MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP gErrt ET ~SENSITTVE (XGDS)
MINUTES
{ S-? 1-rl
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date: Friday, March 28, 1975
Time :
Place:
Subject:
Principals
Middle East and Southeast. Asia
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of the Treasury William Simon
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William. Colby
Other Attendees
State: Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll (only for
Vietnam portion)
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph Sisco
Defense: Deputy Secretary William Clements
WH: Donald Rurnsfeld
NSC: Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Robert B. Oakley 2'
NSS, DOS, OSD
and JCS reviews
completed
XGDS - 3
DECLAS .. Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
TOP y SEC ET !SENSITIVE
~+rexs rTosm+,~nrr~z (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
This is the first of the steps, and a very important
step, which we must take following the extremely
disappointing results of Henry Kissinger's long and
arduous trip to the Middle East. I told Rabin that .
unless there was a settlement, we would have to
reassess our policies. toward the Middle East,
try and get a settlement. We acted in good faith and
I assume they did, also, but when the chips were
down they showed a lack of flexibility which was
needed for an agreement. What I said to.the Hearst
papers about more Israeli flexibility being in the
best interests of peace is true.. But there was no
flexibility. I will catch flak for my position and
Henry is already catching it. The time has come
for a good hard look.
including Israel. I don't know if they understood
what I was saying but I think they do now. Since I
have been in office, we have worked wits Israel to
I will tell you briefly about my record in Congress
where Israel is concerned. It was so'close that I
had a black reputation with the Arabs. ' I have always
liked and respected the Israeli people. They are
intelligent and dedicated to the causes in which they
believe. They are dedicated to their religion, their
country, their family and their high moral standards.
I admire them and respect them. And I have never
been so disappointed as to see people I respect unable
to see that we are trying to do something for their
interest as well as for our own. But in the final
analysis our commitment is to the United States.
Vice President: Hear, hear.
President: We could have been together but now I do not know.
The reassessment will take place and we will see.
We cannot afford to have our position in this country
undercut but I must tell you what I think. .. We will be
following a firm policy of reassessment. It will not
be decided today. Everyone will take a close look
first. But in the meantime, keep everyone at arm's
length.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Henry, do you want to tell us about your mission
and where we are now?
Kissinger : Let me describe some of the issues which wewill face in the reassessment of a Middle East policy.
First, what have we been trying to achieve?
In November 1973 all the Western Europeans, the
Japanese and the USSR were solidly united on an
immediate Israeli return to the 1967 lines. If the
situation had been allowed to continue, given the
economic problem in the West, all the pressures
would have been on us. And at Geneva everyone
would have been united against Israel with the US
acting as Israel's lawyer. Our policy?helped abort
this sort of Geneva Conference, even though we
went along with the idea in order to keep the Russians
calmed down. We had the willingness of Sadat to
play a constructive, cooperative role and the active
encouragement of Ferisal for the step-by-step.
approach. This held off the radicals and enabled
us to create a situation in which all the Arabs were
turning to us, while Israel had a situation which it
could handle politically since ithad to deal with only
a small piece at a time. We also neutralized the
Western Europeans and Japanese who are anxious to
replace us in the Middle East. Objectively, there
is little to distinguish the effect of their policies
from those of the Soviets. This process which we
instituted proceeded well and met Israel's interests
as well as our own. The two were compatible in
the step-by-step approach.
So the big issue with Israel during my last trip was
not lines on maps. By the way, the leaked maps in
-the New York Times and elsewhere are inaccurate.
They only showed us a map after the negotiations
were over. But lines are trivial compared to
whether or not the moderate Arab leaders are able
to say the US has delivered something. And this is
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGD5)
fully in line with the survival of Israel, really'
the best way to ensure Israel's survival. The
USSR was completely out of the game and on this
last trip Feisal came to the point where he told
me he trusted me to proceed as I judged best even
though he would have preferred another approach.
And Asad told me he wanted separate negotiations
with Israel rather than Geneva.
So our disappointment is 'that Israel did not under-
stand. They could have been shielded and their
only friend, literally their only friend in the. world,
was in control of the process, dealing with the. Arabs
singly and keeping the USSR out. Even Iraq was
beginning to move out of the Kurdish orbit.. I do not
approve of the brutal way in which Iran and Iraq
disposed of the fate of the Kurds, but it created a
situation whereby the Iraqis no longer had such need
for the Soviets. I was hoping that in such a situation
with all the Arabs turning to us and away from the
USSR, someone.in the Kremlin would have gotten
discouraged and said, "Let's stop pouring so much
money and effort down a rat hole; " That was the
situation we had one week ago.
On the whole, in the negotiations, I think "Egypt,
went further and Israel not as far as I had expected.
But our role and the whole strategy we had followed
for eighteen months, putting us in the key position, has
been disrupted. Now that the parties are face to face
with it, they are not so eager for Geneva.
A unilateral US effort now would be a mistake, would
make it look as if we were more anxious than the
parties, If they came to us, we could think about
doing something but there can not be any more
shuttles. The pressure on the Arabs is likely to be
against cooperating with us. Sadat will have to move
toward the other Arabs in order to protect himself and
also a bit toward the Soviets and Western Europeans
and Geneva. Moreover, tensions in the area will
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGD
y ,,1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
build up. UNEF is due for renewal on April 26
and TJNDOF a month later. Sadat told,niehe
would renew UNEF for three months, not six.
I would expect UNDOF to be renewed for two'
months. Both would thus expire simultaneously
by the end of July and by August we could have a
flash point on both fronts.
Schlesinger: Will the Soviets veto a renewal?
Kissinger: Not if the parties are for it, I expect we will have
some violations of the agreement soon. The
Egyptians already have some SAM sites across the
Canal and there will probably be more. Syria and
the PLO will get back in the game, perhaps with
guerilla raids from Lebanon. The Secretary General
is already in the game, trying to arrange Geneva.
I am trying to slow him down a little. If Geneva
meets, things will -happen. Israel will have to deal
with all of its neighbors and all of the final issues
at the same time. Up to the present, thanks to our
strategy, we and Israel were able to avoid this.
President: When would Geneva meet?
Kissinger: Let's not rush into it. We must act as if we were
ready to go all-out to head for Geneva but not
actually set a date. That will have a good effect on
the parties. I think we can wait until June but we
can not appear to stall or hang back. Even though
the Soviets are now in a good tactical position, we
still have the chips. because everyone is still counting
on us to move Israel. We can get the benefit of this
basic situation if we can deliver. This is true
bilaterally or at Geneva. If we do not deliver, the
Arabs will conclude that only force can get anything
from Israel. For the moment Egypt and Saudi Arabia
still have some confidence in the US, judging from
what was said to the Vice President.
Vice President: And also affection for the US and for Henry.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Kissinger; There will now be a more active Soviet role and
if the Arabs do not think they can get enough
progress they will ask that the UK and France
participate at Geneva. We have an interest in the
survival of Israel but we also have broader interests
with the Western Europeans and Japan and the Arabs.
If there is another war we run the risk of antagonizing
the Arabs definitively and of pushing them into the
arms of the Soviets. We will also risk a direct
confrontation with the Soviets. At Geneva we will
confront the basic issues of final frontiers and
Palestine and guarantees and demilitarization. We
may have to draw up a comprehensive US plan for
the Middle East so as not to be empty-handed.
A big question is to what degree we will want to
coordinate with or dissociate ourselves from Israel.
What kind of economic and military aid should we
provide and what should the timing be? What kind
.of military, supply policy should we have for the
Arabs? As I see it, the only remaining Soviet
influence in Egypt is the latter's need for spare parts
and other military items from the USSR.' What about
our energy policy and the Joint Committees? What
about the PLO?
Even if we decide to do nothing we must have a policy.
We need a diplomatic strategy for Geneva and a
strategy for bilateral relations, with the Arab states
and Israel, economically and militarily. There are
also some tactical questions concerning Geneva:
Should we go for a stalemate with a subsequent
resumption of our bilateral efforts, or go to Geneva
with a US plan and force a settlement? We need a
carefully worked out strategy for another war. The
last time we came out very well without an advance
strategy but the next time we can not improvise.
Another war will produce very heavy casualties--I
think Bill Colby's estimate is for 7000 Israeli dead--
with more Arab countries joining in and a greater
risk of Soviet involvement !
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGD )
The Soviets will be a much bigger threat than in
the past. In.1967 and again in 1973 they stood aside
while their Arab allies were humiliated. The cumu-
lative resentment is building up and is likely to push'
them to be less cautious this time in showing their
power. This is all the more true since they see the
US as weak and unwilling to stand up for its commit-
ments anywhere in the world.
That is why we need a total. reassessment. . Joe
Sisco will be in charge of a special working group
to consider all of these questions. It should take
about three weeks.
We need to keep the immediate situation under
control and then recapture control of the, long-term
situation. We can do this since the Arabs know they
still need to come to us to get progress. But we
must be absolutely certain that we can deliver
progress the next time.
President: Thank you, Henry, what do the others have to say?
Schlesinger: I think Henry's presentation was very accurate.
Our position could be one of dignified aloofness.
We are in the cat-bird seat. We can go to Geneva,
point out we have already done our best but did not
succeed, so we will just sit and wait to see what
develops.
Vice President: Do you mean aloofness from Israel?
Schlesinger: Yes, I do. There should not be full policy coordination
with Israel as in the past. We should look forward,
not to the past. United States policy has been
frustrated to the extent we hope to be successful in
the years ahead. We can not allow Israel to continue
its relationship with us as if there were no problems.
We can not let them conclude that they can upset the
U. S. applecart but the Administration can do nothing
about it. The military balance from the Israeli stand-
point is much better than the last time we met (in the
NSC) to discuss this problem. We overestimated
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE (XGDS)
badly the amount of Soviet arms which Egypt had
received. So the balance for Israel is reasonably.
favorable and we need not be concerned over our
aloofness
Simon: What about the Joint Economic Commissions?
President: This is a crucial question. Joe Sisco is coordinating
our reassessment. It is not aimed at tilting toward
or against Israel or toward or against Arabs. It is
aimed at the best interests of the U. S. Jim ..
(Schlesinger) used a good word, "aloof, " and I think
this is the posture we should adopt at least during
the period of our policy reassessment. As. an
example of this, it would be better if Peres did not
come on his visit as originally planned. And as for
the F-15, I think we should holdup the visit by the
Israeli team which was coming to make an assess-
ment. Bill (Simon), you should be aloof with the
Joint Committee.
Simon: We have Joint Commissions with several countries,
including Iran and Saudi Arabia. How shall we
handle this?
President: The Iranians and Saudis are in a different category.
They were not involved in the negotiations.
Simon What about Egypt?
President: What are we doing there?
Simon: We have several projects, particularly helping them
rebuild the area along the Suez Canal.
President: As I recall, we were slow in getting started with
Egypt so we can afford to be more forthcoming than
with the Israelis. Bill (Colby), we don't want to
jeopardize Israel's security but you can also be more
aloof. There is no pique on our part but we are
reassessing so we will be restrained.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS).
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
CCoo!by:,
President:
We can do that.
As I recall my own experiences as a Congressman,
the Israeli representatives float very freely on.
Capitol Hill. Now we can't do anything about that
with Congress. But I have the impression the
Israeli representatives are almost as free in many
Departments as they are with Congress. You must
try to control that.
Schlesinger:
President:
Kissinger:
President:
Schlesinger:
Vice President:
Clements:
President:
Try to do both but concentrate on the overt ones.
Channelize the relationships with Israeli represen-
tatives. The proper relationship should be business-
like but arms-length and aloof. Jim, what did we
do about that Israeli shopping list last fall?
The NSC recommended that we give them two out
of eight slices but we ended up by giving them four
out of eight.
I decided to include the Lance and the LGB because
I thought they needed it. In retrospect, bearing in
mind what I believed we were going to do together
and what has actually happened, we were probably
too generous. Jim, hold off on delivering those high
priority items if there is a way to do it.
We have a commitment to deliver the Lance.
Ithought they had a commitment, too, on negotiations.
We can prolong the Lance training in order to delay
delivery.
Stay within the guidelines. How you implement it
is your business. When we have reassessed, then
we can proceed. For the moment, I would like to
'look at the four slices of arms we gave them and
what. we have delivered already.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
him he knew all about it.
drawdowns on NATO stocks in Europe. I told
Schlesinger: Haig was here last week complaining about the
President:
General Brown:
President:
I would like to see those four slices. 'Did we go
so far as to increase their offensive capability,
not only improve their defensive capability? I
want to see everything that has been delivered to
Israel. I want to be able to show Congress just
how much we have done militarily for Israel. Also,
I would like to see what we have delivered to the
Arabs in the way of military hardware.
There is the question of when the stocks we have
drawn down for Israel.will be replaced for our own
forces. You can use this with Congress.
That would be useful. Get me a list of what we
have done since I have been President. If challenged,
I want the record,
Kissinger: It would also be valuable to know what we have
delivered since November 1973 when our major
re-equipment program began.
President: That will be useful for background but the stress
should be on what has happened since I came to office,
so show where the cut-off is. We have drawn down
our own capability.
Clements: We have even drawn out of our own stocks.
President: I want to look at the facts. Bill (Colby), do you want
to talk?
Colb)[:
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
25X
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITN.E (XGDS
Kissinger: We told Asad this was our estimate of how the war
would develop, not Israel's estimate but our own.
Asad told me we did not understand "We learned
in 1973 that Israel. can not stand pain.' We will lose
a lot but we will not give up and we will use the
strategy of inflicting casualties and fighting an
extended war. We will lose territory and men but
bleed Israel and draw the Soviets in. "
Schlesinger If Israel strikes first, they will not behave rationally.
They are likely to strike through Lebanon.
Kissinger.
Colby:
They may be able to hit quickly but the Syrians
are determined to hold out.
Sisco: The Arabs will not stick their necks out. This is
a very critical judgment. It can determine the
outcome of the war. The Arabs will fight on the
defensive and drag it out as long as possible.
Kissinger: The Arabs think of prolonged war and an early oil
embargo.
Schlesinge Before the US resupplies? That would be crazy.
We won't stand for it.
Kissinger: We must think of it. Also, our contingency planning
needs to assume higher risk-taking by the Soviets.
President: Did the Soviets go further ixi 1973 than before?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDSJ
2`25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) 2
Schlesinger:
Kissinger
Schlesinger
Clements :
They threatened the British and French in 1956
with nuclear attack.
Only after we had dissociated ourselves from. our
allies and told them to pull back.
They already had before April 1st enough to preempt
and as their situation worsens, they could decide
to go now. Also, as we became more aloof, this
could aggravate the situation. It could push them
to this kind of decision.
The Soviets were all bluster.
The priority problem is that Israel may decide
their position will worsen so they will preempt.
Kissinger: We must weigh many factors. I agree with Bill
that if there is no progress by summer, there will
be war within one year or maybe this year.`` We have
six months to produce something. For Israel to go
to war at the known displeasure of the U. S. would
be a monumental decision. We must keep the Arabs
from becoming too upset but show Israel they can
not ignore us. The next time we must be in a position
to get results from Israel.
Schlesinger: Maybe the word aloof is not a good one. We can
say to the Israelis that we have made an honest effort
and our well is temporarily dry. Whether it will be
temporary or permanent depends on you. We are
here,
President: Rocky, what about your talks with Sadat and the
Saudis?
Vice President: Mr. President, your thought of sending someone to
the funeral of King Feisal and your letters made a
deep impression and I believe really helped the Saudis
get through a very difficult period. Saudi Arabia
wants to follow the policy of cooperation of King Feisal,
judging from my talks with Khalid and Fahd. I told
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 13
Fahd we want his advice. He said that Feisal had
stood up to Nasser on radicalism in the Arab world
when it appeared that Saudi Arabia was all alone
but by the time of his death Egypt had come around
to seeing that Feisal was right. Fated said, however,
that unless there is a "just, equitable and lasting
peace within one year"--and those are his exact
words--the Soviets will move back in, the radicals
will be reinvigorated and rearmed by the Soviets
while the moderates will move away from the US
and establish a close relationship with Western
Europe. The Europeans have arms they want to
sell, we have the money to buy and we can learn
to fly the planes and drive the tanks. The Arabs
will keep building their military strength as long
as it takes from the USSR and Western Europe and
in time we will crush Israel. That is what Fahd
said to me. He is right about the Western Europeans.
The French sent their Defense Minister to the,
funeral with a list of items for sale and models of
aircraft and tanks. This offended the Saudis.
Simon: Israel might strike first. Is Egypt fully resupplied?
I gather they are not and Israel is militarily superior.
They won't allow the Arabs to fight a war of attrition.
Also, if there is too much uncertainty about our
support, it could lead Israel to conclude it must hit
first.
Kissinger: - Our problem would be the same if Israel hits soon
or. later on. Even if Israel destroys the Arab armies,
we will face the same problems in our relations with
the Arabs, Western Europeans and Soviets. We
would be obliged to step in, tell Israel that is enough
and impose or try to impose a settlement along the
1967 line. There is a physical limit to what three
million people can occupy and sooner or later we
will have to stop this process.
President: Exactly. How many miles of territory and how many
cities can Israel occupy?
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE SXGDS)
Kissinger:
Colby:
14.
And would the Soviets stand by-, while that happened?
We think-the Soviets are freer to support the Arabs
than they have been before. It would take them only,
a very few days to fly in defensive support such as
SAMs and aircraft. Their airborne troops could
probably be beaten by the Israelis because they
would only be lightly armed, but they could reinforce
the air defense around Cairo and Damascus and other
cities.
Kissinger: I am not sure Israel would directly attack ' Soviet
troops.
Brown: When I was reading the Special National Intelligence
Estimate, I had the impression of hearing' an old
record over again. We made a mistake about the
Arabs in October 1973. What Sisco had to say.is
very important. We must keep our minds open:
Schlesinger: . Israel will certainly win another round.
Brown: Israel's army is very good. We know that. But
don't count out the Arabs.
Vice President: Think what another war would mean for us. The
OPEC countries would stick together in an oil embargo,
particularly since the Latin Americans are already
unhappy with us. This could cause paralysis of the
East Coast of the United States.
President: I told Morton to put together a contingency plan on
what would be likely to happen if there were another
oil embargo, what measures we can take, and what
the probable result would be. We need to follow up
on this.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS) 15
Simon:
I don't believe Venezuela will, shut off exports
to the U. S.
Vice President: Venezuela is leading the movement of Latin.
American solidarity in standing up to the U. S. on
economic matters. Would you like to take the risk
if you were Governor of New Jersey?
Clements:
Clements
.1 agree with Nelson.
We would have two or three months of grace due
to our stockpiles.
There is the geographical dislocation problem.
We are just not set up to transfer our production
and stocks rapidly enough from one part of the
country to another.
President: I told FEA and others to get some contingency plans
ready. I have decided that when Congress comes
back on 'the 9th or 10th, I am going to speak to a
Joint Session on foreign policy. I am going to lay
it on the line, Far East, Middle East, National
Security and Defense, and other topics. The' President has to speak out strongly and positively.
Send your suggestions to Brent for incorporation
in the speech. We will announce it tomorrow and
I will spend a lot of time in California on this. Henry
will come out and help. By the time I get back on
the 7th we will be in shape for the speech. The
American people want to know where they are and
Congress needs to know what to do. The State of the
Union message had nothing on foreign policy so it
has been a long time since a major address on this
subject.
(At this point the discussion turned to Southeast Asia; Deputy Secretary
Ingersoll joined the meeting.)
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
President: Bill, what is the situation on the ground in Vietnam?
Cam' The Vietnamese Government has enough to control
d the Delta for this dry
a
d S
i
n
gon
a
the area aroun
season but they are likely to be defeated in 1976.
Thieu tried to extract his troups from the highlands
in time but his ploy failed. 'He was so afraid of
leaks to the Communists that he told no one in.
advance, not even his own commanders who were
caught by surprise. There was really only one
battle. Thieu was aware of the superior comparative
strength of the North Vietnamese in the highlands
so he wanted to pull out.of Pleiku and Kontuxn. He
wanted to fight at Ban Me Thuot, but he could not
do it. Among other problems, hisC-130s were
sidelined. So the move to the coast became a
route instead of an orderly withdrawal. Then they
were attacked in Quang Tri and Thieu was indecisive
about Hue, first he was not going to fight and then
he was and then he finally decided not to. This
caused the commander of I Corps to become confused
and angry. And now the airborne, their best troops,
are being taken out of Danang to Nha Trang and
Saigon. Thieu also wants to bring the Marine
Division out of the perimeter around Danang. If so,
Danang will surely fall. Originally, Thieu wanted
to defend the enclaves, like General Gavin.
Kissinger: Colby's estimate indicates that Thieu's pullback was
? designed to put him into a position to cut his losses
and stagger through until 1976. He decided to do.
this because he was not getting enough support from
the U. S. It was due to a lack of spare parts and
ammunition. The idea of pulling back was not bad
but when the move began, the refugees clogged the-
road and the troops did not know how to move anyway.
Thieu was trying to get ready. His estimate and
ours was the same; an all-out attack next year
would finish him unless he got more support. So
he wanted to stagger through this year and hope
for a change.
TOP SECREWSENSITIVE (XGDS).
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Clements He did not tell us anything at all and did not tell
his own commanders.
Kissinger: The move could only have been carried
shows clearly how they really feel about the Communists.
Clements: But the army may leave some $200 million.in arms
and military equipment in Danang alone.
Colby: And there is some grumbling about Thieu in the army
as well as in political circles. We may hear more
about this.
with the highest point coming after the Tet offensive.
Now we are back up to over one million refugees.
President: Can the Vietnamese be economically self-sufficient
in the smaller area?
Colby: Yes, the Delta is the big rice area. This would
have been the first year of economic self-sufficiency
had it not been for the suddenly deteriorating
situation. The refugees are placing a big burden.
on the government but it is interesting to. note that
they are. all fleeing toward the government. That
Colby: The refugee figures have fluctuated up and down,
surprise.
President: You are not optimistic about Danang being held?
Colby: It should fall within two weeks even if the Marine
Division stays instead of being pulled back. to protect
Saigon.
President: What about the evacuation of civilians?
There have been terrible mob scenes, both at the
airport where they stormed loading aircraft and at
the port where they jammed aboard ships. Some of
the military have even shot their way on to the ships.
A small number has been loaded but law and order
has broken down completely and it is almost impossible.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGD
No Objection to Declassification in Part 201133/03/20 : LOC-HAK-531-6 2 3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS) 18
Ingersoll:
Reportedly 6, 000 refugees got off on one ship this
morning and another one is. loading now.
President: What are these rumors about Ky coming back?
Kissinger: Ky is a boy scout, a flamboyant< pop-off; he can,
not do the job.
Colby: Chief of Staff Vien and Prime Minister Khiem are
possible candidates to replace Thieu.
Kissinger: Thieu has shown himself. far and away the most
capable of all the Vietnamese leaders I have known
since 1965. No one else could do as well. He holds
things together. He made a mistake in ordering
the withdrawal from the highlands but he had no
good choice. We were unable to give him the support
he needed.
Colby: I agree with Henry. No one else is up to Thieu.
Khiem would probably be the next best bet but he is
.some way from being up to Thieu.
General Brown: I agree with Colby's estimate about Danang. It will
be hard to hold 10 days. We have gotten all the
Americans out. A second ship is loading. There
are two airfields, the main one at Marble Mountain
and a small one. There is an ARVN battalion
protecting the small one from the mobs and some
C-47 flights are getting off. The mobs took the main
field and may take the second one.
Coib
There is little fighting in the Delta and a.-kound Saigon.
Unless the North Vietnamese move their reserve
divisions into the Delta from the North, Saigon and
the Delta can probably be held militarily but the big
problem will come when the stories.about Danang
start to circulate in Saigon.
Concerning Cambodia, Lon Nol is going to leave for
Indonesia on April first. But there is no hope of
talks with the Communists. They will see Lon Nol's
departure as weakness and will push harder. The
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
Schlesinger:
new Communist proposal for a government `would
leave Sihanouk with no base at all, even if he was
front for themselves. The French told us at
base for Sihanouk and bring him back, only as a.
the Khmer Rouge want to erase all possible political
ostensibly the' President.
The war is now being conducted against Sihanouk.
If it were a question of Lon Nol leaving and then
our dealing with Sihanouk, it would be easy. But
was unable due to the Khmer Rouge.
worried about U. S. support and losing their commanders.
With adequate resupply they would have lasted through
the dry season. But the morale is no good. The
.debate in Congress has hurt them badly. It is likely
to collapse in two weeks. .
The Cambodian airlift is suspended. The Communists
could make the airfield unusable. The Government
is losing ground east of the capital and also down
along the river. The wet. season starts in late May
but the river will not come up until late July and
by then it will probably be too late.
We are getting the first reports that the Cambodian
troops are beginning to lose their drive.. They are
Kissinger: We have to make an evacuation decision. Ideally,
from the political viewpoint, we should hold on until
after your speech and after Congress makes a decision
on our aid request. But if we wait it could collapse
all at once before we can get our people out. But if
we pull out, we will surely provoke a collapse.. There
are about 1100 people of all nationalities to be
evacuated. We may need to decide next week.
General Brown: The situation has changed. The outlook is bleaker.
We need to decide now to take them out or we could
have a major problem. There is one brigade of
Marines in the Pacific. - We could use U. S. forces
to take out the residents and try to beat the mob
out with helicopters.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
Martinique that Sihanouk. Wanted to negotiate but
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS~
President: How long will it take to get them out?
General Brown If we have to use helicopters downtown, it would
take one day to get 1200 out. If we have the; airfield,
it would take less time. They can get there on
their own. This is a very difficult operation.
Vice President:
General Brown:
President:
General Brown:
The Marines might have to shoot civilians and that
would create a huge uproar.
The mob will be hard to control.. We might have to
shoot refugees in front of the press.
If you decide to use the airport, will you need to
clear out: the enemy?
We may need air cover. If there is any firing on
our people on the ground at the. airport, we will
attack. We will have aircraft in the air.
Clements:, We can't tell whether or not the Khmer Rouge
will fight us.
Kissinger: We need a joint estimate about the unravelling in
Cambodia. If they can't hold, you need a chance to
look at the situation. We need an estimate as to
how long it can hold so we can decide on whether or
not to order fixed wing aircraft in for evacuation.
Vice President: There is also the symbolism of Lon Nol leaving.
This will have a bad effect on morale.
Kissinger: The Khmer Rouge will negotiate only unconditional
surrender. They could get a negotiated settlement
anytime but they refuse it. When Lon Nol leaves,
it will demoralize the country. Long Boret will try
to carry on but will fail.
Schlesinger: How long do we keep the Americans there after
Lon Nol leaves?
Kissinger: We are pressing them to get. out. Lon Nol wanted
to stay but we had to press him to get out also, to
calm the situation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3
 No Objection
We' need a decision now on improving our. intelligence
capability. We can not wait for the Forty Committee,.
Mr.'' President. Will you authorize us to preposition
intelligence collection aircraft now fo.r, us over North
VietNam if we need it?.
President, Yes, that is' okay.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/20: LOC-HAK-531-6-2-3