INDOCHINA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
31
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
November 7, 2012
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 9, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
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Gt
/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
7 OP
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date: Wednesday, April 9, 1975
Time: 11:25 a. m. to 1:15 p.m.
Place: Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject; Indochina
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
JCS: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army General Fred C. Weyand
WH: . Donald Rumsfeld
NS C:
NSS, DOS, ARMY,
OSD, USAID, JCS,
NSA reviews completed.
Robert Hartmann
John Marsh (at end of meeting)
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
W. R. Smyser
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH -Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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DCC.Ett t.M R
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
president: The best way for us to proceed would be to have
Bill Colby give the intelligence
community's judgment. Will you please go ahead,
Bill.
Colby, After a week's lull, the Communists have begun a
new round of fighting, with Saigon as the ultimate
target.
East of Saigon, a North Vietnamese division sup-
ported by artillery and armor attacked Xuan Loc,
the capital of Long Khanh Province this morning,
and heavy fighting is reported inside the town.
Xuan Lac sits - astride Route 1, which links Saigon?
and the coastal provinces.
Fighting also has increased in the delta. The heaviest
attacks occurred in the northern delta provinces of
Dinh Tuong- and Long An.
Elements of the Communist 8th division attacked
Tan An, the capital of Long An Province, but have
been pushed back.
Schlesinger: They cut Route 4.
ColThey cut it, but they have beeii pushed back.
A Communist troop buildup in Kien Tuong Province
had raised the possibility that the North Vietnamese
were preparing to attack the provincial capital at
Mac Hoa. Late reports indicate, however, that
these forces have withdrawn, apparently in preparation
for attacks closer to Saigon in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia
provinces.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
The COSVN instructions call for the Communists to
press the attack and expand Communist territorial
holdings during April by "liberating" Tay Ninh,
Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong provinces.
As the fighting moves closer to Saigon, the likelihood
of confusion, public disorder and even panic will
increase.
The past week of relative inaction has given the
government some chance to consolidate its military
position. Nevertheless, in terms of capabilities,
the strategic balance decisively favors the.Communists.
The North Vietnamese now have 18 infantry divisions
in South Vietnam supported by numerous armor,
artillery, and air defense units.. Eight of these
divisions are located in Military Regions 3 and 4.
Moreover, there are strong indications that a North
Vietnamese Army corps headquarters and three more
reserve divisions are moving to South Vietnam. Two
of these divisions have already reached the DMZ and
could show up north of Saigon in two to four weeks.
In addition, two NVA Air Defense divisions are in
South Vietnam, one in MR-3 where it could soon
threaten Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut airports. .
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XODS)
By comparison the South Vietnam; se, at this moment,
now have seven combat-ready infantry divisions.
They are rebuilding three from personnel extracted
from the north and plan to form two more by early
surmxa.er.
On paper, the GVN's long-term prospects are
bleak, no matter how well Saigon's forces and com-
manders acquit themselves in the fighting that lies
ahead.
This is already beginning to become an accepted
judgment within both civilian and military circles
in South Vietnam.
At this moment, pressure continues to build among
the civilian opposition and among some military
commanders for President Thieu either to exert the
vigorous leadership which has been conspicuously
needed and missing, or step aside.
So far Thieu has shown considerable skill in keeping
the opposition divided. He is aided by the fact that
there is no single figure who his various political
and military critics believe would provide more
effective leadership.
While yesterday's bombing of the Presidential
palace was an isolated act, it underscores the ever-
present possibility of a single incident that would
overturn Thieu and bring on political chaos.
Thieu's new nominee for prime minister, Nguyen
Ba Can, hopes to have a government formed by
this weekend.
Can will try to encourage representatives from the
civilian opposition to join the cabinet. There is
considerable reluctance, however, especially among
important Buddhist and Catholic groups, to be as-
sociated with a Thieuwgovernment.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
In any case, we see no dramatic improvement likely
to stem from this new government.
Another factor is U. S. aid. A prompt and large-
scale infusion would tend to restore confidence.
The converse is obviously also true.
The most likely outcome.3s a government willing to
.accept a settlement on Communist terms, i. e.,
surrender.
The Communists are repeating their willingness to
negotiate with a post-Thieu government, in an
obvious effort to encourage a political upheaval in
Saigon.
At the same time, Hanoi is making it clear that it
is not interested in a compromise but rather in a
figleaf for a North Vietnamese takeover under
military pressure.
In this regard, the new COSVN instructions men-
tioned state that negotiations or atripartite govern-
ment are merely stratagems to isolate the GVN.
We have few indications yet on how the Communists
are setting up their new administration in the northern
half of South Vietnam.
In at least some instances they seem to be maintaining
the facade of a transitional national liberation govern-
ment.
We believe, however, that there has been a basic
downgrading of the Viet Cong's PRG in North Viet-
namese thinking. Hanoi now sees no need for a
lengthy intermediate stage of negotiation and coalition
rule, and has little incentive to maintain the PRG as
a separate political entity.
In sum, we believe Hanoi will take whatever action
is necessary to force the war to an early conclusion --
probably by early summer. The remaining questions
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 6
have to do with Communist tactics and timing,
and whether or not a political solution on Com-
munist terms can be arranged prior to a final
South Vietnamese military collapse.
Finally, Mr. President, there is the question of how
these recent events may effect the attitudes of other
nations toward us.
In general, the current debacle is seen not as a
turning point, but as the final step on a particular
path that most governments had long seen coming.
They have, in short, seen the whole Indochina ex-
perience as a major setback for the U. S.
Many, especially in Europe, had long questioned
America's judgment and the propriety of its in-
volvement.
Others were disillusioned with America' s ability
to cope with an uncommonly complex situation.
Still others gradually lost faith in America's will
to stay on a difficult course.
The circumstances of the Vietnamese collapse have
dramatized these perceptions, but adjustments were
already being made.
There will, however, be apprehension over the
repercussions, and the American reaction to the
dramatic finale.
Our allies have been disturbed, and our adversaries
heartened, over trends in American attitudes toward:
-- limiting the flexibility of U. S. foreign policy in
meeting new challenges,
reducing U. S. support for our allies and friends,
-- reducing the share of U. S. resources devoted to
maintaining our military power and foreign policy.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 7
Any signs that the American people are beginning
a prolonged and bitter internal debate will heighten
these concerns and intensify fear I 'at we may be head-
ing into a new era of isolationism. U. S. actions in
the Middle East, in particular, will be closely watched
in judging our future course.
Levels of trust, however, will be affected mainly by
perceptions of U. S. behavior on issues of direct
and compelling interest to the countries concerned.
Western Europeans and Japan, for example, do not
expect a reduction of U. S. power relevent to their
immediate concerns. And none of them consider
U. S. aid to their security any less necessary than
before.
A number of regional powers, such as Iran and
Brazil, will continue their trend toward self-reliance
rather than linkage with the U. S. in anything but
major confrontations with the USSR.
Among those on the firing line, uneasiness will
increase, and the drive toward self-reliance will
accelerate.
The South Koreans and Nationalist Chinese will
see greater parallels to their own situation, and
will put pressure for maximum support as long as
possible.
Southeast Asians, especially the Thai, will feel
more exposed, but have long anticipated eventual
U. S. withdrawal from the mainland. They may now
advance their adjustment to growing Communist
power.
Middle East countries will see U. S. interests there
as compelling continuing involvement. However,
9
there is one particular situation on which Vietnam
developments could have a direct impact. Both
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 8
President:
Colby
Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have
been very reluctant to place their respective nations'
vital interests hostage to any agreement which was
not self-enforcing, especially any agreement that
was silent on matters which either regarded as being
of major concern. The experience with the 1973
Paris Agreement could reinforce this already manifest
reluctance.
Soviet, Chinese, and other Communist leaders,
for their part, will not automatically conclude that
other U. S. commitments are placed in question,
unless:
The U. S. public reaction points to a repudiation of
other foreign involvement, or
Internal U. S. recriminations are so divisive as to.
raise doubts of the U. S. ability to develop any
consensus on foreign policy in the near future.
North Vietnamese leaders will exploit their victories
to denigrate U. S. power, especially among third-
world countries.
Hanoi may increase its support to Thailand's
insurgency.
Its principal energies, however, at least for the
next year or two, will be devoted to consolidating
its control over Indochina.
Do you wish rue to go on to Cambodia now or later?
Please go ahead now.
In Cambodia, it is difficult to see the government
holding on for much more than another week.
Communist attacks in the Phnom Penh area have
weakened government defenses north and west of
the capital to the degree that they could collapse
at any time.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
The Communists are also placing additional artillery
near the capital.
The insurgents will soon have their forces ready
to begin the final push.
Meanwhile, the time is rapidly approaching when
ammunition shortages will directly affect Cambodian
Army capabilities.
By April 17 all ammunition earmarked for Cambodia
will have been delivered. In-country stocks of some
types of ammunition will be exhausted soon there-
.after and all ammunition will be gone byApril 25.
In the face of the steady battlefield pressure and
uncertainty over U. S. assistance, morale in the
army is plummeting.
The army high command is nearly paralyzed and
is issuing only limited guidance to units in the field.
A number of key unit commanders in the Phnom Penh
area have expressed the belief that the end is near
and the fight may soon go out of the army completely.
25X1
On the political front, most Cambodians now realize
that President Lon Nol's departure has had little
effect on the prospects for meaningful negotiations
with the other side.
Prime Minister Long Boret returned to Phnom Penh
yesterday saying that there wereno prospects for a
compromise solution or a cease-fire.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 10
Boret met with Sihanouk' s son, Prince Yuvaneath,
in Bangkok. Yuvaneath admitted that he was not
authorized to speak for his father but his claim that
Sihanouk would not negotiate is undoubtedly correct.
The government may soon invite Sihanouk to return
and try to tie the invitation to an agreement that
Communist forces not enter Phnom Penh or hinder
the flow of relief supplies to the city.
At this point, this sort of an orderly surrender is the
best that can be hoped for.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
President: Thank you, Bill. Are there any questions?
Schlesinger:
President: Fred, will you give us the benefit of your report?
General Weyand: In preparing this report, I went back and
referred to the report I did on a trip I took
in July, 1973, about two years ago. In that
report, I said that the position of the North
Vietnamese and of the PRG had been drama-
tically improved since the start of the cease-
fire. They were shipping major quantities
of ,supplies to their forces.
On the other side, the leaders of the South
Vietnamese army were aware that they were
now engaged in a political struggle. General
Truong's civic actions in MR-1 were especially
impressive. The political struggle was
engaged, and the GVN was determined to
win it.
I found this interesting in the light of recent
developments. The South Vietnamese continued
,the concept that this was a political struggle
and they organized their forces to this effect.
I said then that the top South Vietnamese
leaders thought the question was not if the
Communists would attack but when. Those
leaders were very sensitive to American
support and they were counting on the inter-
vention of U. S. air power in the case of such
a Communist attack.
They are still in this mood. They clearly *till
cherish the hope that the U. S. will help them.
There are many reasons why they responded as
they did; that is one of them.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) 12
I found the situation critical. It is clearly
going in favor of the other side. Hanoi has
many options; the GVN and the U. S. have
few.
The South Vietnamese have suffered heavy
losses. Their morale was very low when we
got there, but it has been improving since
then. I believe your decision to send a team,
whatever may be said about its composition,
is clearly vindicated.
I believe the South Vietnamese are on the brink
of total military defeat. I examined a plan that
is intended to deal with the area that they now
hold. They have been thinking of this for some
time, once they saw that American support was
dwindling and would continue to dwindle where-
as North Vietnamese support would grow.
They have been rationing arms and ammunitions
for some time. They have been trying to husband
their resources. They have cut down the use of
rifle ammunition and of grenades very dramatically.
They had made plans to complete their resources
in an area which corresponds roughly to what they
now have, though they had hoped to hold more of
the coast, especially to the extent to which they
had some expectation of finding oil. The Delta,
of course, is their rice bowl and very valuable.
The rest of the area, south of the present line,
contains lumber and a lot of population.
I told Thieu this plan was sound but a linear
defense was not appropriate to the type of situa-
tion that they face. They should find enemy
divisions and destroy them wherever they are,
and not just try to hold the line that it is not
identifiable by sonte geographic feature. The
big question is whether they now have time to
get organized.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
The issues they face are as follows:
First, to reconstitute their forces and to
create four more divisions in order to defend
against the larger North Vietnamese army.
Second, to upgrade their territorial forces
to 27 regiments (which would have been done
a long time ago if they had though that they
would face this kind of military challenge).
Third, to upgrade their ranger groups.
If they could do all that, they would be in
pretty good shape. There is a limit to what
the North Vietnamese can send down. The
South Vietnamese could mass, and with the
very strong air support. that they have they
could do a good job for a time.
We all agree that the long-range prospects are
just impossible for them. The issue is: can we
get the stuff to them in time and will the enemy
give them time?
I have not tried to be too optimistic. However,
there have been reports from some of the places
where I testified that I said the GVN could win.
They can, locally, but I do not believe they can
push the North Vietnamese army back.
I have said that the South Vietnamese could and
would fight. I have said this in part in order
to help keep the South Vietnamese together. But
their leadership is very doubtful. I have talked
to Thieu. If he does what he says, it can go
pretty well. As for the will to fight, I have
said that in March, 1972, there were 16 North
Vietnamese divisions down there. And they
were defeated, though with American help.
General Vogt and I concluded that they had
the will to fight. But they had our support.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRETISENSITIVE (XGDS)
Last year they had 600 people a week killed
and many wounded. So I think they have the
will to fight. I do not think one should regard
this panic as a sign that they have no such
will. I have seen such panic in Korea in 1950
as well as in Burma. It is not pleasant, but
it is not unprecedented. The 18th and the 25th
divisions have been doing well. The question
is the will of the people to resist or to accept
a form of government that they consider alien.
The other question is the support of the
American people. I assume they would
support more assistance, having stuck with
it this long. That is the way I dealt with it
in my report. I have found support on our
determination not to let force prevail over
the will of the people.
I have recently seen some talk about secret .
commitments. In a visit last year to Vietnam,
Cambodia and Thailand, I spoke of continuing
American support. It is clear that they all
expected American support, although Thieu
was worried about threats in the Congress.
Thieu clearly believes you have done all you
could. He understands the Congress.
One thing that I had in the back of my mind as
I wrote my recommendations was that we owe
it to them to help them or at least we should
not deny them the help if they need it. If I did
not believe it, I would not be here. Neither, I
guess, would the rest of you.
The question is whether the American people
would accept the burden. As I have watched
the orphan program and the refugee movement,
I have concluded that the American people'
desperately want to help the South Vietnamese.
Whether this sentiment translates into military
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
assistance it is hard to say, but I believe it
exists.
The price that I think it requires is $722 million
which would build four more divisions and up-
grade other units. This amount subsumes the
$300 million that is now in the supplemental.
I also had recommendations on refugee assis-
tance and on evacuation policy. You are aware
of these.
President: Thank you, Fred. I read your report and I
talked to you about it in California. I am
impressed with its solid factual analysis.
Henry, zriay I have the options as you see them?
Secretary Kissinger: If I may wear my hat as Secretary of State for
a time, I want to take issue with the estimate
of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding
the impact on our worldwide position of a
collapse in Vietnam. It was his judgment
that the world reaction would be negligible,
based on the fact that everybody had been
anticipating what would happen.
Let me say that, whatever their long run expec-
tations, no country expected so rapid a collapse.
I believe their reaction would also be affected if
they did not even see an effort made.
We have reports that the Japanese, the Indo-
nesians, and other Asian nations are watching
closely, and they are forming judgments. It
is not in their interests to say this publicly.
Especially in Asia, this rapid collapse and our
impotent reaction will not go unnoticed. I
believe that we wilt see the consequences
although they may not come quickly or in any
predictable manner.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) 16
So I cannot share the judgment expressed by
the Director of Central Intelligence. I believe
that, even in Western Europe, this will have
a fall-out.
Let me now come to the options.
On military assistance, the first option -would
be to ask for no military aid but to follow the
predominant mood in the Congress and do
nothing. You could say that your predecessors
have put in $150 billion and that it has not worked,
and that no amount foreseeable is going to work.
You could say that you are concentrating on the
economic and humanitarian side. You would
have the advantage that you could be the first
President since 1947 who will have had nothing
to do with Vietnam.
President: Not as President perhaps, but as a member of
Congress I have.
Secretary Kissinger: The negative aspect of such an option is that it
would trigger an immediate collapse in Saigon
and that this collapse would be caused by the
United States.
It would give Saigon the least opportunity to
negotiate. It would imperil 6, 000 Americans,
and it would make it impossible to evacuate
any Vietnamese. The international implications
would compound those that I have described.
But, it would provoke the least dissension in
this country. ?
Between that and the $722 million that Fred
has mentioned, you can about pick your own
figure.
A
You can go for $300 million saying that this is
all that is immediately available. You can say
that you will either try to get some more
later, or you can say that you will specifically
try for the $422 million later.
'S'OP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET ISENSITIVE (XGDS) 17
President: This would be easiest to get but, as Fred told
me in California, it could not be justified in
terms.of additional forces.
Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. The $300 million is designed
to bring supply stocks up to the 60-day level.
Schlesinger: You should know that Mahan is marking up the
$300 million tomorrow. I told him he may
want to wait until after the speech. You may
want to send him a signal.
Secretary Kissinger: The problem with $300 million is that it will
be hard to defend. It is important to get the
debate behind us and not to go on for months.
So a case can be made that you either go for
close to nothing or that you go for Fred's
recommendation, since $300 million is not
enough.
If you say $300 million and more later, you
are simply bringing about months of Vietnam
debate. But you could do it that way. It is
possible that South Vietnam may collapse,
and then you may not need to ask for the
$22 million. It is, of course, also probable
that if you go for $722 million, there will still
be a collapse.
The advantages of the $722 million are: First,
that it's militarily defensible; second, that it
would strengthen the South Vietnamese position
for inevitable negotiations -- as Fred says,
South Vietnam can then negotiate with North
Vietnam; and, third, that it would put us in
the best position to negotiate our extraction,
with South Vietnam, North Vietnam, or both.
So I see three viable options:
-- First, to ask for nothing or nest to nothing;
-- Second, to ask for $300 million and indicate
that there might be more to come;
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) 18
-- Third, to ask for the whole amount.
Next, we must deal with the options regarding
economic assistance.
President: If we ask for $722 million, can we say that
this is all w'e ask?
Weyand:
President:
Secretary Kissinger:
We think that the amount for 1976 that we have
requested, which is $1. 3 billion, would
be enough to carry us from there on.
Then, if the $722 million is granted, and if it
is effective, we would expect that about
$1. 3 billion would do it.
As I understand it, the $722 million would have
to be followed by $1.3 billion in order to have a
chance for success.
There is also the question of economic assistance.
It is also related to the military option. AID
wants to stay within the limit of its original
authorization, so they do not want to ask for
more than $167 million. This was our appraisal
as being what we needed before the attack, but
it would appear unbalanced in comparison to the
great increase in our request for military aid.
President: Does this figure include economic and humani-
tarian aid?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Our Embassy has asked for $450 million which
has a lot of money for economic development
that makes very little sense right now.
I am inclined to think that anything between-
$170 million and $450 million might make sense.-
We can say that anything around $250 million or
in that area would make sense, but there is no
hard basis for any of these figures.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
There is a hard basis for the Embassy figure,..
but we cannot defend it on the Hill., under present
circumstances.
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ince We are ~a
it should be more than in the past. Cep tiniv
anything between $170 million and $300 r i3:lio
can be put to use.
We need also to determine our stance on a
Congressional resolution that some of 'otir aid
should go to support people living in Communist
areas.
We have several options: We can oppose, we can
be neutral, or we can be favorable toward such a
resolution.
The major problem is that we would :be supporting
the rear area of a country that is attacking an
ally. A case can be made for the argument that
they have the Soviet Union and China to help them.
As Secretary of State, I think that this kind of idea
presents an image of a sappy America getting
creamed and at the same time helping those who
are attacking it.
Schlesinger: What is'your opinion as National Security Advisor?
Secretary Kissinger: As National Security Advisor, I have to be
impartial, but that is a hard one. I will risk
the recommendation that we should oppose such
legislation.
President: I gather that Senator Kennedy tends to advocate
it, wanting to administer the funds through the
United Nations.
Secretary Kissinger: It amounts to the same thing: it relieves
Communist resources and personnel. If the
U. N. wants to do it without U. S. participa-
tion, that is its business. But for the United
States to do this, while a war is going on,
would be hard to explain to the American
people and to foreign countries.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
President: Have all the refugees come to the South.Vietnamese
area, or are they still in areas controlled by the
North Vietnamese?
Colby: Some have come to the South Vietnamese area,
but many are still in the North Vietnamese area.
Weyand:
We are now talking of a refugee figure of about
400, 000 in areas under South Vietnamese control
as opposed to 1 million earlier.
President: Do we still hold Cam Ranh?
Colby: No.
Secretary Kissinger: It is a terrible tragedy. Nobody can deny the
ineptitude of the South Vietnamese. But for the
United States to send relief to Communist areas
and to help them devote resources to the war
seems very questionable.
President: In effect, we would be financing both sides.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 21
Kissinger:
You have these three choices. You can oppose the
proposal for providing aid to refugees in Communist
areas, or you can give the Congress the facts and let
them decide, or you can support it. It is not a
disgraceful argument.
With regard to evacuation of Americans and Viet-
namese, there aye"three things that affect a decision.
First, the number of people who might need to
be evacuated; second, the political conditions
under which they might need to be evacuated; third,
the question of how to organize such an effort.
I have a list of potential evacuees. The maximum
total of thoseincluded in this list is 1, 700, 000.
They fall into eight different categories:
1. American citizens and their relatives;
2. The diplomatic corps;
3. The IC CS;
4. Third country nationals under contract to us;
5. The employees of the United States and their
dependents. This latter category is estimated at
about 164, 000 people.
The total included in those five categories comes
close to 200, 000.
President: Of which, I understand, 6, 000 are Americans.
Kissinger: There are about 5, 400 and 500 dependents.
We would then have the other categories.
6. The Vietnamese relatives of American citizens.
7. Senior GVN andmilitary officials and their
dependents.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
The total for this category is given as 600, 000,
which seems high.
8. Former Vietnamese employees of the United
States intelligence and other agencies as well as
their dependents.
One problem is that, even if you accept the level of
200, 000 on the list, Graham Martin refuses to
carry out the order to evacuate them.
Clements: Why don't you fire him?
Kissinger: Graham Martin's major problem is that he does
not want to trigger panic by beginning any evacuation
process.
Schlesinger: Conditions will get worse.
:
Kissinger
Once we get a Presidential decision, I shall see
to it that Graham Martin carries it out. But we
have not had a clear-cut decision.
It depends a great deal on what the President recommends
for aid to South Vietnam. If the President recommends
nothing, then panic could create an immediate problem.
If the President recommends support and asks for
money, we can then tell Thieu that we are going to
have to take out some Americans and it should not
create the same result.
As for the Vietnamese, there are some problems.
For one thing, they are scattered all over the place.
We would have to get them to the aircraft. If we
gave the order to evacuate, it might well be impossible
to carry it out.
Schlesinger: We have to have the cooperation and the acquiescence
of the Vietnamese.
Kissinger: This is the next point: We have to decide how to
organize such an effort. This will require immediate
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 23
consultation with Thieu, once we decide, or with
whatever successor government there might be.
But, whoever is in power in Saigon, we will need
to coordinate. Your speech will have some
effect on this.
We have looked, with the Department of Defense,
at all available assets. It is clear that, with the
numbers involved, this cannot be a one day operation
like Eagle Pull in Cambodia.
By commercial aircraft, we could take out 600 a day.
By military aircraft, we could take out 15,000 in a
day. By ship, we could take out anywhere from
26, 000 to 125, 000 a day. Of course, ships have a longer
turn around time of four to five days. So you have
an evacuation that will take a week if you go to
240, 000.
Schlesinger: It also depends on the cooperation of the North Vietnamese
They have anti-aircraft weapons. If those weapons
are brought near Tan Son Nhut, they can make it very
difficult.
Kissinger: So the issue depends first on your decisions, second
on identifying the persons to evacuate, third on the
cooperation of the GVN, and fourth on the cooperation
of the North Vietnamese. I should add that this is
one area where I believe the Soviet Union and the
Chinese could be helpful.
In your decision you would have to deal with evacuation,
with what to say to the GVN, with what you want the
Department of Defense to do, and with what diplomatic
efforts you would want the State Department to make
vis-a-vis these countries and others. I agree with
the Secretary of Defense that it will be hairy.
President: To put into effect an evacuation proposal for our own
people and for 200, 000 others, would that not require
violation of the law or the agreement of Congress if
we need to use force.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Kissinger: My own personal view is that you would have to ask
Congressional authority to take forces in. It is not
like Cambodia. It will last longer. Even if we have
the consent of the GVN, we will have to fight Viet-
namese. If that is your decision, this will require
U. S. forces.
First we have to decide what to go for. Then we can
talk to Thieu. Then we can get the Embassy to
thin out our personnel, removing those who were
assigned to I Corps and II Corps as well as dependents
and the like.
President: Do you have any observations on this, Jim?
Schlesinger: You have the innate power to protect Americans.
I think the Foreign Relations Committee is anxious
to cooperate and would not object to our use of force.
Moose and Meissner, who have been out there, have
been cabling back favorable recommendations on
this issue.
.Kissinger: The problem is not under the War Powers Act,
as I see it. It is under the Indochina Restrictions,
where the issue becomes more difficult. Elsewhere,
it would appear to be easy to use U. S. forces for
this purpose.
President: Which of these was approved last?
Kissinger: We went through that at the time of thislegislation
and determined that the War Powers legislation
superseded the other. But the Administration of
your predecessor took the position at the time that
it would not claim this.
President:
However, despite this kind of issue, the question is
whether it would be politically acceptable for us to do
this. I question whether we should rely on Moose
or Meissner.
It is great for people to say this, as they have in
Turkey and Greece, to the effect that we can go
ahead. But, of course, if it does not work it is we
who are in trouble.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 25
rh~l~sing~~: On Turkey, the General Accounting Office says
that it is all right.
President: If Congress wants us to do it, let them pass a
Sense of the Congress Resolution.
Kissinger: Another problem is that in Vietnam it is not just
a matter of evacuating American citizens but also
of evacuating Vietnamese.
Clements:
If we go to the Congress, we should have one
package and go for it.
President: I think we should ask for a change in the law that
we can use certain resources that we need for
evacuation. Somebody should be preparing it so
that we can send it up by Friday. We should not
just be limited to one division, or one other type
of unit, or just to our personnel.
Brown:
If we have a disaster, Congress will evade the
responsibility. Let us get some language. I am
sick and tired of their asking us to ignore the
law or to enforce it, depending on whether or
not it is to their advantage.
When this legislation came up, Admiral Moorer
spoke specifically of this problem. He was told
that the U. S. of course had the power to protect
Americans.
President: Let's get that testimony.
Does anybody wish to comment on the general
issues?
Schlesinger; I think we have a number of problems.. The
first one is Vietnam itself. . We must recognize
that it is gone. It is going now and it will go
quickly depending on the North Vietnamese.
With any aid we give them
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE(XGDS) 26
we are buying time, partly to get out the Americans.
We must try to see what it willlook like in 90 days.
It is desirable to avoid fragmentation of the people
and an argument with Congress. We must state
clearly in closed rooms that hope is slim, and that
we are moving on a strategy of 60 days to 6 months.
We should say that we are doing, this to save the
Americans and to protect the Vietnamese.
I think in your speech you should push for $300 million
and say that we will ask for more later. We will use
the time to get the Americans out. Fred says we
just have a chance and that it depends on the North
Vietnamese. So far, the South Vietnamese have
not been able even to regroup the unruly people of the
Second division. We may be faced with a situation
that will last only 30 days.
The important thing is for you to establish leadership
and to give a call to the people. You could talk
along the lines of Churchill's blood, sweat and tears.
You could say that U. S. foreign policy is in the most
difficult period since 1939. I would tick off Portugal
and say that we insist on a free election. We should
tell the Europeans we expect them to do more in
their own defense. Also, we should speak of Turkey
and of what must be done there.
I think that if you have a fighting speech, you will
have a positive impact on the Congress. I think there
are two kinds of people on the Hill: Those who want
to get out of Vietnam and those who are just waiting
for an inspirational message.
Let us not talk of detente or of past ,achievements.
I am concerned for the country and for you. We
need to challenge the Soviet Union. We should say
that detente is not consistent with revolutionary actions in
Portugal and with what they have been doing in Southeast
Asia. We want to preserve detente but it cannot be
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE(XODS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
a one way street. The speech should also have a
tone of admonition to the Chinese, who have sup-
ported North Vietnam and the Cambodian Communists.
We need a Churchillian speech that would establish
a fighting leadership, even if we have to postpone
it for a few more days. When the speech was originally
scheduled, we thought the situation was more manageable,
but the situation has changed to the point where we
need this kind of address. As for Vietnam, the situa-
tion is now hopeless.
Clements: I want to endorse what Jim says. I think the time
has come to be candid. The people want the President,
to get out in front and to give us leadership.
The American people do not like what has happened.
We should say that Vietnam is bad and has been for
twelve years. Americans have been divided. Now
let us look ahead and not get into acrimonious debates
over the past.
Colby:
We should not get into recriminations. We have to
move forward. You can say that you are the man
who will take them forward. We should not promise
anything that we cannot do. In my judgment, there
is very little we can do. All options are bad. It
takes a strong leader to be able to cut your losses.
But more important things lie ahead. I agree with
the humanitarian side. But we should not get out in
front on an idle threat or on some bluff that we cannot
support.
If I may take advantage of the precedent set by the National
Security Advisor, and if I may state my views on
policy, it would be that you should put your stress
on the Vietnamese people.
In 1954, 900, 000 Vietnamese went to South Vietnam
from,North Vietnam. It will be important to speak
of the free choice of the Vietnamese. We should
ask Congress to commit money to carry out the
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 28
Brown:
pledge to let the Vietnamese, perhaps one to two
million, leave, and to provide diplomatic support.
Also, the forces could leave. This would give
those forces something to fight for.
Americans could respond to their feelings. We would
accept the fact that Vietnam has been a defeat, but
go on to our concern with the people.
I would Mike to support what Jim Schlesinger says.
I have been on a trip, to Indonesia, Singapore,
Pakistan and other countries. In Pakistan, I was
approached on whether we would let the Vietnamese
fall. I cited the record.
There is great interest. People wonder if we will
turn our backs on Asia. The main question is what
we will do about Asia. I think $722 million, even
with Fred Weyandts objective* would be wasted. We
would have no hope. Perhaps $300 million would
maintain some effort on behalf of the Vietnamese and
would say we are not turning our back on Asia.
The large sum would also have an impact on the
equipment of our own units. We would have to send
material that our own forces should use.
Clements: In any case, we cannot get the material there in time.
President: Bob, do you have anything you want to add?
Ingersoll: If you say what Jim suggests, you will have chaos in
Saigon.
Schlesinger: You would not say it publicly. You would say it
privately to the Congressional leaders.
Kissinger: It will certainly get out.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
i
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) 29
President:
*I am not going to tell the Congressional leaders
that sort of thing. I will tell them my decision.
We have an executive and legislative branch. I
still think we have to make our own decision
within the executive branch. We solicit their
views, but I have to make the decisions. I do
intend to make a strong speech. It will be looked
upon as a strong speech.
I believe my speech has to be consistent. I can-
not make a strong speech on certain areas of the
world, and then, as I look at it, ask for $300
million. No military estimate can justify it.
If we are going to be blunt and say we will do
nothing, that is one thing, but we have to use
figures that are justifiable. Maybe Congress
will not give it to us, but at least, on the record,
we have to say what will do it.
Marsh: Congressman on Fraser has just made a speech
calling for Vietnam aid.
President: I will ask for $722 million because we can justify
it. At least the record will be clear. I will ask
that it be done by a date certain, perhaps May 1,
though we still .have to decide that.
I will ask for humanitarian aid but not through
the United Nations. Third, I will ask for authority,
which I think is needed, to evacuate the Americans
and others to whom we have an obligation.
I do not rule out at some point letting the North
Vietnamese know that any interference with our
humanitarian efforts will be met with strong
measures. That is why I want flexibility.
It will be a strong speech in my own way, not
perhaps in Churchill's. It will not be. a phony.
I gather, Jim, that you have reservations. But this
is the decision. This will be the only group that knows
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
it. 3: have spent a lot of time on this, now and even
earlier, going back to 1952. I think our policy,
going back to Presidents Truman and Eisenhower,
was the right policy. We did not always implement
it well, and we may have made many mistakes.
But it was the right policy.
But to go to Congress and ask for nothing, that
is dubious. It is our best hope, if we can get it.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 7, 1975
TO: General Scowcroft
FROM: W. R. Sm
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting of April 9, 1975
Attached are the minutes of the NSC
Meeting of April 9. As you may recall,
I gave you an earlier version of the
April 9 record on that same day for
your immediate information. That
should now be destroyed and replaced
by this proofed and corrected version.
cc: Jeanne W. Davis
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-3-2