INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. COMMISSIONER, SALT STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, GENEVA, APRIL 2, 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-533-5-4-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 18, 1974
SENSITIVE
National Security Decision Memorandum 252
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
. Consultative Commission
SUBJECT: Instructions for U.S. Commissioner, SALT Standing
Consultative Commission, Geneva, April 2, 1974
The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S.
component of the SALT Consultative Commission:
1. U.S. Commissioner should continue his efforts towards
achievement of an agreed set of procedures governing replacement,
dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof for Strategic
Offensive Systems and for ABM Systems and Their Components as
called for in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its
Protocol.
2. U.S. Commissioner is authorized to accept the Joint Draft
Texts for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their
Components, dated November 16, 1973, as the basis for negotiating
the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and
the Interim Agreement. He is also authorized to make appropriate
language changes in the Joint Draft Texts including those resulting
from the review by government lawyers.
3. The U.S. Government considers the achievement of these
mutually agreed procedures to be important, but not at the expense of
essential U.S. security interests. The U.S. Commissioner should
proceed accordingly consistent with the instructions contained herein.
4. In the negotiations, the U.S. Commissioner should accord
priority to inclusion of the following items in the Agreed Procedures
for Strategic Offensive Arms:
NSS, DOS, OSD Reviews
Completed
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-- In the case of soft launch sites an area of the launch pad
per se at the location of the launch stand must be made unusable by-
dismantling or destruction; removal of launch device alone is not
considered adequate.
-- In the case of silo launch sites the silo headworks shall
be dismantled or destroyed.
-- In the case of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers,
the U.S. Commissioner should attempt to obtain Soviet agreement to
U.S. proposals in the JDT of November 16, 1973, including those for
H-class submarines. The U.S. Commissioner should make clear that
In implementing the proposed procedure for "removing the submarines
xnissile section in the open," the missile section will not be replaced
by a new section of similar dimensions. Any replacement hull section
must be significantly shorter in overall length than the missile section
it replaces. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to drop the proposed
procedure of sinking in international waters if the Soviets refuse to
accept prior notification thereof.
5. The U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek notification that
SLBM launchers under construction are intended as replacement for
older ICBM launchers or for launchers on older submarines. Notification
should be given prior to the start of sea trials of the replacement SLBM
launchers. If after several weeks it is clear that the Soviets will not
accept any form of prior notification, the U.S. Commissioner should
seek instructions.
6. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to negotiate agreed
language for the remaining issues as indicated by the bracketed text
of the procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms in order to achieve the
important elements set forth in para. 4, above, and to protect para. 8
of the Protocol. In this connection:
-- U.S. Commissioner should continue to seek inclusion of
a definition of a modern SLBM, and is authorized to modify the language
of the present sentence to achieve same objective. If he is unable to
obtain Soviet agreement, he is authorized to drop the sentence, but should
attempt to obtain Soviet agreement for the record that "launchers for
SLBM's first flight tested after 1965 and deployed on diesel submarines
are also modern SLBM's. "
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? The U.S. Commissioner should attempt to achieve Soviet
agreement that facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites will not be
used for storage, support or launch of ICBMs. If unable to achieve
Soviet agreement after several weeks, he should seek instructions.
7. The U.S. Commissioner is authorized to accept Soviet language
on the remaining dismantling or destruction issues as reflected in para.
I. 2 of the JDT of November 16, 1973, for ABM Systems and Their
Components.
8. At an appropriate time the U.S. Commissioner should inform
the Soviet Commissioner that the U.S. does not desire to negotiate
ABM replacement procedures during SCC-IV; in the event that the Soviet
side indicates an interest in beginning work on these procedures at the
next SCC Session (SCC-IV), the U.S. Commissioner should seek instructions.
9. The U.S. Commissioner should retain the current wording
regarding voluntary information in the SDT's of November 16, 1973.
10. The U.S. Commissioner should not raise the subject of
publication of these procedures. If raised by the Soviet side he should
respond that the U.S. has no plans to make these procedures public at
this time.
11. Sensitivity of the SCC negotiations and the avoidance of leaks
must be maintained. All substantive statements on SCC activities are
to be cleared through the White House.
This NSDM supersedes NSDM 217 and NSDM 237.
Henry K. Kissinger
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Central Intelligence
Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation
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-t.
COi-riplArly Outside the System
MEMORANDUM
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
:-
April 15, 1974
4-70
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: VAC LODAL/ITELMUT SONNENFELD
SUBJECT: SCC NSDM
The SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) has now been in
session for over two weeks, and the US representative is still without
instructions. The Soviets are ready to talk substance; it is something
of an embarrassment to the US to be without instructions, so we
recommend that you act on the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) as soon as
possible.
If we want an SCC agreement at the Summit, we need to move forward
to narrow the differences between the US and Soviet positions. Our
recommended NSDM contains only two changes from previous US
positions ? both dealing with dismantling older ICBMs. These are:
1. Dismantling ICBMs at Soft Sites. Our previous position
includes removing all missile equipment, destroying the concrete launch
stands and destroying warhead bunkers and handling gear located about
two miles from the actual launch sites. We now recommend letting the
Soviets keep some equipment (such as warhead handling gear) at locations
near soft ICBM launch sites (approximately two miles away), provided
the Soviets agree not to use what remains of dismantled soft sites for
mobile ICBM deployments. OSD has recently made clear they consider
this change an acceptable outcome.
The Soviets are unlikely to accept our proposed prohibition on mobiles
at these soft sites which they would interpret as legitimizing our unilateral
statement on mobiles in SALT I. Thus, in the end, we will probably have
to make a unilateral statement for the record and we expect OSD will go
along with it.
The draft NSDM instructs the SCC Commissioner to seek Soviet acceptance
of the prohibition on use of dismantled sites to support ICBMs and, if he
cannot get acceptance in several weeks, to seek instructions.
SECRET
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2. Dismantling ICBMs at Hard Sites. Our current position
requires that the Soviets dismantle their silo headworks and adjacent launch
control bunkers at older ICBM sites. We now recommend allowing the
Soviets to forego dismantling launch control facilities (L CCs) at hard
ICBM sites (they would still have to destroy the silo head works).
Requiring them to also destroy underground launch control bunkers would
not increase the time needed by the Soviets to reactivate the sites, but
would be costly for them to undertake. The OSD and JCS staffs prefer
that we retain our present position of requiring destruction of the launch
control facilities but want to meet perceived Soviet concerns by assuring
them they could retain their LCCs until there are no longer any active
silos left which the LCCs control and that procedures would only apply to
older missiles. In short, OSD's approach is to tell the Soviets they should
dismantle LCCs at old 55-7/8 sites and emphasize that the requirement
applies only to older missiles and does not set a precedent for SS-11s
and SS- 9s .
Our concern is exactly the opposite. We don't care if the Soviets retain
their LCCs at 55-7/8 sites but we are concerned about the special problems
posed by widespread deployment of the III-X silos if the Soviets also retain
their existing 55-11 and SS-9 LCCs. We should make an effort to get
Soviet agreement to dismantling existing LCCs at SS-11/9 sites once the
III-X silos are fully operational.
OSD has recently indicated that, as a fallback, they would go along with
letting the Soviets retain existing LCCs at the SS-7/8 sites. The OSD
staff indicated they considered this outcome acceptable and would not
recommend raising the issue to Schlesinger. This approach (letting the
Soviets keep the SS-7/8 LCCs) was preferred by ACDA, CIA and State. It
is also incorporated in the recommended NSDM.
OSD and JCS have taken their strongest stand on only one issue -- that of
prior notification of replacement of older systems. OSD and JCS insist
that we continue to seek Soviet agreement to prior notification ( your
recent discussions indicate we may be able to achieve such an agreement).
We recommend going along with. OSD and JCS on this issue for now and
have drafted the NSDM along these lines.
In conclusion;
? The SCC issues are not terribly contentious within the bureau-
cracy. DOD has been involved only at the staff level; Schlesinger is
probably not even aware of these issues. (John Wickham has indicated that
Schlesinger need not be involved.)
SECRET
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SECRET 3
? The recommended NSDM goes along with the DOD position on
the issue on which they feel the strongest (prior notification). Moreover,
while DOD's preferred positions are not endorsed on the ICBM dismantling
question, DOD is on record as saying the proposed decision on this issue
is an acceptable outcome.
? Most importantly. the issues involved in dis mantling obsolescent
SS-7s and SS-8s do not in any sense constitute a serious risk to national
security.
-- Finally, we continue to believe wrapping up the SCC work before
the Summit is an important objective. While it will be difficult to reach
agreement along the lines of the recommended NSDM by the Summit, we
think it can be done. But without our recommended instructions, that go
a few steps toward Soviet concerns on secondary issues, a Summit agreement
on the SCC will be impossible.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the
SECRET
SDM at Tab A.
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?
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
NAtt SG-0 l? Sort%
ACTION
April 9, 1974
SECRETARY KISSINGER
JAN M. LODAL
HELMUT SONNENFELDT
SCC NSDM
The SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) has now been in
session for almost two weeks, and the US representative is still
without instructions. The Soviets are ready to talk substance; it is
something of an embarrassment to the US to be without instructions,
so we recommend that you act on the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) as soon
as possible.
Our earlier memorandum (Tab I) provides an analysis of the technical
issues. In summary, our recommended NSDM contains only two
changes from previous US positions -- both dealing with dismantling
? older ICBMs. These are:
? We now recommend letting the Soviets keep some equipment
(such as warhead handling gear) at locations near soft ICBM launch
sites (approximately two miles away), provided the Soviets agree not
to use what remains of dismantled soft sites for mobile ICBM deploy-
ments. Only OSD opposes this changes the JCS as well as other agencies
support it.
? We also recommend allowing the Soviets to forego dismantling
launch control facilities at hard ICBM sites. They would still have to
destroy the silo head works and fill in the holes. Requiring them to
also destroy underground launch control bunkers would not increase
the time needed by the Soviets to reactivate the sites, but would be
significantly costly for them to undertake. The OSD and JCS staffs
continue to prefer that we retain our present position of requiring
destruction of the launch control facilities.
SECRET
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111 IP
SECRET
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Both OSD and the JCS have taken a strong stand on only one issue --
that of prior notification of replacement of older systems. OSD
and JCS insist that we continue to seek Soviet agreement to prior
notification. We recommend going along with OSD and JCS on this,
and have drafted the NSDM along these lines.
In conclusion:
? The SCC issues are not terribly contentious within the bureaucracy.
DOD has been involved only at the staff level; Schlesinger is probably
not even aware of these issues.
? The recommended NSDM goes along with the DOD position on
most issues, including the one on which they feel the strongest (prior
notification).
? We need to show some flexibility so that we can wrap up SCC
work on SALT procedures as soon as possible. If we could do so before
the Summit, this could be another element in the Summit package.
Furthermore, within eight or nine months, the Soviets will begin dis-
mantling their older systems. If we don't have agreed procedures by
then, we will be forced to either accept whatever procedures they
unilaterally choose to use or create an unnecessary disagreement
with them.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the NSDM at Tab A.
SECRET
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