we will announce that next week on my way
to Peking I will stop in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Pakistan, in order to begin the.American'participatio
in .the diplomatic effort to bring about a just and durable
peace.
I must say I will go into this in somewhat greater length
in response to your questions. We have had rather good talks.
with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, which are not yet com-
pleted, by which showed some awareness of the fact of the
Israeli problem with respect to the third army and some willin
ness to work it out and .-.on a realistic basis.
We have not completed these talks yet but so far they hav
gone well.
Let me make a few fundamental points.
First, where are we in the Mid East, where are we in
relation with the Soviet Union and where are with relation to
Western Europe?
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First , where are we in the Middle East? We have, of
course, this nerve racking problem of the third army and of the
maintenance of the cease fire.. I say the nerve-racking problem
because, unfortunately when the Middle Easterns wake up it is
just after midnight in the United States and they all seem to
have an-enormous compulsion to communicate with us at this
precise moment and it is the Middle East torture test because
it comes every '25 minutes. Just as you begin to doze off
somebody else will come in with a message or telephone call
each of which is characterized by total.inability.to see any_
body else's point of view except his own. But what these phone
calls illustrate is something of great political and strategic
significance for,-.the United S tates.
We have come out of this war with all of the agony and
anguish as the only country in touch with all of the parties.
We have come out of this war as the only country that can
bring about a permanent solution to the middle East and all
of the participants in the Middle East, whether they like us
or. hate us, have realized the elemental fact that they must
deal with us and, therefore, there is not one faction in the
Middle East right now from the most radical to the most con-
servative that has-not sent emissaries or messages to us and
that is not willing to listen to us. This gives us a great
responsibility and a great opportunity, a responsibility which
is somewhat complicated by the fact that the Arabs are not
_G r A?& raa P9 r^^, 6 :S f'
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con-
looking for active policy, but for a miracle, and they
stantly ask us to deliver their ultimate aim as the first
stage in the process, but this is tactics in terms of the
opportunity we have. It is an unusually fluid situation in
which we are expected. for the sake of everybody to play a
major role and, therefore, with all of the agony that is going
on right now about the cease fire,we.believe that we can
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move into a very constructive place.
In fact, one of - the difficulties
situation
59
is
of what
in this-
that the Soviets realize that the Arab perception
happened must be that the Soviets can get, the
only we can get them a solution and,therefore
have a . i
anyway.
hardware.but
the Soviets
.ens?^nc?;~ to ~-.ry to ;'i:ggy back on~ what we may be doing
on the other hand,
not give them the sense
out of the area because
So in terms of the
opportunity if there is
they are a great power and we must.
that we are squeezing them and beyond
then they will.do more drastic things.
Middle East situation we have a great
statesmanship on all sides and if
the Israelis and Arabs realize that there must be a compro-
mise, that it is impossible to have.a lasting peace if every-
body insists on the satisfaction.
As this diplomacy develops I would appreciate the oppor-
tunity to meet with you gentlemen because we will need a great
deal of public support to manage this.
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Now, about relationships with the Soviet Union.
There was.a.great eagerness on the part of many commen-
tators to announce the end'of detonate to see this in terms
of a permanent confrontation. I think we have to. look at the
situation in terms of the lasting interests of the world.
Why is detonate with the Soviet Union important. Not
because we are friends, riot because we have compatible politi-
cal systems,, not because we have parallel interests, precisely
because we have incompatible idealogies, precisely because we
have different political interests, but because we-are the
possessors of nuclear arsenals that can destroy humanity and
we have an obligation to this generation and to future genera
ticn: so to man-:1n our rel:nt' onr-h r}s that we van lift from
the world to the greatest extent possible the danger of a
nuclear confrontation.- So it is precisely because we have
different interests and precisely because they have a differen
political system that the need for detonate becomes. important.
When this crisis started the Chairman and I happened to
appear on the same platform and T spoke before he lacerated
me and I pointed out that the United States objectives in the
detonate were the ones that I have indicated here, that we
would resist foreign policy of the Soviet Union or attempting
to use the detonate for weakening our alliances or exacerbatin
tensions, but that there were limits beyond which we could not
go, including the manipulation of its domestic structure.
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But this is a-discussion you will probably wish,to have
with me at some other time.
Now, in the Middle East the fact is that we. were allied
indirectly, not formally, but in effect to Israel. The
Soviet Union had vested interests and vested friendships with
the radical Arab countries. They were no more willing to give
up those interests than we were willing to give up our.interes's
with relation to. Israel. So the question is not.did the Sovie
Union do things to exacerbate the radical Arabs, the question
is did they and we manage our relations through most of this
period in such a way as to avoid confrontation to use our
influence to cool matters and, finally, to bring matters to a
conclusion.
I would have to say that we did and it was the detonate
that. brought it about.
Now, last week, what last week proved is that there is
a point beyond which detonate as yet does not contain matters
and that when the Soviets saw an Egyptian army trapped and bei:
pushed into surrender under conditions of.a cease fire that
they helped to arrange, they lost their cool and they. then
made threats they should not have made and took military
measures they should not have made and we responded so strongl
because we felt our only chance was to get this thing under
control very quickly and that we could not measure our respons
with an eye dropper under those conditions. nut what we have
4? [~ ?~ ~~ ~rv~ e~ Via' .
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to be careful now is not to take the events of one night or
one day and make them the pattern of relationships with the
Soviet Union.
The President, Dobrynin and I met yesterday evening and
we all agreed that we have to, that what happened last week,
however it happened, should be treated as an aberration and
that-we should try to work again cooperatively towards a peace-
ful solution. We believe very strongly, as I said in my press
conference, that if for any reason this Administration does
not solve the problem the next one will have to settle it or
the one after that. We cannot accumulate nuclear arsenals on
both sides without attempting to bring peace and this is what
our view of thy: detonate is about. It has no illusions about
Soviet purposes. We will resist Soviet aggressive moves but
we will also seize every opportunity to work constructively
with them.
Now about Europe. In the.relationship with our West
European allies we went through a rather dramatic period and
it would be comforting if we'could say the Administration
made five or six definable mistakes. I would say it would
be comforting because we could remedy those mistakes and del
with them. But such has not been the case.
As you gentlemen know, we have attempted for six months
to get a joint statement of principle with our European
allies whose primary motive was not to get a great negotiating
[tea cars KA F 'er E ` rp ray a
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asset but to get some emotional content to the.Atlantac
relationship 25 years after it was established under one set
of conditions and try to adapt it to conditions which would
no longer beso, primarily military in nature. That process
has gone much more slowly than we had hoped and has taken some
odd forms in which the Europeans, for example, would refuse to
put the word partnership in an Atlantic declaration which is
almost inconceivable to us.
I will be prepared to go into that in detail with you
some other time.
What- wa.s our problem with.the Europeans during this
crisis? our problem had nothing to do with the alert. Our
problem had to do with the fact that once the' war started,
one of the big problems was to strengthen those elements
in the Soviet Union who were looking for a peaceful evolution
and not those who-thought there were opportunities for adventures.
It was in the common interest to prevent an outcome in which
the radical Arab states would be so strengthened that they
would undermine all of the moderate statesa.nd that, therefore
the oil supply to the non-Communist world would be controlled
by the most radical elements in the Arab world. It had
nothing to do anymore at that ;,point with the details of where
the borders of Israel and the Arab States were. The Euro-
peans were infinitely more vulnerable to these pressures than
we were and at that point whatever mistakes we might have made
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64
before 1973,. a rapid outcome of the war followed by a rapid
negotiation, was at least as much in the European interest as
in ours.
Now, it is said that we did not consult adequately with
a 12-page memorandum which just lists all of the consultations
we had with the Europeans. Now whether that was absolutely-
enough I don't want to argue.
We had a three-day session at the NATO Council on the
?the Europeans, and I don't want to waste time here, but 3 :,have
10 Middle East crisis. We'informed the NATO Council of every key
11 decision we made.
12 I have here just the telephone calls I made to Lord
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Cromor and they wor r.:-vcr lc c than cno a. day arc? sc*nst imes
as many as three a-day during this crisis.- And the major
difficulty was shown by the fact that, for example., when we
tried to get the British to put forward a cease fire resolu-
tion in the.UN they would not do it on the ground that the.
Arabs might not like it. All we-were asking them to do was
a simple cease fire resolution which at that time would have
kept both sides of the Canal in Egyptian hands, so it was not
unfavorable to the Arabs and the Israelis told us they would
accept it. This we could not get out of them. We had long
talks with the French and each European country with the
exception I regret to say of Portugal, when the airlift
started, refused us over flight rights, refused us the use of
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was after all an extremely risky effort for us..
It is not true that we did not tell the Europeans about
the alert. We.were faced with a problem that we received the.
Brezhnev letter at 10:30,at night, we thought that in the
light of all of the alerts that.the Soviets themselves had
taken during the day if they were going to act they were going
to act in the morning Middle East time, so we, had very little
time to react on our own to head them off.
We immediately informed the British on the theory that
they could help us in the NATO-Council. We informed the NATO
Council at the precise hour that we responded to the Soviets.
We informed the military committee of NATO and we 'informed thei
ambassadors here then during the day.
Now it was an emergency situation and there could not be
detailed consultation about what we would do ahead of time.
Now I don't want to castigate the Europeans because I
would like to stress that it is the Administration's view and
remains the Administration's view that the Atlantic Alliance
remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy and we still
believe that if the Democracies can not develop a unified polic
in the face of the challenges they now confront then perhaps
the Western World is going to go the way of the Greek City
states. It is. not a question of resisting military threats
primarily, it is a question of looking at the world which we
''J i
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now face and to see whether we can develop some common
approaches rather than to consume ourselves in every crisis
in these desperate attempts to gain any little advantages whic
...are to the disadvantage of everyone, and we decided I must say
with a bleeding heart and not with any anger to point out
to the Europeans that it was important for all of us to face
the fact that this sort of behavior on either side of the
Atlantic was simply not adequate'-anymore.
We had to be able to define for each other what we all
wanted in the middle East and that when one of the allies thi
that when we acted in what we thought was the common interest,
that a little more understanding of our position was called
ftir:' This is the basis for C?,,r cOYrp7. .nt,
I do not draw from this conclusion that the Atlantic
Alliance is dead, that it should be altered. We do call, how-
ever, attention to the fact that the-dialogue which we asked
for earlier,.-this year is urgently necessary and that both side
of the Atlantic have the responsibility in overcoming the shor
term and asking themselves where it is that the democratic
nations really want to go.
We believe that this dialogue can go forward, we will
encourage it and we will do it as one of our principal foreign
policy objectives in the months ahead.
So this is where we are in our relations with the principa
parts of the world and I am afraid, Mr, Chairman, I have spoken
Ca r? F 1VFM
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a little longer than I had planned.
The Chairman. Nom
Secretary Kissinger. I will be delighted to answer any
--questions.
The.Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I think you have given a
very enlightening analysis, particularly the last part of it,
an explanation of your objectives.
I propose that we will limit it to the ten minuteso
will start and then we will go around to the membership.
if you would enlarge a little bit on the importance of the
detonate which you have talked so much about. The reason
I concentrate on this, I know others will ask other questions,
i s I think it is in th:^ ~.rea that the Can;w s ca .t t r has
been.ar,maybe may create difficulties for you in working
out the settlement, the permanent settlement.
AsI understand it, your next objective is this negotia-
tion for a permanent settlement somewhere along the lines
of the principles of the '67 resolution, if I understand you
correctly.
Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.
The Chairman. And I think I have noted a disposition
to, as you have stated, not only by commentators but members
of Congress to assume that you cannot with the Russians. If
you would pursue that a little bit for the moment the impor-
tance of that and hopefully give us some indications as to
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68
what you think. I know the Executive takes the views it is
not.your business to tell Congress what to do, but I don't ask
it in this spirit but simply an explanation of the fact, and
--'let us draw our own conclusions as'to what our action should
be. But I feel there is a misapprehension about this particu.~
lar aspect of it and I think, if I understand you correctly,
it is fundamental to a successful.,negotiation, you will need
in a negotiation the continued cooperative attitude on the
-part of the -Soviet Union if the negotiations are to succeed
Would you elaborate a bit on that because I think it does
bear upon the attitude of the-Congress.
Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.
First,. let t,s go b'r rk , tro
th? r-ri? he-~fr?art tr, o t r k.
of the war. We had developed over a period of years, after
about. two and a half years of confrontation with the Soviet
Union, we had moved into a more cooperative relationship which
for a long time had wide bipartisan support. This support
began to be weakened not so much on a partisan basis but
I will be very frank, through a curious coalition of individua
of some of the radical liberal elements joining forces with
the conservatives being supported on specific issues by the
Jewish community, especially on-the issue of immigration,
and on some other issues by labor. So that you had for the
first time a consensus, an opposition going across the whole
spectrum not in a uniform manner but still in a rather wide
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-otahes so that a broad scale attack developed and Dobrynin
way of the most desperate motives. Now, this consensus could.
only be held together in a way by raising all sorts of issues
and by almost trading off each group's grievances against the
at a lunch with me a week before this crisis started said
look at our position in Moscow, we are supposed to be in a
period of detonate and yet we are. now receiving more criticism
in the United States than we ever have at the -height of the
-cold war because the newspapers and the groups that use to
oppose the.cold_war are now attacking us and there is almost
no-counter weight to this developing pressure. And this.-is
a very real problem.
There was I must tell yot.i? can0idly in my view a ti ndency
to take the stemming stability so much for granted people
were beginning to try to draw interest on it and start pressin
on issues that were important but.not central to the question
of nuclear war such as the fate of particular individuals
in the Soviet Union. -
That was the atmosphere :.that existed. Nevertheless,
from the beginning of the Middle East crisis there were
exchanges between us and the Soviet Union, which even though
they did not necessarily .bear 'fruit immediately, which were
of a comprehensiveness--,and-detail that I did not think were
possible, they never happened in any previous Administration.
Secondly, the Soviet press and propaganda during this
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24 b W V
United states.
been jeporadixed far managed to xna .main
have d Nations we
United states we co could
against the nd American interests
orld an
itol around the w are
._prab cap and what they today*
bey an
p every
if the Soviet Pr in
NOWt uld have had riots
?0
unleashed
Period never attacked the had been
whole p aganda organs h
in the UnI-te ,his Whatever
Thirdly' even with
w
wand
in which even "uP to o
a osphere 4 on. tes:tf or what?ver you
last wgek? confron"""' any invoctive of
it was
has-never been
ere
there will be
9 .to call it. even th n ar
And 01 fourthly,:
h
.
ot
the
side again' the sa.ddi East i-f
-10 either
ttlement in they
S 'x..3.011
'impossible to get a most radical P?sx Y
31
o position'
19 the last 25 years t total.
he tholy
20 conquered over ce prise into the negotinti?n and
21 an entrap principle a
n getting uestion of
o to.them as a q
made in
o
wall have to give up some they have
o inch o f territory insist
18 every squar but the Arabs cannot
They cannot hold
the r1l secu-L Y ?
settlemeht in
n their insistence on
7
1S ask yourself what East, it Vi-11 have to be th .
'Adis
15 is the inteileG Israelis
. Soviet cooperation s tual structure of a PV,
th
t union takes #-h vo arl _e r
12 'Soule r 'c.1 e`'^n ?. .
and
beha Arabic tha Phoscow
13 will less no Arab ca?artrY can b"
esSc'nti'a1' beca'ase if you
14 because
4 absolute
over o ed and adjustments
demand. handed
el p
have to be garant~ees Bev
influence with the xsra~=li.s~
there our
will use and both.
which hopefully we With theArabsr
,.1; Its will use their iniluoce
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71
of us together with whoever else is willing will guarantee
the outcome.
If the Soviets move into a position of hostility toward
----us in this,.i t is not so much toward us, it can keep that pot
-boiling until there is no solution at all and, therefore, we
do attach great importance to maintaining a civil relation-
ship with the Soviet union during this.crisis. There.is a
price neither country has been willing to pay. We are not
willing to give up' Israel, the Soviet is not willing to give
up-its position-in the Arab world and, therefore, within these
constraints we-have been drawn into opposing views. They have,
to be mitigated.-gut we believe that detonate must be
rc?--establishcd, if it.has been weakened, and we believe that
really those of you gentlemen who have expressed some concerns
about it, that we have been unilaterally victims of detonate
should really be carefully examined. -Except if you ask your-
selves what exactly have we paid for the detonate? We managed
to end the war in Vietnam, whatever you may think about it,
under the conditions that we set, and we do not have to-debate
whether those are adequate conditions. We settled most of the
European problems. We'have made a beginning towards arms con-
trol. We are now in -negotia~jons on mutual force reductions
in Europe. All of these are in the-mutual benefit. The wheat
deal, which is often mentioned, has, nothing to do with detonate
The wheat deal has to do with a total misconception on the
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part of United States about its position, about how much wheat
we-had. The conviction of the Agricultural Department that we
could never sell. enough wheat and the nature of our domestic
market in which. the companies were not exchanging information,
so that we had no idea of the scale of the exchange. As a
matter of fact, wheat was never discussed at the Moscow summit
in 1972.
I go into this so we get in perspective who paid what for
the detonate. - - -
I think the wheat deal was a horrible mistake but not for
detonate reasoiz-., maybe for the political reasons., maybe for a
lot of other-reasons,'but not for detonate reasons.
And what has been created from this I rthi_nk is really
in. the interests of-the long term peace of the-world and, as
I said on a number of occasions, it is essential if we are
going to have peace in the Middle East, and it is essential
if we are going to prevent all of the world's trouble spots
from being exacerbated. If the Soviets do not play that game
then we will resist them, but it will be to nobody's benefit
and sooner or later some generation will have to come along
hopefully before it is too late and solve that problem.
The Chairman. -Could. I just,.summarize, is it fair to say
you think this negotiation is in the interest of Israel as
much as anybody else?
Secretary Kissinger. Yes, sir.
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The Chairman. if it succeeds. And since it is under
the Security Council it will revitalize the UN. That would
seem to be the conclusion that you could draw.
- Secretary Kissinger. First about Israel. Israel has
gone through a traumatic experience. They live with the
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belief in-total military supremacy. They have emerged
tarily victorious but at an enormous price. They
alties which transposed to the American scene would be
lent-to something like five to six hundred thousand in
..two-week period and they face the prospect any renewal
war, even if they win it, will-from now on be a war of
73.
mili-
had casu
equiva-
the
of the
attritio
rather than the spectacular victories they gained in '56 and
161. That in m view is going to b into' o-cable for Israel
in the long term. Whether they have yet realized this shock
of war and the eminence of an election I am not prepared to.
say, but it is in long term interests of Israel to achieve
legitimacy or security through legitimacy and through inter-
national guarantees and we believe that we can bring about
-this realization in Israel over a period of time in its own
interests.
The Chairman. Don't you think using the United Nations
is the beginning to restore it-as--a vehicle that the Soviet
Union and others can use?
Secretary Kissinger. I must say I had not in my academic
writing been a total supporter of the United Nations, as you
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know, but I cannot imagine how we would have gotten through
the crisis of the last three weeks without the forum of the
united Nations. With all of its weaknesses, with many of
.the self righteousness of the non-alligned nations, for example,
nevertheless it provided the buffer and legitimacy and pro-
vided the possibility, for example, of getting an expedition
and emergency force in their observers in there. We worked
very closely with the Secretary General.. Taker for example,
this-rather minor case of the Soviet Union informing us on
Thursday that-they had sent 70 observers into the Middle East
and demanded that we also send 70 observers. The whole UN
observer force is.only 280. That would have meant 50 percent
of the observer force would have 'been .Sovi et--Amg*iri-can a i we
have.had introduced all of the great powers rivalries right
.into the UN observer force.
The Soviets tried to.-pressure us. to go along with this.
We said, finally we said whatever the Secretary General.does,
we do what the Secretary General asks us to do, we won't
.follow, just because you send 70 people in there does not
oblige us, let's get the Secretary General to.ask for a force.
The Secretary General finally decided he would not accept
more from any of the-super-powers than the..-largest single
contingent if any other country in the UN force, which comes
out to about 30, and that is the compromise that is now being
developed. There was.-:no way of solving this as a direct US-
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Soviet confrontation. and you accumulate these over aperiod of
time, so I have become really the UN I believe has played a
very important role in this.
The Chairman. Senator Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, you have certainly
given us a very fine review. We tried our best to keep up with
it in the newspapers as we were going along.
I felt that it was a very fine accomplishment. I was
particularly pleased when I learned of the cooperation between
the United States and the Soviet Union, especially iz those
resolutions in the UnitedNations. I found that most?encour-
aging and I have felt very strongly that if that kind of
cooperative effort can be maintained we might be on the eve
of a peaceful arrangement, at least in the Middle East, and
I want to commend you for the tremendous job that you have
done in connection with that.
Secretary Kissinger. Thank you very much. There is one
thing about the UN cooperation. To the best of my information,
last week is the first time that the Soviet Union voted for a
United Nations emergency force. They have abstained on a
number of occasions and permitted it to happen but this is
the first time that they _actively_worked with the Secretary
General on a charter for an emergency force in a crisis area.
The Chairman. Hopefully they will help pay for it.
Secretary Kissinger. They will help pay for it.
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Senator Sparkman. That excluded personnel from the Soviet,
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Union?
Secretary Kissinger.' That is right.
..Senator Sparkman. ..As well as from the. United States?
Secretary Kissinger. That is right.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. You have done a great job, including the
whole business of what we heard and all the rest. I said so
at the time and I am enormously"happy about it as it has gone
so far. I only hope that your energy and your ability survive
the period in-which you had this--responsibility.
I share also your perception of the United Nation's use-
fulness and its limitations. Again this leads'me?to my first
point.
You obviously are more than an activist in this situation,
as has been true of our foreign policy people, State Depart-
ment and otherwise, for:sometime, and I know you believe in
this kind of necessity for us to take a more active role in,
bringing about a settlement. That requires, of course, an
enormous responsibility for seeing that basic terms
it make sense. All I can say is this rather obvious thing,
that I hope in spite of all the aspirations of everybody that
when Israel's borders are finally settled they are such that
she can maintain.her own defense because in the past she would
have been wiped out three times if she had not done this and
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I say this not because I think we are bound. to do anything:.
more, but I think this is an obligation in the interest not
only of Israel but in the interest of humanity. This is not
_.something that we can leave to the will of the United Nations
peace keeping operation or of the future Security Council
willingness to go along, this is a very specific thing and I
don't mean adjustments do not have to be made, I know they
have. I wish you would comment on that.
.Secretary Kissinger. We have. not stated-our view and we
do not now have a fixed view as to exactly where Israel's
borders should be. The Security Council resolution 242 pro-
vides for secure and recognized borders without giving ' any
criteria as to what a secure border is. ''But we certainly
believe that the borders of Israel should be secure.
Now how do you achieve security? This is what the negotia-
tions will depend upon. Absolute security for one country
means absolute insecurity for other countries, so there
always has to be a balance between the security needs of every-
.-body.
Secondly, the security depends.in part on the location of
the frontiers, in part on how these frontiers, what the
military arrangements on-these-frontiers are, and, thirdly,
in part on what guarantees are given. For example, wherever
the frontiers are, I must tell you candidly the frontiers
have to be back a considerable distance from where they were
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when the war started, they cannot be on the Suez Canal and.
Sinai. Where.exactly they should be, this is a question that
the parties out to negotiate among each .-'-.other. But-, if for
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:example, there were on the Arab side of the frontier substan-
tial demilitarized zones so that before the Arabs could launch
any, attack they would have to violate the demilitarized zone,
that is one of the security features that. has to be considered.
Why, for example, did the Israelis lose control of the East
Bank-of the Canal? It is because the Arabs, because the
.Egyptians had-accumulated so:many surface to air misiles on
their side of-the-Canal-that'.the Israel air force could not
operate and really could not operate-in that area.for about
eleven days of the war. "I`f there had 'been -a ? substantial.
demilitarized zone along the Canal or along the Border,
.wherever that is, there would not have been surface to air
misiles and, therefore, curiously enough the defense would
have been easier, aggression would have been more'difficult.
These are the considerations.
We have no doctrinary view about pushing anybody to any
particular frontier. .. -
Senator Sparkman. Neither do I. I just want to make
the point and I see you understand-fully what I have in mind.
There are just two other things I would like to leave
with you. one, it seems to me that it is maybe a ;.blessing in
disguise we have been faced with this energy crisis. I think
....!. ..k.. r^a f: 9 P:.J Lip E.a:"~
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it has been:insane we have allowed ourselves and the Western
World, even more the rest of the Western Would even more to
get to the point where we are going to be dependent upon the
.-Middle East 'for energy and that the Israel-Arab conflict,
entirely apart., we should have come to a decision we were
not going to do this anymore, the idea of pouring billions of
dollars in the area, so as to be-.unable to spend it to do
anything with it as a means of our going ahead with our tech-
nology. It seems to me something we had to deal with and
.we should.make this occasion for that rather than in any sense
letting.oil be an instrument for affecting American policy
as far as that goes. That is one point. _
The second is, again I want detonate as we all do, but
again quite apart from that, the whole question of Jews treat-
.ment in Russia and all the rest, it seems to me very, very
important for us to accept the broad proposition and to work
on it, that we are never going to get permanent peace with the
totalitarian power that is going to be something we can rest
with unless inside that power there is some real ferment
itself among the intellectuals, among the academicians, among
the people in general who are capable of leadership roles,
if they are permitted to-take it,-and, therefore, for us to
let detonate be a means by which Russia expresses whatever
beginning of an opening there may be within Russia for this
kind of ferment and intellectual activity would be a very great
t.T~N. ern. L:a. ~!3 Std !^:K 'a I b?:TB
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mistake on our part. Specifically we ought not to give
them technology, credits,or anything else if it means that
they therefore-have less need for reliance upon their odrn ?: :. :_
resources as Solzhenitsyn and the other people have recently
written. It seems to me this general proposition makes great
sense and we ought to go very slow.
On the wheat.deal, I think.you are absolutely right, it
was a stupid mistake, it did not happen to be related to the
State Department view of its relationship with Russia, but it
was awfully stupid any way.
Secretary Kissinger. No question.
Senator Sparkman. But on these other matters of long
term credits, of technology,, and ?of ' encouragement -of this,
in circumstances. that permit the Russians to express their
own intellectual resources and people, and clamp down harder
at home, it seems to me this very great question in the long
run whether we are serving any useful purpose.
Perhaps you would like to comment.
Secretary Kissinger. This, of course, is a very complex
Senator Sparkman. Of course.
Secretary 1.Kissinger._,Which_the.Chairman and I had promise
ourselves we would discuss once formally before the committee.
This is, of course, a question whether the detonate leads to
an acceleration of repression in the Soviet Union. You can
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make a case for the proposition that 20 years ago Sahkarov
and Solzhenitsyn would have been shot. Ten years ago Sahkarov
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and Solzhenitsyn would never have been heard. Now S.ahkarov
.-and Solzhenitsyn make long distance telephone calls to foreign
newspapers and state their opposition to the regime and
Solzhenitsyn claims about not being permitted to live in
Moscow but lives in Moscow without apermit now. It would be
better if he lived there with a permit but, nevertheless, lives
in Moscow. So you could make a case for the proposition that
..a'system which is oppressive, anyone who has been in.Moscow
knows it is palatably oppressive, nevertheless, I think you
could make a better case for the proposition that its ferment
is inc .-easing r.r.ther' than decreasing and instead 'you can use
Sahkarov and Solzhenitsyn as symptoms of the inevitable pro-
cess which the ruling group in the Soviet Union will yield
.to very reluctantly and very graciously.
Senator Sparkman. They will never-do it voluntarily.
Secretary Kissinger. That is right. But one could make
a better case for the proposition as used to be made generally,
that under conditions of detonate that process is more likely
to accelerate than under conditions of foreign danger of
international conflict where the-foreign danger can be used
as an excuse for international repression.
Now, on the relationship, but the long term credits
will really reduce the reliance of the Soviet system on its
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82
own technologists. I think we.should have a session sometime
of the committee on this whole problem.
Senator Sparkman. And there are other facets, too.
Secretary Kissinger. Yes, it-is a very important issue.
Our view has been that there are two separate problems related
but not identical. First, is to moderate the foreign policy
confrontations that exist in the world...and reduce the dangers
of nuclear war.
Secondly, to move from them to a more stable international
order in which it is not that..we. are mitigating confrontations
but making them more and more unthinkable.
.For that second one, a greater combatant of domestic
structures is ,probably useful and maybe .:even pss.etn-Ual, but
how to get this'without ruining the first is the big issue.
The Chairman. Senator Mansfield.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take
too much time except to commend the Secretary and the Admini-
stration for its success in bringing about at least a tentative
cease fire and the possibility of further negotiations, and I
think a great deal of credit must be given for what has been
done and be given publicly as far as I am concerned, because
it made it possible for the nation, this nation, to avoid a
difficult choice and made it possible for some of us to avoid
a difficult personal choice. So I have nothing but words of
commednation and I am glad things have turned out the way they
rnt)"n --%,r T vi rr1 t3 h. rk the rest of my ten minutes.
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83
The Chairman. Senator Javits.
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to commend the
Secretary who?I think behaved brilliantly, and whatever
may be the other troubles of the President, perhaps
22
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as we expect the President of the United States to behave
in.great international crises,. taking-great risk, but very
prudent, I do not believe the United States over-reacted.
I do not believe -- I?think the Secretary put it correctly
when he said you cannot measure that out with an eye dropper.
Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to
ask you a question
which is perhaps most fitting for me. Why is it to the
interest of the United States to support Israel?
Secretary Kissinger. First -of'all, because we.are commit
to the freedom and independence'of nations in general against
foreign aggression and because we have opposed the resort
to military power. Secondly, because whatever the origin of
our attachment to Israel, it is now clear that in the Middle
East and around the world it has become clear that we have
had a special relationship with Israel and that for Israel
to be submerged by Soviet arms in this conflict would
have had consequences far beyond the Middle East, and
this is what we saw as the danger of the radical countries
relying?onmilitary power solving their problems, solving
their problems by resort to force.
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It is for these reasons that'we believe that the survival
and independence and security of Israel are important
and are in no sense incompatible with any legitimate aspiration
of any other nation in the area. And one can add to it
the following: That after 25 years.all:Arab states have
now practically accepted the fact that the existence of
Israel.' is. no'.longer- at issue. What is now at.i?: sue is
the frontiers of Israel, and that is an issue, that is
a problem to be settled by negotiations.
Senator Javits. At this time, in your judgment, is`
the presence of Israel in that area, in the condition in
which she finds herself, that is great military effectiveness
but with the difficulty which you have described, a fricational
danger, helpful or harmful to the position'of Europe and the
rest of the free world with.respect to Middle East oil
supply. In other words, is Middle East oil supply more
or less likely to be materially disrupted by her presence
or her absence? You get az attitude for example, in some
quarters in Europe that they could just as soon see Israel
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go down the drain and get the oil flowing.
Secretary Kissinger. When you have countries in a
monopoly position with respect to energy, as the Arab
countries are, it is unrealistic to assume that they would
not use that monopoly position regardless of whether
Israel exists or not.
wy, [ /
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85
X have seen and you must have seen statistics where
the Saudis can cut oil production and riase prices and come
out ahead of.where they were last year, which again, which
in turn was in excess of anything that they could possibly
spend.
This is one of the cardinal featuresof the period.
Now, one of the long term solutions is the. one Senator
Case mentioned. We have to break the monopoly position.of the.
Arab countries on the oil supply of Western Europe and the
U. S. and. we are going to. submit an energy message in the
very near future which will be a first step in that direction.
I would say: that any 'realis'tic ` Ti.ddle- East policy has to
begin from the premise that Israel will.exist and it.is one
of the irresponsibilities of some of-the European nations
to engage in this illusion.
Israel will exist. We cannot be part of the destruction
of Israel and, therefore, one has to operate within that
framework.
Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary., may I suggest, too, that
the possibilityof exploring the connection between oil
and food, you cannot eat oil, and the Arab masses must eat.
It is said that half the grain in the world available for
overseas consumption originates here or at. least in the
North American continent and I would suggest that the
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-` "? V,- .
you say about Israel's what Y
?t is at least one
Is s a ing ~-
";dale fast by yn
s't
opoly
the
mon
being a
ce in i preen honest
influence which "keeps.:..them
of
h
h
a
position'
n?sst say that the S
Secretary Kis`'inger ? -
sed to ...consider the exi5terace ' ..
S' u
te
an .. to conduct modera
ability
~.5 GS
d after all is the second largest
oil Supplier first I
moving to ~Ir Secretary'
olicy in that area,
Senator Javit's. Case
what Senator
gly
stron 10
e ver
y
dors
at the i~oxth
would dike to en
M
11 Committee of line
chairing the and. Sir ~tc~x
has said as; e7.d and
12 h3ch .gpna.to~^ 1~4atis
w
ope
psser~k~Iy
clear that even Eur
lit lanti'o very c
3 it was
l attended Sparkman ust this cormittee believed
n
14 its members o
rented by an Inderwriting to detente a
as repre
16 which would give
that an element w Eastern Europe, and
16 enness which exists in
the degree of op recollection be had
that some
17 Mr? Secretary, may I suggest,
IlancocY, approach to the
18 ds ofthe so-caller: garucYir.
,ery long time, which was
in the records
v
19 which goes back a
soviet anion each mono a step
20 u on the theory that We would
a step until the other
premised p
t move
on the
23 string
For example' even conditioning. a
24 -C limitation, curtailment'
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21 t we would no
d but tha
t
si rnendmen
de moved a step. ~
.-called Jackson
so
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87
by the Congress, must be explored very, very seriously.
Similarly, credits. I am pretty well oriented in business, in
banking, and credits depend on how long and at what rates,
and that is very, very flexible and I think again the Baruch-
Hancock theory was the carrot and the stick. We.will gamble
with you for a year, two, or three, and if you do what
you ought to do we will go with you.further.,. but.. we won't
until you do, until we see some performance. So I just
wonder whether or not that might not be a way in which
rather than the all or none theory, we. have to go with them
because it will have some indirect effect upon easing matters.
Our policy might be directed.tow.ard getting more out of
detente and yet not in the process, I. do not like to use
harsh words, but abandoning at least to some extent-our
conscience.
Secretary Kissinger. Senator Javits,-we could live with
an amendment that set out certain criteria for periodic review
and there were several compromises that were explored at
various -istages'-thatc -we'_could live with which say every three
years there should be a review of whether indeed some
progress has been made or a finding by-the Executive which
then the Congress can review. Those are criteria that we
could live with.
What would be very difficult is if the attempt
to put'.the Soviet Union into a situation which after all it
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had before 1951, and which is already enjoyed by over
a hundred other .rations would lead to a Congressional prohi-
bition of that status in terms of very specific conditions
and lead to a decision to cut off credit, which is what
the present Jackson-Vanik amendment would in effect do.
If the amendment could be reformulated so it set down certain
criteria that it would have to be periodically reviewed
depending on the language, I think that might be a reasonable
compromise between the all.or nothing positions.of both sides.
Senator.'Javits. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I had not goiie into Europe with you, which I want
to do, but I hope there will be another opportunity.
The Chairman. Senator Church.
Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, I would like to
add my voice to the chorus of praise for your efforts.
I`have an idea of the kind of questions we would be
punishing you with if your efforts had not been blessed with
success.
In your exposition of the foundations for detente you
mentioned certain mutual interests that give us some
basis for conflicts, that is to say, our obvious mutual
interest with the Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear weapons
and the obvious mutual interests in the reduction of the
load we carry in Middle Europe, the resolution of the problems
in Middle Europe, which might have led to conflict.
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But what is the mutual interest with respect to the
Middle East lookipg..".at it not from our. standpoint but from
the Russian standpoint?
Do the Russians have as much reason to want a negotiated '!
? i
settlement of this long standing and acrimonious dispute
of ".Israel and- the 'Arab' countries, as