THE U.S. POLICY ON MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE (MBFR)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 28, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET June Z8, 1971
National Security Decision Memorandum 116
TO: The Secretary of State_
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: The U.S. Policy on Mutual Force Reductions
in Europe (MBFR)
Following the June 17 NSC meeting, the President has decided that
U.S. explorations with the Soviet Union and consultations with our
Allies in NATO on'the subject of mutual force reductions shall be
based on the following approach.
\ In general, the U.S. objective is to develop a consensus within the
NATO Alliance governing the substantive elements of its position
on mutual reductions of forces in Europe. Regarding specific.
elements, the Verification Panel will prepare a formulation and
assessment of alternative options for MBFR for consideration by
the National Security Council based on the followi,ng policy:
? Reductions should cover both stationed and indigenous
forces, either simultaneously or in succeeding phases. The primary
U.S. objective, however, is to maximize the reduction of Soviet
forces, and, for this reason, proportionately large Soviet and
American (or stationed force) reductions should be emphasized
rather than balanced stationed and indigenous reductions. A
reduction of indigenous forces only should be excluded.
TOP SECRET
NSS,DOS,
OSD Reviews
Completed
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK:533-3-11-4
TOP SECRET 2
-- Another important U. S. objective in reductions should be
to establish constraints on the reintroduction of stationed (Soviet)
forces or equipment into the zone of reductions. Such constraints
should be correspondingly comprehensive, possible to include
Soviet territory, as the size of reductions is increased. On the
other band, it is not essential that the area for reductions include
the territory of the USSR.
-- The area of reductions should not be confined to the
Germanies alone; it is preferable that the area include Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland, especially insofar as Soviet ground forces are ?
concerned. While not desirable, the inclusion of the Benelux
countries is acceptable. The inclusion of other NATO countries
could be considered with an appropriate expansion of the area .for
Warsaw Pact reductions.
-- A full range of symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions
should be considered based on various degrees of severity, the
requirements for adequate verification and their effects upon the
conventional balance.
In developing a consensus within the NATO Alliance on this policy,
the U. S. shall prepare for future transmission to the NAC.
-- The "sanitfle'd" April 12 Evaluation Report with an
appropriate covering memorandum indicating that its conclusions
are still tentative. This study should be completed no later than
July 2, 1971. ?
-- A revised version of the June 1971 Elements of MBFR study,
modified to indicate the decisions in this memorandum. This study
should be completed by July 6, 1971.
-- A range of specific MBFR options and a thorough assess-
ment of their implications. These options should range from
limited symmetrical reductions to more comprehensive reductions
possibly involving a wider area and a variety of reductions as well
as verification provisions and collateral constraints. This study
should be completed by August 1, 1971.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
TOP SECRET 3
These preparations for consultations should be made by the agencies
responsible under the overall direction of the Verification Panel.
Prior to the development and consideration by the President of
specific mutual force reduction options, it is understood that the
substance of our consultations with our NATO allies shall not go
beyond existing Presidential guidance. In no instance will reduc-
t-ions figures be discussed with our allies. Regarding the procedure,
forum, and timing of exploratory or preparatory talks with the
Warsaw Pact, the U.S. should give full weight to the views of the
allies.
Henr A. Kissinger -
yop SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
,L71 7N.1.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4., /11 //4
TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY
TO Br DELIVERED AT OPENING OF BU INESS
June 23. 1971
TO: vid Halperin, London, for Henry A. Kissinger
MEM: Al Haig
SUBJECT: NSDM o BFR
The following is the NSDM on MIMI. which Wayne Smith and
j=i-c,_ 05_- 25X1
?25X1
Souneoleldt drafted. You should be aware that General Goodpaster
Ms serious reservations about maki the sanitized Evaluation Report
available to NATO because he believes it is overly optimistic concerning
enemy capabilities and necessary force levels.
AMII:JTH:feg:6 /23/71
TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
???.-
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smi h/Hal Sonnenfeldt H-g.
URGENT ACTION
June 21, 1971
-
SUBJECT: Follow-up to June 17, 1971, NSC Meeting oil MBFlif
Enclosed at Tab A is a draft NSDM on MBFR for your consideration.
It is designed to provide the agencies with a starting position from
which to initiate consultations with our Allies and extend substantive
preparations for serious negotiations with the Warsaw Pact.
The U. S. Position
The principal points of the draft NSDM follow from the position you
presented to the June 17 NSC meeting on MBFR and which was developed
earlier at a Verification Panel meeting. In particular, emphasis is given
to:
-- The reduction of U. S. and Soviet forces as part of a comprehensive
approach including both stationed and indigenous forces.
-- The reduction of Soviet forces in Poland and Czechoslovakia as
well as East Germany. In addition, while it is not critical to include
USSR territory in an agreement, it is vital to limit the reintroduction of
Soviet forces into Eastern Europe.
-- The consideration of only those reductions that are (a) verifiable
through national means, and (b) not significantly detrimental to the
present conventional balance. For these reasons, we should only consider
reductions between 10% and 30%. Phoney approaches such as a freeze or
common ceiling should be excluded.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4
TOP SECRET 2
It is our judgement that this general position was agreed to at the NSC
meeting and that a NSDM incorporating it will not arouse significant
agency objections and will usefully narrow the focus of our remaining
work. On the other hand, a more specific directive could prematurely
foleclose options to the President while a failure to issue guidance at
this point would give the agencies freedom to develop a U. S. position
on their own. Neither of these outcomes would be desirable from the
President's viewpoint.
In addition to laying out the skeleton of a U. S. position on MBFR, the
NSDM provides for:
? The transmission of a "sanitized" Evaluation Report to NATO.
This was agreed to by Admiral Moorer at the June 11, 1971 VP meeting
but his staff have since objected to it on behalf of General Goodpastor.
Given Moorer's formal concurrence, we think these staff objections should
be ignored.
-- The preparation of a revised Elements paper to transmit the
President's position on MBFR to NATO. This paper would hopefully
evolve into a statement of the basic Alliance position on MBFR. The
alternative approach proposed by State is to let the Allies expand the
"criteria" of the Rome Declaration. In our opinion, this would result
in a negotiated mess.
? -- The preparation of a range of more specific MBFR options for
the President's consideration. I will prepare more detailed guidance
than is provided by the NSDM.
To maintain our momentum in these MBFR preparations and some
substantive guidance on our position, we recommend that you approve
the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) on behalf of the President. Given the absence
of serious substantive problems or agency disagreements, it is probably
not necessary for the President to give much further attention to this NSDM.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the enclosed NSDM (Tab A) on the U. S. policy for mutual
reductions of forces in Europe.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-533-3-11-4