NSC MEETING ON SALT COMPLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-531-6-1-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 2, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
SALT Cavh~U~v~ce_
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IlYlq 5- MAY-.SMlC-
TOF ?E66 /SENSITIVE
ACTION
March 2, 1975
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FROM:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
JAN M. LODAL
NSC Meeting on SALT Compliance
I have enclosed both a memo to the President for the Tuesday NSC
meeting (Tab )k) and a draft of your talking points (Tab 19). Both
assume that the principal purpose of the meeting is to bring the
President up to speed on SALT compliance and head off potential
problems growing out of Jackson's hearings.
I have included a brief review of the status of the Geneva negotiations.
You may also wish to mention the issue which arose at the Verification
Panel of whether to stick with our past position on banning intercon-
tinental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles on ships, seabeds and
inland waterways.
In describing and discussing SALT compliance and general SALT
verification issues, I suggest you take the following approach:
,. Describe the individual compliance issues, with Colby and
Duckett providing the technical details.
-- Describe the Soviet complaints with respect to US compliance
with the SALT agreements (Minuteman silo covers, etc. ).
-- Discuss the overall problem of adequate verification and the
impact of verification on the viability of arms control agreements.
One of the most important results you could achieve at the meeting
would be to get everyone in the Administration to agree to take a more
realistic approach to verification. We anticipated that compliance ambiguities
would arise when the SALT I agreements were negotiated. That is why
NSS, DOS, OSD,
USAF, Reviews
Completed
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the SCC was created -- to deal with such ambiguities. Given the highly
technical nature of these agreements, we must expect similar situations
to arise in future agreements. We should not permit the possibility of.
future verification ambiguities, which can be handled so long as there is
a measure of good will on both sides, to detract from the advantages to
be gained from agreements which have a sound basis and rationale.
This approach is somewhat risky because it openly acknowledges that
we cannot write agreements which cover every possible verification
ambiguity. Thus, you may not want to take this line at the NSC. If
not, I will be happy to revise your talking points accordingly.,
VI
I have included considerable detail in the President's background paper,
based on his request for a detailed background paper. If you feel that
it is too complicated, I can simplify the discussion somewhat.
I have also enclosed relevant backup materials in the attached briefing
-book.
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ATTENDANCE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
March 4, 1975
Cabinet Room -
Principals
9.)
The Vice President
Secretary of. State Henry Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikie
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State: Deputy. Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
CIA: Deputy Director of Science and Technology Carl Duckett
ACDA: U. S. SCC Commissioner Sidney Graybeal
WH: Donald Rumsfeld
NSC:
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Jan Lodal
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Following is a summary of the significant developments during
the fifth session of the SCC, which was held during the period
January 28-February 13.
US Concerns and Soviet Responses
At the opening meeting of the session the US side set forth its
concerns with regard to : (a) silo-type launch control facilitries;
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(b) concelament measures; and (c) the definition of MLBMs. At the
February 11 meeting, the US raised an additional concern regarding
(d) the possible use of an air defense radar in an ABM mode.
-- Silo-tK2e Facilities. The US. expressed concern that there are
new large silos under construction in the western USSR which US
national technical means (NTM) cannot confidently distinguish from ICBM
silos. The US side observed that'the silos are large enough to hold ICBMs,
have headworks which could house needed equipment, and have rapidly-opening
doors. The US noted that there are already launch control facilities at
these missile sites. During the course of the SCC session, the US
stressed that we were not questioning Soviet assertions that the silos
are intended for launch control but rather about their potential for use
in the future as launchers. The US side advised the Soviets in the
opening session that we believed the issue should be resolved by: (a)
dismantling or destroying existing launch control facilities at each
site within six months after completion of each new silo launch control
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facility; and (b) in the future, equipping such silos with doors or
coverings of a type which would preclude the launch of missiles.
The Soviets responded that the silos are intended for missile launch
control and that because of their design missiles "cannot be installed" in
them. The Soviets asserted that they have clearly defined external features
which distinguish them from ICBM launchers. Some of these features
were described by the Soviet side (they were the features which
we had observed). The Soviets also stated that the US 11canx6t have
any facts concerning the use of these facilities as ICBM launchers since
such facts do not exist and in actuality cannot exist. " They also observed
that the Interim Agreement does not limit the number or nature of launch
control facilities, and that this issue was therefore not appropriate for
SCC consideration. Finally, with regard to the US proposed solution,
they responded that this would be extremely expensive.
-- Concealment Measures. The US indicated that numerous examples of
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concealment in connection with several Soviet strategic weapons programs
had been observed by NTM. Four examples were given--two relating to
.concealment at ballistic missile test areas, one involving an ABM test
center, and one involving the covering of hull sections of ballistic missile
submarines. It was stressed that the US was concerned over the expanding
pattern of these concealment measures, and it was asserted in the opening
statement that the US believed that the Soviet side should "cease"
these concealment activities.
The Soviets sought clarification of the examples of concealment at
ballistic missiles and ABM test centers. They observed that a "significant
portion" of the questions raised by the US in relation to concealment
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involves ballistic missile testing, that testing is not included in the pro-
visions of the Interim Agreement, and that such questions therefore should
not be considered by the SCC.
Later in the session, without requesting clarification, the Soviets
responded to the submarine. hull section concealment charge in a way
which indicated they had misunderstood our example. We contributed to
the misunderstanding by using the term "under construction", (which
under the IA does not apply to hull sections not yet in the construction
hall.) The example was subsequently clarified by the US side, and
Ustinov indicated informally in a humorous vein that between SCC
sessions he would send one of his advisors, Captain Kuznetsov, "to
the north" to find out what we were referring to. Generally, however, the
Soviet defense on concealment matters seemed to be oriented toward
interpreting the existing agreements in rather strict legalistic terms, and
taking the position that the SCC should not discuss concealment measures which
are not very closely tied to the IA or the ABM Treaty.
--Modern Large Ballistic Missiles. In raising this issue, it was noted
that the volume of a new Soviet ICBM (which the US calls the SS-19) is
"significantly greater" than the volume of the largest "light" ICBM
operational on either side (i. e. , the SS-11) within the meaning of the US
statement of May 26, 1972. It was stressed that the distinction between
"light" and "heavy ICBM would continue to be important for the
agreement the two sides have undertaken to conclude this year. Finally,
the Soviets were advised that in the US view any missile with a volume
or throw weight greater than the SS-19 must be considered a heavy ICBM.
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The,Soviets responded initially that this was a complicated question
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position in SALT: the IA applies to launchers rather than missiles;
the agreed approach to preventing the. conversion of launchers for light
missiles to launchers for heavy missiles involves limitatio:-.s on the
either at the next SCC session or within the framework of SALT. Sub-
sequently, the Soviet position within the SCC was brought into step with their
which mightrequire some time for a response, and that it might be discussed
dimensions of the launchers; and no definition of heavy ICBNs is needed.
There was little formal discussion of this subject at subsequent meetings
of the SCC, and it seems clear that this issue will have to be worked
out mainly in SALT rather than in the SCC.
-- Air Defense Radar. In raising this issue, the US advised the
Soviets that our NTM indicated the possibility that an SA-5 air defense
radar at Sary Shagan was being tested in an ABM mode and requested
clarification at the next SCC session. There was no further substantive
discussion of this subject during the January-February session.
Soviet Concerns
During the course of the session the Soviet side expressed its concern
regarding: (a) the confidentiality of SCC proceedings; (b) shelters over
ICBM and ABM launchers; and (c) the status of 177 inactive Atlas and Titan
ICBM launchers. In addition, the Soviet side offered a proposal for
working out an understanding within the framework of the SCC clarifying
the procedures for notification of ballistic missiles launches as required
by 'the. Agreemdnt.on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear
War Between the USSR and the US.
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Confidentiality. In their opening statement at the first meeting of
the session, the Soviets leveled a fairly strong charge at the US for failure
to maintain the confidentiality of SCC proceedings -- referring specifically
to a Voice of America broadcast, an article in the trade journal Aviation
Week, and (incorrectly) to a statement by the State Department press
spokesman. The Soviet concern over the confidentiality issue was raised
on several subsequent occasions in private conversations. These included
repeated references to the Nitze article in Foreign Policy, which apparently
has generated considerable bitterness in Moscow, and to "press coverage
,of more recent Nitze speeches, etc.
-- Atlas and Titan I ICBM Launchers. In what appeared to be a charge
designed to counter the US-raised issue regarding silo-type launch control
facilities, the Soviets requested clarification of the status of 177 inactive
Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers. They pointed out that only a small
amount of dismantling work had been undertaken on these launchers, and
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that their reactivation time might be substantially less than that required
for new construction. They noted that "a simple declaration of US
intentions concerning the silos" would be adequate to dispel their concern,
perhaps seeking to set the stage for disposing of the silo launch facilities
issue through a similar declaration by the Soviets.
- Concealment. 'Agai4 apparently seeking some balance, the Soviets
expressed concern regarding shelters over Minuteman launchers at Warren
AFB, shelters over ABM launchers at Grand Forks, and the covering of
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US ballistic missile submarines undergoing conversion (for Poseidon
deployment). We responded daring this session to only one of
these- -Minuteman shelters-- indicating that the US would consider
modifying this practice in the context of an acceptable resolution
of US concerns. The Soviets asserted repeatedly in their formal
statements that they had received official US assurance on two
occasions that the use of the shelters over Minuteman silos would
be discontinued.
Measures Agreement. The Soviets indirectly responded to the US
complaint at the previous SCC session about their runaway SS-9
launch by suggesting that the two sides should resolve an ambiguity
in Article IV of the Agreement on Measures. They proposed that
there should be notification in advance about a planned missile launch
beyond national territory in the direction of the continental part
of the other side's territory and there should be immediate noti-
fication if this situation occurred unexpectedly as a result of an
unsuccessful launch. They argued that a greater uncertainty would
be created by a missile flying toward the continental portion of
either country than by a missile flying "for example, in the
direction of some individual island" -- an obvious reference to
Midway in the case of the SS-9. They noted that since the missile
in question had not been equipped with a nuclear warhead, and
had not flown in the direction of the continental US, they had not
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regarded the incident to be subject to the provisions of the Agreement
on Measures. They stated that, with regard to the hazard to
aircraft and shipping entailed in such launches, a similar hazard
is created by the impact of missile fragements in international
waters after unsuccessful missile launches from US test ranges.
Where Things Stand
During the January-February session, neither side offered
any real concessions(apart from our indication of willingness to
modify our Minuteman shelter practice). Moreover, the initial
-Soviet tendency was to scrutinize US concerns in a rather narrow,
legalistic manner and to try to dismiss those not directly related
to the provisions of the IA or the ABM Treaty. The US side
stressed the need for each side to give serious consideration to
any concerns of the other side. It is too soon, however, to know
whether this approach will elicit any sort of favorable response
during the next session; if the Soviets persist in the approach taken
in the past session, the March-April session could be unproductive
in the extreme.
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE ACTION
February 22, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: JAN M. LODALIJO" V
HELMUT SONNENFELDT
SUBJECT: US Assurances on Removal of ICBM
Construction Shelters
We have obtained additional information on Soviet claims in the SCC
regarding "..official assurances" that the use of silo covers at Warren
and Grand Forks would cease. Mr. Karpov, the Deputy Commissioner
of the Soviet SCC and a member of the Soviet SALT Delegation, told
Graybeal in a private, informal conversation that the Soviets on three
separate occasions had received assurances regarding US shelters.
Karpov indicated that the assurances had not come from President Nixon
or President Ford, but from you, and that they were subsequently
followed-up by General Scowcroft. Furthermore, Ustinov indicated.
in a formal statement that the three occasions on which assurances had
been given took place in 1973 and in June 1974.
We examined the correspondence and the memoranda of conversation
regarding compliance issues during this period; we found no record of
any note to the Soviets in which the US gave assurances on removing the
silo covers. The memorandum of conversation at Tab A was the only
evidence we could find where US comments might be interpreted by. the
Soviets as assurances. However, the date of this meeting does not
correspond to the dates mentioned by Ustinov. In addition, there was
no record of action on this matter by Brent Scowcroft, and he does not
remember taking any action.
In reviewing the record on this, we did find two notes which were drafted
that could have been interpreted by the Soviets as assurances that the US
would remove the covers had they been sent. However, our records
indicate that they were never sent.
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t;.
subject (Tab B).
Our most recent statements on this issue occurred at the recently con-
cluded session of the SCC. Graybeal emphasized that, in the context of
arrangements to eliminate other compliance ambiguities, the US will be
prepared to modify its use of these shelters. In direct response to the
Soviet claims of "official assurances", Graybeal explained that the US
was unaware of any such assurances and that there must have been "some
misunderstanding or misinterpretation in this regard". This response was
in conformance with your decision in our earlier memo to you on this
In summary, while we can find no "assurances" other than your March 1974
comments, the Soviets apparently feel that there can be no m: -,interpretation
that assurances were given. Thus, we need your decision on how to proceed.
We could, for example:
-- Have Alex or some other member of the US SALT Delegation raise
the issue with Karpov, who is with the* Soviet Delegation in Geneva, to seek
further clarification of the Soviet record on this issue.
Take up the issue in your channels.
Have Graybeal in the next session of the SCC continue to deny
that such assurances were given.
b- Ignore the Soviet claim on prior assurances and hope the .issue
is resolved in the next SCC, or that they will stop talking about it.
Its either `case, we would continue to link removal of the Minuteman
shelters to satisfactory resolution of the compliance ambiguities of
concern to the US.
This issue could be explosive. DOD knows .of the formal Soviet state-
ments regarding the assurances, and could leak the information to Jackson,
who will charge "secret agreements". At this stage, it looks to us as
if the Soviets are reading more into this issue than they really have. How-
ever, because this issue is so explosive, we believe that you should
either take up the issue in your channel, or have Alex follow-up the issue
in Geneva to find out more precisely what record the Soviets have of US
assurances.
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YOUR DECISION
Raise the issue with Karpov in Geneva.
Handle in your channel.
Have Graybeal deny assurances at the next
session of the SCC.
Ignore Soviet claim on prior assurances.
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Fret-41 & V//111T_r1F ~t4 L.
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prezbuv s
In fact, Dr. Kissinger. I can tell you our military men have certain fears
about a violation of the agreement, as far as widening of silos is con.-
-corned, to house new-type rockets. You know what those fears are based
on? The fact that in the United States about 500? land-based launchers
have been covered' up. And we made two representations about that.
Kissinger: 'But we have stopped that.
Brezhnev: That is still going on.
Kissinger : That is impossible.
Brezhnev; That introduces certain questions. It is not something I
really wanted to mention but it is a fact. Let us act In good faith.
Kissinger: Mr., General Secretary, I have to check this, but we
ordered it stopped, and if it is not stopped, it violates orders.
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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URGENT ACTION
January 30,1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: JAN M. LODALt V
SUBJECT: U. S. Shelters
In today's SCC session (Thursday), the Soviets claimed that the
US had given assurances that the use of silo covers at Warren
and Grand Forks would cease. In a private conversation which
followed Ustinov's formal statement (Tab A), Karpov further
indicated that the US assurances were given "at the highest level"
and were inade "prior to the Ford-Brezhnev meeting", i. e. , that
they were made by President Nixon.
I am not familiar with any assurances regarding US silo covers
and a quick review of available minutes from past meetings with
the Soviets reveals no instances of such assurances. If there have
been none, we can instruct Graybeal to deny that assurances were
given and to continue with the discussion of compliance ambiguities.
However, if assurances were given, or of instances where US state-
ments may have been misinterpreted as assurances, we probably
would wish to take a different approach. We could instruct Graybeal
either:
-- To indicate that earlier US statements on this subject
might have been misinterpreted, but that no assurances were
intended. Nevertheless, he US is willing to consider modifying
its use of shelters in the context of an otherwise acceptable agree-
ment on concealment acti??ities.
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-- To continue to maintain that he personally has no know-
ledge of such assurances.
YOUR DECISION
Have Graybeal deny assurances.
Claim misunderstanding, but hold open
possibility of removal.
Have Graybeal maintain that he has no
knowledge of assurances.
Other.
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